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THE INF TREATY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

FEBRUARY 1, 2, 3, 4, AND 5, 1988

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THE INF TREATY

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Sarbanes, Adams, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Murkowski, Evans, and McConnell.

The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

I shall forgo my opening statement. If the ranking minority member wishes to make one, I would then reserve the right to reply on my side, and then we will go straight to Mr. Carlucci.

Senator Helms.

Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

Like the man down in North Carolina said, he heard the preacher say the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, and he said, that is a fair proposition if I ever heard one. So that is a very fair proposition, for you to respond to me if you wish.

Mr. Chairman, after our first week of hearings we are beginning, beginning to face up to the question of whether this treaty in fact increases or in fact decreases the danger of nuclear war and conventional war.

I think that Senators should ask themselves whether this treaty can pass the truth in labeling test. If it does not reduce the nuclear arsenal on either side, is it really intellectually honest to all it an arms control treaty?

Then there is the question whether the treaty is really equal in its effects. If the treaty removes the only sure, swift, and certain nuclear deterrent that NATO has, but at the same time allows the Soviets to retain full INF capacity through the variable range SS-25 system, then I think we have to ask ourselves what benefit is this treaty to freedom, and is the treaty fair?

Why should the Soviets retain full capacity to terrorize and neutralize Europe, while NATO has in effect given up everything that really counts in deterring aggression? Is it not obvious that the conventional balance is out of proportion?

Is there virtually any hope of significantly modernizing NATO forces, given the political and budgetary problems of the member countries, including the United States. Last week I talked with a distinguished European journalist, an editor for one of the largest continental magazines. And he asked me this question: Senator, once the Pershing II's are taken out of Europe, once the Cruise missiles are gone, what is left to prevent a Soviet takeover one way or another?

And then he asked further: Will the United States commit itself to all-out nuclear war if the Soviets start throwing their weight around?

Well, I did not really know the answer to those questions, but I told him that war in Europe would depend not so much on what the Americans think as what the Soviets think.

Now, the Soviets are confident that we will not risk this planet just to put an end to what some are likely to describe in that event as just some unpleasant Soviet aggression in Europe. That is why I think we need to consider very carefully whether the withdrawal of the only credible deterrent to the startup of Soviet aggression in Europe is not the first step toward tossing Europe into the trash-can of history.

If this treaty encourages the Soviets to flex their muscles in Europe, if it in fact brings the prospect of war in Europe closer, will we continue our close relations with NATO?

Right now we have 300,000 American troops there, plus their dependents. Are they in a position of becoming Soviet hostages?

Is it not reasonable to conclude that if this treaty is ratified the American troops should come home before a war breaks out? Some will say that.

As a matter of fact, some Americans already think that the U.S. forces in Europe have little military purpose. And if the INF Treaty is ratified, many will conclude that the U.S. forces have no military purpose there.

These are some of the questions before us today and for the remainder of the week—the state of NATO's military preparedness and the ability of NATO's deterrent to deter.

We welcome Secretary Carlucci to help us assess these problems and to clarify some other things.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms. I must say, I concur in the thought you brought up as to what is to be destroyed, and I am very glad that Secretary Carlucci has brought with him some exhibits which will show us more clearly what is to be destroyed and why it is in our national interest to have the missiles destroyed, even if we cannot destroy the fissionable material.

I think, too, that in Secretary Carlucci's testimony he will indicate why, if a nuclear war is fought in Europe, it is the same thing as if a nuclear war is fought worldwide, because there is no such thing to my mind, though maybe there is in the Secretary's, as a contained nuclear exchange of weapons.

In any case, we would be very glad to hear from you, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK C. CARLUCCI, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Should I proceed?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Mr. Chairman, I have a full statement and I would appreciate it if that could be inserted for the record, and I will abbreviate the statement.

It is a pleasure to appear before the committee to testify on the INF Treaty, which in my judgment is a major achievement in arms control. But more significantly, it is a treaty that supports our overall national security policy, in which arms control is but one component.

The treaty itself is a direct result of the strength and solidarity of the United States and its allies. Secretary Shultz has described how these qualities, sustained through the sometimes turbulent years of the INF negotiations, resulted in an agreement which meets our stringent standards.

The INF Treaty reflects the Reagan administration's philosophy that arms control agreements should reduce the number of weapons, rather than merely limit their growth. In so doing, the treaty codifies important U.S. negotiating principles.

It makes reductions in the most destabilizing Soviet systems. It makes asymmetric reductions to equal levels, third country systems are excluded, and onsite inspections are a key means of verification. All of these principles set important precedents on which to build in other arms control negotiations.

The verification regime established by the treaty is particularly significant. Its objectives are threefold: first, to provide confidence in our ability to monitor Soviet compliance; second, to help deter Soviet violations by enhancing the likelihood of detection and making it more difficult for the Soviets to commit an undetected violation; and third, to permit timely detection if any Soviet violations, so that we, the executive and the legislative branches can, in concert, take appropriate and proportional steps to protect U.S. and allied security.

National technical means comprise our principal capability for monitoring Soviet compliance. However, these means will be supplemented by an unprecedented set of cooperative verification measures. These measures include comprehensive exchanges of data; restrictions on the location of systems during the 3 year elimination period; displays at certain SS-25 ICBM bases to enhance national technical means; and a variety of onsite inspections that extend well beyond the elimination period.

The treaty's verification provisions are designed to maintain a proper balance between protecting U.S. security interests and maintaining an effective capability to deter and detect Soviet cheating.

The verification provisions are complemented and reinforced by other provisions of the treaty. The prohibition of flight testing, the production ban, and geographical constraints will make it difficult for the Soviet Union to deploy a militarily significant covert force of INF missiles.

Should the Soviets still elect to violate the treaty, this will prove costly, complicated, and we believe detectable before any significant military threat to United States interests would arise.

The verification provisions for future arms control agreements will need to be tailored to meet the specific requirements of each.

START, for example, involves reductions to agreed levels across several classes of weapons, rather than the elimination of an entire category. Thus, an even more comprehensive verification regime will be necessary.

Nevertheless, the basic principles contained in the INF Treaty, such as onsite inspection, form an important precedent.

While the success in meeting our arms control standards and establishing precedents for future agreements is important, what matters most from my perspective as Secretary of Defense is whether the INF Treaty contributes to the security of the United States and its allies, the question that Senator Helms posed.

The treaty clearly does, in two important ways. First, elimination of current and future Soviet INF missiles will reduce the military threat to NATO. Under the provisions of the INF Treaty, the Soviets will eliminate forces with deployed missiles capable of delivering over 1,600 nuclear warheads.

This includes shorter range Soviet systems which also have a conventional or chemical capability. This will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to execute rapid strikes throughout Western Europe without resort to its strategic weapons.

In addition to relieving pressures on our own nuclear forces and elements of their command and control, this should increase the survivability of the air bases, ports, depots, and other facilities vital to NATO's conventional defenses.

Because many of the Soviet INF missiles can reach a large portion of Asia, the INF Treaty will also enhance the security of our friends and allies in that part of the world.

In exchange for the elimination of Soviet INF missiles, the United States will give up the Pershing II and GLCM forces with deployed missiles capable of delivering about 400 nuclear warheads. This will remove a part of our capability to hold at risk targets in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union with European-based systems.

Nevertheless, NATO's agreed strategy of flexible response will remain valid and credible. A variety of nuclear systems will remain committed to NATO, including dual-capable aircraft, Lance short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery, as well as United States and United Kingdom strategic forces.

With these forces, modernized as necessary, NATO will retain a wide spectrum of retaliatory options to maintain deterrence. The U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe will not be decreased.

A second major way in which the INF Treaty promises to bolster NATO security is by enhancing the political credibility of NATO as a whole. Deterrence is based on not only NATO's military capability, but also on its collective political will.

The INF experience demonstrated to the Soviets that our nations have the political resolve to make and stand by the tough decisions necessary to ensure our security. In short, in the face of Moscow's protracted intransigence, NATO held together in implementing both tracks of its 1979 decision by deploying our INF missiles and steadfastly supporting the zero/zero proposal.

Having seen the strength and solidarity of the alliance in peacetime, Moscow is less likely to reach the mistaken conclusion that it could defy the alliance in a crisis or war.

The INF Treaty should not be considered or become a step toward the denuclearization of Europe. NATO's defense ministers have agreed that the alliance must retain a balanced mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities to provide for deterrence.

Nuclear weapons must continue to provide a counter to the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior conventional forces, to offset the Soviet Union's remaining theater nuclear capabilities, and to hold Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory at risk, thus deterring war.

The United States and other NATO governments have agreed that negotiations to reduce NATO's remaining nuclear forces in Europe should await establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces there. NATO has already made sizable unilateral nuclear reductions prior to the signature of the INF Treaty.

In 1980, 1,000 warheads were withdrawn without replacement. As a result of NATO's 1983 Montebello decision, an additional 1,400 warheads were withdrawn, and one additional warhead was withdrawn for each Pershing II and GLCM warhead introduced.

As a result, the number of NATO nuclear warheads in Europe has declined by 2,400 since 1979. The INF Treaty will lead to even further reductions.

In making the Montebello decision, NATO's defense ministers agreed that NATO must take steps to ensure the responsiveness, survivability, and effectiveness of the forces that would remain after NATO's unilateral reductions.

The Supreme Allied Commander of Europe was asked to develop recommendations on how best to structure these forces to maintain deterrence with a minimum number of nuclear weapons. His recommendations involved modernization of existing systems, improved deployment of nuclear forces within Europe, and enhanced survivability of these forces and their command, control, and communications.

The improvement measures stemming from the Montebello decision, which preceded the INF Treaty, are required independent of the agreement, and NATO defense ministers have reaffirmed their continuing importance. Some of our weapons, such as the Lance missile and nuclear artillery rounds, are 15 to 30 years old.

A number of improvement measures have been or are currently being implemented by the United States and other nations concerned. Improvement measures which still require implementation include: developing a follow-on to Lance, replacing a portion of our nuclear free-fall bombs with a tactical air-to-surface missile, and production of sufficient modern artillery rounds to allow retirement of older rounds. None of these improvements are constrained by the INF Treaty because the agreement does not limit dual-capable aircraft or nuclear forces with ranges below 500 kilometers.

With respect to conventional forces, the need to redress critical deficiencies was well established long before the Soviets began negotiating the INF Treaty in earnest. The ongoing conventional defense improvements effort is intended to reduce NATO's reliance on the threat of early nuclear use to deter conventional aggression by the Warsaw Pact. It is designed to bolster NATO's capabilities in such areas as reinforcement, follow-on forces attack, sustainability, and air defense. This effort must also continue in a post-INF environment.

While the INF Treaty will provide important security benefits to NATO, some adjustments might be necessary to ensure that NATO's remaining forces provide the full range of deterrent capabilities required by alliance strategy. Such adjustments are under consideration by NATO's nuclear planning group, of which I am a member. They involve reallocation of existing assets and changes in planning and procedures. Like the programs that the alliance is pursuing independent of the INF Treaty, any adjustments would be fully consistent with the agreement and not undercut the real reductions in nuclear forces that will result from it.

The INF Treaty does not exacerbate NATO's defense needs. Rather, it heightens awareness of the risks of persisting deficiencies.

The alliance will face two major challenges in pursuing those programs necessary to ensure the deterrent capability of its remaining forces. The first challenge is to make the most efficient use of limited resources and to share the burden equitably. Even though defense budgets are likely to be constrained, I intend to ensure and will so encourage my fellow defense ministers that the nuclear and conventional programs I have discussed are given special focus as they compete with other priorities.

The second challenge is to avoid being lulled into a false sense of security by the INF Treaty. We have already witnessed Soviet efforts to use the treaty to undermine support for necessary modernization efforts outside its scope, even though we can fully expect the Soviet Union to continue upgrading its own remaining forces. This is a standard Soviet tactic which reflects one of Moscow's primary strategic goals—to convince Western European nations to distance themselves from the United States and to neglect their military preparations. The task for NATO leaders is to convince their publics that they must not rest their security on Soviet pledges.

The Soviet Union respects strength and scorns and exploits weakness. If NATO citizens resist vital defense modernization efforts for fear of upsetting Moscow, they invite eventual Soviet dominance.

While the INF Treaty stands on its own merits, other arms control agreements could complement and reinforce the INF Treaty and the benefits it provides. Our top priority is a START agreement involving 50 percent reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Such deep and comprehensive reductions could limit Moscow's ability to offset the INF Treaty's elimination of the SS-20 with increases in its ICBM and SLBM forces. At the same time, continued modernization of U.S. strategic forces will ensure their continued credibility as the ultimate guarantor of alliance security.

Another high U.S. priority is to negotiate an agreement on conventional forces in Europe. While Soviet intransigence has stalemated the MBFR talks, NATO has called for new negotiations for an agreement covering forces from the Atlantic to the Urals to deal with the threat arising from Warsaw Pact advantages in Europe. Such an agreement should establish a more stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, eliminating the Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack in large-scale offensive operations. This will require deep asymmetric reductions, for which the INF Treaty provides an important precedent.

In conducting these other negotiations, we must remember a key lesson of the INF negotiations: Without sustained efforts to improve United States and NATO capabilities, the Soviet Union will have little incentive to negotiate away its advantages.

The INF outcome proves unilateral disarmers wrong. Had INF opponents succeeded in blocking our deployments, we would now be faced with a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles, rather than have before us a treaty eliminating them on both sides. Arms control can complement efforts to maintain an effective military posture, but cannot substitute for them.

We must also avoid the false hope that a fundamental change in Soviet aims was responsible for the INF Treaty and will now ease the way for future agreements. Credit for the INF Treaty should go where credit is due, to the resolve and solidarity of the Western alliance.

The Senate now has the important task of providing its advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty. Ratification would provide NATO significant security benefits, as I have indicated. An entire category of nuclear missiles would be eliminated permanently, reducing the Soviet threat to our friends and allies in Europe and Asia.

NATO's deterrent strategy would remain intact and the solidarity of the alliance would be strengthened. The elimination of INF missiles in conjunction with continued efforts to maintain an effective nuclear and conventional force posture would contribute to alliance security by allowing for credible deterrence at a lower level of forces.

If the INF Treaty were not ratified or were otherwise crippled, the threat posed by Soviet INF missiles would remain. In fact, the Soviets would likely continue to build up these forces, deploying the already tested SS-20 follow-on and the SSC-X-4 ground-launched Cruise missile and continuing deployments of the recently introduced SS-23.

The solidarity of the NATO alliance and the bilateral security relationships between the United States and its allies would be weakened. This could undermine the ability of the alliance to sustain the determination and resolve to counter Soviet INF capabilities, as well as to move forward in other vital areas of NATO defense.

Mr. Chairman, you referred to the models that we have here on the table. I have read in the press that there has been some discussion in this committee about destruction of missiles versus destruction of warheads. I have here a model of the Pershing II on its launcher and a separate model of the Pershing II missile.

What would happen in the case of destruction is, you would take the stages apart, and these two stages [indicating], the first and second stages, would be either static fired—that is to say, you fire it, holding it in place, you fire it to destruction—or——.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Could you move the microphone so that the audience can hear you.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Or you would cut it open and put in explosives, destroying it.

The front section looks like this inside [indicating], and what would be taken out of the front section would be the radar section here, the nuclear warhead device, and the guidance and control section [indicating]. Those would be retained for possible future use. There is no treaty that I am aware of that requires destruction of the warheads.

The nuclear warhead device essentially consists of the physics package, including the high explosives, highly enriched uranium, and plutonium. That package, consistent with what we have done with other weapons systems that have been destroyed, could either be reused or, depending on the circumstances, recycled. To destroy the physics package would be a virtual impossibility.

I guess you could bury the plutonium and then reproduce some more. But we do not use plutonium for peaceful purposes in this country, so we would either have to give it to the French or somebody who does.

But more significantly, to monitor the destruction would be a nightmare. We would have to have the Soviets at some of our most sensitive facilities. Nor is there any way we know of that we could control production.

Finally, let me point out that, in the area of fissionable materials, the Soviet Union has a much easier time producing new fissionable materials than we do. So it is clearly in our interest to be able to retain the warhead.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carlucci appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

My understanding is that you have a Cabinet meeting that you have to go to this afternoon, but that you can stay with us until the lunch hour if necessary?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir, I have a meeting with the President. This is also the last day that we put the defense budget to bed, so I have a little work that I have to do there.

The CHAIRMAN. We very much appreciate your being here and hope not to go into the lunch hour too far. But we appreciate your willingness to do so. And we will each limit ourselves to 10 minutes' worth of questions.

Just touching on the illustration you have right there, when you say it is impossible to destroy the material now, that does not mean to say that some time in the future, as we hopefully are down the path to increasing arms control, if the time comes when the President's thought of a nuclear-free world becomes perhaps more visible, that some other means will not be found to destroy fissionable material. Would that be a correct statement?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well I guess there is always a possibility, but we have serious environmental problems.

The CHAIRMAN. As of now.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Actually, I guess the problem is disposing of the material, since it is not possible to destroy it.

The CHAIRMAN. But we were unable to create it a half a century ago. So the time may come when we can destroy it too.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well I would not foreclose the possibility. But I know of no system that has yet been invented that would "decreate" it.

The CHAIRMAN. To come to a more technical point, on page 3 of your testimony, you say that nuclear, related improvement measures stemming from the 1983 Montebello agreement are required independently of the INF agreement.

Would you also include that no nuclear-related improvement measures are required as a result of the INF agreement? No new ones?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct. The improvements I noted are required on their own merits as a result of the 1983 Montebello decision. As I indicated in my testimony, some of the nuclear systems that we have in Europe, such as Lance and artillery fired atomic projectiles, are 10 to 15 years old, and require some urgent modernization.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now does the INF agreement, which requires the Soviets to make greater reductions to get to the common zero, reduce or eliminate the need for, or probability, any of our own improvements, the NATO improvements?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely not. We are fully permitted to go ahead with all of the Montebello decisions, with the conventional defense initiatives and some of the other initiatives that are underway in NATO. There is nothing whatsoever in this treaty that would impede the modernization of nuclear systems below 500 kilometers. And, obviously, there is nothing in it that would impede the modernization and improvement of our conventional systems.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. In general then, will the INF Treaty open the way for curtailment of the defense programs other than those directly related to the missiles or the launchers that are being eliminated?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, Mr. Chairman, it will not.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you cited I think the Lance missile and the nuclear artillery rounds as aging weapons, are there reasons other than age which would cause you to seek the follow-on Lance and a new artillery round?

In other words, is it only because they are aging that you need to follow-on?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It needs to be modernized. The system will be basically obsolescent after the mid-1990's. Therefore we need to get on with modernization in order to maintain our capabilities below 500 kilometers.

The CHAIRMAN. As a layman, I don't quite understand why when you are permitted to test, why a system is obsolescent if it still works and presumably in 10 or 30 years it might still work.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is a question of the reliability and the effectiveness of the system. Any system degrades over a period of time, and while you can continue to test it, your confidence of its reliability in between your testing periods obviously goes down.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize this may go to the heart of defense procurement, but if it is being tested and those parts that are found to fail during the testing, can be replaced. The system would still work. It might not be as effective in comparison with an improved system but there is no reason why the system itself could not work in 10 or 50 years if it is fully tested and the parts are replaced, correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I guess you could keep any system going indefinitely. I see DC-3's still flying in Israel. But this is not a desirable military posture in which to be.

We owe it to the 300,000 troops who we have in Europe to give them the best systems that we can, consistent with the objectives of the treaty. We do not want to deny them the wherewithal to effectively defend themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. So what you are seeking though is an improved system, but you are not saying that the systems in being cannot be made to work indefinitely?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would like to submit an answer for the record on that. I am not sure that our experts would say the systems can be made to work indefinitely. Certainly there would be a degradation in reliability. So it is a question of what kinds of risks do you want to accept, whether mechanically, all the nuts and bolts would work for the indefinite future, I hesitate to respond off the top of my head.

But it is certainly not desirable from a military point of view.

[The information follows:]

SNF MODERNIZATION

Modernization of Artillery Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAPs) and fielding of a Follow-On To Lance (FOTL) Missile System are long standing high priority modernization requirements of NATO. They are a NATO/US agreed Force goal, and supported in SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study—1985. Modernization of AFAPs and development of a FOTL are required regardless of an INF Agreement.

Modernization AFAPs, the W79 (8") and W82 (155mm), offer major improvements in range, response time, target effect, accuracy, modern safety features, command and control, survivability and security over their 1956 and 1963 vintage predecessors. The W79 completed production in 1986. The W82 is in engineering development with a planned IOC in the early 1990s. The FY85 DOD Authorization Act limited AFAPs to a total of 925 (W79 and W82 combined), no enhanced radiation warheads after October 1984, and a $1.1B DOE production spending cap. The current and mid-1990s requirements for AFAPs exceeds the Congressional limit. It is necessary, therefore, to retain older AFAPs in the inventory until the Congressional restriction is lifted and additional W82s are produced and deployed.

The current Lance Missile System, fielded in 1972, is manpower intensive, has insufficient range to counter the current threat, and has experienced degradation of reliability. A Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was initiated in FY86 to restore the capability and extend the life of the system to the mid-1990s. Our NATO Allies are participating in the SLEP. The SLEP is a minimum fix of shelf-life expired components of the guidance section and warhead adaptation kit. Funding of $15.3M to complete the SLEP was authorized but not appropriated in the FY88 DOD Budget. The Army must complete safety and reliability elements of the SLEP to avoid further reliability degradation due to aging.

A Follow-On To Lance (FOTL) with increased range and survivability, modern nuclear safety technology, and force structure savings is a high priority requirement. The FOTL will support joint Army-Air Force doctrine and be fully integrated in the Deep Battle concept of the Army Corps. The improved capabilities of FOTL will support deterrence and, in the event of conflict, the conventional battle by holding at risk the lead elements of offensive forces. It will significantly improve the short range nuclear option required by US/NATO strategy. A dual-capable MLRS force structure equipped with the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) or other MLRS compatible missile is an attractive option to our Allies who coproduced MLRS and could offer significant research and development savings. Congress, in the FY88-89 DOD Authorization Bill, authorized study of the ATACMS as a candidate for the FOTL. However, remaining Congressional restrictions prevent development of the ATACMS for this mission. These restrictions undercut our ability to fully consider the ATACMS as a viable candidate. If ATACMS is deemed the most promising candidate, these restrictions preclude meeting SACEUR's requirement of a mid-1990's FOTL.

With respect to Senator Pell's specific comment as to the feasibility of retaining the older AFAPs and current Lance in the inventory for another 10-50 years, it is important to note they have already been operational for 15 to 30 years. While it is theoretically possible to retain these older systems indefinitely, such a course of action is not cost effective. Furthermore, keeping these older systems in the inventory does not satisfy the requirements expressed by SACEUR, other CINC's and our Allies and does not alleviate the shortcomings mentioned above. In effect, due to the inevitable erosion over time of their reliability and effectiveness (even with the replacement of parts) with respect to the more recently fielded comparable Soviet systems, the indefinite retention of these older systems is equivalent to a unilateral reduction of our Short Range Nuclear Force warfighting effectiveness and its contribution to deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN. In the conventional world, you often hear of "built-in obsolescence." I have often heard that a tennis ball could be made that would last for 20 sets, and I know you play tennis, but that obviously would harm the market for tennis balls. You do not think there is any built-in obsolescence sometimes in military equipment?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think that I would like to play tennis with a ball that has lasted 20 sets, but maybe that is a possibility.

Another element in all of this is that when you modernize a system, you can improve the safety features of that system. Let me emphasize again—while it may be theoretically possible to extend the life of some weapons systems—it is not in the interest of the United States to forgo modernization as long as we are going to have a credible deterrent in Europe, as long as flexible response is our policy, as long as these items are not prohibited by the treaty and as long as NATO has already voiced its unanimous decision that we should go ahead and modernize. We need to go ahead and modernize.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Going on to another subject, you state that elimination of current future INF missiles will reduce the military threat to NATO. Now what do we know about Soviet intentions and capabilities regarding future INF systems?

Secretary CARLUCCI. With regard to INF missiles, or intentions pursuant to this treaty are to eliminate the INF missiles, or are you talking about strategic forces?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I am talking about this treaty.

Secretary CARLUCCI. As far as we know, their intentions are to abide by the treaty. But one never knows for certain. That's why we have required such extensive verification provisions in the treaty, to make sure that they do abide by the treaty, in the light of their rather extensive history of cheating on treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of cheating on treaties, we would maintain what would you say, that they have cheated about 1, 2, or 3 percent of the time? What would be a horseback estimate?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I had never thought of putting it in percentage terms, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very roughly, pull it out of the sky.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would prefer to say that they have, on a variety of occasions cheated on treaties, and in sufficient measure so that we should not place full trust and confidence in them. We should have effective verification provisions and we should be ready to deal with the compliance issues.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, no further questions. Senator Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was thinking back, Mr. Secretary, am I correct that you were Deputy Director of the CIA from 1977 to 1981?

Secretary **Carlucci**. 1977 to about 1980, end of 1980.

Senator **Helms**. Well, that was the period including the most intensive negotiations for SALT II, is that not correct?

Secretary **Carlucci**. The negotiations for SALT II were going on then; yes, sir.

Senator **Helms**. Now then, President Reagan has declared that the SS-25 is a second U-type of ICBM forbidden by the constraints of SALT II. And I might mention parenthetically that both the Soviet Union and the United States say that we are going to abide by SALT II, right? Even though it was not ratified?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, no. As a result of the Soviet violations, we have indicated that we no longer feel obliged to remain under the constraints of SALT II. Unfortunately, the Congress has effectively pulled us back to some of the constraints of SALT II.

Senator **Helms**. Well that is a small point. But initially, both the Soviet Union and the United States——

Secretary **Carlucci**. Initially, yes.

Senator **Helms**. That is what I was saying. We now know to our dismay, that the Soviets were developing the SS-25 at the very moment that SALT II was being negotiated. Both sides declared that they would continue to abide by the constraints of SALT II even though it was not ratified. Yet the SS-25 was deployed anyhow.

Now why do you think that the CIA failed to detect or failed to predict or whatever way you want to put it, the SS-25 development and deployment?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, you have asked me to go way back in my memory.

Senator **Helms**. Well you were Deputy Director of the CIA.

Secretary **Carlucci**. I cannot recall at exactly which stage of development the SS-25 was during these negotiations. The CIA has had a pretty good record of predicting the deployment of Soviet strategic weapons systems. Their job is not to determine policy, their job is to make intelligence assessments.

Senator **Helms**. I do not believe I said that their job was to develop policy. I would be glad to check the record. I just wanted to know what the CIA reported. And since you say that they have a good record, let's go on to the SS-24.

President Reagan who appointed you Secretary of Defense, believes and has said publicly that the SS-24 constitutes the deployment of a second heavy ICBM, another category forbidden by the SALT II Treaty, yet it's a matter of record that the SS-24 was under development during the negotiations for SALT II.

You do not remember why the CIA missed that one either, do you?

Secretary **Carlucci**. I am not prepared, Senator Helms at this hearing to admit that the CIA missed the development of either of these weapons systems. I would prefer to submit something for the record. You have asked me to go back 10 years in my memory and tell you at what precise point in time the CIA may have predicted the development of the 24 and 25, and I just cannot remember that.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. All right then, let's go on to the SS-26, the so-called superheavy-type ICBM. It too is a violation of SALT II, which the Soviet Union and the United States said we are going to abide by even though it is not ratified. Yet we now know that it was being developed during the negotiations for SALT II.

Now then, President Reagan has declared that the SS-16 is a violation of SALT II, even though it is banned by name from development and production and deployment. Yet the Soviets have gone ahead and deployed that.

Now I am asking these questions because there is the implicit message from you and others, "Do not worry about this, we have got verification by the tail," and the fact is, you do not.

During the negotiations for SALT II, the CIA predicted that the Soviets would deploy 3,000 nuclear warheads in the period 1979 through 1985. But we now know that the Soviets actually deployed 8,000 nuclear warheads.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Helms, I once again would like to submit something for the record. I do not recall the CIA indicating that the figure would be as low as that. In fact, I recall the CIA indicating the figure could be substantially in excess of that. But once again, I am speaking from memory. I had not anticipated these kinds of questions.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. Well you do not think that these questions are proper?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I just said I had not anticipated these kinds of detailed questions, asking me to go back and tell you what kind of predictions the CIA had made in 1979.

Senator HELMS. Well Frank, you were Deputy Director of the CIA, and you came up here and testified for SALT II.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No sir, I did not.

Senator HELMS. Well, you came with Admiral Turner.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No sir, I did not.

Senator HELMS. You want to be careful now.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I did not testify on SALT II at any time.

Senator HELMS. Did you not come up here with Admiral Turner?

Secretary CARLUCCI. When he testified on SALT II, no sir, I did not.

Senator HELMS. I think the record will show differently. Well anyway, do you remember a man named William Perry, P-e-r-r-y?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Do you mean the man who was Under Secretary of Defense?

Senator HELMS. Who was a top defense official, that is right, in the Carter administration? And that is the time that you were Deputy Director of the CIA.

Now, somebody called my attention to a report in December 1980 which I had forgotten, published in the Washington Post, New York Times, and others, that Mr. Perry acknowledged that the CIA had grossly underestimated the rapidity of Soviet MIRV missile deployment and accuracy improvements in the late 1970's.

Now Mr. Perry further stated, and it has not been contradicted to my knowledge, that as a result of this CIA failure to predict Soviet deployment rates, the Carter administration failed to take steps to develop new systems to counteract the new deployment. I think that they called it the "window of vulnerability."

Now I guess you do not remember that either?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not remember Bill Perry's statement. Let me only point out that the Reagan administration has taken very substantial steps in the direction of strategic nuclear modernization.

Senator HELMS. Well I think that we need to be certain. And that is the reason I have been asking a lot of questions. I am a lot more worried about the duplicity and dishonesty of the Soviet Union than apparently some other folks are.

I remember sitting in the Anchorage airport one night waiting for a plane to Seoul, South Korea, at the same time our plane was there, a plane, KAL-007 was parked right beside it. It came in earlier and left earlier than we did. And during that time, I held two little girls on my lap, 3 years old and 5 years old, named Noel and Stacy. And I taught them how to say "I love you" in sign language. And they got on their plane and stuck their little heads in the doorway and held up their hands and said "I love you."

Now if anybody expects me not to raise every possible question about this treaty, they are wrong. I am not going to accept these bland assurances that everything is A-OK. Senators can criticize me, the press can criticize me, but I am going to continue.

In the 1979 hearings on SALT II, representatives of the CIA, and this is a matter of record, testified that the SALT II Treaty was verifiable with "high confidence." That is precisely what you are saying about this treaty. You say that there is no reason for me to question whether you are accurate or not. I wish to God somebody had questioned the CIA back then.

Mr. Chairman, I will return to this line of questioning in a minute.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If I might just comment, if I understand the line of your questioning, it is not whether the SALT II Treaty was verifiable, but at what point in time the CIA might have predicted violation of the treaty. The fact is that they did violate SALT II and we did detect the violations.

Another area where I think that you and I would be in complete agreement is the area of compliance. I think it is very important that we have a national policy on compliance.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Carlucci, I think it is important to develop the rationale for eliminating the INF missiles. It is quite true that the Soviets could take an ICBM, which exceeds the range of the INF missiles and can reach the United States, and use it to hit Europe, is that not the case?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Certainly.

Senator SARBANES. I mean this treaty would not affect that ability.

Secretary CARLUCCI. This treaty is not designed to solve the problems of strategic weapons.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well some have made much of the fact that even if we eliminate the INF missiles, the Soviets could use other weapons to hit Europe, which is of course quite true, isn't it?

Secretary **Carlucci**. That is quite true.

Senator **Sarbanes**. That is not a loophole in the treaty, that was outside the bounds of the treaty.

Secretary **Carlucci**. The treaty was never designed to deal with this problem. They could, with some disruption to their programming retarget their strategic systems on Europe. We obviously could do the same thing.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Retarget our strategic systems?

Secretary **Carlucci**. To pick up the same targets, yes, sir. There is nothing in the treaty that prevents retargeting.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Now since they can retarget, how does the treaty an advance in Western security by eliminating the intermediate-range missiles?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Because it eliminates a convenient capability for them—the highly effective SS-20—that can hit the ports, the depots, the rail facilities in Europe.

We need to bear in mind when looking at this treaty that we are an ocean away from Europe. It is very easy for the Soviets to reinforce their forces in the Warsaw Pact. It is much more difficult for us. We are dependent on the airfields, the harbors, and to a greater extent than they, the rail lines.

So for them to have a dedicated missile force to attack those ports and other facilities, is a significant security problem for NATO. The fact is that the treaty will eliminate that theater capability, and in a highly favorable ratio. That is to say, the Soviets will eliminate deployed missile systems capable of carrying four times as many warheads as the United States.

This does not mean that they could not at some inconvenience, retarget the more expensive strategic systems that are designed, and currently targeted, to hit the United States. But overall there is a degradation in their capability and the ratios are in our favor.

Senator **Sarbanes**. So the point made by some that the Soviets can take long-range weapons systems and use them to hit European targets is not a deficiency in this treaty; is that correct? This treaty was not intended to address that problem?

Secretary **Carlucci**. That is precisely right, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. And limiting the dangers posed by longer range missiles is the task underway in the START negotiations, is that not correct?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Correct, sir.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Now it has also been asserted that when we eliminate the INF missiles, the Soviets will have more nuclear material left over than we will as a consequence of destroying these missiles.

It is then contended that this shows that the treaty is blatantly unfair and unequal in its impact. Now it seems to me that if it shows anything in terms of unfairness and inequality, it shows an advantage for us rather than the Soviet Union, because the material left afterward has no destructive capacity unless it is attached to a missile.

So in fact all this shows is that we have succeeded in destroying far more Soviet missiles, with a much greater level of kilotonnage, than U.S. missiles.

Could you develop that a bit, because this point is constantly being made, and it strikes me as just an "Alice in Wonderland" point.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well I think you have developed the point fully. Senator Sarbanes, the fact is that they are eliminating much more capability than we are eliminating. And fissionable material without the means to deliver it does not do you much good.

Furthermore, let me underscore a point that I made earlier. We have a much more difficult time developing new fissionable material than they do. So it is much more in our interest for us to keep the physics package than it is in their interest.

So yes, I think that this demonstrates the effectiveness of the treaty, that they are going to have to eliminate delivery mechanisms for a substantially larger amount of fissionable material than we are. This is to our clear advantage.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Let me turn to the verification question.

First of all, it has been asserted that this article by William Beecher back in 1976 indicated that the Soviets had a plan to deploy five missiles to one launcher in the SS-20. That has been asserted. I cannot find that in the Beecher article.

Is that your understanding of the SS-20?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Are you talking about refire capability on the SS-20?

Senator **Sarbanes**. I am talking about the number of warheads.

Secretary **Carlucci**. There are three warheads on the SS-20, sir.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Yes. But it has been asserted that Beecher wrote that they could deploy missiles in launchers at a ratio of 5-to-1 and I do not find that in the article. And that was not my understanding of the SS-20 either.

Secretary **Carlucci**. I think he must be talking about the number of refires.

Senator **Sarbanes**. But he does not talk about a 5-to-1 ratio. It has been asserted that that's what he said in the article. And I do not find it in his article. The only ratio his article talks about is the 3-to-1 ratio of warheads per missile, and that is my understanding of the SS-20, three warheads.

Secretary **Carlucci**. There are three warheads on the SS-20.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I think that you ought to develop a bit the extent of the onsite verification contained in this treaty and its importance to us. It has been asserted by many who support this treaty that this represents a very significant breakthrough in terms of a verification regime, and that it significantly alters our ability to verify the treaty.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well let me emphasize first of all that onsite inspection is not the sole means to help us verify Soviet compliance with the treaty. We still will depend in large measure upon national technical means and all sorts of intelligence. But we have in this treaty the most intrusive verification provisions in the history of arms control, including a full exchange of data, limitations on where the systems can be located; onsite "baseline" inspections, to help verify the data; onsite elimination inspections to witness the elimination of the weapons; and onsite "close-out" inspections to help confirm the cessation of INF activity at declared facilities. In addition, the treaty gives each party the further right to inspect on short notice, for any reason, any facility—except for production plants—included in the MOU on data. This right lasts for 13 years. Moreover, we have the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system of the SS-25 assembly plant at Votkinsk, where we will actually have U.S. personnel who will measure, image, and weigh items coming out to ensure that SS-20's are not being illegally produced under the guise of SS-25's. Eight times a year we will be allowed to look inside existing missile canisters to help confirm that only SS-25's are being produced.

Finally, there are enhanced national technical means at the SS-25 bases not subject to inspections the SS-25 bases that might have had SS-20's on them, where they are obliged to open the roofs of their garages and demonstrate to us that the missile is the SS-25 and not the SS-20.

So it is a very thorough onsite inspection regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Carlucci, I think it is fair to say that committee members are unanimous in their mistrust of the Soviet Union, be it with respect to any treaty, the development of offensive missiles or anything else that might be malevolent to our security.

I just want to retrace with you the rationale once again for this particular treaty and what it is supposed to accomplish.

For much of the postwar period, there has been general agreement that Soviet conventional forces in Europe have been superior. The Warsaw Pact forces have been larger than those of NATO.

As your testimony makes clear, this particular treaty will not remedy that conventional imbalance. It existed in the mid-1970's prior to the deployment of the SS-20's.

Some witnesses have suggested that the SS-20's were targeted on European capitals and military installations in an effort to intimidate the allies and to break up NATO by calling into question the credibility of extended deterrence and the willingness of the United States to employ strategic systems in a response to a Soviet "theater nuclear" threat.

There were many Europeans who were, in fact, intimidated, believing that if Soviets put them under the gun, the United States would not respond. NATO was under great stress, and the 1979 NATO dual-track decision was designed as a partial remedy.

NATO succeeded in holding together on the deployment track of that decision. This was extremely important because the allies, at least thus far, have indicated that they want the Senate to consent to the ratification of this INF Treaty, that they want the United States to enter into this agreement.

I appreciate the fact that many strategic thinkers are concerned that the alliance's conventional deficiencies of 1975 remain a major deficiency in 1988. I share that concern.

But I do not think a sizable body of NATO opinion would look kindly on Senate rejection of this treaty. As a matter of fact, rejection of this treaty could very likely bring about the very result that the Soviets sought to achieve through the intimidating SS-20's and fissures within the NATO alliance.

I want to emphasize this latter point. Many critics contend that NATO will be weakened by this treaty. I would suggest that if one wants to weaken or cripple the alliance, precipitate rejection of this treaty would certainly do the job.

Those who are sincerely interested in the future of NATO need to pay particular attention to the origins of this INF Treaty. Through deployment of the SS-20's, the Soviet Union sought to wreck the alliance, and we countered that threat successfully. To be sure, the Pershings constitute a threat to the Soviet Union; the Soviet leadership understands this, which accounts in part for the Soviet willingness to engage in asymmetrical reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces through this treaty.

But if this treaty solves some problems, it may accentuate others. The problem of the conventional force imbalance will remain a bone of contention within the alliance. NATO still retains all of the fractiousness to be expected among good friends seeking to sustain an alliance that has served us well for so long. Even though many of the problems predate the INF Treaty, the debate occasioned by the treaty offers us an opportunity to draw up an inventory of those problems still requiring resolution by the alliance.

Mr. Secretary, the committee thus far has spent consideration time on the elimination process called for by the treaty. As the Soviet Union proceeds with the destruction of the launchers required by the treaty, what will it do with the fissionable material and guidance elements extracted from the warhead prior to destruction? As I understand, the United States has no particular plans at the moment for the use of those guidance elements removed from the Pershing II's and GLCM's. I suppose we could stockpile the fissionable material that we extract, because of a deficiency in supplies.

What do we anticipate the Soviet Union will do with their nuclear explosive devices, and what actions do we plan?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Lugar, the Soviets would probably try to recycle their fissionable material for use on some of their other systems.

It is possible that we would use the guidance system and the fissionable material in some of our other systems as well, but I would prefer not to get into that in an open session.

Let me say I agree with your thesis that the SS-20 has failed in its political purpose, because, basically, it was deployed for political reasons in my judgment. I would only add to what you have said my personal experience shortly after I came into this job when I attended a meeting of the NATO defense ministers, the NATO Defense Planning Committee in November. We unanimously issued a statement supporting the treaty as a NATO triumph, not just as a United States-negotiated treaty.

The comments of the defense ministers in the corridors were the same as they were in the communique. They solidly support the treaty as being in NATO's best military interest.

Senator LUGAR. If this is true, try to trace again just why it is true, why this treaty serves NATO's interests?

In other words, I suspect we will hear assertions that, although the NATO defense ministers defend this treaty in public, down deep they harbor a suspicion that this treaty really is not in their best interests.

Try to explain why this treaty is in the best interest of NATO; why, even with a continuing conventional force imbalance, NATO will be better off if this treaty is ratified.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, first of all because of the asymmetrical reductions and the fact that we get to a lower level of nuclear weapons in an asymmetrical way.

Second, you have to look at the geostrategy involved, as I indicated earlier. It is vital for our own security and for NATO's security that we be able to reinforce NATO, the so-called 10/10 formula, get 10 divisions in 10 days to NATO.

The Soviets depend very heavily on a rapid attack and look to the rapid collapse of NATO; therefore, reinforcements become very important in our part of the equation.

Any Soviet system with a theater capacity that can strike NATO ports, harbors, and rail lines impacts us more severely than the systems we would have that could strike the Soviet Union. Not that the Pershing II is not a threatening system to the Soviets or a good deterrent, but, net, it is to our advantage to eliminate these systems, and later on the Joint Chiefs will so testify.

As I indicated to Senator Sarbanes, it is not intended to carry the strategic burden, but it is certainly an inconvenience or a disruption of their program for the Soviets if they need to compensate with strategic systems.

Senator **Lugar**. As Secretary of Defense, you have surely heard the argument that even if this INF Treaty is not so bad, what one really needs to worry about is a START Treaty or some follow-on agreement.

But I gather, that you would disagree. As a matter of fact, you would affirm that it is in our best interest to proceed with the START negotiations.

Secretary **Carlucci**. A verifiable treaty in which we achieve our objective, including our right to go ahead with the development and eventual deployment of SDI, is overall in our interest. But we have a lot of work yet to do before we can come up here and tell you that we have a verifiable treaty in which we have achieved the goals that we are currently seeking.

Senator **Lugar**. Thank you very much.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in response to Senator Helms' questions on cheating by the Soviet Union in the past, you say that it is important that we have a strong policy on compliance, and this is something that has interested me as far as what the role of the Special Verification Commission will be.

There was a report under the Carter administration that the Standing Consultative Commission which was established to monitor past compliance was working well; but Under Secretary Weinberger issued a rather damning statement as far as the SCC has failed to resolve any significant compliance issue in the approximately 1,005 days it has been in session over the last 13 years. The last productive form for the resolution of disputes would be difficult to find.

I wonder how you would analyze the work of the Standing Consultative Commission and how you would compare that to what is anticipated for the Special Verification Commission?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, there certainly have been problems in the SCC, in that it has not functioned in as effective a way as we had hoped. That is one of the reasons why we decided on a new forum for the INF Treaty.

Another reason, though, is that we spent a long time trying to get the Soviet Union to decouple INF from defense and space issues—which of course includes ABM Treaty issues. It would seem anomalous to turn right around now and put the compliance back in the same forum that is handling the ABM Treaty.

One of the problems that we saw with the SCC is that it is a permanent body, and a permanent body tends to take on bureaucratic characteristics. Hence, we judge that a body that met on demand might well be more effective, and the SVC is a body that would meet on demand.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But it is really rather loosely drawn as far as how this is going to operate.

Is there a good understanding between the Soviets and ourselves exactly how this is going to operate, or is it just sort of assumed that on demand each side will put together the needed composite group to deal with a particular issue?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have not designated individuals or set out a tasking to set up the organization. However, during the course of the deliberations with the Soviet Union, the SVC was discussed at some length, and I think there is a good understanding on how it will function.

That does not mean that there will not be problems in compliance. We are clearly going to have disagreements. One can read the fine print of any treaty and come to different conclusions. But we are determined to use diplomatic channels and the SVC to help resolve compliance concerns as effectively as possible.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I do not think you can ever guarantee airtight compliance, but I think that there is a way that adds some degree of assurance, perhaps, or comfort to those who want to make sure there is an adequate forum and that it is utilized.

It is hard to compare those who have felt that the Standing Consultative Commission really was not fully utilized, that we, ourselves, did not give it the credibility to perhaps have caused it to work better.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If that is your concern, I can assure you that there is every intention on our part to utilize fully all appropriate bilateral channels and the Special Verification Commission when there are compliance issues that arise.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would like for you to answer if you think the Standing Consultative Commission has been underutilized.

Do you feel it has been a forum that could have been more successful, could be more successful?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It has been very bureaucratic, and we have been very frustrated at the way it has functioned. What you are suggesting is that it may be our fault because we did not use it enough. When we tried to use it, it did not function very well, which is one reason why we decided to go to another forum.

To be candid with you, Senator Kassebaum, I am not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the day-to-day workings of the SCC to tell you exactly what its failings are or were and whether we were at fault for not attempting to use it as much.

You will find advocates of both points of view within the U.S. Government, and I have not made an independent determination.

Senator KASSEBAUM. The President reportedly suggested that in the event of Soviet violations, we would place Pershing II missiles again in Europe.

Is there any validity to that statement? If so, how would NATO accept this and how practical would that be at this point?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think, quite candidly, there are certain practical limitations to that. In fact, should the Senate fail to ratify the treaty, we would probably be unable to go ahead with the deployment of the Pershings and the GLCM's in Europe. We would have unilateral implementation of the treaty because the Soviets would have no counterpart obligation to take down their systems.

I think compliance has to be looked at from a much broader point of view. First of all, if there is cheating on a treaty we need to go immediately to the Soviets to try to correct the violation.

If we are over a period of time unsuccessful, the executive branch and the Congress may need to take appropriate action to maintain our deterrent.

I would think that some expression of willingness on the part of the Congress to do this at this point in time might well be appropriate. Because we are severely constrained in the defense budget, I, myself, would be prepared to make the necessary recommendations for compensating measures if there are persistent military significant violations, but I need the express willingness of the Congress to cooperate to make it credible for the Soviets.

In other words, as a deterrent to cheating, if the administration and the Congress together express a willingness to do something about violations if they occur, then we are more likely to deter it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. There have been those who have suggested that, as a condition of the treaty, if there were violations we would withdraw from our obligations.

Are you suggesting that perhaps——

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is one option, to withdraw. There, you would have to make a determination of whether that is in our best national security interest.

The other option, as I have indicated, is to continue to pursue the violations and make sure you have restored your own deterrent capability.

All of this is highly scenario dependent; the nature of the infraction, the state of our relations with the Soviets at any given point in time, whether or not there is a START agreement. It is awfully difficult for us in advance to answer hypotheticals on this score.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think that is true, but I think it also goes a long way in helping the public at large to feel comfortable to a certain extent with the nagging question that is always there about can you trust the Soviets. I think the more that we can provide in our own testimony and in the record of this, the assurances for the verification and compliance, I think that perhaps it lends not a false sense of security but of comfort to those who are questioning just how this will function.

Let me ask on the verification procedures that have been worked through, how and in what way would you believe they would enhance the strategic arms control negotiations? Would the onsite provisions be useful for the START?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The onsite inspections set a very useful precedent for START, but we have to be a little careful here because we are going to have a residue of systems remaining in START, whereas in INF we have eliminated an entire class. So INF is much easier to verify.

I think we are probably going to have to have some form of challenge inspections, suspect site inspections under START.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, let me first of all welcome you here and say that I think there is a phenomenon which might be good or bad that has occurred regarding this treaty. Everybody is embracing it: the national press; the various political leaders. Even Jean Kirkpatrick, I read, said that she probably would not be for it but, now that we are this far into it, it would be too awkward to back out.

I know that some say we cannot reach a conventional forces reduction agreement very quickly, but the MBFR talks have been going on for a long time.

Many of the definitions have been agreed to by both sides. A lot of the preliminary items that must be considered in reaching such an agreement have been covered already in the MBFR talks. I know there are more than just two countries involved, but really there are two principal countries involved.

Unless we do something in terms of the conventional forces, the Soviets will be left with a 3-to-1 or a 4- to-1 superiority. I know that the Committee on the Present Danger, the committee that President Reagan and others formed and in which Paul Nitze and others were very active, always said that we should not go into SALT II unless there were at least an agreement in principle regarding conventional forces. I do not know if Paul Nitze said that necessarily, but that was one of the major points of the Committee on the Present Danger.

It has occurred to me that the Senate could add such an amendment and, indeed, there will be an effort to add such an amendment, but it seems that we are told this would be a killer amendment or something of that sort. But such an amendment could become a protocol and be agreed to within a matter of weeks if the Soviets are serious about arms control.

How do you deal with the desire for 1-to-1 ratio on the conventional forces? How would you recommend we proceed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think it is very desirable that we negotiate conventional forces down to common levels, and we are moving in that direction. When General Secretary Gorbachev was here, he accepted at least in principle the idea of asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces.

We are currently developing a mandate for what are called the stability talks. These are extraordinarily complex because they are tied to CSCE. They involve some 23 nations, and the verification of conventional reductions is infinitely more difficult than even START verification. So we are entering into some extraordinarily complex negotiations.

I think this current treaty has to be weighed on its own merits. On its own merits, in my judgment and in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs, the treaty is militarily desirable. To tie it in some way to these extraordinarily complex, albeit desirable, conventional negotiations would, in my judgment, be a killer amendment and would result in the adverse impact on our NATO allies that Senator Lugar has already described.

Senator PRESSLER. Let me just talk about those a little bit, because everybody seems to be saying that we are going to negotiate the conventional treaty right after this. But we have lost our trump card, it seems to me. The nuclear forces were, in the Russians' view, our trump card, and their trump card is still there, the superiority in conventional forces.

It seems that there has been an orchestration here in terms of this issue. First, on December 14 the administration, or the President, told our allies that we would expect to increase our spending in Europe on conventional forces. A report to that effect was published in the New York Times.

Also, there have been reports that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will seek an increase in modernization of certain nuclear weapons, such as lengthening the range of the Lance missile.

What about this at a time when there are budget cuts in defense? Then, just last week after this matter had been raised in this hearing by myself and others I saw several reports about the pledge to our allies to increase our spending in Europe and speculation that this may have been part of the reason the European leaders endorsed the treaty.

Then I saw another statement last week saying that our military leaders will request no increases in spending in Europe as a result of the treaty.

How do you foresee this developing?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Pressler, I cannot quite keep up with all the press commentaries on this kind of subject, but let me be very clear that we have in NATO certain ongoing programs. One is the nuclear modernization program, which is not particularly designed to deal with the conventional asymmetries but does deal with our overall deterrent. It is an integral part of NATO's flexible response doctrine.

Second, we have the Conventional Defense Initiative Program which was started in 1985, where we are looking at such things as rapid reinforcement, sustainability, air defense, and dual-capable aircraft. All those things are underway.

We also have a program looking at force goals.

Finally, we in the Defense Department have been working on something "called competitive strategies," which is designed to pit our enduring strengths against Soviet enduring weaknesses in several critical areas, such as command, control, and communications.

We are also developing certain standoff weapons, certain smart munitions.

I do not start with the funding part of the equation. I do not say that you are going to say to the NATO allies you are going to put more money into Europe in exchange for this treaty. Far from it. This treaty is an alliance treaty that we all judge is in our overall interest. Nonetheless, we have these ongoing programs that we need to go ahead with. To some extent, they will require resources, but those are the choices that we will be making as we put the budget together.

If I can get on my soapbox for a second, we are going to be very resource constrained in this budget, and we will be taking down a substantial amount of force structure. One reason that we are taking this approach or that I am going to advocate this approach with the President is to preserve the necessary modernization programs, to preserve our technological superiority so there will be some movement of resources within the defense budget to accomplish these goals.

Senator Pressler. You cannot be responsible for what your predecessors say. Way back in the days when I was in the U.S. House of Representatives, two of your predecessors, Secretary Rumsfeld, I believe, and Secretary Brown, told me that the funding for these missiles was necessary to protect the lives of U.S. servicemen in West Germany.

Would you say that was a fair assessment at that time?

Secretary Carlucci. Oh, certainly, because it was the funding of these missiles, their deployment, that brought about this treaty.

You have a net reduction which on balance is in our favor and enhances the security of our servicemen in Europe, so that is precisely the point.

Senator Pressler. So this treaty will enhance the safety of our servicemen in Europe?

Secretary Carlucci. Yes, sir.

Senator Pressler. Tell me how it will do that in terms of their facing a 4-to-1 inferiority ratio in ground forces troops? Some say 3-to-1 but I do not want to get into a big debate on that.

Secretary Carlucci. Bear in mind, this treaty was not designed to solve the conventional imbalance. It was designed to take out a certain class of highly threatening weapons, weapons that could strike the ports and facilities that we need to use to reinforce our servicemen and our NATO allies in Europe.

And there are asymmetrical reductions, which are in our advantage.

Senator Pressler. Well, that is good news to me as one who voted for the Nunn amendment.

Then could I expect you to be recommending a reduction in our troop levels in Europe?

Secretary Carlucci. I did not say that. On the contrary, I think we need to maintain our troop strength in Europe, and I am distressed that the Congress has put a ceiling on our troop strength in Europe.

What I have said is that this treaty creates a better security environment for our troops in Europe. But you yourself have pointed to the conventional imbalances, so there is absolutely no justification, in light of the conventional balances, for withdrawing troops from Europe.

Senator PRESSLER. But if this treaty makes our troops safer, as you say, contrary to what I understood from two previous Secretaries, although I see your reasoning, because the other side is taking out theirs, it would seem to me that then it may well follow that we do not need as many troops there.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think it follows at all.

Senator PRESSLER. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Pressler. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I agree with you. I do not see how that follows at all. And by the way, I should note I took pains to tell everyone in Europe who asked me, from Prime Minister Thatcher to President Mitterand, that I do not know of any serious effort to withdraw or draw down U.S. troops in Europe.

That is one of the main concerns they have now. It is funny. They are all for the treaty, but they are shaky about what comes next.

I would like to pursue a little bit of that if I may in my first round with you, Mr. Secretary. Just as a preliminary question, for reasons I think you will understand, I am going to ask you this: Is it fair for the committee to consider your testimony on the meaning of this treaty as being authoritative?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator BIDEN. And how should the Senate regard a statement by the State Department Legal Adviser 10 or 15 years from now that your testimony should be discounted because you really did not understand the treaty or because you misrepresented it intentionally?

You do not really have to answer that, but if you would like to.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not plan to answer that. I think that is a question for the legal advisers to answer. I am not a lawyer, Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. But you are one of the most competent people I have ever come across in the 15 years I have been in the Senate, and it is not just because you are from the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton area that I say that.

Let me talk a little bit about NATO modernization, if I may. Is it fair to say that the INF Treaty represents a triumph for NATO solidarity, and yet in the wake of the treaty NATO now faces other tests that are causing the alliance some consternation, in particular on the question of modernizing those nuclear systems in Europe not covered by the INF Treaty?

Let me be specific. I refer to the zero to 500-kilometer range weapons, such as the Lance follow-on, and to the introduction of a new airborne capability, such as a TASM or ALCM or SLCM.

You are well aware, I trust, of the contours of the German political scene right now and the degree of sensitivity on both the left and the right in Germany to their fears of singularization, a new word of the day, which is the notion that Germany has been delimited by the INF Treaty as Europe's nuclear battlefield.

You are also aware, I am sure, that the Soviets are seeking to play to these fears in two ways: first by offering the "third zero"—in other words offering to eliminate all short-range nuclear weapons and second by warning the Germans that any modernization of nuclear weapons of any kind would constitute circumvention of the INF Treaty.

Indeed, just last Thursday a Soviet parliamentary delegation came here bearing the same message to this body. I think we face a challenge, both to head off the third zero, which I think we should head off, at least until we have made considerable progress in other areas, and to achieve modernization that we think is necessary for NATO's defenses and that provides us with sufficient bargaining leverage in our overall negotiating posture.

My question is this: How does the administration, in light of all that I have just said, intend to proceed on the question of NATO nuclear modernization?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is a good question, Senator Biden.

First of all, I do not fully accept the singularity thesis. It is true that your short-range systems, those under 500 kilometers, are based in Germany. But an integral part of flexible response are our dual-capable aircraft, which are not entirely based in Germany, particularly when you take into account the FB-111's.

And as you yourself pointed out, one of our programs is to upgrade the dual-capable aircraft, bring in more F-16's, Tornadoes, develop the TASM, the standoff, 400 kilometer standoff weapon. And all of those contribute to the deterrent and are supportive of our forces in Germany.

Finally, there is the link with our strategy systems, some of which, as you are well aware, are committed to SACEUR.

So we have that full linkage, that full range of flexible deterrence. It is very important that that be carefully explained to the Germans.

I thoroughly agree with the thesis that the third zero would be a disaster. The Soviet charges of circumvention on nuclear modernization are pure propaganda. The negotiating record is very clear on that point, that both sides have a right to modernize. They are clearly going to modernize their systems.

Senator BIDEN. Let me be clear now for the record. You are speaking of modernizing systems that are from the zero to 500 range not covered by the INF Treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is right. What we are talking about specifically are the artillery-fired atomic projectiles, the follow-on to Lance, and TASM.

Senator BIDEN. And also modernization of——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Dual-capable aircraft.

Senator BIDEN. Dual-capable aircraft, air-launched and sea-launched.

Secretary CARLUCCI. ALCM's and SLCM's. It is very clear that INF range ALCM's and SLCM's are not prohibited by the treaty.

Let me emphasize that this was a unanimous NATO decision back in 1983 at Montebello, and in the discussions of the NATO defense ministers and I assume the NATO foreign ministers, although I do not attend those, everybody has supported this decision.

We need to find ways of getting on with the selection of the systems, in consultation with our German allies. We have not yet selected any follow-on systems to Lance. We are presently looking at alternatives, but that will be done in full consultation with our German allies and in a politically sensitive way.

Senator **Biden**. What I am worried about, Mr. Secretary—and I would be very interested to have a discussion with you about the strategic and tactical applicability and rationale for the modernized systems we are talking about. But when I met with your counterparts in Germany, France, Great Britain, and also with a number of representatives in Brussels of the other NATO countries, they acknowledged that Montebello was agreed to.

And they support modernization, especially in France and in Great Britain. They are adamant about it. But they point out that the modernization decision was taken in 1983 and this is now a post-INF political atmosphere.

My question is this: Even though you are "not a political man," you are one of the most competent political men I know. How are we going to go about the politically difficult decision of accomplishing what most of us agree may be necessary—that is, a modernization of those systems that we have mentioned?

Secretary **Carlucci**. I think the only way this can be done with a minimum of consternation is through a quiet dialog with our NATO colleagues, particularly the defense ministers, and in particular the Germans, so that we can find a formula and a system that both meets our needs and accommodates to their own political imperatives. I think that can be done.

I will try at all costs to avoid the blunderbuss approach.

Senator **Biden**. My time is almost up and I have a number of other areas I'd like to discuss. I will not go into a new one now, but let me follow up with just one last question on this area—modernization.

You have about three groups going now. I am fascinated by the jargon: the Par 8 group—the Paragraph 8 group—the high-level task force, and the HL—the high level group).

These are three different groups, all grappling with various aspects of what will come after INF. It seems to me it is imperative that the decision on how to approach modernization be arrived at with some clarity and that U.S. leadership be exerted prior to the final ratification of this treaty. If we ratify this treaty, and I believe we will, it will not take place until some time in probably April or May.

And you all are going to have a meeting, I am told, a NATO summit, before then.

I will come back to this. My time is up. But I hope that that strong leadership is exerted to solve the short-range nuclear force modernization problem, which as I see it is a most difficult one. But I will come back.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Evans.

Senator **Evans**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is interesting that virtually all of the questioning this morning has proceeded along the lines of either tactical nuclear weapons or conventional forces. We almost left the INF Treaty as if it were a done deal.

Let me not shift from that, but get back to conventional weapons. Is it not super-simplistic to talk about a 1-to-1 ratio in conventional armament? Is it not much, much more complex than that in terms of qualitative differentials.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, yes, by all means. You have to take into account readiness. You have to take into account warning. You have to take into account geostrategic factors, the quality of the weaponry.

There is a whole host of things that go into assessing the conventional balance. That being said, I still think it is fair to say that there are serious asymmetries that have to be addressed. But you do not address them purely by counting up the number of systems and comparing them.

Senator EVANS. In other words, if you had a tank that shot a mile against tanks that shot three-quarters of a mile, you may not need very many to knock out a whole bunch of the others?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

What we are doing is focusing on the clearest threats, tanks and artillery. Those are the main asymmetries and the main threats to our forces, and we will be making an effort to get at those in the negotiations.

Senator EVANS. Let me turn for a moment to some of the questions and answers raised this morning on Lance or tactical nuclear weapons. Would it be accurate to say that if Lance were to be modernized and its range extended from, I guess it is what, currently in the 70-mile range?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is a little over 100 kilometers, 110 kilometers or about 70 miles, yes.

Senator EVANS. That range presumably—I do not know what is contemplated, but presumably it could be extended clear up to the 300-mile range and still be within the treaty, isn't that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct. And one concept would extend the range. Let me point out, and this is partially in answer to Senator Biden's question, that we do have some problems in getting on with the modernization decision.

First of all, we have not selected a system that would be a follow-on to Lance.

Second, on one system that is clearly a very viable candidate, the ATACMS, the Army Tactical Missile System, the Congress has imposed a prohibition on looking at that, on our looking at that system in a nuclear configuration. So we are blocked from getting on with this decision by congressional legislation.

Senator EVANS. Would it be accurate to say that for Lance or for another system that by extending the range that you then expand the flexibility and the potential number of targets, and maybe even reduce the numbers required, because you have better coverage?

Is that a logical conclusion?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would agree that it enhances the capability of the system. You extend your target range. I would certainly not at this forum at this time be prepared to agree that that automatically means you would require less of them. I think that is a decision that will have to be made at the time the system is selected and in consultation.

Senator EVANS. Well, it was not my intent in the question to get you to suggest that you could get by with fewer, just that in tactical operations greater range does give you a whole lot more flexibility.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It does, yes, sir.

Senator EVANS. As we move past INF, you said in your recent NATO strategy report: "We must ensure that the prioritized elements of an integrated program along these lines; that is modernization of forces, are given special attention as they compete with other priorities."

You said something essentially the same, to the same extent, in your statement this morning.

How do you expect to identify these as you come to Congress? Would there be a special package that can be identifiable as sort of a post-INF package, or would it be just part of the regular presentation?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I would not label it a proposed INF package, but we can certainly identify in the budget the conventional defense improvements we think are necessary and the decisions we think are necessary as a follow-on to Montebello.

We have not programmed money against the Montebello decisions for the reasons that I just mentioned. Most of the systems that we are talking about are listed in that report that you referred to, the so-called Byrd-Quayle report. They are all laid out there, and we will try to package them in the budget as well.

Senator EVANS. You have already responded to a question on noncircumvention, article 14. Let me just pursue that a little bit further. Do you feel that it will in any way have an effect on our modernization plans, either in Europe or in Asia?

For example, would it have any impact even on our FSX development with Japan?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely not. First of all, we do not characterize article 14 as a noncircumvention provision. It is simply a good faith provision that says we will be bound by the terms of the treaty, and I would be prepared to develop that further if you want.

But it is very clear that there is nothing in this treaty that would prohibit the modernization of systems with ranges below 500 or above 5,500 kilometers, the negotiating record also makes that clear.

Senator EVANS. You mentioned in answer to a question this morning about redesign and the reuse of fissile materials which would require testing. I presume that any redesign of a weapon or a weapons warhead really does require testing before either side would be willing to bet their security on it. Is that not correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct, sir.

Senator EVANS. Under the INF Treaty both sides are to withdraw warheads which would require some retooling or redesign before they can be reused. Doesn't this give the nuclear test ban treaty a higher priority or, at least, some additional benefit, to make it more difficult for the Soviets to reuse the fissionable material?

Of course, it would make it more difficult for us as well, but these will be an asymmetrical reduction. Wouldn't this make it that much more difficult for the Soviets to reutilize that fissile material?

Secretary Carlucci. Well, as long as we are going to have nuclear weapons, Senator Evans, we need to make sure that those weapons are effective, reliable, survivable, and safe, so that we can ensure the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.

We have laid out a step-by-step process in the nuclear testing area which starts with an agreements on effective verification of the TTBT and PNET, and we are making good progress in that area. Once we complete that process, and after the treaties have been ratified, we will take a step-by-step approach to possible intermediate limitations in conjunction with the reduction of nuclear weapons. We will look at the question of the comprehensive test ban as an ultimate objective in the intent of the elimination of nuclear weapons. But I think looking at that right now would be premature.

So I really do not see how our nuclear testing policy would play into the reutilization of these weapons. The tests that you are talking about here would be minimal and well within—well, I am not sure we would even be testing the nuclear material. What we are testing is the weapons system.

Senator Evans. Surely, I understand.

What about these two treaties you mentioned? How close are we in terms of satisfactory verification that would allow us to act on the treaties?

Secretary Carlucci. I would prefer to submit something for the record on that. We are making good progress in exchange of information with the Soviets and have made some arrangements for onsite observation of tests with regard to, in particular with regard to the CORRTEX system.

[The material referred to follows:]

Nuclear Testing Talks

The U.S. position remains—and the Soviets now have agreed—that the first step at the Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) must be agreement on new protocols that would provide effective verification of the existing but unratified 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976). Since the NTT began in November 1987, we have seen some positive steps taken toward the agreed goal of effective verification of the TTBT/PNET. For example, the sides have agreed that a Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) could be useful in making progress toward the agreed goal. The U.S. concept is that the JVE would take place at each side's nuclear test site and provide opportunities to measure the yield of nuclear explosions using the techniques proposed by each side. The U.S.-preferred method, of course, is CORRTEX, the most accurate technique we have identified for TTBT/PNET verification. The JVE will be designed to provide the Soviet Union with all the information it will need to accept United States use of CORRETEX for TTBT/PNET verification.

The reciprocal familiarization visits of U.S. and Soviet experts to one another's test site, which took place in January, increased considerably each side's understanding of the practical problems connected with the JVE and provided information necessary for the sides to start work on the actual design of a JVE.

Senator Evans. Just one final question. This [indicating] is a schematic of the Soviet SS–20 warhead system. Is this a Xerox of what they had submitted to us? Does anybody know where this came from [indicating]?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is a photocopy of a schematic diagram that they gave us. They have given us, obviously, a photograph of the SS-20 missile.

Senator EVANS. They have given us a lot more than this, in other words?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, yes, they have given us a lot more than that. We have site diagrams of every inspection facility and photos of each treaty limited missile.

Senator EVANS. I would just comment, Mr. Chairman, I was looking at it as a sometime engineer, and if their missile designers are not any better than their draftsmen, we have not got much to worry about.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, let me say that when I was in Moscow with Secretary Shultz, they did show us a much more elaborate schematic design of the SS-20.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator McConnell.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I gather, Mr. Secretary, in your responses to Senator Biden, that you think even in a post-INF situation our NATO allies have the will to pursue the Montebello improvements?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think they do, yes, sir. It is not an easy process to go through, but I think we can certainly go through it.

Senator MCCONNELL. Shifting to the Soviets for a minute, we have talked about what we ought to be doing after INF. I am curious as to what you think they will be doing. Do you think their military doctrine changed in anticipation of the treaty?

And also, as a followup, what do you anticipate they will be doing now, on the assumption that they feel they need to do some modernizing after INF?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think the treaty would call for a change in their doctrine. They are going to eliminate a number of systems, one of which was certainly put in to achieve certain political goals but which fell short of achievement. They will do some retargeting, I would anticipate, possibly up to and including some of their strategic systems.

I see no particular rationale for them to go ahead with, I guess to use your phrase, compensating measures, particularly in light of our ongoing negotiations on START. But I would not completely dismiss the possibility.

Senator MCCONNELL. Over the weekend there were press accounts of further discussions between France and the United Kingdom over their cooperative security efforts. This follows on past talks that France and the United Kingdom will jointly develop air-launched Cruise missiles.

How do you feel bilateral efforts between France and the United Kingdom might affect this overall picture? Do you view it as eroding NATO cooperation?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think those are helpful and desirable. In France you have a remarkable defense consensus, and we have an ongoing dialog with the French. And to the degree that we can have arms cooperation with the French, between France and the NATO countries, that is also desirable.

What you are referring to is the TASM, which is a stemming from the Montebello decision, the 400-kilometer standoff missile. We are also talking with both the United Kingdom and France on this.

So one of the real success stories in NATO has been arms cooperation for the past couple of years, thanks in large measure to the Nunn amendment and support of the Congress.

Senator McCONNELL. So you do not think that those two countries pursuing these independent undertakings in any way erodes the sense of NATO cooperation and support?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, on the contrary. I think cooperation between France and the United Kingdom and to take it one step further into an area that is even more controversial, I think cooperation between France and Germany is desirable, as long as it does not undercut NATO.

And there is nothing that I can see in any of this cooperation that moves in that direction, that is to say, to undercut NATO. It does not undercut NATO.

Senator McCONNELL. Back to INF for a moment and the question of how we handle the inspection effort. Under the treaty, as I understand it, notifications of onsite inspections are to be communicated through the nuclear risk reduction center.

According to the administration's plans, the American risk reduction center would be based at the State Department. The responsibility for conducting inspections, however, will be vested in a newly created office in your Department.

I am wondering why we are dividing responsibility and doing it this way.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We did not feel in the Defense Department that the communications, the nuclear risk reduction Centers, was a defense function. It was really a diplomatic function that was to serve the purpose of warning the other side when problems arose. It was decided subsequently to use this medium for communication for the onsite inspections.

On the other hand, onsite inspections is very much a national security issue. We have in the Pentagon most of the capability needed to do the job. In fact, we are well underway in establishing the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). The OSIA should be ready to operate by April 1.

Let me just close with the note that we and the State Department do communicate, contrary to the popular belief. So it is not a problem to have the communications in the State Department and the inspections agency in the Defense Department.

Senator McCONNELL. So which unit has the principal responsibility for reporting a violation, yours?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The On-Site Inspection Agency and the intelligence community would have responsibilities for monitoring the INF Treaty.

Senator McCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I think that completes what I wanted to ask the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McConnell.

Mr. Carlucci, I think the record shows that you never did testify before this committee between 1977 and 1985, and I just wanted to—I think that clear up this exchange that you had with Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. If the chairman will yield, I believe the record will also show that I said Intelligence Committee. You may have inferred that I was talking about the Foreign Relations Committee, but I think the record——

Secretary CARLUCCI. The same applies to the Intelligence Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chief Clerk to the Intelligence Committee states that you never testified before them on SALT II.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct. I have testified many times before the Intelligence Committee, but not on SALT II.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Senator HELMS. I will get to it on my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

I may have expressed clumsily one of my questions in the previous round. I should have phrased it as follows.

What do we know about Soviet intentions and capabilities regarding future INF missiles in the absence of the treaty? In other words, if we did not have this treaty, what do we know or consider to be their plans?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would anticipate the continued proliferation of SS-20's including deployment of the already tested SS-20 follow-on, the further development of the highly capable SS-23 with a possible extension of its range, and deployment of the SS6-X-4 GLCM. I think we would see a continued growth in Soviet systems in the prohibited range ban area.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I would like to follow up a little bit on Senator Kassebaum's question particularly concerning the Special Verification Commission, and I share her concern at the thought of setting up a new body, even though it has a different name and is set up on an ad hoc basis, apparently, when some of us have thought that the SCC has been doing a pretty good job under General Ellis' leadership in the past, and I was wondering if you would outline a little bit more how you see the SVC working.

For example, there is a report of a violation by the Soviets somewhere or they say there is a report of a violation by us, what would then be the game plan?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We really thought it was better under this treaty to start out afresh and not to be burdened by the bureaucratic procedures of the SCC, and not to have any linkage between the INF Treaty and the ABM Treaty, because the SCC is a forum for ABM. As I mentioned earlier, we spent a considerable amount of time trying to get the Soviets to separate the two.

And we now have the necessary latitude to work, to shape the SVC to best serve our compliance concerns. As I indicated, we have not started to look at the exact structure of it yet, although that kind of work is underway in preparation for the ratification of the treaty.

Suffice it to say that both sides have a very clear understanding that this is the kind of forum we want, one that would be able to meet on demand and that we both intend to use it in a serious way. I was present at the conversations with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on this subject, and it is clear, both sides intend to treat it seriously.

The **Chairman**. You and the Soviets may have a clear understanding. I am not sure we in the Congress have a clear understanding of where would it meet, how many people would participate in it, what would be the level?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Those are all questions that are being staffed out at this point. It was not necessary to have all those questions answered in order to sign the treaty.

Just like setting up the On-Site Inspection Agency is something that is underway now, it was not necessary to answer all those questions either before the signing of the treaty.

The **Chairman**. Following up with that, your point about the onsite inspection group, is it your thought that each time that an inspection is made or they are needed, their services are needed, that they would be pulled together on an ad hoc basis from the various government agencies, or will you set up a corps, will there be a corps of inspectors who have had experience?

Secretary **Carlucci**. There will be teams of inspectors who have had experience, who are language competent and who are specially trained. Indeed, we have them in training starting this month.

So, no, they would not be called upon as needed. There would be a cadre dedicated to inspections. They would be inspectors that would over a period of time gain considerable experience. And of course, at Votkinsk, we would have the permanent onsite inspecting team.

The **Chairman**. Could you give us an idea of about how many inspectors you see on a permanent basis? Where would they be trained?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, the overall size of the On Site Inspection Agency is projected to be around 600 or 700, including inspectors. There will be a list of 200 inspectors who will be exchanged with the Soviets for the short-notice inspections and another list of 200 that would be submitted to the Soviets for the permanent onsite inspecting team.

The **Chairman**. Now, would they be trained in an institute of some sort?

Secretary **Carlucci**. They are being trained in Defense Department facilities.

The **Chairman**. Right. Through an institute that will be set up for that purpose?

Secretary **Carlucci**. We are principally using existing facilities. We do not see any need to set up new facilities. We have plenty of Defense schools that can handle this function. Essentially they have to be trained in the provisions of the treaty, the purposes of the treaty, the techniques of onsite inspection, counterintelligence, language—we try to find language competent people. We are going out through the military and civilian networks right now to locate the appropriate people.

The **Chairman**. Well, then, is it a fair statement that they will be individuals, highly qualified, who will be in this service for 10, 20 years, on a permanent basis? In other words, will there be a corps?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are talking about a 13-year inspection regime.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there will be——

Secretary CARLUCCI. There will be a cadre.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be a cadre, a corps of inspectors.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With a sort of esprit de corps of their own?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will they be in uniform or will they be civilians?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, they will be both uniformed and civilians. We would have a military head of the agency. One has already been selected, a brigadier general, and then we would have a principal deputy director from ACDA.

The CHAIRMAN. And would there be a permanent cadre in there?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The deputy would come and go, the general would come and go——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the military people would rotate as military people generally do, but there would be a permanent infrastructure I think is probably the best way to put it.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And it would be called—you will give it a name like——

Secretary CARLUCCI. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA).

The CHAIRMAN. And the people would be the corps of inspectors, something of that sort.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. It will receive administrative support from the Defense Nuclear Agency. It will report directly to the Under Secretary for Acquisition and will receive oversight, policy, and technical guidance from a committee composed of the USD(A), USD(P), and the CJCS. This would be a sort of governing board for the OSIA.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the Senate should condition its consent to the ratification of the INF Treaty on a guaranteed response to potential violations?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not know how you would do that in advance, Mr. Chairman, how you could possibly conceive of every potential violation and how you would respond to it. As I indicated earlier, the nature of the violation or the nature of the response is highly scenario-dependent. The question of whether you want to withdraw from the treaty or seek to redeploy Pershings or seek some other measures to enhance our deterrent capability, are all things that would have to be decided at the time.

I think it is impossible to determine that in advance. On the other hand, I think what we can express jointly, the administration and the Congress, is our determination to face up to the compliance problem. We have had some unfortunate experience in SALT II where when in light of Soviet violations, the administration took a position that it was not bound by the SALT II limitations; the Congress took a different position.

Well, I think we need to express our determination well in advance of what we, the executive branch and the Congress, are going to do should there be persistent militarily significant violations.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. Thank you.

Senator Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say again that it is not important which committee session you attended.

Senator Wallop I have talked with twice. He is in California, returning from Taiwan where he attended the funeral at the request of the President. But Senator Wallop recalls that you did appear, and the record shows that you did appear before the Intelligence Committee on March 28, 1979.

But I do not care about that——

Secretary **Carlucci**. I am sure I might have appeared. The question is what was the subject, Senator Helms?

Senator **Helms**. Well, SALT II was part of the subject.

Secretary **Carlucci**. It may have been in connection with the budget. I did testify on the budget.

Senator **Helms**. Well, whatever.

But the question is, as Deputy Director of the CIA, did you support SALT II, or did you oppose your boss, Admiral Turner?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Senator Helms, it was not the role of the CIA to determine policy or to support or not to support SALT II. The only role the agency played in SALT II was to assess the capability of the Agency to monitor the treaty, and indeed, that is the only role that the CIA is currently playing when we talk about the INF Treaty.

So the issue of support or not support is totally irrelevant.

Senator **Helms**. Well, it is supporting when you say it is verifiable.

Now, the same witnesses who are coming here and almost boastfully saying that this is a completely verifiable, the best thing we have ever had, this is essentially what they said with respect to SALT II. I attended many briefings, many briefings as just a Senator where all sorts of assurances were given. But, you know, whatever you want to say about your position then or your position now on SALT II is up to you.

Secretary **Carlucci**. I never testified on the verifiability of SALT II, either before this committee or the Intelligence Committee.

Senator **Helms**. I do not believe I said you did.

Secretary **Carlucci**. And the record will show that.

Senator **Helms**. But you have never taken a position on the verifiability of SALT II, never?

Secretary **Carlucci**. I personally in testimony never took a position.

Senator **Helms**. I did not say testimony.

Secretary **Carlucci**. The Agency did assess for the Congress its monitoring capabilities for SALT II. As I recall the system that was used back then, we assessed probabilities of verification of different items under SALT II.

Senator **Helms**. Precisely what this treaty provides, when you get down to it, guts, feathers, and all.

Now, let me move on to something else because we do not have but a few minutes per round.

It has been said that NATO will still have, what is it, 4,000 nuclear warheads after the warheads on the Pershings and the ground-launched Cruise missiles have been removed and the delivery vehicles are destroyed.

Is that approximately correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Approximately correct.

Senator HELMS. I want to know a little bit more about those warheads since there seems to be such a tendency to say, "well, they do not matter." I think they do matter.

For example, according to the figures published by the Institute of International Studies, my understanding is that more than half, or about 2,100, are M-110 and M-109 artillery shells, is that right?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I cannot tell you off the top of my head the exact quantities.

Senator HELMS. I think that is correct.

Now, in any case, what is the approximate range of these shells, the M-110 and the M-109?

Secretary CARLUCCI. About 14 or 15 kilometers.

Senator HELMS. Compared to the Pershing II are they low yield or high yield?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, compared to the Pershing II they would be low yield.

Senator HELMS. Of course.

Now, another 80 of these 4,000 nuclear warheads are on Lance shorter range ground-launched missiles.

Secretary CARLUCCI. NATO has 88 Lance launchers.

Senator HELMS. Now, what is the range of the Lance?

Secretary CARLUCCI. About 110 kilometers.

Senator HELMS. Or 66 miles, in that neighborhood.

A great number of the remainder of these 4,000 warheads are mines, land mines, sea mines, depth charges, and so forth.

Now, I am not going to get into it——

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not know of any mines, Senator Helms. We will submit the figure for the record, if you would like.

[The information referred to follows:]

COMPOSITION OF REMAINING NUCLEAR FORCES

Senator HELMS. Of the 4,000 remaining nuclear weapons, how many are mines?

Secretary CARLUCCI. NATO maintains no nuclear land or sea mines in its inventory. At the same time, the NATO inventory includes a small number of nuclear depth bombs.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think you will find there is. I know the young man advised you that there were no land mines.

But the point is, to whatever extent these weapons are used in mines, what is the range of a mine? Zero, right? It is there.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I do not know of any nuclear mines.

Senator HELMS. Well, you know, Barry Goldwater put it this way, that——

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not know of any nuclear mines.

Senator BIDEN. If the Senator would yield I think we voluntarily withdrew them under the first phase of the Montebello decision.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is right.

Senator BIDEN. But the Senator is correct, there were mines, but I do not think there are any now.

Secretary CARLUCCI. And I would prefer not to discuss all this in open session, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Well, I agree, and I am a little bit anxious about open session discussing of figures that obviously are classified.

Now, these warheads, the battlefield weapons that I have described, you say you do not know of any and——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I do not know of any mines. The others——

Senator HELMS. That is what I am saying, but I remember Barry Goldwater said that he could not see anything that could be lobbed into the men's room of the Kremlin, a typical Barry Goldwater quote—I was careful to attribute it to them.

These are all weapons against which the Soviet war doctrine has planned appropriate countermeasures, including chemical and biological warfare.

Now, NATO has, as I understand it, about 700 short-range nuclear weapons on dual-capable fighter bombers, and I am not going to ask the exact range.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have dual-capable aircraft, yes, with nuclear weapons.

Senator HELMS. Right. It is no secret that these fighter bombers do not have the range to reach into the Soviet Union.

You agree to that, do you not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The FB-111 and F-111 can get into some parts of the Soviet Union without refueling.

Senator HELMS. I will get into that in a minute.

But anyway, according to my arithmetic, and I do not want to concentrate too much on it, that takes care of about 3,800 of the so-called 4,000 nuclear warheads left to defend Europe.

Now, as you have indicated, I left out one important category; namely, the approximately 200 warheads on the F-111's.

Before we get into that, let me ask you this question. Do any of the 3,800 weapons I have just identified have the range and the penetration to reach military targets in the Soviet Union?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Helms, I would prefer not to answer those kinds of questions in an open hearing. I think we are getting—when you are getting into targeting in the Soviet Union, you are getting into very sensitive subjects.

Senator HELMS. Well, everybody knows except the American people. I do not even think that is classified, it has been published so many times by the New York Times and others.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have dual-capable weapons, and we have an FB-111 that is capable of striking into the Soviet Union, but I would prefer not to get into specific ranges. What we have now are gravity bombs, but we are talking about developing some standoff weapons.

Senator HELMS. But the point is——

Secretary CARLUCCI. And we also have Cruise missiles.

Senator HELMS. The point is that witness after witness has said one way or another that really, we do not have to worry about giving up the Pershing II's because we have around 4,000 nuclear weapons left in Europe.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I have not—I do not think I made that kind of flat statement in my testimony. I indicated that it is vitally important that we get on with modernization, it is vitally important that we get on with the conventional defense initiative, and I indicated also that some adjustments would have to be made, and these adjustments are currently being examined by the NATO High Level Group—HLG—and will be examined by Defense Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Denmark in April.

So there are going to have to be some adjustments, and this may well have to include adjustments in strategic forces.

But I would prefer not to get into the subject any further than that.

Senator HELMS. Well, I can understand that you would not, but the point is that somewhere, somehow, sometime we have got to put an end to this euphoria that this is an end-all, be-all and cure-all. Now, I understand you have not said that, but there is an impression abroad that we really do not have to worry because this is not an important treaty, the next one is important, and all sorts of things are being said.

The fact is that we are dealing with a lot of things that are of importance, including, and to me especially including the duplicity and the dishonesty of the Soviet Union, you know, those nice guys who dropped toys in Afghanistan, loaded toys that blew off the arms and killed the little children.

Now, as I said earlier, Mr. Secretary, I am going to push for as complete an understanding of this, no matter how much wisecracking and how much criticism comes to me. I am used to that. But I am not satisfied about a lot of things in this treaty, and I think I would not be doing my duty as a Senator under the advise and consent constitutional responsibility if I did not raise the questions.

But I thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I was going to go on to something else, but I almost always find myself in disagreement with what my friend from North Carolina has said.

Let's set the record straight at least as I understand it.

Prior to us deploying or agreeing in the dual-track decision in 1979 to both negotiate and deploy our ground-launched Cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles, we felt we had a totally flexible and full arsenal of response to the Soviet Union.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Correct.

Senator BIDEN. The end result of us moving forward with this decision was that we ended up where we were prior to 1979, except stronger. The Soviets do not have all the SS-20's they had before.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. So that if Senator Helms is correct, that we are somehow so naked now on the European front—not his word, my word—then we were obviously extremely naked prior to the time you got this agreement, prior to deployment and prior to 1979.

So I do not quite understand what he and others are talking about here. The fact of the matter is that we will have the same flexible response we had prior to 1979—prior to the time we deployed—and we have the same capability, quite frankly, that we had before they put in the SS-20's.

So all around, we end up with us being back where we were prior to 1979, and the Soviets being back to pre-1977 where they have no SS–20s.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is essentially correct, Senator Biden. I agree with you.

Senator BIDEN. And also Secretary Shultz testified that SACEUR has assigned to it 400 Poseidons, all of which can go into every men's room in the Kremlin, and can get in there and take not only the men's room but everything else with it, all the plumbing for a long, long distance, right?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct, and there is absolutely nothing in this treaty that prevents us from assigning such things as sea-launched Cruise missiles or ALCM's.

Senator BIDEN. You are now referring to those missiles which are a part of the modernization program we are pursuing that provides us with a standoff capability. In other words, they may sit in an airplane or they may be assigned to, and fired from the deck of a ship or launched from a platform that stands off.

When you say standoff, you mean the airplane does not have to necessarily penetrate the air space of the other side. It can get up close, fire its Cruise missile, and that can depending on what missile is assigned to that mission, hit military targets and any targets in the Soviet Union.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely, spoil your whole day, yes.

Senator BIDEN. So we have lost two categories of weapons—one, a Pershing missile which was shot from a canister and has a range of up to 5,500 kilometers; and two, a ground-launched Cruise missile.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Correct.

Senator BIDEN. And we will lose at the end of this treaty a Pershing I nuclear missile whose warhead we must remove.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Pershing IA, yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Pershing IA, excuse me.

And it has a range of up to 1,000 kilometers.

So when people say we are going to be left as a consequence of signing this treaty in a terrible state what they don't mention is that the Soviets will have to remove all their highly sophisticated, multiwarhead, very precisely targeted SS–20's and other systems.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

They will be gone in disproportionate numbers.

Senator BIDEN. Now, the administration is seeking to ratify the treaty at this point in the absence of any collateral restraints on strategic systems.

I have raised this issue now on several occasions with every witness that I have been able to be here for. The answer I have received is basically this: don't worry about strategic limits; we're working on a new agreement.

Now, I wish the administration well on its work. But my question concerns the possibility of what happens if we do not get a strategic deal in the next few months or the next year or so? The President has declared what he refers to as an "interim policy" by which the United States will not exceed the Soviets in number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or in ballistic missile warheads. That is the present policy.

My first question is this.

Presumably, the President would not commit the United States to such a policy—that is, of not exceeding the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles the Soviets have, and not exceeding the number of ballistic missile warheads the Soviet have—unless he felt we could verify those two categories, ballistic missiles and delivery vehicles, by national technical means.

Is that not true?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We can come up with estimates for those two categories by national technical means. The problem with what you suggest, or what you are going to suggest, I think, is when they MIRV, because a restriction is on launchers and there is nothing that would prevent them from MIRVing, and they can go up to very substantial numbers by MIRVing.

Senator BIDEN. They can.

But what I am trying to get at here is that the President's interim policy of limiting ourselves—not the Soviets, but of limiting ourselves—to a certain number of ballistic missile warheads and a certain number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that presupposes our ability to verify to a reasonable degree the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles the Soviets have and the number of ballistic missile warheads the Soviets have. Otherwise, how could we agree to such a policy?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, estimating the number of warheads can be done with reasonable accuracy over a period of time; but it all hinges on monitoring capabilities, and impediments to monitoring, telemetry encryption, for example.

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Soviets encrypt their telemetry extensively.

So, I would have to say, in terms of the warhead count, should they decide to MIRV and proliferate extensively, certainly over a short period of time our capability to monitor, I think, would be relatively low.

I would defer to the Director of Central Intelligence on that point. But I think they could very easily break out of an interim constraint before we could become aware of it and it could become militarily significant over a period of time.

Senator BIDEN. Is there some level of Soviet increase above their current levels of SNDV's and warheads that would constitute an increase in the threat to the United States, or are we facing a level of Soviet deployment such that numerical increases would not really increase the threat significantly?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would think that numerical increases would heighten the threat. They have a very substantial arsenal now, one that is way out of proportion to their needs, quite frankly.

But I think the threat could be even greater, yes.

Senator BIDEN. If that is the case, why have we not done more to provide for a clear understanding of mutual intent during the period before the START agreement has been achieved to prevent that from happening?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, we have resisted any kind of agreement in principle.

Senator BIDEN. I know—but why?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Because we have had bad experience with that.

What happens is that we lock ourselves into compliance and allow them a free hand at cheating before we have nailed down all the treaty provisions and all the provisions on compliance.

I think that would be a very dangerous way to go.

Senator BIDEN. I will come back in the next round.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and I must apologize to Senator Adams, who has been quietly there, though I had not noticed.

So after Senator Kassebaum, I will call on Senator Adams, who has not yet had his first round of questioning.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow on a bit, too, on Senator Helms' comment about a euphoria which exists. I do not think that is true at all.

As a matter of fact, I think people, both here and in Europe, our NATO allies, have been realistic in assessing this, and I think those who have testified have also been realistic. In fact, you, yourself, have said that a second challenge is to avoid being lulled into a false sense of security on the INF Treaty.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Quite so.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I think actually there has been a very impressive sense that this is just a first step in trying to analyze what it does and does not do.

I would also like to follow on a bit on Senator Biden's saying that were we not back to really the same type of flexible response capability that we had in 1979. Given the moneys that we have spent for strengthening our defense capabilities in the last 5 or 6 years, could not the case be made that we are even better off than we were, certainly prior to 1979?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, militarily, I don't think there is any question that we have strengthened our deterrence since 1979. My concern is what is going to happen in the future.

Senator KASSEBAUM. It actually I think should be of some concern because the budget is flattening out and I do not see in the foreseeable future that it is going to grow significantly.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is worse than that, Senator Kassebaum. It has been going down, and it will have gone down for 4 straight years.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Let me ask you this. In the light of the strong buildup that we had, though, have you felt this has certainly benefited the balance in Europe and the force capabilities in Europe?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, there is no question. If you go over and visit our troops in Europe and you see the M-1 tank, the Bradley, the increase in ammunition, the spare parts, the decisions that we jointly with the Congress made back in 1980, 1981, and 1982 are now bearing dividends out in the field. We are infinitely stronger.

We are also at a much higher state of readiness. The All-Volunteer Army is working. That is why it is so important to maintain pay comparability—and you will hear more from me about this when the budget comes up.

We have made tremendous gains. There is no question. My argument is that we need to preserve those gains.

Senator KASSEBAUM. There is also going to be, I think, obviously, a growing belief that the burdensharing capability should be expanded.

Don't you agree that there is certainly room for improvement there?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Our allies actually do much more than we give them credit for.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I recognize that.

Secretary CARLUCCI. But in terms of percent of GNP, we are still the largest, and I think they need to do more and we need to make an intensive effort in that direction.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is really all I have.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Adams.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Secretary Carlucci.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you.

Senator ADAMS. I have known you for many years and in many different existences, from OMB to Ambassador to Portugal to the CIA to the Department of Defense. I am pleased that you are there. You are a professional and you are the kind of person that I think can help forge a bipartisan foreign and defense policy in this Nation.

I wanted to say that before asking any questions because I have no question about your capability and your ability to handle large bureaucracies.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ADAMS. So, as far as I am concerned, welcome to the committee.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Senator ADAMS. As part of these hearings, there have been a number of questions about warheads and recycling fissionable materials. While and I do not want to go into classified material, can you give a general idea of how many years of production of plutonium we will have if we recycle the plutonium in these weapons?

The reason I ask that is we have heard rumors over the weekend indicating that there is some question whether the N Reactor in our State will reopen again. This is in the public domain. That question has been asked. And the question was asked by Senator Helms about warheads. Unfortunately, he was not here when I asked the questions about the fact that with a nuclear warhead, you almost have to recycle it back into the stockpile because you certainly cannot blow it up; you cannot bury it in the ground; and you cannot turn it into powder. Isn't that true?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is essentially correct. I wouldn't know what to do with it.

Senator ADAMS. That is the problem we have had with civilian and military nuclear waste material, and I might say there are hundreds of millions of gallons in the ground in our State which we do not know what to do with.

So, if we implement the INF Treaty, can you give me some idea of the amount of plutonium production we will offset? We are going to save a lot of plutonium, aren't we, in the process of this? By "save it," I mean it's going to go back into what we use for our nuclear devices and the Soviets use for their nuclear devices.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

The drop in our requirements is much more a function of what the budget has obliged us to do, than it would be a function of any savings in fissionable material achieved by virtue of retaining the physics package on a Pershing missile.

Senator ADAMS. This is not a large amount of plutonium. I am not trying to say that. But the plutonium recaptured through this treaty involves a substantial amount of production because we don't produce that much plutonium every year.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No.

We would be glad in classified form to make this information available to you.

Senator ADAMS. I will ask that when we are in a classified forum, either of you yourself or of one of the other witnesses.

A second question goes to our force structure in Europe.

You have testified about the fact that we now have the M–1 main battle tank, and the Germans are using the Leopard II I believe, isn't that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That's correct.

Senator ADAMS. It is my understanding that we have about 17 divisions on readiness and they have about 19 in Central Europe in the German plain. Isn't that a rough idea?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I would have to submit something for the record on that, Senator.

Senator ADAMS. Would you please do that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator ADAMS. Here is the point.

I am going back to Senator Biden's questions. We have upgraded our forces separate from this, and the general Russian strategy is about a 4-to-1 or 5-to-1 advantage. It is my understanding, from your testimony and from the testimony of others, that we are rethinking our total strategy in Europe in terms of sealift and other items, which means that if we are faced off somewhere close to 1-to-1 on a 4-to-5 day period and then up to a 30-day period, we are not a toothless tiger in Central Europe.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, I don't think I ever said we were.

Senator ADAMS. Well, others have.

I cannot believe 19 Russian divisions can break through 17 German and U.S. divisions, armed with M–1 tanks, Leopard II's, with basic air superiority in Central Europe. The answer to this question determine to a very great degree both future defense expenditures and whether or not we ought to have this kind of treaty.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have a stable deterrent. But it carries with it a degree of risk that is too high for my comfort or the comfort of the Joint Chiefs, which is why we need to get on with the modernization programs and the Conventional Defense Initiative Program. It has nothing to do with the INF Treaty.

Senator ADAMS. That's correct. This is an entirely different——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely.

Senator ADAMS [continuing]. Conventional analysis should, in my opinion, be left out of the INF Treaty. But, a conventional analysis is important and involves both offensive counterattack strategies and Russian deployment strategies.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Exactly.

Senator ADAMS. Senator Helms mentioned mines. People are talking about such simple things as tank traps and other items that channel.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Terrain enhancements, yes.

Senator ADAMS. Yes.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are looking at the whole range of things.

Before you came in, I mentioned that we have been studying what we call "competitive strategies," pitting our enduring strengths against the Soviets' enduring weaknesses, so that we can deal more effectively with air defense or with massed Soviet battle tanks, going more to smart munitions, standoff weapons. All of those are things that are under examination in one way or another. Some of them are further on in the process, in actual development.

Senator ADAMS. That brings me to my question.

In the course of this, is there a discussion of what this new man, Gorbachev, brings into the equation? The Russian strategy, the Stalin strategy, was never fight again on Russian soil, which has created the whole Eastern bloc and so on.

This, though, is part of the mutual reduction in force discussions, is it not, and it should be separate from the INF. This treaty as Senator Biden pointed out, really takes us back to about 1977, in terms of the nuclear exchange. Yet, we are probably stronger in the conventional area now than in 1977.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No. Taken out of context, your last statement, I do not accept—we are not stronger in the conventional area. There are asymmetries in the conventional area.

Senator ADAMS. No, no. I don't say that we are stronger than they are. I am simply saying that we are stronger now conventionally than we were in 1977.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, yes. Clearly.

But in terms of Soviet strategy and doctrine, unfortunately we have not seen a change to match Mr. Gorbachev's rhetoric. The weapon systems continue to pour off the production lines, and we have no suggestion that they have changed their doctrine—although there is one interesting development. This is that at Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion, I will meet with my Soviet counterpart, Minister Yasov, to discuss, among other things, our respective doctrines. So the Soviets have proposed a discussion in this area and we will see what they have to offer.

But we have no grounds for believing that the INF has resulted in any change of Soviet doctrine or strategy at this point.

Senator ADAMS. But the INF, by removing the SS-20's and other intermediate-range missiles, does help protect the NATO rear control systems and so on, does it not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator ADAMS. So it is a positive contribution to the conventional force face-off?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. I prefer to say it is a positive contribution to our deterrent capability in Europe. That is the way I would put it.

Senator ADAMS. That is very acceptable.

Secretary CARLUCCI. It contributes to flexible response.

Senator ADAMS. To flexible response. And we, according to your testimony, are reexamining our NATO strategy in toto at this point, not just based on the INF but on the whole idea of parity.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I don't want to say that we are reexamining our NATO strategy.

Senator ADAMS. Reexamining our force structure.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Force structure would be fine.

Senator ADAMS. The lingo, Mr. Secretary, is something we all have to be very careful of, and I apologize for using the wrong word.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Adams.

Senator Murkowski has not had his first round of questions.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Good morning.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I have just returned from the funeral of President Chiang, so I am a little groggy from about 27 hours on an airplane. So please excuse me, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary.

Let me ask a relatively simple question. I am sure it has been posed in other ways.

In your opinion, does this treaty make your job a little easier or substantially more difficult?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, it gives me one more bureaucracy, which I——

Senator MURKOWSKI. Which you don't need, obviously.

Secretary CARLUCCI. But it makes the job easier in terms of enhancing our deterrent capability.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I noted that there is a reference in your testimony that the INF Treaty does not necessarily exacerbat NATO's defense needs; rather, it heightens awareness of the risks, et cetera.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That's correct.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Isn't that a bit of a conflicting statement?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No.

Senator MURKOWSKI. It makes it easier, yet the risks implied might be higher?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Irrespective of the INF Treaty, we have been for some time concerned about certain NATO inadequacies. We talked earlier, before you came in, about modernization of such things as the Lance and the artillery fired atomic projectiles. We have been concerned about the conventional imbalance. We are making progress in all these areas.

We are concerned about such things as sustainability. It does you no good to have qualitative superiority if everybody runs out of ammunition.

So these are all things that have been a matter of concern to us, and, just like this hearing is doing, the INF agreement is beginning to focus attention on these issues. The deficiencies do not result from the INF agreement. They are longstanding deficiencies on which programs exist to correct them. But it highlights the imperative of moving ahead vigorously on these programs.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Let me turn very briefly to the verification issue.

Recognizing the significant meetings and discussions that went into the formulation of the agreement, is the verification better than you had hoped for, or less than you had hoped for? Are you content with it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, I dare say that 2 years ago, very few people in this country would have thought that the Soviet Union would have accepted the kind of intrusive, onsite verification that is contained in this treaty. It has been persistent negotiations, coupled with NATO resolve—our resolve to maintain the deployments of the Pershings and the GLCM's—that has brought about this change. It is not a gesture of goodwill on the part of the Soviets.

But the verification provisions are very far-reaching.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Do you feel they are adequate for your purpose and your responsibility?

Secretary CARLUCCI. In general, they meet our requirements. Yes, sir.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, as far as you are concerned, you are basically content with it, as far as the operational responsibility that you have.

My point is this. If we went back with any modifications here, do you have any suggestions specifically of items that might be included? Are there areas where you feel a little unsure?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Under the verification provisions of this treaty, I am confident that we could, certainly over a period of time, detect Soviet violations before they became militarily significant.

I think a larger issue is compliance, and that is an issue that the executive branch cannot address alone. It has to be addressed jointly with the Congress, and this has come up in the context of several other exchanges in this hearing.

But in terms of verification, we think that the treaty is effectively verifiable.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Carlucci.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.

Just by way of announcement, I will add that the committee will be meeting at 3 p.m. to hear Mr. Nitze. Senator Biden had a medical problem and was not able to be at the meeting before.

Also tomorrow, we meet again at 9 a.m. in the morning to hear the former Secretaries of Defense, and then at 2 p.m. we meet in executive session for the discussion of Contra aid. I would hope that that vote could occur, prior to 4 p.m.

Senator Sarbanes, I would ask you to preside for a few minutes, while I make a call. Oh, Senator Biden is here and he will preside for me.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to clarify one matter that came up in our earlier discussion.

I made references to the dispute over the number of SS-20 missiles that exist, and the assertion that the Beecher article would indicate that there are 2,250 such missiles. That figure was premised on the proposition, as I understand Senator Helms' statement about it, that Beecher stated in his article that the Soviets had a plan to deploy SS-20's in a ratio of five missiles to one launcher.

I have read the Beecher article over and over again, and I find no reference in that article to any such ratio of five missiles to each launcher.

The figure of 2,250 missiles would work out at that ratio, but I don't know where the ratio comes from. In any event, I don't think the source cited for it, the Beecher article, in fact makes any reference of that sort.

In fact, as I understand it, while there may be some differences within our intelligence community over the number of SS-20 missiles, I do not believe there is any estimate that even begins to approximate figures of that magnitude—2,250—is that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I have not seen any figures of that magnitude in any of the briefings that I have received, in terms of refire capability. It sounds larger than the intelligence estimates that I have received.

Senator SARBANES. Now I take it under the treaty, each missile and each launcher will be destroyed, is that correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct, all missiles and launchers.

Senator SARBANES. And all the support infrastructure, or at least a significant portion of it.

Secretary CARLUCCI. A significant portion is eliminated.

Senator SARBANES. What would be the significance or the danger to us if some missiles were not declared—in other words, if the numbers declared fell short of the number of missiles which actually existed? What danger would that pose for us?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, of course, it depends, first of all, on the number. If the number was relatively small, it obviously would be of no or very little military significance. Also it depends on the number of missiles the Soviet Union has overall.

If you are talking about a Soviet Union with 11,000 warheads in a non-START constrained atmosphere, obviously covertly stored missiles may be less militarily significant if than you have a reduction to 6,000 warheads.

If there is a cheating scenario—and I assume there is always a possibility of cheating—this is the most realistic one. They currently have some nondeployed missiles that they could stash away.

The problem is that over a period of time, they would lose confidence in those missiles. They cannot test them. They cannot train their people, and everything we know about the Soviet Union tells us that they want to test and they want to train to the limit of their capability. Otherwise they lose confidence in a system.

Senator SARBANES. Does the prohibition on testing begin from the very start of this treaty?

Secretary CARLUCCI. From the day the treaty goes into effect, any flight test of an INF missile is a violation of the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. As of that moment.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That's right.

Senator SARBANES. Whereas the treaty does not phase out all of the missiles until 3 years later, is that not correct?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That's correct.

Senator SARBANES. So we have at least a 3 year period while the numbers of missiles are being reduced in which any testing is precluded——

Secretary CARLUCCI. That's correct.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Even though the Soviets will retain some of their missiles and we will retain some of ours until the end of the 3 year period.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct. So we would detect testing and that would be a violation.

Excuse me—one qualification of a sort. They are allowed to launch to destruction, as are we, 100 IRM's in the first 6 months of the treaty. But any flight not for the purposes of destruction would be a violation.

Senator SARBANES. Constant reference has been made to the situation or the conventional forces, and one can debate how much of a gap there is—there are differing views on that—and how to go about correcting it.

What I do not understand is why eliminating the present Soviet advantage in intermediate-range missiles would make the conventional situation worse for the West.

I mean, assuming there is a conventional imbalance, why would eliminating the Soviet advantage in INF weapons worsen our conventional problem?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I'm afraid I cannot help you with that, Senator Sarbanes because I do not understand it either. If anything, militarily we are better off. We have more flexibility to move our conventional forces.

Senator SARBANES. You, of course, are in close consultation with our European allies. Suppose the Senate were not to ratify this treaty, which, of course, could happen with only a small minority of the Senators taking that position, since the treaty requires a full two-thirds majority in order to be ratified.

What would be the impact in Europe?

First of all, do you think we would be able to continue to deploy INF weapons that have not yet been deployed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, sir.

I do not believe we would be able to continue to deploy. I think there would be substantial adverse repercussions on NATO. I think, without question, this would weaken the cohesion of NATO. We would not be able to deploy. I think it would impact adversely on our other ongoing programs that we have already discussed today, and it would leave the Soviets with their SS–20's, SS–4's, SS–5's, and SS–23's intact and continuing to proliferate.

Senator SARBANES. Let me take it a step further.

In addition to not being able to make additional deployments, would it not bring forth again as a major controversy the continued deployment of those intermediate-range systems that have already been deployed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I mean, they are there now. They are scheduled to be eliminated under this treaty. They were controversial when they were put into place. In addition to the problem of additional deployment in case the treaty is not ratified, what would we face in terms of maintaining in place the systems that are already there?

Secretary **Carlucci**. A great many problems, Senator Sarbanes.

In a number of cases, our allies stood up with great courage to the peace movements and to the Communists to deploy these systems. There is no widespread expectation that the systems will come down.

So it would be virtually like fighting the battle of deployment all over again. When you have the mayor of Comiso, who is a Communist, fighting very hard against these kinds of things, just as one example, it creates severe political problems.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, it would be especially difficult since we would be hard-put to come up with a rationale for having made that decision.

I mean, we had a difficult fight when we deployed them, but there was a rationale behind the deployment. Not everyone accepted it, but it could be argued.

What rationale could be advanced now for not moving forward with this treaty?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, the rationale was, of course, to force the Soviets to negotiate the reduction of the SS-20's. The only rationale I could offer if this treaty is not ratified is that we still need the systems there in the face of the continuing proliferation of Soviet INF missiles. But that is going to be a hard sell with the Europeans, there is no question.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Biden** [presiding]. Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Chairman, I have just arrived. If you could, skip me and then come back to me on the next round.

Senator **Biden**. Very well, Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Let me finish, Mr. Chairman, if I may, on my interest in the NATO forces.

I have noted that Gen. Bernard Rogers has come out against this treaty. A lot of people, such as Jean Kirkpatrick, have said that it is a bad treaty but the Senate should ratify it anyway. General Rogers is one of the few who have really taken a strong position against it. I know that he served as the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He served 8 years in that capacity.

I think we need to look at some of the things he is saying about that treaty because he was on the scene. He was our commander in NATO.

There is one area, Secretary Carlucci, where he summarized his arguments against it, by saying that the treaty "puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, which is what the Soviets want. Such denuclearization would make Western Europe safe for Warsaw Pact conventional aggression, with no fear of nuclear escalation. The risk of starting down the slippery slopes of denuclearization is that it brings NATO from a range of 1,500 miles to a range of 300 miles for its theater land-based systems. This may well open the door, with the German people applying the pressure, to slide on down to a range of zero total denuclearization. After all, the theater systems that will remain will generally be able to strike targets only on German territory, West and East German."

What is your reaction to General Rogers' opposition to the treaty and to his summary of his position?

Secretary CARLUCCI. First of all, let me point out that I gather the committee is going to hear from General Rogers. But I believe you are also hearing from General Galvin, the current SACEUR, as well as from the Joint Chiefs, all of whom support the treaty.

General Rogers is essentially making a political, not a military judgment, when he talks about the denuclearization of Europe. The Joint Chiefs' assessment of the treaty is that militarily it is advantageous to us.

Now, it is true there are political currents in Europe that would push us into a negotiation on the so-called third zero, the denuclearization of Europe. We need to be very firm in resisting this.

We have taken a clear position against it. The formulation worked out by NATO Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik makes clear that we do not negotiate below 500 kilometers until we have achieved a stable, conventional balance. We need to adhere to that formula. That is a formula that has been agreed upon in NATO.

If we stand firm, then I think we can resist the trend toward denuclearization of Europe.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Secretary, you were required to do a report last week on the military implications of the INF Treaty, and you stated that before entering into our agreements with the Soviets, we made sure that from the standpoint of the military implication of the INF Treaty, NATO's resulting force structure would be fully capable of supporting deterrence, provided that we vigorously pursue the necessary modernization and make effective use of gains in capability achieved over the last few years.

Your emphasis on this modernization did not include a figure. However, the law requiring the report suggested that some discussion of the costs of such weapons and prospects be provided.

It has been estimated that what you suggested would cost at least $10 billion. It will cost something, certainly.

What would you suggest that it would cost?

Secretary CARLUCCI. If you are talking about modernization pursuant to the Montebello decision, a $10 billion figure is absurd.

We will try in the budget to cost out the conventional improvements, to aggregate them. But if you are developing, for example, an ATACM, an Army Tactical Missile System, that is of utility in places other than just NATO. So it is very difficult to segregate the costs completely.

We have not yet made a decision on which system is best, for the TASM, the Tactical Air Stand-off Missile, or for the follow-on to Lance.

In the latter case, as I indicated earlier, we are impeded by congressional legislation, which does not allow us to look at one of the systems, ATACM's, in a nuclear configuration.

So we cannot really put a price tag on that at this point.

But we will in the budget attempt to cost these out as best we can. The systems are listed in the so-called Byrd-Quayle report.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

For the record, one part of that law requested a discussion of the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of substituting advanced conventional munitions for nuclear weapons currently employed by NATO, including a discussion of the costs of such weapons and prospects for sharing such costs among NATO allies. I could not find any real cost estimates in the report.

Is it possible that you could provide the best estimates?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Those will be provided in the budget. We will have costs. We will have figures against those systems in the budget.

Senator PRESSLER. And that will come up here when?

Secretary CARLUCCI. February 18.

Senator PRESSLER. The report on the military impact of the INF Treaty said that Congress should allow development of a new nuclear tipped army tactical missile, I believe, a system, which would replace the aging Lance missiles.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is what I was just referring to, yes, sir.

Senator PRESSLER. The report also called on Congress to lift restrictions on additional production of nuclear tipped artillery shells, which you probably also were just referring to, and to provide new funds for nuclear bombs and missiles to be deployed on aircraft based in Europe.

My point is maybe we will do it, maybe we will not. But the original law also asked for cost estimates in that area. I wonder if we could get those. We will get them, as you say, in the budget.

But if you could provide your best estimates for the record for this committee, I would very much appreciate it.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. But with all due respect, Senator Pressler, we are kind of caught in a catch-22, because we cannot consider one of the major systems for the follow-on to Lance, yet we are being asked to provide cost data on the follow-on to Lance.

We will do our best.

[The information referred to follows:]

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE INF TREATY

The requirements for modernizing NATO weapons, which had been identified by NATO political and military authorities prior to and independent of the INF Treaty, have drawn additional attention with the signing of the Treaty. Two weapons programs are addressed. Follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) development was budgeted to begin with $15.0 million in FY 1989. Development of a strategic, conventional cruise missile, which includes the Cruise Missile Advanced Guidance (CMAG) and Propfan Programs, has been enhanced with the addition of $10 million in FY 1988 and $50 million in FY 1989. Several other adjustments to conventional and nuclear forces are under consideration. The following table provides cost estimates for DoD programs that were not in the FY 1988/89 Five Year Plan but are being considered. As alluded to earlier, the cost estimates are dependent upon the actual method selected to satisfy the mission, therefore a range of costs is provided.

Cost estimate

[In billions of dollars]

Program:	
Follow-on to Lance (FOTL)	0.5–1.0
Tactical air to surface missile (TASM)	.3–1.1
Additional nuclear artillery modernization	.2
Potential force deployment changes	.2–.3

Senator **PRESSLER**. Thank you very much.

The **CHAIRMAN** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Pressler.

Senator Adams.

Senator **ADAMS**. I just want to state, Mr. Chairman, that I believe this is a great opportunity to once again reestablish a bipartisan foreign policy for the United States. I am in support of the treaty and I very much hope that we will neither amend it nor in any way send it back to the Soviets, but proceed forward.

I appreciate the testimony of the Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **BOSCHWITZ**. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry that I missed your testimony this morning. I just came in from Minnesota. Unfortunately, the planes do not leave very early.

I, too, echo the Senator from Washington's hope that we can achieve bipartisanship in foreign policy. It certainly goes beyond this treaty, however and refers to a number of matters on which there has been considerable contentiousness. But perhaps a good place to start with that bipartisanship will be a vote that we are going to have, I believe this Thursday. It probably will draw apart some of the bipartisanship that might be built as a result of this treaty.

Mr. Secretary, in reading through some of this over the weekend, I was struck by the fact that 100 intermediate-range missiles, but no short-range missiles could be eliminated by launching. I did not understand the rationale for that, and wondered whether or not a massive amount of testing could not thereby be undertaken, and if that testing would not be inconsistent with the aims of this treaty, and whether or not that testing might not give longer life to weapons that may or may not be revealed by the Soviets?

Secretary **CARLUCCI**. That is why there was a limit put on it, as to the number of missiles and timeframe for launch to destruction.

Senator **BOSCHWITZ**. But 100 is a big number. They can conduct a lot of tests.

Secretary **CARLUCCI**. Senator Boschwitz, one of the reasons was to reduce the overall timeframe in which elimination takes place. Otherwise, the Soviets, who have many more missiles than we to destroy would have insisted that we stretch out the 3-year period.

Senator **BOSCHWITZ**. But the difficult things to destroy are not being destroyed.

Secretary **CARLUCCI**. Also, let me add, as I indicated, there is a limited timeframe, the first 6 months, and there is to be no telemetry broadcast except for range safety purposes.

Senator **BOSCHWITZ**. Pardon me?

Secretary **CARLUCCI**. There is to be no telemetry, so neither side could gain useful reliability information from launchers to destruction.

Senator **BOSCHWITZ**. The difficult things to destroy, as I understand it, are not being destroyed: the fissionable material, particularly. The other materials are not that difficult to eliminate, are they?

Secretary **CARLUCCI**. What is being destroyed—and I described this earlier—as the stages. And then, if you take the front end, the front end of the missile [indicating], we will be taking out the radar, the warhead section, and the guidance and control section. Everything else will be crushed.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Crushed. That is not so difficult to do.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No. But when you destroy the stages through a static firing or an explosion, you do have environmental concerns.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You are not concerned about the fact that popping off 100 missiles can give a good deal of opportunity to test those missiles? That is quite a large number of missiles to fire away.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think that is a manageable problem. These are systems, 80 percent of which would be eliminated in the first 29 months. Again, the only telemetry that is allowed is range safety telemetry.

So we do not think that they would gain much by it.

On the other hand, we gain substantially in shortening the timeframe for the implementation of the treaty.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Since the START Treaty is not unlikely to follow upon this treaty, and since the talk concerning that treaty is that half the strategic missiles of both sides will be eliminated, are we to be concerned about the number of missiles that will be left if half are eliminated?

Will we have enough missiles to target the multiplicity of targets that they have?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Without getting into a classified area, Senator Boschwitz, the Joint Chiefs have examined the 50-percent reductions in light of military sufficiency, and the answer is "Yes." They agree that you can have the 50-percent reduction. They would not like to go lower than that.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is correct to say, however, that we have fewer targets than they?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I really would prefer not to get into the area of targeting in an open session.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I see.

Mr. Chairman, if I may yield, I would reserve the balance of my time. So I will pass at the moment with further questions to follow.

How long, Mr. Chairman, will the Secretary be here?

The CHAIRMAN. He could be here until as late as 1:30, but that seems hard on him because he does not get lunch then.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, come back to me.

The CHAIRMAN. But he cannot come back because he has another meeting.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, come back to me, if you will.

The CHAIRMAN. We will.

It is my turn now, and I will pass and will call on the ranking minority member.

Senator HELMS. You caught me by surprise, Mr. Chairman, but I thank you.

I find myself intrigued at some of my Senator friends who are attempting to pick holes in the information that I have given. For example, one Senator said he had read the Beecher article and he didn't find any allusion to the figures that I mentioned.

Well, the fact is that the Beecher article is only one of the articles to which I alluded, and I said that very clearly for the record, and also in printed material.

Senator SARBANES. Would the Senator yield on that very point.

Senator HELMS. No, sir. No, sir, I am going to let you do it on your own time, if you don't mind.

Now, as for the statement that there are no mines that you know of, I think you want to look at that, Mr. Secretary.

Furthermore, again, I didn't confine my comments to mines. I said "sea mines, depth charges, and so forth."

Now, I have pretty good authority in many ways for what I said, including General Rogers, the former NATO Commander. He puts it very succinctly, what is going on in so much of this testimony, and the self-laudatory evaluations of this treaty.

General Rogers said, and I quote him: "I am also concerned by the glib rationales being put forth by some persons to justify the double zero agreement. One is the Montebello decision left 4,600 land-based nuclear warheads in Western Europe. Surely that is plenty."

Then, General Rogers said, "However, when one strips away the 572 NATO LRINF weapons, we would eliminate what is the composition of the remainder." And he says—this is not Jesse Helms—he says, "A few maritime nuclear depth charges with zero range."

Then, further down, he says that another rationale often heard to justify double zero INF is, "The Soviets are giving up 1,550 warheads and the United States and West Germany only about 430. Surely that's a good deal for NATO."

Well, we heard that repeatedly last week.

General Rogers says, "Again, numbers only count if NATO has to fight. But for NATO, the name of the game is deterrence, the prevention of fighting so long as its nations can retain their freedom. The fact is that the Soviets will be giving up only about 3 percent of their current nuclear warheads. Almost all of the remaining 97 percent, thousands of warheads, can strike Western Europe if the Soviets wish. And 14 of the 16 NATO nations are in the Western European area. And what is NATO giving up? The one theater weapon system that in the eyes of the Soviets makes NATO's deterrent highly credible, the P-II."

Now, let us go back, if I may, and look at the 200 warheads which can be delivered by the F-111. We were talking about that earlier in my last round.

One of the difficulties here is there is about a 30-minute gap, at a minimum, between a line of questioning.

What is the approximate range of the F-111 system?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, it can reach into Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union. I don't know the precise range.

Senator HELMS. It's 400 to 700 kilometers.

Does the F-111, as presently configured, have sufficient refueling capability and penetration capability, to be able to deliver warheads to targets deep in the Soviet territory?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We think it is an effective deterrent and that it has the capability of penetrating the Soviet territory, yes.

Senator HELMS. You don't want to answer it yes or no, do you?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are getting into highly sensitive areas, and I would prefer to deal with them in a classified fashion.

Senator HELMS. Well, I don't think it is highly classified. But I will let you make the judgment on that. And I know the answer to my own question.

Has the Warsaw Pact significantly upgraded its air defenses since the 1979 decision to deploy the Pershing II?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Soviet Union has made vast strides consistently in upgrading its air defenses. It has the most effective air defense system in the world.

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Will that not make it harder for the F-111 to get through than before we decided to deploy the Pershing II?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It will make it harder for the FB-111 to get through. But, at the same time, the fact that we have developed standoff weapons, Cruise missiles, and all kinds of new developments in the strategic area will allow us to maintain a credible deterrent and to implement NATO's strategy of flexible response.

Senator HELMS. The point is as General Rogers made it.

He is a pretty good authority, having been a former NATO Commander. It is that we are giving up NATO's deterrent.

Now, I am not going to get into the business of trying to read the minds of people in Europe. But you would be astonished at how many, how many people from Europe, have expressed to me since the hearings began last week that they are terribly alarmed about this treaty, that they feel intimidated by it.

I mentioned the French editor who came to me last week, and so forth.

I hope that we can somehow make a silk purse out of this thing. Jeane Kirkpatrick had a suggestion that occurred to me during the Christmas holidays about our abrogation of the treaty automatically with the very first Soviet violation of it. The trouble is that the Pershings will be gone then.

A lot of us are thinking, and I hope that we won't get obsessed with this business of "killer amendments." I would prefer to call them amendments to prevent us from being killed, and NATO, because the Soviets have got the SS-25. They can hit either short range or long range, meaning us.

But we will try to work it out and do it as amicably as possible. But I think these questions ought to be raised.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Helms, let me say that General Rogers is a respected military man. At the same time, I would hope you would give equal weight to the testimony of the current SACEUR and to the testimony of the Joint Chiefs, all of whom are supportive of the treaty.

Senator HELMS. Whatever.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I am going to yield for just a few seconds here to the Senator from Maryland, to be able to answer or to make a comment on what the Senator from North Carolina had to say.

Senator SARBANES. I appreciate the Senator yielding.

I simply want to make sure the record is very clear.

Senator Helms stated last week, and I now quote him from the transcript: "In 1976, William Beecher," who I might add, is a reporter from the Boston Globe "revealed that the Soviets had a 5-year plan to deploy SS-20 launchers in a ratio of five missiles to one launcher."

But there is nothing in the Beecher article which says that the Soviets were building five missiles for each SS-20 launcher.

Now, Senator Helms said today that he had other sources for that assertion, and that may be the case, and I don't know what those other sources are. But the assertion which he made last week before the committee, and which has been repeated in a statement that he put out, is that the Beecher article revealed a Soviet plan to have a ratio of five missiles to one launcher, and there is no such statement in the Beecher article.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I think you will find that the official transcript will show what I actually said.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I am quoting from it right here, I would say to the Senator, on page——

Senator HELMS. No, you are not.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, I am. "In 1976, William Beecher revealed that the Soviets had a 5-year plan to deploy SS-20 launchers in a ratio of five missiles to one launcher."

Senator HELMS. Well, what counts is what was said.

Senator SARBANES. And then you go on to talk about the Beecher analysis, but that ratio is not in the Beecher article. I just think that ought to be made clear.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I think this is useful, but maybe it could not be taken out of my time.

Go ahead, Jesse, why don't you answer. I think this is a useful exercise.

Senator HELMS. I have said that the New York Times has published, Evans and Novak. There is a bevy of articles on this subject. What counts is what I said here and, of course, the Senator extrapolates and expands on every prepared speech he has ever made, and so do I.

But I am saying that there is a sound basis for questioning these figures, and that is what I am doing and that is what I am going to continue to do.

I'm sorry it offends the Senator, but I am going to continue to do it.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I want to make it very clear that the Senator is not offending me. I just want to make the record clear.

Later that same morning, after Senator Cranston had made a response, Senator Helms said, and I now quote him again, "I think I explained in my opening remarks that what Beecher reported in 1976 was a Soviet plan to deploy SS-20's at a rate of five missiles, five reload missiles, for every launcher."

Beecher did not say any such thing in his article.

Senator HELMS. Well, the Senator got a copy of this [indicating], and it says, "U.S. intelligence estimate of total SS-20's produced based on William Beecher, September, 1976, and various press." I had this before me when I discussed it, and you had it before you. You are nitpicking, that is what you are doing.

[The chart referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are going to set the record straight, and I think it is important to do it. If the Senator is going to make these assertions and then when you read the article you see there is no reference to it whatever, I think that goes beyond "nitpicking."

Senator **Helms**. Well, I will just say again, and thank you, Senator Biden for yielding——

Senator **Biden**. I'm just sorry that I cannot turn and watch this. [Laughter.]

Senator **Helms**. It says, "U.S. intelligence estimate of total SS-20's produced based on William Beecher, September 1976, and various press."

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, you ought to take Beecher out of it, at least, because there is nothing in his article about it, and that is very clear.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I know the Senator would like——

Senator **Sarbanes**. And I take it now you are no longer asserting that it is in the Beecher article.

Senator **Helms** [continuing]. I know the Senator would like to get the Beecher out of it because it is very damaging to his case in support of the treaty. But no, it will stay.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Then the Senator continues to cite it to support this 5-for-1 proposition, that that is in the Beecher article?

Senator **Helms**. I support the 5-to-1 ratio in the cumulation of responsible articles, just like I said.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Is it in the Beecher article?

Senator **Helms**. Just like I said.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Is it in the Beecher article?

Senator **Helms**. I don't recall, but that is a minor point because I said and various press or other newspapers. I think I mentioned the New York Times and Evans and Novak. I still say the Senator is nitpicking. But we can go to the official transcript, if he wants to.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, I have just done that and it is not in the Beecher article, and I take it the Senator is not now asserting that it is.

I think I have made my point, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I still say, Mr. Chairman, that what we say here counts, and no typewritten speech counts for over and above what a Senator says here in the public forum.

Senator **Sarbanes**. But that is what I am quoting, Senator. I am noting from a transcript of your comments before this committee, exactly. That is precisely what I quoted from.

Senator **Helms**. Well, the Senator is wrong.

Senator **Biden**. Well, thank you.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you know why sometimes we are confused here.

I am not quite sure where to start.

The **Chairman**. I think your 10 minutes may have almost expired.

Senator **Biden**. I thought I asked permission, Mr. Chairman, that that not be taken out of my 10 minutes.

The **Chairman**. I don't recall that.

Senator BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that that enlightening exchange not be taken out of my 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would——

Senator BIDEN. All right, forget it.

Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I really don't object, but I would suggest to the Senator that he make that request in advance because I gathered from his comments that he made——

Senator BIDEN. We are wasting time now. If you want to go, go ahead.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The Senator, I don't know what happened to him, but he is a little testy this morning, if I may say so.

Senator BIDEN. I just think we waste so much time not accommodating people around here. Why don't we just accommodate one another. I accommodated my colleague.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be my great fault. I accommodate too much, I think.

Senator BIDEN. How much time do I have left under the official rules, according to the transcript that Senator Helms says is not a transcript.

Mr. BOWMAN. You have a total of about 7 minutes.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I would ask the Senator are you now accommodating your colleagues by those kind of statements?

Senator BIDEN. How much time do I have left?

Mr. BOWMAN. You have 7 minutes left, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

I don't yield on my time and I will not accommodate.

Mr. Secretary, there was a comment about these invulnerable air defenses of the Soviet Union. I found it interesting. I was standing in Red Square about 2 weeks ago, and the probably KGB guide with me proudly pointed out that the bridge we were about to cross as we left Red Square is where a young fellow named Mathias Rust had landed his aircraft, through these supposedly impenetrable Soviet air defense systems.

I just think that is kind of interesting to point out. I realize I am being anecdotal in pointing that out, but it is interesting.

I spent 10 days in Europe, and notwithstanding what the Senator from North Carolina has said, I think I had about 40 or 41 meetings. I met with a prime minister, a president, a chancellor, defense ministers, foreign ministers, their chief bureaucratic counterparts, their legislative counterparts, and I did not hear anything along the lines that I have heard here that there is great consternation about the INF Treaty in Europe, that they are not for the treaty, et cetera.

The record does not sustain that at all, at least not that I have seen thus far. Granted, my 10 days in Europe does not answer all the questions. But I did meet with, I believe, with the exception of one defense minister, every major player from Gaullist in France to SPD leaders in Germany. And I did not hear outright opposition from anyone at all—from no one, including Mr. Giraud, your counterpart in France, who called it a "Second Munich" when it was signed. He has substantially changed his view on that.

With regard to the notion that the Soviets can still hit all those European targets and we can't hit the Soviet Union, well, the fact of the matter is that we have about 9,000 nuclear warheads that can rain upon the Soviet Union. Granted, they are strategic systems—most of them. Some of them are forward-based systems.

But the fact is that it is not like the Soviet Union is not making concessions in signing on to this agreement, which is what I think we are led to believe.

I would like to wander off into an another area before my next round. I will not complete this, I am sure. It is about START, which I would like to discuss just a little bit.

INF was, in my view, although it has military applicability, it was largely a political victory for NATO, whereas START is going to have to be measured by its military significance and how it impacts upon and measures strategic nuclear stability.

Do you think, Mr. Chairman, that the START agreement should be comprehensive, covering all systems able to strike the United States and Soviet territory? Or should some systems, such as the forward-based systems and sea-launched Cruise missiles be omitted?

Have you a view on that?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the sea-launched Cruise missile and such things as the Backfire are particularly sensitive items.

We have agreed that there should be some kind of limit on nuclear sea-launched Cruise missiles outside the START 6,000 limit.

Senator BIDEN. What is our position on mobile ICBM's?

As I understand it, mobiles are generally considered to be more stabilizing than silo-based ICBM's? Is the U.S. position still to propose a ban on mobile ICBM's?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Our position at the negotiating table is that mobile ICBM's should be banned.

We do recognize, as you say, that mobile systems do add a stability factor to the overall strategic equation. But that is offset by the very great difficulty in verifying mobile systems, particularly nondeployed mobile systems. We are in a dialog with the Soviets on the verification issue.

They claim that they are verifiable. We have said all right, show us.

Senator BIDEN. The President has been determined to avoid any agreement that would clarify which tests of strategic defense technology are permissible and which are not.

The administration has portrayed this as a concession that we are unwilling to make to the Soviet Union. But, ultimately, Mr. Secretary, isn't an agreement on strategic defenses something that we will need for our own security as a prerequisite to entering a regime of deep reductions in offensive systems?

To put it another way, would we be prepared to cut our strategic forces by 50 percent if the Soviets had a full-scale effort to develop and test a nationwide strategic defense system?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I do not think there is an "if" in that equation. They are moving ahead very rapidly on strategic defenses.

No, I do not think we have ever argued that there should not be constraints on defense systems.

We indeed have proposed a 7-year nonwithdrawal period, with regard to the ABM Treaty. So we agree that the nondeployment provisions of the ABM Treaty are of military benefit to us over a certain period of time.

The Soviets frankly, given the configuration of their strategic defenses, are in a position to break out more rapidly than we are.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Boschwitz, I believe you and Senator Murkowski have each had one turn.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I have already had some questioning. Go ahead.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I will proceed very briefly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I will come back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Secretary, there has been some discussion with regard to the third zero option, and it is my understanding that that would eliminate all nuclear weapons from the European theater. Recognizing that we are talking in this treaty about the intermediate range, for the record, from the standpoint of the next logical followup, assuming that this treaty is ratified, leads me to the question of whether a third zero option is a natural followup and could be assumed to be a part of the treaty, as opposed to a decisive step by itself. Recognizing that there will be political pressures to include the total reduction of all nuclear weapons, ground weapons and so forth, from Europe, how can we make very sure, as we contemplate creating a record here, that there is not an assumption that somehow the spirit of intent was to eliminate all nuclear weapons in Europe?

Would you in your answer separate the INF from the dependence, as you see NATO's military capability, somewhat dependent on ground nuclear capabilities, other than that encompassed by INF.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The answer is categorically "No." There is no assumption that the third zero, negotiations below 500 kilometers, is a logical follow-on to this treaty.

With your permission, I think it probably would be good to submit for the record the formula arrived at by the NATO foreign ministers at the meeting in Reykjavik last June where they laid out a framework for arms control negotiations. It is very clear that NATO does not want to go ahead with below 500 negotiations until a stable conventional balance has been reached.

So I think we need to be just as forceful as possible.

Senator MURKOWSKI. If I may interrupt you, you say "until a stable conventional force." Aren't you kind of conditioning? That is my concern for the record. It would seem to me that you are kind of conditioning this?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I am citing from memory, now and I would like to be able to correct this for the record because it is a finely tuned formula.

What the formula says is after the INF Treaty, we need to move on to strategic, chemical, conventional, and only after we have achieved a stable conventional balance do we contemplate negotiations on nuclear forces below 500 kilometers.

That is the position of the NATO governments.

So, I think it is important that that be made part of this advice and consent record, and, with your permission, I will submit it for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

REYKJAVIK LANGUAGE ON POST-INF ARMS CONTROL APPROACH

Concerning future arms control priorities after INF, the Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik reads:

"They [the allies] consider that an INF agreement on this basis would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, would include:

> "a 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and Soviet Union, to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations;
>
> "the global elimination of chemical weapons;
>
> "the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
>
> "In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings."

Secretary CARLUCCI. But our position is categoric on that. There should be no negotiations below zero until a stable conventional balance has been reached.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Now, Mr. Secretary, the point of a conventional equity of some kind of evaluation would be made and determined mutually?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, you would get a conventional arms agreement pursuant to the stability talks being held in Vienna, and you would have such an agreement before the Senate for advice and consent. So you would be able to make a judgment on whether that agreement is adequate.

Senator MURKOWSKI. My concern here is whether the INF Treaty binds us into drifting into a third zero option——

Secretary CARLUCCI. It does not.

Senator MURKOWSKI [continuing.] By intent, or whether the third zero option stands by itself, upon its own evaluation of what our terms and conditions might be in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the INF Treaty does not get us into a third zero option by intent.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Would it, in itself, necessitate specific talks to achieve a third zero option?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Oh, yes. You would have to have separate discussions on that.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So we would basically terminate the action on the INF ratification and at some point in time begin a separate process on the zero option, a third zero option, excuse me? Is that the logical sequence?

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, that is not the sequence.

Senator MURKOWSKI. OK.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The sequence is that after ratification of INF, we move on to START chemical and conventional before we get to any discussions on the third zero. In other words, these other negotiations first.

Senator **Murkowski**. OK.

How does a third zero start? Let's assume that we have moved and ratified the INF.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Let's assume that we've ratified INF, we've ratified START, we've solved the perplexing problem of chemical weapons, and we have negotiated a stable conventional balance, and we are all happy with all of these. Then we could sit down with the Soviet Union and discuss the so-called third zero. But that is a fairly long and bumpy road to travel before you get there.

Senator **Murkowski**. Well, my point in going through this is there appeared in the minds of some, perhaps, and implication that somehow we could get or achieve a third zero option from this current process as part of the INF.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Absolutely not.

Senator **Murkowski**. I think you have cited the realities for the record.

I have one other question, Mr. Secretary.

How do you address what would appear to be NATO's laxity in the sense of assuming this treaty goes through, the threat of INF, intermediate range weapons, is removed from Europe? Is this likely to result in the NATO defense capability being less committed, recognizing that suddenly we have the reality of comparing conventional forces, yet at the same time the nuclear threat potentialiy from intermediate range missiles is gone?

How do you compromise the two situations?

Secretary **Carlucci**. I would argue it just the other way around, Senator Murkowski.

It seems to me that the lesson of INF is that negotiating from a position of strength and resolve is the only way to deal with the Soviet Union. We should not depend on the goodwill of the Soviet Union or on their arms control rhetoric.

What this is is a triumph for NATO. It was a NATO decision to deploy the Pershings and the GLCM's. It was a NATO decision to hold firm on deployment. When the Soviets walked out of the talks, our allies stood firm in the face of pressure from leftist parties in their countries.

So I would think that the alliance should come out of these negotiations triumphant and with a strengthened sense of purpose.

If we all move rapidly to ratify this, then we create a sense of cohesion in the alliance that allows us to get on with some of the other programs we have been talking about today.

Senator **Murkowski**. Does this not force the European nations to perhaps designate a higher percentage of their GNP to conventional weapon contributions through NATO, recognizing the inequity of the conventional forces and they are going to be torn with the economic desires to do something else with that productive capability, rather than put it in military armaments?

Secretary **Carlucci**. That imperative exists without the INF agreement.

We all have to do more in the conventional area, ourselves included.

But, yes, the Europeans made a decision in 1983 to develop what is called the conventional defense initiative, in which we put more resources into the conventional area. We need to move forward on that vigorously.

Senator **Murkowski**. This is just a followup.

And you feel convinced that this treaty will lead them to significant initiative to indeed put more into NATO's conventional capability?

Secretary **Carlucci**. If we and the Congress can work together and demonstrate our resolve, our support of the treaty, and our support of these other programs as well, then yes, I think we can achieve that.

Senator **Murkowski**. So you are saying that it is up to the Congress, up to us, to get them to do it?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, it's not just the Congress. I said "we," together with the Congress, meaning if we, in the executive branch, working with the Congress, can demonstrate support for these modernization programs. And I have already cited some of the things that you can do.

Senator **Murkowski**. Then you feel that the NATO, the European, allies will do it as well?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator **Murkowski**. I am just wondering where the initiative starts, and you are suggesting that it starts on our side.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Yes, sir. I do.

We all have to work together. It is not a chicken and egg question.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden was very considerate earlier and yielded to me. I yield to him.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, back to the START regime.

You said that we should include SLCM's in a START agreement; that is, we should allow ourselves to maintain conventional——

Secretary **Carlucci**. They should be excluded, conventional SLCM's——

Senator **Biden** [continuing]. That we should exclude SLCM's.

Secretary **Carlucci**. That's a very important point—conventional and SLCM's and ALCM's are excluded from a START agreement.

Senator **Biden**. Right.

Secretary **Carlucci**. And even the nuclear-armed SLCM's are not under the START agreement in the formal sense that they are under the 6,000 ceiling. It is separate.

Senator **Biden**. Now the rationale for that is that you want to be able to maintain the conventional capability of those systems?

Secretary **Carlucci**. That is correct.

Senator **Biden**. Now, in the INF agreement, we concluded that we had to ban all GLCM, all ground-launched Cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional, because of our inability to verify the distinction between the two.

Is not the logic of including SLCM's in a START agreement that we would have to include all or none?

Secretary CARLUCCI. We have not yet gotten to the verification provisions with regard to SLCM's and ALCM's under START. But in no sense should the INF agreement be considered as a precedent here.

We did not have a military requirement for a conventional ground-launched Cruise missile. We have many military requirements for conventional SLCM's and conventional ALCM's.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I am not suggesting that it is in any legal way binding. But logic is logic, and I assume we continue to be bound by logic.

Secretary CARLUCCI. We are also bound by national interest, and we are pursuing these negotiations in terms of our national security interest.

Senator BIDEN. But my point is not whether or not they should be in. It seems to me it is either all or none. That is the only point I am trying to make.

We acknowledge that we cannot verify the distinction between a conventional tip and a nuclear tip, on a Cruise missile.

Now, I am not arguing here. Our national interest may, for the sake of argument, require us to maintain that capability; therefore we should not have them part of a START regime.

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Soviets maintain that you can make this distinction. We don't see how, and we have said to them "show us."

So we have not gotten into the details of verification. But I would urge you to resist the demands of logic, at least at this stage of the negotiations.

Senator BIDEN. Well, that is a prerequisite for serving in this body. [Laughter.]

And I will continue to sustain it.

Let me ask you another question.

It seems to me that nuclear stability can be enhanced, not always but sometimes can be enhanced in two ways. One is through arms control and the other is through independent procurement and development decisions.

I have a question about each.

First, in the START talks, we are told we have reached preliminary agreements on a ceiling of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Correct.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. And 1,600 launchers.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Correct—but 1,650, I believe it is.

Senator BIDEN. Is it 1,650? OK.

Would you please explain why a warhead limit, in and of itself, is not sufficient to achieve the goal of increased nuclear stability?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, you obviously have to look at the delivery systems. You cannot just look at the warhead?

Senator BIDEN. Why?

Secretary CARLUCCI. For example, we think there ought to be sublimits on the highly destabilizing land-based ICBM's. As you yourself pointed out, mobile missiles are more stabilizing, and sea-launched ballistic missiles are the ultimate mobile missile.

Senator BIDEN. But won't the Soviets be driven to that? If you limit the warheads, so what if the Soviets want to concentrate? It would seem to be totally against their interest to concentrate warheads in what are clearly vulnerable targets?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Let me point out that in START we are limiting warheads. What you seem to be arguing against is sublimits.

Senator BIDEN. No, I know. I am wondering why. I am not arguing. And I think it is 1,600 total delivery vehicles, isn't it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It's 1,650. I am pretty sure that it is 1,650. At any rate, what we want to do is get at the Soviet heavy, destabilizing systems, and they have already agreed to that. They have no problem with it.

Senator BIDEN. But that is the purpose of it?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. I won't belabor the point. Let me move to the next question.

Secretary CARLUCCI. If I may correct the record, I think the figure we were groping for was 1,540. The 1,650 is a figure that would include mobiles, along with heavies. The limit on heavies is 1,540.

But we will check that.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

With regard to our own procurement and deployment plans, how does the MX missile, as opposed to the Midgetman, serve the goal of nuclear stability?

Does the MX not constitute a highly lucrative target, inviting preemption? And if we do have a START agreement, won't it consume an inordinate number of our permitted ballistic missile warheads, leaving the stability situation as bad, or even worse, than it was before?

Secretary CARLUCCI. You have asked for quite a long speech, Senator Biden, and this will be dealt with in the budget.

Senator BIDEN. You say "I have asked for a long speech?"

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. It is a complex subject.

If you want my personal view, I do not think it is desirable to have the MX in fixed silos.

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think we ought to come up with a mobile system.

We are currently looking at one. As you know, there is money in the budget to do the R&D for a rail garrison, which, as best I can tell, gives you almost, and maybe all of, the invulnerabilities that the Midgetman will give you. But I would let the Air Force testify on that subject. It gives you a great many more warheads.

Senator BIDEN. But we do agree, though, as presently based——

Secretary CARLUCCI. As presently based——

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. The MX missile.

Secretary CARLUCCI. I've got some problems with the way it is presently based, yes, sir, in fixed silos. I think they ought to be taken out of the fixed silos and put on a mobile system. And I hope the Congress would support us on that.

Senator BIDEN. Well, we can go back to that. I want to get in this last question in my time.

There has been some discussion in the Senate of a provision which some are talking about adding to the treaty—that would have the effect of providing for U.S. withdrawal from the treaty prior to completion of the 3-year implementation period, if certain conditions relating to conventional force balance in Europe had not been met.

The idea would be that the United States would invoke the supreme interest concept, and withdraw, if improvements had not occurred in the European conventional force balance, either through NATO modernization or through arms control.

Would it be in the U.S. interest militarily to withdraw from the treaty if the conventional force balance remains unchanged?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Senator Biden, it is hard to make a judgment in advance on that kind of question. But the treaty is not some favor that we are giving to the Soviet Union. It is something that we are doing in our own national interest.

So if we are unable to achieve the conventional equities that we seek, we would have to evaluate the treaty at the time, and not make any judgments in advance of the fact.

I think that such an amendment would be very undesirable.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to return to a line of questioning that I had before.

But also I would like to just respond to my friend, Senator Biden. I did not mean to be offensive in my response to him earlier. But when Senator Helms held this up [indicating] I think he was—and I invite his response on my time—when Senator Helms held this up, I think he was trying to illustrate the very large diversity of opinion, indeed, in the intelligence community—I am aware of that diversity because I was briefed by the intelligence community—on how many missiles, or how many SS-20's, there could be.

I know there was a doctrine—at least I read about a doctrine and I don't know the source—that the Soviets would have four or five reloads, even, with respect to the SS-20's, which I suppose is how Senator Helms got to this figure [indicating], and that has appeared in various articles. But I thought he was trying to illustrate the large variety of estimates that have been made over a period of time.

Senator BIDEN. As the Senator said, our friend Howard Baker used to say, I don't have a dog in this fight.

Paul.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Oh, Senator Sarbanes is then welcome to respond. I think that Senator Sarbanes restricted his remarks rather narrowly to the fact that this number [indicating] did not appear in the Beecher article. I might say that Mr. Beecher is now the head of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune bureau here in Washington, and is a very capable journalist—he writes about me from time to time—and then is sometimes capable, more capable, than at other times. But, nevertheless, he did mention in his article that as many as 1,200 SS-20's are going to be built, and talked about the fact that there would be parts sheds, I believe, Senator, in proximity to them, and perhaps it could be construed that those parts would be these spares.

I don't want to argue the point other than to say that I thought the Senator from North Carolina was trying to give us the diversity of estimates, and there has been that diversity of estimates, and nobody estimated, to the best of my knowledge, 650, though that was within a range of estimates, certainly, that I have heard about.

Senator SARBANES. Would the Senator yield?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Sure, I will.

Senator SARBANES. I didn't realize I was trying to be helpful to your home town reporter. The only point I was making, and I think it is a point of some merit, is that Senator Helms, in his statements here before the committee, as reflected in the transcript, cited the Beecher article for establishing this proposition of a ratio of five missiles to one launcher, and there is no such reference in the Beecher article.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I did not see a reference, either, though he certainly says "and various press," and in the Beecher article there was a number more than either of these two numbers; there was a number of 1,200, and he talked about parts.

Senator SARBANES. Did you see in the Beecher article a reference to a 5-to-1 ratio?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No, I did not see a 5-to-1 reference.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. But it seems to me that I have seen that in other press, or from briefings. I have a recollection of that.

Senator HELMS. Would the Senator yield——

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Yes.

Senator HELMS [continuing]. And he can have time from my next round.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a study by the Heritage Foundation, a column by Evans and Novak, from the New York Post, as well as the Beecher article be incorporated into the record on the 5-to-1 debate at the end of the discussion between Senator Sarbanes and me earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Senator HELMS. I thank you, sir.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent, since my reference was to the Beecher article, and to Senator Helms' citing of it for this proposition, that that article be included in the record, which will enable people to read the article for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator BOSCHWITZ. In any case, let me go back for a moment, if I may, Secretary Carlucci, to the destruction of the 100 missiles. I am struck by that.

I did not realize that there would be difficulty in destroying the balance of the missiles, that there would be a time factor involved.

May I ask if there could be SDI testing in the destruction? I presume the destruction means that you blast them off into space.

Could this be a method of SDI testing? Could it occur?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think it would be very difficult to construct any kind of SDI experiment with missiles that are launched to destruction. Let me stop at that point. Let me also point out another consideration, Senator Boschwitz.

Had we been obliged to stretch out the time period for destruction past the 3 years, the Joint Chiefs would have required us to continue testing the missiles in order to maintain their operational capability during the drawdown period. This would have been a very substantial impediment to verification, had both sides been allowed to test.

So it was important to get the drawdown under the 3-year timeframe.

Senator **Boschwitz**. It is because of that that I wondered whether or not understanding the meaning of "testing" and the fact that that was undesirable in a drawdown of this nature, I was curious whether or not testing could occur in the process of destruction.

Let me pursue for a moment the line of questioning on Germany, most particularly. With missiles of only 500 kilometers or less, I understand that the available missiles are of such a nature that they could only hit targets in either East or West Germany, those that are close enough, I suppose some in Czechoslovakia.

But is there not a reasonable fear that Germany will decide that it does not want the next war fought on its territory and that is the only place it can be fought upon, and, therefore, the Germans will conclude that they have to neutralize in some way?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, the so-called singularity argument ignores a number of factors. We had a discussion earlier on the FB-111's, which can penetrate into the Soviet Union, and their avionics is being upgraded.

We have other dual-capable aircraft. We have hundreds of Poseidon missiles committed to SACEUR, and, most importantly, we have the link with the U.S. strategic deterrent.

So it is by no means axiomatic that a nuclear war would be fought on German soil.

As I said earlier, I reject the singularity argument.

Now, there are political concerns in Germany. I am prepared to concede that point. I myself have gone over there and have had lengthy discussions with them, and I think we need to reassure the Germans.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I would address my comment to my friend, Senator Biden.

I read in an article by Secretary Kissinger, and I quote him as follows:

> I have known the Christian Democratic leaders who have the responsibility for foreign policy and defense for decades. After a lifetime of unquestioning support for American policies, they find themselves adrift in an unfamiliar world in which American briefers parrot the slogans of their anti-nuclear adversaries.

In other parts of this article, which appeared in Newsweek last October, Secretary Kissinger said that the Europeans certainly were not very enthralled about this treaty, particularly after having gone through such political difficulties in placing the missiles on their soil or planning to do so in the case of the Belgians and the Dutch.

So, when you say that everybody in Europe, even the French official who said it was like Munich, agrees with the treaty, frankly, my assessment of that is they figure that they have lost the political will or the political majority in their own countries to do anything other than see this treaty ratified, because I think there is no will left to place the missiles on their soil over there.

I don't know if you want to respond to that.

Senator **Biden**. Me or the Secretary?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Is the question to me or to Senator Biden?

Senator **Boschwitz**. Well, he is addressing my comment to him to you. Perhaps I should do that.

Secretary **Carlucci**. First of all, let me say that I don't think you find any antinuclear sentiments in the testimony I have offered today. On the contrary. I have been urging nuclear modernization below 500 kilometers.

Second, let me point out, once again, that this was a NATO decision back in 1979. In fact, the concept originated in Europe, in Germany.

Third, it has been solidly supported by the NATO defense ministers and is now supported by French Defense Minister Giraud.

Sure you can find Europeans who are unsettled——

Senator **Boschwitz**. Have you talked to him about his remarkable turnaround from his original statement?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, I just took at face value what he told me the other week when he and I had a conversation on this. He told me that he supported it.

You can find critics and certainly I think what may have prompted some of this was the suddenness with which it came about, when the Soviets suddenly reversed their position on the 100. Nobody expected it to go quite that fast. So there was, understandably, a certain degree of trauma.

I think if you go over and talk to the Europeans now—and I am going to do that starting tomorrow—you will find them more reassured.

We need to continue to assure them that they are tied to our strategic nuclear deterrent. They are very much afraid of decoupling.

You talk about lack of will on their side. They look at us and at some of the things that are happening in our defense budget, and they say, "Wait a minute, maybe there is a lack of will over in the United States."

So it is a little bit of a chicken-and-egg here, and we have to stand up to the leadership role that is essential for us to play.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I am with you on that.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

I would add that the time is rolling along. I think the witness had hoped to get away at 1 p.m. That already had gone by us. I will limit myself to just one question and hope that we could be as brief as possible.

In your recent report: "Support of NATO Strategy in the 1990's," Mr. Secretary, you identified a number of nuclear and conventional weapon modernization programs. Do you think the Senate should attach or should link its consent to the treaty to the moving ahead on those programs?

Secretary **Carlucci**. No. They are unrelated, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Helms.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Secretary, I think all of us will say that we are for straightforward, direct, legislative language that is impeccably clear. I want to ask you about article 14 of the treaty, which you discussed this morning.

It reads as follows:

> The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Now, is there any way that this article could be interpreted to prohibit the President from assisting NATO allies to develop their own systems?

Secretary **Carlucci**. Well, let me preface that with a comment on article 14, and I emphasize a point I made earlier, that it is not a noncircumvention article.

If I may read into the record the lawyers view of this article, it records that the—

> Parties undertake to comply with the treaty and not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the provisions of the treaty. This provision thus reflects the duty of each party under customary international law to comply with the treaty. This provision does not impose any additional obligation on the parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the treaty. The provision refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future and existing agreements are therefore unaffected. Article 14 will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our allies, nor would this provision preclude cooperation with our allies in modernization.

Now, if at some future point in time an ally might wish to build a system that is treaty-constrained; that is to say, is within the 500- to 5,500-kilometer range band and is tested for weapon delivery, then a reading of the treaty—not article 14—would, in all likelihood, constrain us somewhat from rendering some types of assistance to that ally.

Senator **Helms**. Well, why wouldn't the text you just read to me be a good reservation for this treaty?

Secretary **Carlucci**. I think it can well be part of the legislative history or the advice and consent record of the treaty. I think it would be desirable to do that.

Senator **Helms**. You wouldn't have a conniption fit, then, if we offered it as a reservation?

Secretary **Carlucci**. I would defer to the lawyers. I am not sure of the meaning of a reservation on a treaty, whether that means you would have to renegotiate it with the Soviet Union or not.

But I would like to reserve judgment on that and submit something for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Reservation to the Treaty

With regard to this point, we believe no reservation is necessary or desirable. A "reservation" implies a need to change the treaty. Such is not required, however, since the text of the treaty and the Secretary of State's letter of submittal, from which I have extensively quoted, provide a perfectly consistent, sufficiently comprehensive and authoritative treatment of this subject. Thus, there is no need to consider a reservation since there is no need to change the Treaty.

Senator **Helms**. The point is that the Soviets do contend that the provision, article 14, which I read, does—does—prohibit the President. I think we ought to make clear as we move along with consideration of this treaty—before the treaty is approved—that both sides understand clearly that it would not prevent the United States from assisting NATO allies in the development of missile systems which they could use.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Let me make a clear distinction, Senator Helms.

The Soviets are wandering around saying that the treaty prohibits the modernization of systems below 500 kilometers. That is pure nonsense. It is Soviet propaganda. The negotiating record is abundantly clear on that point, and my statement is categorical on that point.

You asked a somewhat different question. You asked about helping our allies in the future, as I understood you, to build systems that might well be banned, that would be banned, by the treaty. There we are somewhat treaty-constrained, according to our lawyers.

Senator HELMS. Who insisted on article 14, by the way—they or us?

Secretary CARLUCCI. This was a process of negotiation between us and the Soviets. They wanted a real noncircumvention clause, and our negotiators negotiated them down to this kind of provision.

Senator HELMS. You gave a report last week regarding the military implications of the INF Treaty, and in doing that, you indicated a desire to have several congressionally imposed restrictions removed——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS [continuing]. As a part of the modernization effort.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. You listed specifically a proposed follow-on to the Lance missile and expanded production of artillery, artillery-fired projectiles——

Secretary CARLUCCI. Atomic projectiles, artillery-fired atomic projectiles, where the Congress has imposed a 925 ceiling on them.

Senator HELMS. What would happen if Congress did not remove these restrictions or fund the new programs?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It is very hard for us to argue with our allies that they ought to go ahead with the modernization program below 500 kilometers when we are unwilling to do it ourselves.

Senator HELMS. We are ending up on a note of agreement here. One of my concerns, Mr. Secretary, is that there are Senators and certainly House Members—and they would be involved in the end result—who want to see the treaty approved, but who have absolutely no intention of supporting U.S. funding for the modernization programs that you outlined.

Now, until we can get some sort of understanding on that, it seems to me that this would be a dangerous combination for NATO security, would it not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. I think it sends a signal that we are not willing to go ahead with modernization below 500 kilometers, and runs the risk that those who are arguing for the third zero could gain credibility.

I think it very important that we go ahead with the modernization below 500 kilometers.

Senator **Helms**. Well, I think we ought to, all of us—and I am talking about me, myself, as well as others—I think we ought to be just as openhanded with our questions and with our consideration as possible, and not wake up, as the late Senator Church.

When he was chairman of this committee, he had a devil of a time getting the CIA to admit, you know, the "foo-fa" about suppressing the evidence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.

Now, everybody around this town knew that it happened, and I recall that Frank Church was in the forefront of those who were trying to get this information to the attention of the public. When the evidence of this duplicity came out, along with the invasion of Afghanistan a few months later, I think those two things were together the final nail in the coffin of SALT II.

I guess I am asking myself and I am asking you if it really helps the cause of arms control for any agency of the government, CIA or otherwise—and you were Deputy Director of the CIA at the time this happened—to even think about covering up, underestimate, or excuse away aggressive Soviet behavior.

I again say that I have no confidence in the Soviets whatsoever. I again allude to those two little girls who were on KAL-007. They were 2 of the 269 people who were slaughtered by the Soviet Union, simply because that private airplane, airlines, strayed onto territory where the Soviets were violating a treaty.

So you will have to forgive me. I am going to do everything that I can to make sure as much information is made known, not only to Congress, but to the American people. I want to work with you and I shall work with you, and I thank you for coming here this morning.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Senator Biden.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you very much.

I guess we have cut into your lunch hour here, Mr. Secretary, but we really appreciate your time.

I would like to clear up the apparent disagreement we had on numbers. I think we are both right.

The current agreed framework—and correct me if I am wrong—is 6,000 total warheads——

Secretary **Carlucci**. Correct.

Senator **Biden** [continuing]. On 1,600 delivery vehicles.

Secretary **Carlucci**. That's correct.

Senator **Biden**. That's the 1,600 I was referring to.

Secretary **Carlucci**. Oh, OK. I thought you were referring to the limit on warheads on heavies.

Senator **Biden**. No. Then there is a 1,540 limit, sublimit, on heavy ICBM warheads——

Secretary **Carlucci**. Yes, on heavies.

Senator **Biden** [continuing]. And there is a 1,650-warhead limit on ICBMs with more than 6 warheads.

Secretary **Carlucci**. That's correct. We're on the same train.

Senator **Biden**. That was the basis of our discussion.

I would say to my friend from Minnesota that Dr. Kissinger's article, which he referred to, is in no way inconsistent with the argument made that there is no major political figure in the NATO alliance opposed to this treaty now. I believe Kissinger points out him-self that he does not think the treaty can be anything other than ratified now.

When you quoted Dr. Kissinger—and I do not have the article before me—but you said something about the fact that it causes concern in NATO when we begin to parrot antinuclear slogans.

I think what he is referring to is the same thing that I referred to in the opening day of these hearings, when a leading European with whom I met but whom I will not cite, said, "You know, it's strange when the most rightwing president in American history locks arms with the antinuclear people, calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons." That sent shivers up our spines—and I am paraphrasing.

So, again, that is not inconsistent.

The fact of the matter is that what worries the Europeans, Mr. Secretary, is: first, what you said—that is, are we, in fact, now going to somehow disengage from Europe. It is a perennial worry that they have. They constantly have that, and I am not making light of it. But that is one of their worries.

Second, they are, quite frankly, Mr. Secretary, disconcerted by Reykjavik. It was an earthquake—Reykjavik I.

It is interesting. They now refer to Reykjavik in terms of the meeting of the defense ministers, as if somehow to mask the fact that there was ever a Reykjavik I.

But Reykjavik sent tremors throughout Europe.

The third point I would make is the point you made, which is that the suddenness with which Mr. Gorbachev changed positions shook everyone. Very few people anticipated that they would agree to the first zero, let alone to propose a second zero.

For all those reasons, there is a lack of ease, which leads me to my question.

You say with certainty, and it pleases me, but I don't know the evidence for it, that there is no question that we have decided that we must move from INF to START, from START to conventional, and from conventional I think you said to chemical.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, chemical comes before conventional.

Senator BIDEN. But the last thing we move to is short-range nuclear, weapons, those with a range of zero to 500 kilometers.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Right. Right.

Senator BIDEN. Is it the High Level Task Force that is supposed to be considering the framework in which we go? It is one of three groups, and I get their missions confused.

When I left Brussels a couple of weeks ago, the group responsible for this mission was hopeful that the sequence I just described is what we arrived at. But my understanding is that it had not been done yet, and they indicated that the only way it could be done would be with strong U.S. leadership.

So I take it that the administration has decided that the order will be START next and short-range nuclear last, and whatever the order is in between.

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Has there been any agreement on that among your counterparts in NATO? Any formal agreement?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, the Reykjavik foreign ministers meeting came to that formula, and I suggested earlier that I submit something for the record on this. But yes, there is general agreement in NATO on it.

Senator BIDEN. That would be a major step, particularly if you get the Germans to sign onto that, since they are the major players.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I won't say that we've got every German signed up, but there is agreement in NATO on this.

Senator BIDEN. Now, my last question is this. We had spoken briefly about this notion of withdrawing from the treaty under the term "supreme interest," the supreme interest of our country, if we did not meet a conventional force balance that made sense to us. People are talking about such a thing. I am not one who believes that, but people are talking about attaching such a condition.

What would be the political effect of withdrawing from the treaty? What would be—and I think you have answered this before, but I think for the record it should be answered again—what would be the political effect on our allies? Would they permit us to leave in place our missiles that are there now?

Secretary CARLUCCI. It's highly unlikely.

I think we would be sending a signal that we have not only changed direction, or changed horses in midstream, but we have changed horses in the final days and snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

I mean, it would puzzle and perplex them that after something like 8 years of negotiations, in the end we suddenly attach a provision like that on it. They would not understand it.

Senator BIDEN. Especially since it has never been discussed in that context.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Especially since it has never been discussed, it would call into question our credibility and our reliability as a NATO partner. I think it would be very undesirable.

Senator BIDEN. To end on a note of harmony, as Senator Helms wanted to do and did, when he said you and he might be ending on a note of agreement, he and I may even be ending on somewhat of a note of agreement.

One of the things that I indicated at the outset that I was considering doing, one of the four conditions, is a condition that would be along the lines of what you and Senator Helms were discussing with respect to the order in which we move and not moving to the shortrange until last.

So now that we have demonstrated how harmonious we all are, I will yield the remainder of my time and thank you for staying beyond your lunch hour.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Senator Biden.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Secretary, I won't be long.

One of the things that has surprised me about the agreement and that Secretary Shultz, at least during my presence here at the hearings while he was here, did not explain is why the Russians gave up the shorter range missiles with, really, no quid pro quo.

Why did they go along?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, that gets into Soviet motives in pursuing its arms control offensive, and this, of course, is speculative.

But by doing this, they foreclosed the option of us deploying something in that range ban, and, further, the so-called singularity concerns in Germany. It also enabled them to bring pressure on the Pershing IA's. That was a very difficult problem for them to deal with in the context of these negotiations, because it got to the heart of the German concern.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Pershing IA's were really intermediate nuclear forces, not short-range.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No, they are short-range.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. The Pershing IA?

Secretary CARLUCCI. The Pershing IA.

The Pershing II is what we are talking about. That is our missile. And the Pershing IA could have been modernized to a Pershing IB. But it is a short-range system.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Yes. They had intended to modernize that. What were there—72 Pershing IA's?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That's correct.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. We own the warheads, as I recall.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Yes. It is a cooperative program. We own the warheads and the Germans own the missiles.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. For that they gave up 387 deployed and 539 nondeployed?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, let me take you back into history for a few months.

In terms of the political trauma that that created, it was very substantial. It was resolved by a very courageous decision on the part of Chancellor Kohl, who made a unilateral decision to end the program of cooperation after the limitation of all United States-Soviet INF missiles. U.S. warheads would be withdrawn during the last 15 days of the destruction period.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Other than the 72 Pershing IA's, which I thought had a little longer range than 1,000 kilometers, they really received nothing in return, and their motivations are not clear.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Well, I think you have to recognize, Senator Boschwitz, that Soviet goals in all of this arms control undertaking are, in large measure, political. And while we look at it in terms of our military requirements, a net assessment of the military balance, which is a proper way for us to look at it, they are looking at it in terms of the political strains that they can introduce into NATO and their decision on the short-range missiles has to be viewed in that context.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I congratulate you on the testimony.

I will read your prepared statement. I congratulate you on your new job. We in the Senate I think are very buoyed by having you there. We look forward to working with you as we have in the past.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, I just have a couple of questions.

Would you say it is the case that this treaty stands on its own and that one, in deciding whether to give advice and consent to ratification, need not make a judgment about what is to follow-on?

There are certain assumptions about what is to follow if, in fact, this treaty is ratified. But the treaty can stand on its own, and it does not require that subsequent questions be answered in a particular way in order to make a judgment on the treaty.

Would you agree with that or not?

Secretary CARLUCCI. That is correct, Senator Sarbanes. That is my view.

Senator SARBANES. Would you also say the same thing in regard to our strategic nuclear doctrine?

There is some concern flowing out of Reykjavik about this.

Secretary CARLUCCI. There is no change in our strategic nuclear doctrine.

Senator SARBANES. Well, it has been suggested by some of our leaders that the current doctrine is immoral, which casts some doubt upon it. But this treaty does not require you to make that kind of judgment.

Secretary CARLUCCI. No.

Senator SARBANES. Approval of this treaty does not require some broader judgment about the strategic nuclear doctrine?

Secretary CARLUCCI. Absolutely not. It does not require any judgments on strategic doctrine, nor the morality thereof.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us.

The committee is now recessed until 3 p.m.

Secretary CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene the same day at 3:15 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met at 3:15 p.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Biden, Kerry, Pressler, and Murkowski.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

We are very grateful to you, Mr. Ambassador, for coming up this afternoon on such short notice, and I know the Senator from Delaware has some questions to ask, and I would defer to him at this time.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, and I apologize to you, Mr. Ambassador, and to you, Mr. Chairman. The chairman made the same votes I made, and he got here in time, and I came the wrong way. I apologize, and thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for coming up.

I know the public sometimes is surprised by the deference we pay to one another, but in my case, the deference I pay to you is genuine. You are a remarkable man. You probably have—not probably, I am sure you know more about this whole process of arms control than any person around, and it is just a remarkable job that you did. I am sorry I was not here for your testimony on Thursday, but it is evident now why I missed it. I had a bout with lifting weights. I forgot that I am getting older. I guess I should not be fooling around with the weights. But anyway, I pinched a nerve in my neck and I was not able to be here. I am sorry.

I wish I was in the shape you are in.

Let me begin with my questions, if I may. I would like to talk about verification, if I could, and as I said, I very much appreciate your taking the time.

First, I want to explore a subject area that is somewhat troubling to me, and I suspect to others, and that is the question of the role we are in danger of allowing verification considerations to play in the arms control process. Obviously we need verification. But we need verification of treaty terms that have merit in their own right. Verification should not, in my view, shape our perception of what a treaty should contain militarily, nor should too high a standard of verification prevent us from entering into agreements that are in our interest and that we can verify adequately.

Let me turn first to the INF Treaty. You yourself have said that the so-called walk-in-the-woods formula, Mr. Ambassador, which would have retained some U.S. INF missiles in Europe, would have been militarily preferable to the zero formula that finally emerged. I think I agree with that.

I believe even more strongly that we would have been far better off with a considerably more comprehensive agreement of reduced strategic and INF weapons in a single integrated package than this, but this is a good package nonetheless.

That such a comprehensive agreement would have enabled us to get the benefits of arms control without bringing into discussion the questions of coupling, a question that quite clearly has arisen, whether rightly or wrongly, with respect to the zero formula. But that is another question.

Now, you have also said that the zero formula, notwithstanding the military preferability of the walk-in-the-woods formula, is preferable overall because it is more easily verified. But this seems to me to be an instance of putting the verification cart before the arms control horse, in other words, letting the issue of verification override the fundamental goal, which is obtaining improvements, that is, stabilizing improvements in the military balance.

In the days leading up to the signing of the INF Treaty, according to inside accounts that have now been reported, the U.S. Government experienced serious confusion over this issue, and I am worried that it is likely to be a forerunner of what could happen again if we get to a comparable point in START. At first, the principle was enunciated that we would seek an inspect anytime, anywhere kind of verification regime in INF. However, when it came to translating that principle into specific policy, our intelligence and defense agencies quickly had to come to terms with the fact that such a policy carries very heavy liabilities for us.

In last Thursday's New York Times, the day you originally testified, there was a fascinating article about the final days of the INF negotiation. We see the U.S. Government caught in a tension between wanting to implement the intrusive inspection principles and yet realizing that such a regime would require inspections that would prove disadvantageous to the United States. One effort to try to resolve this tension was a so-called Fruit Loops secret list plan, devised in the closing days of the INF negotiation. It would have allowed each side to proceed on the inspect anytime, anywhere principle, but subject to the other side's right of refusal.

For example, as I understand it, if the Soviets identified what they regarded as a suspect site and it turned out to be a Fruit Loops factory, they could proceed, but if it proved to be a site identified as highly sensitive on a secret U.S. Government list, then we would refuse.

Now, it does not take too much reflection to see how unsatisfactory such a regime would be from the U.S. perspective. It would lay us open to charges of cheating whenever the Soviets wished to lodge such a charge, and it would lay open the high probability of the United States Government identifying a Soviet site as suspect and then being denied access. Combined, the two possibilities represent a formula for mistrust and treaty breakdown, and ultimately, as I understand it, we came to the satisfactory INF verification regime.

But it seems there might be a lesson in the experience. When we set too high a standard for ourselves in verification, it became perverse, and it is bound to fail.

Now, let me turn to strategic weapons.

What concerns me is that we have in the INF Treaty a verification regime so intrusive, a regime that sets so high a standard of what proper verification must consist of, that we will be unable to translate that standard into the realm of START and will therefore be inclined to regard whatever numerical limits we have agreed to as unverifiable when we could verify compliance with less extreme regimes of inspection.

In short, what I am afraid of, Mr. Ambassador, is that we are in danger of again putting the verification cart before the arms control horse. It seems to me we have to remember that in a START agreement, we will be dealing with, as you know better than anyone, a very different situation and a very different set of objectives.

In INF, our goal was to verify a process of dismantlement over a 3-year period, and then to ensure that further INF missiles were not being produced. However, in a START regime we are talking about the inspection of thousands of existing deployed missiles embodying our highest technology and our strategic deterrent, our ultimate national defense. We are simply not going to be able to allow highly intrusive inspection involving Soviet inspectors pursuing all the detailed aspects of the production and deployment of our deterrent forces.

Last week Ambassador Kampelman said, and this morning Secretary Carlucci repeated it, that in the START regime, we are going to need to have verification procedures that provide for challenge inspections of suspect sites, perhaps using the right of refusal. What concerns me is that we had difficulty coming to terms with this in INF, and I am wondering why it should be any easier in START.

So the point, to repeat it, is this. Are we not now in serious danger of, as we approach the START agreement, of setting for ourselves a level of expectation about verification that, when it finally comes down to it, we will not be able to meet because we ourselves will not want to meet it, and will that not render a START agreement vulnerable to the charge of inadequate verification?

That is a long prelude to a short question.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. NITZE, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL MATTERS, AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Ambassador NITZE. Let me begin with your first point.

You discussed for a short bit the walk in the woods.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Ambassador NITZE. And the fact that I had said that I thought this formula that we finally worked out is better than the walk in the woods because it is more easily verifiable, and in the walk-in-the-woods formula we settled that point very loosely. As I remember it, paragraph 16 of that paper merely said that appropriate measures for effective verification would be worked out. We ducked the question in the walk in the woods.

We have not ducked that question in the INF Treaty, and I think with reason, because I think we do have grounds for believing that adherence to a treaty, compliance with its provisions, is by no means certain. In fact, we have had poor experience with the compliance with preceding agreements, and therefore, I think it is important that if at all possible we have measures which would enable us to monitor adherence, compliance with the obligations under the treaty, so that I believe it is an important objective.

Of course, you are quite right in pointing out that any agreement has multiple objectives, and you have to weigh one objective against another and try to work out a final deal which satisfactorily deals with each one of those objectives. You never can take a single objective and make it an absolute without running into the danger of making that single objective an absolute making it impossible to obtain other important objectives. So, the final judgment as to what is correct and what is the best you can do and what you want to advocate to the Senate for ratification involves judgments on a host of difficult issues.

So I would not say that verification is a god, an absolute in its own sense, but certainly we ought to try to work out measures which give you confidence that these limitations are in fact monitorable and verifiable, and that you will know when they are being violated.

And I do not think that that is an impossible target. Certainly, all the words that Mr. Gorbachev uses indicate, at least he claims to be, that the Soviets are equally interested in the verifiability of an agreement with us. In other words, if both sides are interested in verification, then you have some grounds for thinking that it may be possible to work out measures, that go beyond just national technical means, that go to cooperative measures which give you higher confidence than you would otherwise have in the verifiability of an agreement.

Frankly, I am confident that in the INF agreement we have succeeded in working out measures which give one high confidence, not perfect confidence, but high confidence that it would be impossible for them to deploy a militarily meaningful military component for any period of time without our having a very real prospect that we would be able to get some indication thereof.

So the interlocking provisions of this treaty which I described at some length in my prepared remarks the other day I believe do give one high, good confidence that this treaty is verifiable, not absolutely verifiable, because, as I said, nobody is going to be able to guarantee that the Soviets could not hide a missile or a launcher or more than that in a cave in Siberia or someplace else.

But that is quite different than maintaining a militarily useful force for a period of time where you cannot test it, because we have high confidence that in an atmospheric test, and these have to be tested in the atmosphere, those we certainly would be able to monitor, and I do not think they would have much confidence in a system that they could not test.

And they would have to, you know, each one of these systems has a long tail. All of us have been fully familiar with the difficulties in maintaining a useful and reliable nuclear force for a long period of time. You have to have a lot of people involved, they have to be high quality people, they have to be continuously under training, you have to replace the various components, and you have to maintain these things. This is not an easy thing to do. And to do all that in secrecy, subject to the verification measures which are available in the treaty, seems to me unlikely.

Beyond that, I cannot see that the Soviets would gain much from violating this treaty in any significant way, or doing it at all.

Therefore, I am confident that the verification objective, among the other objectives in this treaty, is well met.

But the main gravamen of your question really went to START, and are the verification problems in START not more difficult than they are in INF? And certainly there they are somewhat more difficult because there you are dealing with not only verifying whether systems exist, but whether the number of systems that exists is above or below some standard which will be set in the treaty. To verify numerical limits is inherently somewhat more difficult than to discover whether or not they exist at all, because under the INF Treaty, the very existence of a missile with a range limited by the treaty, would be a clear cut violation, while under a START Treaty, for instance, if you limit the number of heavy missiles on the Soviet side to 1,540, you have the task of verifying that they do not have more than 1,540 deployed missiles.

But that is not really that tough a problem. We have never had much doubt about the number of big, ICBM launchers like the silos for the launching of their SS-18's, and I think the follow-on to the SS-18 will be fully as large and the silos fully as large. Those big silos are certainly countable.

Now, maybe they could put them on pads, not silos, something or other, but I think they would be reluctant to do that. But you cannot guarantee that you can verify all the 1,540, I mean, that they do not have anything beyond the 1,540. And one knows that they have a practice and have had a practice in the past of training for reloads, and so one is interested in the number of nondeployed missiles that they might have. And that is more difficult to verify than the number of deployed launchers.

So we will have a problem of how we work that out, but I do not think it is an infinitely difficult problem, and I do not think the measures of uncertainty that we would have are infinitely difficult.

Therefore, I am really hopeful that we will, through the combination of measures which we worked out in INF, plus building upon that to really more elaborate measures with respect to START, be able to come to you with a verification regime which we would be able to say we have confidence in that it would be unlikely that they could maintain a militarily useful additional force.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield for one moment?

Senator BIDEN. Of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

One question that bothers me a little bit is who would do the verifying? Would you have a verification corps that would be assembled that would go through some sort of institute that would give continuity, or will you have people pulled in each time there is a need to verify?

It would seem to me much better if you could develop, first through training in an institute of some sort, a corps of verifying officers, whatever you want to call them.

Ambassador NITZE. Well, of course, the fundamental tool that we use to monitor what happens in the Soviet Union is national technical means, and clearly, many people are involved in that. We have got agencies that are devoted to that. So clearly that will continue and will be in some instances, I hope, refined.

But then what I believe you are referring to are the short-notice onsite inspections and the permanent onsite inspection at Votkinsk, as a particular example, and there we are in the process of creating exactly the kind of a corps that you are talking about.

There is an agency at the National Defense University who are training people for this role. There is an institution being created which will be, I guess, within the management framework of the Department of Defense, which will run this corps.

But the head of the corps will be specially selected and approved by the President, and he will have two or three deputies. I think one of them will come from ACDA, and this institute will select people, and is selecting them right now—it is already in operation. It is not fully in operation, but it is already selecting people and putting them in training.

The CHAIRMAN. Should this not come under the ACDA as being basically the responsible agency?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, I think not. I think managementwise it comes, in the first instance, under the Department of Defense, and I forget exactly which part of the Department of Defense is charged with running this, but the ACDA I think will nominate the person to be the deputy.

The OSIA—On Site Inspection Agency—is the office, and the principal deputy will be from ACDA. Now, I think they are getting along very well in organizing this, and I have high confidence that this will work all right. And the State Department is very much interested in it. We certainly want to see to it that enough of these teams are able to speak Russian.

We want to be sure, and so does the Pentagon want to be sure, that enough of them are technically competent. And we want to be sure that the objectives are clear and that the methods of operation are clear. And all of it, of course, has to be done within the parameters of the annex having to do with the inspection procedures.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I guess the question of verification then comes down to really how much risk are we willing to tolerate, and you have answered my next question by your answer, by using phrases such as militarily meaningful, for any period of time, with any real prospect, et cetera.

And you said in your statement last week something not dissimilar to what Harold Brown had said 8 years ago. You said: "If the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively."

Harold Brown had said 8 years earlier: "The standard should be this: Any Soviet cheating which would pose significant military risks or affect the strategic balance would be detected by our intelligence in time to respond effectively."

And I know that is what you are saying, and that is what we have said in the past. But you also know how my colleagues in this body and former colleagues of yours and mine outside of this body raise the verification icon to a level that is as if we expect it to or think it should be perfect.

And I think it is important that we set out clearly the standard that should be used, and the standard is any militarily significant change, any militarily significant cheating. The idea if it is 1,540 as opposed to 1,541 heavies I suspect would not arguably be militarily significant.

I guess the question is, at what point does the agency give the Chiefs information that makes them say that is militarily significant?

Ambassador NITZE. I believe Admiral Crowe is the one who would have to determine what is militarily significant, and I believe he has given some thought to that matter.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I will ask him that when he comes. But it gets me back to the issue that I raised a little bit earlier about challenge inspections anytime, anywhere. Do you believe that we will be able to have challenge inspections anytime, anywhere?

And if we have the right of refusal, will that not raise the problems of mistrust that I just mentioned?

Ambassador NITZE. One certainly has the right to request onsite inspection or any other measure at any time one wishes to so do. That really is what the verification commission which is created by this treaty is meant to be for.

In other words, any worry that one has about verification one raises with the verification commission, and one proposes—you know, I think one is perfectly free to explain there what it is one thinks could be done in order to allay our worries about it.

And similarly, the Soviets could raise in that commission any worry that they have about verification.

But let me just continue, because I have not finished. But clearly they could and we could refuse a request of that kind. And so the question is not whether or not you can ask for an onsite inspection.

Of course you can. That you can do under the treaty the way it is in INF, and you certainly would be able to do it under a START agreement.

The question at issue is whether you have the right of refusal, and that is exactly what many thought one needed to have, certainly with respect to certain of the more classified facilities in the United States. We did not want the Soviets roaming around some of the very highly classified facilities in the United States.

And I think those who raised this question were correct, and therefore we finally, after mature consideration, decided that there the offsetting considerations were such that it was wiser not to have—not to deny the right of refusal in this instance.

Senator BIDEN. In other words, to allow the right of refusal?

Ambassador NITZE. That is exactly right, to allow the right of refusal.

Now, you know, if one found that such a right were used arbitrarily it would have a bearing. It all depends upon what evidence one has that gave rise to the suspicion and then the degree of clarity of the Soviet explanation of why the suspicion is unfounded, and vice-versa.

So that this is something we would have to work out with respect to the INF Treaty. We will have to work it out between us. Frankly, I do not think that there is much chance under the INF Treaty that this question will arise, but it might.

Senator BIDEN. Well, how exactly would the suspect site regime with the right of refusal work, given the INF experience with the secret list, et cetera? It seems to me you made a pretty compelling argument in your initial response to my comment and question when you said that we really do not need to be able to go anywhere anytime in order to verify whether or not there is a militarily significant change or alteration in the force structure of the other side.

And yet, Secretary Carlucci and others seem to be throwing in here, a verification standard that surely will raise havoc in the Senate. I mean, can you imagine what Senator Helms and Senator McClure and others who speak to verification quite a bit would have to say about a single refusal of the Soviets to allow an inspection?

They would say obviously that we would not have asked unless we had good reason, because we Americans always have good reasons and we would not ask for any bad reason; therefore, they must by refusing—I mean, you have been around this town a lot longer than I have.

Ambassador NITZE. I have great respect for the Senate and I see all kinds of strange things. But I also see that in the long run the Senate exhibits a degree of wisdom.

Senator BIDEN. Well, your faith is maybe warranted more than mine.

Ambassador NITZE. I have been around a long time and watched a lot of ins and outs, and I have seen a lot of strange things happen. But in the long run, I think we have done really pretty well.

Senator BIDEN. Well, if we are going to apply that standard of verification to START, I am just worried we may have worked ourselves into the position of expecting something that we really cannot or really would not wish to attain.

Ambassador NITZE. Let me make clear that we have not yet settled upon what the verification regime in START will be.

Senator BIDEN. I know. I just, I think it is important to get on the record.

I think this debate we are having—and not you and I, but that the Senators are having—is really not about INF. I think it is all about START, and I think there are a couple of straw men being set up here, one of which will be the verification issue.

So when you come back with the treaty, that I expect you will come back with. I do not know the details of it, but something along the lines that have been discussed in START, I predict to you the very first thing that will be read back will be all the comments about verification. And someone over half-rimmed glasses will be—and I have got mine in my pocket here—will be looking at you and saying: "But did you not say?"

Because I think that is what the debate is going to be all about in START. And that is why I want it on the record at this juncture this notion, especially coming from a man of your stature, that the test is really the military significance of the cheating and not whether or not one has cheated.

Ambassador NITZE. I might make one other point, and that is, as I look back on the record of past nonadherence to our understanding of the treaty—let us go back to 1972. At that time we were trying to get the Soviets to agree to a formula with respect to a distinction between heavy missiles and light missiles, and they would not agree with us on that.

And we made it clear what we considered to be the distinction and we said that we thought that any missile larger than the SS-11; that is, any missile with a volume greater than 70 cubic meters, we would consider to be a heavy missile.

And then very shortly thereafter it became clear that the Soviets were working on a missile which was larger in volume than 70 cubic meters. So that this was in fact not in violation of the treaty, because I do not think the Soviets were obligated to do anything other than what the treaty overtly provided for.

But it was contrary to what we had stated to be our unilateral interpretation of the treaty. We were trying to fill in what otherwise was a lacuna in the treaty, and that is that there was no definition of the dividing line between a light missile and a heavy missile, and we wanted to fill that in.

But then the problem we ran into was that the budgetary considerations were such that it did not seem to be appropriate from the Defense Department's standpoint to apply for the funds or ask the Congress for the funds to finance a missile as heavy as the new missile, the SS-19, that the Soviets were claiming to be a light missile and which was therefore, under their interpretation, permitted. And we were late in asking for it.

And then when we did ask for it, why, the Congress found difficulty in authorizing and appropriating the funds. And it has taken years and years and years before we could take the measures necessary to offset this unilateral—or this deviation from what our interpretation of the SALT I Treaty was.

So that even though I have said that I think we will be able to detect a violation in time to take offsetting action, the important thing is that then we do take the offsetting action; that is where the real problem will be.

And this is not something that just the executive branch can deal with, but which the Congress also will have to join us in dealing with.

Senator **Biden** [presiding]. Well, as you know better than anyone, the fact is you said that they did not violate the treaty, although they went beyond what we set out as our understanding.

But you acknowledged that it did not prevent anybody here from saying that they violated the treaty, which has been one of the major arguments against every treaty with the Soviets since then. The first litany they start with is, the Soviets violated the SALT I Treaty by, and then they go into the heavy missile argument.

Ambassador **Nitze**. It is my belief that they did violate.

Senator **Biden**. I understand that, but on that score they did not.

If I am hearing you correctly, the United States still has not decided whether it will seek a regime requiring challenge inspections. That decision has not been made yet?

Ambassador **Nitze**. It has not been made.

Senator **Biden**. Well, if we have not made that yet, could you elaborate on the pluses and minuses of such a regime of suspect site or a challenge of suspect sites? Tell me the good points and the bad points about such a regime if we had one?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Well, clearly the good points about it would be that if one had a reason to suspect that there were missiles in a given cave, let us say, or in a given tunnel through the Urals, let us say we believed they were hiding an additional SS-24 train in a tunnel, it would be good if one could have a short inspection of that, either through cooperative means or through onsite inspection.

And I think that would be both a good deterrent and a good way of detecting a violation if one occurred.

Now, the negative to that is that if you adopt such a regime, it has got to be similarly equal for the United States as it is for the U.S.S.R., and then you get into the reciprocal of these things from the standpoint of the United States and where you draw the line and how do you do it.

That is something which has to be worked out with great detail in order to know that the pluses are greater than the minuses.

Senator **Biden**. I assume that the minuses would be rapidly pointed out by the Defense Department. And I am not being smart when I say that.

Ambassador **Nitze**. No, I think the entire community would. This was not a matter of disagreement within the executive branch, it really was not.

Senator **Biden**. Were we surprised by the Soviet response on verification?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Well, to get back all the way to Reykjavik, when we put before Marshal Akhromeyev during that all-night session a paragraph which outlined all the measures which eventually find their place in the INF Treaty, he said "Yes "and frankly I was surprised.

Now, there is a good deal of difference between saying "Yes" to a single paragraph which outlines the headings and finally working out in detail how all those ideas will be translated into the most minute detail.

And the treaty, much of the difficulty in the treaty was working out those minute details.

Senator BIDEN. Previous agreements between us have not limited nondeployed missiles, I assume because of the difficulty of verifying such limitations. Has that been the primary reason in the past?

Ambassador NITZE. I forget which. You are talking about SALT II?

Senator BIDEN. SALT II did not, did it? Nondeployed missiles were not covered?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not remember too well whether they were or not. I think it was deployed launchers.

Senator BIDEN. Well, nondeployed. In SALT II we were only talking about launchers, but nondeployed systems, whether it is a missile or a launcher is what I am referring to.

I assume the reason they have not been included in previous agreements has been because of the verification difficulty. And yet, there have already been reported discrepancies between the data provided by the Soviets' in their memorandum of understanding and the earlier United States estimates of the number of nondeployed Soviet missiles that will be banned by the INF Treaty.

Are you concerned about the difficulty of verifying the elimination of all nondeployed missiles covered by the INF Treaty?

Ambassador NITZE. That is a more difficult thing to be positive about than the verification of the elimination of all deployed missiles. What you said earlier, and that is that under SALT II the only things that were limited were deployed launchers, and then indirect limits on the number of RV's you could have on such missiles or on such launchers.

Senator BIDEN. And I assume—the point I was making, I assume the reason why we did not attempt to cover nondeployed missiles before was because of verification difficulty. But I may be wrong about that.

Ambassador NITZE. I think that is correct. I cannot quite remember, but that is my recollection.

Senator BIDEN. And now, as you know, already the firing shot has gone off about Soviet violations on the question primarily of the discrepancy between the number of nondeployed listed and the number thought to actually exist in the Soviet arsenal.

Is that of concern to you?

Ambassador NITZE. I would put it differently. I would say that today that concern has been expressed about the difference between the intelligence estimates, as to some of the intelligence estimates, as to the number of Soviet nondeployed missiles and launchers and the number that they declared as of November 1, 1987.

But that is a difference, and all that indicates so far is the uncertainties of estimating.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with you. My point is, does it concern you? It is being advertised by the opponents of the treaty as a violation of the INF Treaty by the Soviets.

Ambassador NITZE. I do not believe that there is yet any indication that there has been a violation. All that one can say is that there is a difference between the number that the Soviets declared and what some of the intelligence people had estimated prior to the time that that MOU was submitted.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I spent several hours over at my old haunt in the Intelligence Committee with the verification experts, and there is some other slight disagreement.

But there is nothing that you are aware of now that gives you reason to be concerned about nondeployed weapons?

Ambassador NITZE. I am always concerned, but I think in the sense that you mean it, is there any evidence that I see, no, I do not see any.

Senator BIDEN. Do you anticipate that such verification difficulties relating to nondeployed missiles could fuel uncertainties whether or not all nondeployed missiles have indeed been eliminated by the time we get to the end of this treaty?

It seems that there would be no percentage in the Soviets attempting to cheat on the elimination of deployed systems.

Ambassador NITZE. I think that is right. The worry is about nondeployed systems, that is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Tell me your view of how the prescribed regime of verification allays your concerns.

Ambassador NITZE. Well, in the first place, the MOU does call for not only a snapshot of the situation as it was on November 1, but it calls for on the entry into force of the treaty an updated and revised MOU, which would give the data as of that date.

And at that time, we would have the right to go into all of those facilities and have onsite inspection.

Senator BIDEN. All the declared facilities.

Ambassador NITZE. All those facilities, all those bases on which those operating systems are deployed, that is correct.

And I think also in all those facilities on which they have declared nondeployed systems.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, but the concern that is being raised by some is that there are nondeployed systems on nondeclared, previously unused sites, that they have carted these things off to someplace other than where they would have ordinarily been.

Ambassador NITZE. I was just trying to go through the steps, and one of the steps was to check and see whether the declared places where they declared that there were nondeployed missiles, whether that was an accurate count.

The second thing that one would rely on is that the reductions during the early months would be more rapid on the Soviet side than they are on the United States side, particularly with respect to short range systems. We do not have any short range systems.

Within 18 months they would have eliminated all their short range systems, and within 29 months they would have reduced their INF systems down to a number of warheads which was equal to ours.

And what I am trying to get at is that the treaty is front-loaded in the sense that the Soviet reductions come faster and earlier on our side, and so that by the end of 29 months one would know whether or not one could have high confidence that those initial reductions had taken place. Certainly that would be an indication that the Soviets were taking this treaty seriously and to carry it out.

Now, beyond that then there would be, after the initial 3 years, the period of elimination, there would be a ban on flight testing of any of these missiles, either the short range or the INF missiles.

And we have high confidence that we can detect the flight test of an INF missile and distinguish it from the flight testing of other missiles, and therefore we would be confident, I think, for a long period of time, year by year, that these nondeployed missiles are not being tested and there will be no deployed missiles.

So you would be clear that no missiles of this type were being tested. And it is our belief that the Soviets, and certainly all their practice in the past has been that of having regular testing of the missiles that they rely on, to be sure of their reliability and their modernity, and so on and so forth.

It is our belief that the Soviets would begin to lose confidence if they had not tested that class of missile for some period of time. Now, that consideration would grow with the passage of years.

Let us say 5 years had gone by without any test of an SS-20 missile.

Senator BIDEN. Every day would give you greater confidence that the Soviets would be uncertain as to the reliability of these missiles, and would give you greater confidence that they did not really intend to maintain a significant operational force.

Ambassador NITZE. Then, beyond that, there is the question of maintaining the tail that I talked about, the troops in training and so forth and so on, who are necessary to give you confidence that you have an operational force.

Now, beyond that you have got the consideration that the most likely facilities and the most likely troops that they might have if they wished to reconstitute or maintain an SS-20 of some usable size, would be the SS-25, because that is the closest to it, and there we do have the right of, you know, of inspection of the SS-25 bases, and we also have the right for continuing monitoring of the production of the missiles at the SS-25 final assembly plant.

So I think we can keep pretty good track of what comes out of that plant, and we think it would be unlikely that they would be able to produce these SS-25 or SS-20 missiles at other plants. They have not in the past. You know, it is conceivable that they could produce a new factory and we would not know about it, but it is not a likely kind of a thing.

So between all the provisions of the treaty, we feel reasonably confident that they would not have excess nondeployed SS-20 missiles or shorter range ones beyond the number that they declared on the day that the treaty enters into force and we have a chance to check out.

Senator BIDEN. To return to an earlier point, it is commonly assumed that we, the United States, want the more intrusive regime in START, but in fact, we ourselves might want the less intrusive regime because we have so much to lose potentially. Do you agree? Do we not have so much more to lose in terms of classified information that the Soviets would gain from a more intrusive regime than we would.

Ambassador Nitze. Frankly, I do not know the answer to that question.

Senator Biden. Let me move on to another area. The President's policy of informal restraint on strategic weapons while we are negotiating START, says that we will not exceed the number of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles and ballistic missile warheads. Presumably the President would not commit to such a position unless we were able to verify the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and ballistic missile warheads that the Soviets possess. And last Monday Secretary Shultz said, "I believe it is fair to say that there is reasonable confidence in verifying the number of strategic delivery vehicles."

My question is, Mr. Ambassador, can we also verify with reasonable confidence the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads now?

Ambassador Nitze. I am not sure of that. I think we can verify with reasonable confidence certainly the number of deployed Soviet strategic launchers. I think we can do that with high confidence. But we can also verify the number of RV's that they have tested on given missiles, but we do not know—you were asking whether we can verify the total number of warheads that they might have for a given class of missile.

Senator Biden. Verify in the same way you used verification earlier, verify to the degree that they could not alter the balance in any militarily significant way.

Ambassador Nitze. I am not sure of that.

Senator Biden. Well, if we can verify the number of SNDV's deployed and if we can verify the number of re-entry vehicles that have been tested on each of those various missiles, then along the same lines of the logic you just laid out for INF verification, can we not be as certain about verifying the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads? The Soviets would not deploy additional RV's on a system that was not tested, would they? I mean, they have never done that in our experience, have they?

Ambassador Nitze. I think there is some doubt about that. I believe some of the missiles have a number of release stations which is in excess of the number that they have normally tested with RV's on them, but I am not sure it is necessary to do that. They may be release stations for pen-aids, but you may not put pen-aids on. I do not know. So that I am not 100 percent clear on that.

Senator Biden. Well, why would the President make such a commitment if we cannot verify it?

Ambassador Nitze. Well, I think we can verify it reasonably enough. It goes back to what we were talking about before.

Senator Biden. Well, that is my question. Do you think we can verify reasonably enough?

Ambassador Nitze. I think we can reasonably enough for that purpose, yes.

Senator Biden. The Standing Consultative Commission, which was established pursuant to the ABM Treaty, has received mixed reviews, as you know. According to a 1978 report by the Carter administration, the SCC worked extremely well. The report states that both countries brought up issues before the Commission, and "in each case the activity in question has ceased or additional information has allayed the concern."

A sharply contrasting view, however, was voiced in 1985 by Secretary of Defense Weinberger who said, and I quote, "The SCC has failed to resolve any significant compliance issues in the approximately 1,500 days that it has been in session over the past 13 years. A less productive forum for the resolution of disputes would be difficult to find. The SCC has become a diplomatic carpet under which Soviet violations have been continuously swept, an Orwellian memory hole into which our concerns have been dumped like yesterday's trash."

The compliance resolution mechanism in the INF Treaty, the Special Verification Commission, is essentially the same as the SCC, and for that reason, I am interested in your views as to the ability of this type of forum to resolve compliance disputes which obviously its counterpart, according to Secretary Weinberger, was not able to.

Which of the two views do you hold about the ability of these compliance units to in fact work?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, I was active in negotiating that part of the original interim agreement which created the Standing Consultative Commission, but there is no doubt, there was no disagreement between the two governments on what this SCC was supposed to be. It was not supposed to be a group of people to whom the two governments delegated some freedom of action to settle an issue as they saw fit to settle it. It was—the Soviets were clear on that, that they wanted this to be a forum in which representatives, operating under instructions from Moscow, would consult with United States representatives under instruction from Washington, so that it would be a forum in which one could have confidential exchanges between the representatives of the two governments, and hopefully then the two governments would work out some way to resolve the difficulties, and they would use their representatives at the Standing Consultative Commission for the purpose of conducting such negotiations.

And from time to time that did result in some change. But one can have real doubts as to whether it resulted in a correction of the violations of which we were complaining. I remember one of the earliest issues which was considered in the Standing Consultative Commission was whether or not they were testing their SS-5's concurrently with their ABM radars being on the net. And this we believe, and I believe, and I think they finally admitted was not consistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

But the resolution was that they would not do that anymore. But this was only after, I believe, they had had 50 tests of weapons with the concurrent presence, or the ABM radars being on the line while those tests went on. So they learned a great deal from it.

Now, can you say that that is a resolution of the issue or not? I do not know.

Senator BIDEN. What gives you reason to think, other than the fact that this is a less complex treaty, that the new Special Verification Commission will be any more likely to work or be more effective than that which you just described?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, I think the point of the new Commission—let me go back. The SCC was a permanent body, and they met from time to time, they had regular meetings, I forget how often; every 3 or 4 months they would meet, and there was a scheduled meeting and then another scheduled meeting.

In the light of what we conceive as being the faster reaction time necessary under this treaty, we wanted a Commission which could be called on a moment's notice and where you could really discuss things such as immediate, short-notice, onsite inspection. So we wanted to have a Commission which could be called right away, within an hour, a few hours, and where the limitations on their composition and the level, et cetera, would be flexible. In other words, you could call people who were knowledgeable about the individual thing right away, and we could produce our people who were knowledgeable about this sort of thing and ask them to produce theirs who were knowledgeable about it. And we thought this was more flexible than the other procedure which had gotten into a situation which many considered to be unsatisfactory.

Senator BIDEN. It is still ultimately going to rely on the willingness of both sides to resolve the dispute, though, is it not?

Ambassador NITZE. Absolutely. This still goes back to what the two governments are prepared to agree to. It is not whether the Commission can agree to anything; it is whether the two governments can.

Senator BIDEN. I said earlier this morning to Secretary Carlucci that I thought the INF was primarily a significant political victory, and that it also had some military applications but that the START Treaty would be much more oriented toward military measures that would enhance strategic nuclear stability.

Toward that end, as we discuss START, do you think that the START agreement should be comprehensive, covering all systems able to strike the United States and the Soviet Union, or should some systems such as the forward-based systems and sea-launched Cruise missiles be omitted?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, I think it is worthwhile going through the main provisions of the draft START Treaty which are agreed between the two sides. We have made a lot of progress. It is not as though we are going into this START negotiation ab initio. You know, we have done a lot, and I think it is worthwhile going through those main points on the START Treaty, and I might point out how they differ from the SALT II agreement.

For instance, we talked earlier about the fact that in the SALT II agreement, the limits were basically upon deployed launchers, SLBM's, ICBM's and heavy bombers. The limit for these delivery systems was 2,504 for the Soviets, lower than that for us, and you look at the limit that we have gotten the Soviets to agree to in START, and that is 1,600 on both sides. In other words, we were able to achieve what had been our objective of equal limits, which are not true of SALT II.

And with respect to the much more important question of the number of warheads, which as I said in SALT II were only indirectly limited through the number of RV's that had been tested and so forth, but no direct limit on the number of RV's, we have gotten a limit of 6,000 warheads on the two sides, an equal limit. And we have also gotten an agreement that of those 6,000, no more than 4,900 will be the RV's on ballistic missiles. Those are the SLBM's and the ICBM's.

And you look at the limits that were in the SALT II agreement, as I remember it, there were 820 for MIRVed ICBM's. And you know, the maximum number was supposed to be 10, I think. So it might be 8,200 MIRVed ICBM RV's, plus a lot of unMIRVed ICBM's. But the limit we have been discussing with the Soviets that they have not yet agreed to, but have said that they do not really intend to exceed, is 3,300 for ICBM RV's, and you look at the limits for SLBM's. Here we have got this 4,900 limit for the aggregate of SLBM RV's and ICBM RV's, there is no comparable limit in the SALT II, as I remember it, but there was a 1,200 limit on MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's plus carriers for ALCM's. It is hard to convert that into a specific number of the warheads involved. But it certainly would permit more than double, I am sure, the number of warheads that are permitted under this START Treaty, as far as we have negotiated.

And if you look at the number of heavy RV's, which was the thing we were most worried about, you know, there is a limit in SALT II of 308 on the number of launchers for heavy missiles, but in START we have an agreement that cuts that number in half to 154.

But beyond that, we have gotten them to agree that they will not have more than 1,540 heavy RV's, which I think is a much more satisfactory solution than the one that was in the SALT II limits.

And then with respect to throwweight, we were never able during the days of SALT II to get them even to take seriously the idea of limiting throwweight. There was some indirect discussion of no increase in the throwweight of this, that or the other, but here we have gotten them to agree that the throwweight would be cut from the level that they have, which is somewhat in excess of 5 million kilograms, to half of that, around 2.5 million and would not go up thereafter.

Now, our throwweight is down around that limit in any case, so that the reduction in throwweight will be largely unilateral under this agreement.

So by and large, when you look at what we have already achieved in the START agreement, it seems to me so far advanced over what the SALT II limits might be, that I do not think we should even consider the idea of tempting them to go back to the SALT II limits. I think that would be a mistake.

Senator BIDEN. I was not suggesting that.

My question was, and maybe I did not state it clearly enough, was that do you think that the START agreement should in fact be comprehensive, covering all systems, or do you think it should exempt forward-based systems and sea-launched Cruise missiles?

Ambassador NITZE. The forward-based systems have been handled by the INF agreement, except for the aircraft.

With respect to the missiles, those have been handled by the INF agreement.

With respect to the virtues of a comprehensive agreement versus one that is less than comprehensive, it depends upon what difficulties one gets into with respect to making it comprehensive, and I guess the most pertinent part of this has to do with the SLCM's, and there we do have an agreement with the Soviets that there should be a ceiling on the number of SLCM's. But that should be outside of the limits of 6,000 warheads on both sides, which is the main limitation within the START agreement.

Now, the difficulty we are having with the Soviets is trying to figure out some way in which we could, in fact, reliably verify both the range and the number of SLCM's deployed at sea, and we have not solved that problem. We do not really see any very good way of solving it. So we have got a real problem here.

Senator **Biden**. What about mobile ICBM's, which are generally considered to be more stabilizing because they cannot be hit, but which we still propose to ban. Why is that?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Well, the main reason we propose to ban them is we are not very confident as to how one can monitor the number of mobile missiles.

They are hard to see, they are hard to follow, they are hard to count. And particularly if you are talking about a numerical limit, how do you make sure that there are not, let us say, no more than 500?

In other words, how do you make sure that there are 495 and not 505, or some significant difference? How do you make sure that they do not have 700 or 800 or twice as many? It is hard to be certain about that.

And it has been our view that until you could figure out a way in which you could reliably verify mobiles, we have asked the Soviets to help us work that out. We think they ought to be banned. And that is our current position, and this is an instance where we believe the verification provisions take precedence.

We also think that there are certain virtues to mobiles. That is why we have been working on the Midgetman and the rail mobile system.

Senator **Biden**. Secretary Carlucci this morning said that he, and I am paraphrasing him, did not like the idea of the silo-based MX. And he would like to see it mobile, rail-based. And I do not know how you do that and ban all mobiles.

Is it fair to say the position is still negotiable? Or is it firm? No mobiles.

Ambassador **Nitze**. No, I think the position is firm and it is exactly what I have described. Our position is that mobiles should be banned unless we can work out some way in which they can be reasonably, reliably verified as to number.

Senator **Biden**. I have a number of other questions, but I have been going on for a while here. And I see one of my colleagues came in.

And because of my inability to turn, I apologize, I did not see Senator Murkowski. He was here earlier, and I hope he did not have questions, because if he did he is gone. But Senator Kerry would you like to proceed?

Senator **Kerry**. Thanks very much, Joe. I would like to ask just a few, if I may. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, it is nice to see you. I have a few questions. I gather from staff that Senator Biden has discussed with you the question of SALT and some of the linkages there. So I am not going to go back into that. I will just check the record and see where we wound up.

I would like to ask you, back in 1982 you made that famous informal agreement with your counterpart in the walk in the woods. And at that time you came to an agreement of 75 missiles each side, 150 nuclear-capable aircraft.

You have acknowledged since that the zero option has advantages, at least as to verification, but that you are not certain that there were not advantages militarily as to the prior offer. Do you still feel that?

Ambassador NITZE. Yes. I am not sure I would put it in the sense of militarily. I think it is in part politico-military.

Certainly, some of the Europeans would feel much better if we had an equal deployment on both sides of a limited number of INF missiles on both sides than if we have the total abolition of those missiles.

From the military standpoint, frankly, I think we are better off with their total elimination. That is why I put it in terms of politico-military.

Senator KERRY. Would a treaty covering nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe have had any specific advantages for NATO, do you think?

AMBASSADOR NITZE. Not with respect to aircraft with a range less than, well, less than that of the F-111's.

At one time we were prepared to discuss with the Soviets the idea of limiting the aircraft of the range of the F-111 and above to include the Backfire. But they were uninterested in that.

And with respect to those with the lesser range, our problem is that almost all of our aircraft have lesser range than that of the F-111 or are dual capable. And we cannot afford to have both deployment of just conventionally capable aircraft and having a separate deployment of those that are nuclear-capable.

And therefore that is why many of our planes are in fact dual capable. And it has been a firm principle on our side that we did not want an INF Treaty in any way to diminish our capability to support the conventional defense of NATO. And therefore, we do not want to have these dual-capable planes limited.

Senator KERRY. Is it possible to verify, if you were to keep the limits of 150 nuclear capable aircraft is it possible to verify that? Because I take it that would be relevant to the START process now.

Ambassador NITZE. I think one ought to go on to say that the walk in the woods provided for a freeze at 90 on the number of launchers in the Far East, and I forget exactly, I guess the aircraft provision was similar in the Far East. I do not quite remember.

But in any case, unless you have limits on systems across the Urals, then you have not gotten very far. Because how long does it take them to fly them, for instance, aircraft, how long does it take to fly across the Urals to airbases in European Russia? You know, it is no time at all.

And with respect to missiles deployed on the other side of the Urals, the SS-20's on the other side of the Urals can hit all of the targets in Europe without exception, I believe.

So that the idea of limitations in Europe restricted to Europe is not an adequate idea. So you really need global limitations, and that is one of the reasons we insisted upon equal global limitations.

Senator **Kerry**. But can you verify that globally as to aircraft, nuclear-capable?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I believe that most of the aircraft on both sides of that kind of range are dual capable. I do not know that you can determine whether each aircraft is specifically wired for nuclear weapons. But it would not take long to so wire it.

Senator **Kerry**. Now, Mr. Ambassador, on page 3 of the DOD report, on NATO strategy in the 1990's, it states that the United States is, quoting from it, "prepared to ensure a high priority for all aspects of the NATO Montebello modernization framework."

The report then goes on to list high priority programs. Those include the follow-on to the Lance missile, the development of tactical air-to-surface missiles, the modernization of the artillery-fired atomic projectiles.

I have a copy here of the Montebello communique, which was provided by the administration, and nowhere in it do we find any reference to any specific modernization programs cited in the report.

So my question is, does the Montebello agreement endorse the specific proposals that are listed in the DOD report? Or is it simply a general commitment to modernization?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I would have to look it up. You have got a copy of it before you——

Senator **Kerry**. I have a copy of the report. But I am wondering just from the approach of the negotiation, what was your intent?

Ambassador **Nitze**. My recollection of that agreement was that it just makes sense that if you are relying upon a given class of weapons that you do not want to be frozen into what you have now for all time.

You want to have a modernization program that goes along with it. And that is true of every one of our weapons systems, that we try to keep them modern and up to date. I am sure that that is true of the nuclear artillery, I am sure that it is true of Lance.

Senator **Kerry**. I have no question of that. But I think the question is more, has NATO officially agreed to that follow-on program, specifically, say, the Lance?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I believe that NATO has officially approved of the Montebello decision. It was a NATO decision.

Now, with respect to the details as to what programs specifically should be procured and deployed, I do not believe that that has been agreed by NATO.

Senator **Kerry**. And has West Germany agreed to the Lance follow-on?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I do not believe they have. As I say, I do not believe that they have agreed to any specific implementation, nor have we.

Senator **Kerry**. Do you think that in our ratification there should be any linkage in terms of an understanding by the Senate as to any of the modernization programs that are mentioned in the report, the specific programs?

Ambassador **Nitze**. My own view is "No." My own view is that what I would like to see is to see the treaty ratified as it is. It stands on its own bottom, and I see difficulties with these add-ons that various people are suggesting.

Senator **Kerry**. Well, an add-on that does not require going back for further negotiations but reflects an understanding of Montebello could be very important in terms of how we proceed into the START and also the issues of NATO balance of forces and so forth. Would they not?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Well, I am not aware that a final decision has been made within the U.S. Government as to a budgetary request for a specific system to implement the Montebello decision.

And before that appears, I would like to see it being a more official decision.

Senator **Kerry**. Now, it has been reported, and only reported publicly, I guess, in a few papers, that at the summit we and the Soviet Union agreed to counting rules that changed the procedure adopted in SALT II, by which we attributed to each missile the maximum number of warheads.

Is that accurate, first of all? I mean, have we in fact agreed to change those counting rules?

Ambassador **Nitze**. My recollection is that in SALT II it was agreed that, for instance, the Minuteman III should be counted with three RV's, even though it had been tested with seven. So, that is a rule not specifically implemented in all its details.

Senator **Kerry**. But at this point in time, is there something that came out of the summit with respect to future counting?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Yes. Yes, we did have an agreement at the summit with respect to the counting rules, with respect to missiles with more than one RV.

And my recollection is that we agreed that amongst our missiles, for instance, the Trident II would be counted as having eight RV's and that we would not increase the number of RV's on the Trident II beyond eight without changing our declaration.

And similarly, they counted their SS-NX-23, I believe it is, with 4 RV's, even though it has been tested with 10.

Senator **Kerry**. How do we verify adequately when a counting rule permits a less than maximum number of warheads?

Ambassador **Nitze**. That is something we are still discussing with the Soviets. We have not resolved that yet.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Biden**. We will come back again.

Senator **Kerry**. I probably have to run, but that is fine. It is not that critical. I think I got the key questions in.

Senator **Biden**. Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I read with fascination former Secretary Kissinger's article in Newsweek on the treaty.

And Secretary Kissinger seems to be saying it is a bad treaty, but we should ratify it, as close as I can understand what he is saying. Or maybe he is saying it is not a Henry Kissinger treaty; therefore, it is weaker than it should be.

But anyway, he concludes that we should ratify it, but he says some very interesting things. You are one of our most seasoned negotiators and public servants. I am wondering about your assessment of the Russian leadership's motivations regarding this treaty.

Now, Secretary Kissinger wrote that he was down here to meet Gorbachev, and was invited to all the functions and so forth and he tells about that. He made the observation that the President did invoke human rights and regional conflicts in the summit talks.

But one could not avoid the impression that these utterances were largely to placate restive rightwing critics. This is Henry Kissinger talking now, "the old Cold Warrior was clearly preoccupied with nuclear disarmament." And then he says, "he also reflected a quintessential American dream that history can be reversed by good will."

Now, we are going through this phenomenon with glasnost and Gorbachev, and I praised the President for getting together with Gorbachev.

But Kissinger's first conclusion is that we should ratify the INF agreement with all its failings. Failure to do so would wreck the Atlantic alliance.

Then he goes on to say, any future reduction of strategic forces must be synchronized with a substantial reduction of Soviet conventional forces. And accepting the Soviet position on the SDI—or any variation of it—would doom our program of strategic defense research.

He makes almost every argument against it. It is something like Jeane Kirkpatrick's testimony that she thinks it is a bad treaty but we should ratify it.

But in any event, getting back to my original question, this business of a quintessential American dream that history can be reversed by good will. In your judgment based upon negotiating with them, from Victor Karpov on up, have they changed? What do they get out of this treaty?

Ambassador NITZE. Let me begin by saying you have Mr. Kissinger's remarks, which I have not read. I am not a great admirer of Mr. Kissinger's remarks. But be that as it may.

I am neither a great admirer of the doctrine that one should approve a treaty even though it is a bad treaty. I do not agree with that at all. I believe this treaty is a good treaty and it should be approved because it is a good treaty. So I differ basically with what Henry Kissinger has to say.

Now, with respect to the specific question about the conventional lankage, that the INF Treaty should be synchronized with conventional reductions, we went through that the other day, I thought, you and I at some length.

And I think we were agreed that righting the imbalances in the conventional field is a very important target that we all support.

But then the question is whether one should make the implementation of the INF Treaty contingent upon prior agreement to eliminate the imbalances in the conventional field. I believe it is totally unrealistic and would result in there not being an INF Treaty. And I am against that, strongly, as I expressed the other day.

Senator PRESSLER. But what is your assessment of the changes in Soviet leadership, of glasnost, and so on?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, we have all read what Mr. Gorbachev has to say, and I think all of us are equally expert or inexpert upon that question, including myself.

I have my views, and my views are that Mr. Gorbachev has affected important changes in the Soviet Union. It is not the same kind of an apparatus that it was before.

I think he has substantially improved the quality of the team that works with him on foreign affairs and national security issues and arms control negotiations. He has gotten rid of a lot of the less competent people, and promoted some very competent people.

He certainly has given new life to a great many concepts which seem to me are in the right direction. But whether or not they really represent a fundamental change in the nature of the system, that is something I do not know. That remains to be seen, it seems to me.

Senator PRESSLER. What is your view of the possible efforts to offer amendments linking this treaty to human rights advances and issues of Soviet Jewry and so on? What would your reaction to those amendments be?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, every one of the meetings we have had with the Soviet Union has been on the broad agenda, which includes human rights, bilateral issues, and regional issues, and arms control issues.

Those have been the four parts of our universal agenda. And the Secretary in particular has been insistent upon making the human rights part of the agenda as important as the others.

I, myself, have been working on the arms control part of the agenda. So I am not the right witness with respect to the human rights part of it. But it certainly, I can testify, has been an important part of the executive branch's agenda, and Mr. Shultz' agenda in particular.

Senator PRESSLER. What about the issue of chemical weapons? We are told that there is a 15-to-1 Soviet advantage. Some say it is 25-to-1.

Again, as we got into before, it is awfully hard to measure these things exactly because in conventional forces you do not really know the quality of leadership, et cetera. Should there be linkage of any sort to chemical weapons equality in this treaty?

Ambassador NITZE. I think not. I think the whole question of the verifiability of a chemical treaty is even more difficult than it is in START, and the START is more difficult than INF.

I think we ought to work on a chemical ban. That is very much part of the executive branch's agenda to work on it. But I think it would be a mistake to make this treaty contingent upon another desirable objective but a very difficult objective to work out in a given time period.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, I have one or two more questions for the record. But I would like to submit those in writing.

Senator BIDEN. If you need more time, go ahead.

Senator PRESSLER. That is all right, I am still preparing them and working on them.

Senator BIDEN. I just have a couple of more questions if I could, Mr. Ambassador and again, I really appreciate your coming back up this afternoon.

It seems to me there is a potentially serious inconsistency between your statement that the U.S. Government has not decided yet on a START verification regime, and the statements of other officials who are saying already that we will require a challenge inspection regime for START or we will not have a START agreement. And again, I hope your position is the accurate one.

But my concern is with conflicting statements which on the one hand, say there is no agreed upon regime and on the other hand, say there is an agreed upon regime that requires challenge inspections. I am worried that we are going to set up a great pitfall for START when it comes up.

And so I want to ask you again, is there no official position yet as to what the verification regime must be in order to have a START agreement?

Ambassador NITZE. Let me make it more specific. I believe there has been no decision on challenge inspection. That is what I said, because there are a lot of other things that have been decided. And we have decided a lot of things.

Senator BIDEN. You are right. I was specifically referring to challenge inspections and there is no decision on these at this point.

Ambassador NITZE. That is my understanding.

Senator BIDEN. Now, with regard to the extent of what START will cover, SLCM's, as you acknowledged, present a difficult problem.

I assume one of the reasons why in the INF agreement, ground-launched Cruise missiles, whether conventionally or nuclear tipped, were eliminated is because you could not make a distinction. You could not verify whether or not a ground-launched Cruise missile was nuclear or conventional. Doesn't the same problem exist for sea-launched Cruise missiles, and won't we either have to have an all or none situation unless there is a significantly different verification regime?

Ambassador NITZE. I do not think that has been firmly decided. With respect to the ground-launched Cruise missiles in START and the ballistic missiles, there, it was agreed that there the goal would be that, rule would be that nuclear-armed would be the standard.

Senator BIDEN. I am sorry, say that again please?

Ambassador NITZE. The standard of those arms to be limited would be that they were nuclear-armed.

Senator BIDEN. Correct. Now, but how can you tell whether they are nuclear armed or conventionally-armed?

Ambassador NITZE. Well, we have not worked that out yet.

Senator BIDEN. The President has been determined to avoid any agreement that would clarify which test of strategic defense technology are permissible, and which tests are not permissible. And the administration has portrayed this as a concession that we are unwilling to make to the Soviet Union. It is one the Soviets are demanding and one that we will not make.

But ultimately, isn't agreement on strategic defense something that we will need for our own security as a prerequisite for entering into a reduction on an order that is now contemplated by the START agreement?

Ambassador NITZE. This matter is also a matter that I would prefer not to discuss.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I will honor that. Let me skip over that then and move on to the last couple of points.

Nuclear stability can be enhanced in two ways. One, through meaningful arms control, and the other through independent procurement and development decisions and I have a question about each, if I may.

In the START talks, as you have pointed out, we have reached preliminary agreements on a ceiling of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads, and 1,600 launchers.

Would you please explain to me why a warhead limit, in and of itself, is not sufficient to achieve the goal of increased nuclear stability?

Ambassador NITZE. My own personal view is that the important limitation is the 6,000 warheads. But this was something that the Soviet Union wanted a limit on the number of launchers, and we did not see any real objection to it, because we did not contemplate having more than 1,600 launchers, and that therefore we were able to agree to that figure.

Senator BIDEN. They wanted the limit on launchers?

Ambassador NITZE. They wanted the launcher limit, that is correct. And we saw no real objection to it.

Senator BIDEN. Because it seems that the limit on launchers simply stands in the way of what we might wish to achieve, and that is to decrease MIRVing, and thereby decrease the ratio of warheads to targets.

But the Soviets are the ones that are asking for the launcher limitation.

Ambassador NITZE. Well you look at the, there was the prospect of the number of launchers that we actually want. And it does not look as though it will be greater than 1,600.

Senator BIDEN. With regard to our own procurement and development plans, how does the MX missile as opposed to the Midgetman serve the goal of nuclear stability, or I guess your answer is that we need both.

Ambassador NITZE. That is my answer. You read my mind.

Senator BIDEN. I feel so comfortable for the first time in a long time, being on your side on a very important issue. Because I respect you so much, I do not want to go back and rehash old fights, but I just want to explore the MX a little bit with you.

The MX in its present basing mode is a highly lucrative target that invites preemption. And if we do have a START agreement, won't it consume an inordinate number of permitted ballistic missile warheads leaving the stability situation as bad or even worse for us than it is now, unless we change its basing mode?

Ambassador NITZE. Well the Pentagon is asking for 50 MX in a fixed deployment mode and 50 in a rail-garrison mobile mode. And I think they may well decide after they have had some time to work out the rail-garrison mobile that they might want to put the 50 fixed ones in that same configuration.

Senator BIDEN. It would seem to me that the logic would drive them that way.

Ambassador NITZE. Well, we have got a problem of time and cost and budgetary considerations.

Senator **Biden**. Well, Mr. Ambassador, in closing I want to ask you a question for reasons that I think you will understand.

Is it fair for the committee to consider your testimony on the meaning of this treaty as authoritative?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I believe so. But I would like to go over the transcript and be sure that it is thoroughly corrected and that it is authoritative after it has been reviewed.

Senator **Biden**. Again, I am not in anyway questioning your judgment or your knowledge, you understand.

Ambassador **Nitze**. No, I know what you are talking about. It is a legitimate question.

Senator **Biden**. Well I would invite you to do that.

Ambassador **Nitze**. I want to be sure that it is authoritative.

Senator **Biden**. Good, that would be helpful. How should a legal advisor 10, or 15 years from now, who decides that they want to discount your testimony——

Ambassador **Nitze**. Want to discount my testimony?

Senator **Biden**. Discount your testimony as to the meaning of the INF agreement and reinterpret it. How should that be viewed?

Ambassador **Nitze**. I think what he would say is that with respect to domestic law, an authoritative statement by a member of the executive branch is determinative as to what the meaning of the treaty is from the standpoint of domestic law.

I believe it is also true that from the standpoint of international law, what is determinative is the language of the treaty itself. And the negotiating record with respect to how that language was arrived at, and not the testimony, my testimony before this committee.

Senator **Biden**. Let me make sure that I understand that. You believe your testimony before the committee would be binding as it relates to domestic law, that is, the constitution?

Ambassador **Nitze**. Yes; that is, that I think one should not change that without getting the concurrence of the Congress thereto. As a matter of domestic law, as a matter of international law, I think that is a different matter.

Senator **Biden**. Well Mr. Ambassador——

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Biden, could I ask one more line? I would like to ask just one more brief question.

Senator **Biden**. I am sorry, surely.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Ambassador, during this morning's hearing, Secretary Carlucci indicated one of the reasons why 100 elimination launches were permitted is because otherwise the 3-year elimination period would not have provided the Soviets with sufficient time to destroy all the missiles covered by the treaty.

He then indicated that the Joint Chiefs had objected to having an elimination period longer than 3 years because they felt that more than 3 years would be too long a period to go without flight testing Pershing missiles.

If we could go 3 years without testing our Pershing II's and maintain confidence in them, could the Soviets similarly go 3 years without testing their SS–20's and still maintain confidence in them?

Ambassador **Nitze**. As I said earlier, I thought that this question of the time period related to the nontesting of a missile was incremental. In other words the longer the period, the less confidence one had. And that may be if one had not been tested for 5 years, one would have low confidence in it. But confidence does not disappear over night.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you.

Senator **Biden**. Well Mr. Secretary I thank you. And again, it would not serve us to get into the debate on reinterpretation here. But as you know, the position of some of us, myself in particular, is that under international law, it is recognized that the Senate and the Executive are an integral part of any agreement, so that there is no treaty until the Senate ratifies it.

But that is a debate that I am sure we will be having for a while. Hopefully we will be able to resolve it, because I think it may be the only potential stumbling block. But I am confident that it can be resolved somehow.

Again, thank you very, very much for coming up on such short notice. We appreciate it.

The hearing is adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9 a.m.,

[Whereupon, the committee adjourned to reconvene at 9:02 a.m. Tuesday, February 2, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:02 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Kerry, Adams, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Pressler, Murkowski, Trible, Evans, and McConnell.

The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

It gives me great pleasure to welcome five Secretaries of Defense here, from Secretary McNamara to Secretary Weinberger. The five of you span a period of more than 25 years and represent every administration from President Kennedy to President Reagan.

I shall forgo an opening statement while retaining the right of reply should the ranking minority member wish to make an opening statement. I would suggest that we go along and the committee hear each of the five of you and then proceed to questions.

I ask your apology for my colleagues who will be coming in and out, and I realize that some of you have to leave relatively promptly. We will do our very best, and maybe Secretary Weinberger would care to lead off.

STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be invited to join you today.

In the beginning, I would simply like to say that I think the INF Treaty stands on its own. It is a sound agreement. It is one that this committee and the Senate as a whole should support.

Nevertheless, of course, as with any important international agreement, especially one that concerns nuclear arms reductions, we must ask the basic question, which always is what is left, and is that enough to continue to deter a Soviet attack.

We should also ask what actions will be required of us if the treaty does receive your advice and consent, as I trust it will.

I would like to begin by making three specific comments about NATO and the INF Treaty and then conclude my statement with some remarks on what the Atlantic alliance can do in the future to ensure that the promise of the INF Treaty is actually realized.

First and, I think, the most obvious point to make about the INF Treaty is that it confirms the basic truth of intentional politics, that one must negotiate, indeed can negotiate successfully, only from strength.

This treaty bears out that truth not only for the obvious reasons that the alliance remained united and successfully began its deployment of the Pershing II and ground launch Cruise missiles, but that this was a prerequisite to our success.

It demonstrated our ability to ignore Soviet intimidation and blandishment, that we are all aimed at preventing our deployment in NATO countries.

If that Soviet propaganda had succeeded, it would have ensured Soviet global dominance would be there in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Had we or our NATO allies submitted to their tactics or, indeed, had we listened to calls within our own countries for unilateral restraint or a freeze, we would now likely face the wholly unstable and dangerous situation of overwhelming and worldwide Soviet superiority in intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

In short, if NATO had not displayed the unity and the courage that it did and if NATO had not been encouraged by our own resolution and resources, Soviet military and political dominance of Europe would be ensured.

There is another dimension to this point about negotiating from strength, and that concerns the global nature of our competition with the Soviet Union. While it surely is a necessary condition of accomplishing a zero-zero outcome on INF for the alliance first to have deployed its own INF force, I doubt that on its own that would have been sufficient to bring the Soviets to give up all of their previously stated nonnegotiable demands, which they did, Mr. Chairman. They gave up all four of those.

When we speak of negotiating from a position of strength, we have to recognize that the Soviets look to the entire correlation of forces. In other words, the fact that the United States was able to rebuild and modernize the entire range of our military force after some 10 years of damaging cuts was also influential in the success of our INF negotiations. It should not be ignored as the background to our successful diplomacy.

Clearly, if we continue to engage in the kind of defense cuts that we have seen over the last 2 years, mirroring the worst days of the decade of neglect, cuts that do, in my opinion, seriously injure our own security, we cannot expect the kind of diplomatic success that we have seen in the INF negotiations again.

We give the Soviets little incentive to negotiate reductions with us if Congress insists on cuts of the magnitude required in the budget resolutions for 1988 and 1989. This simply tells the Soviets that we are back to the days of unilateral reductions in our total military strength. In short, we are telling the Soviets that we will reduce on our own.

The second point I would like to make with respect to the INF Treaty is that it clearly enhances NATO security. The treaty does this for the simple reason that under its provisions, the Soviet Union will eliminate forces capable of carrying over 1,600 nuclear warheads, while the United States will eliminate forces capable of delivering some 400 nuclear warheads.

The initial advantage for the alliance is that the treaty reduces significantly the Soviets' ability to strike NATO targets without resort to their strategic missiles.

We should also bear in mind that much of the Soviet INF force that will be destroyed under the treaty, that is, the SS-12's and the SS-23's, have chemical and conventional warfare capabilities, and those are both areas in which the Soviets have enormous advantages.

So, the INF agreement reduces these threats as well. These are targeted primarily against ports and airfields and larger sites. In short, they are targeted against our reinforcing capabilities.

Another advantage in this treaty lies in the asymmetrical nature of these reductions. Given the enormous Soviet advantage in conventional and nuclear arms, this principle of asymmetrical reduction is an excellent and necessary pattern for the future.

Finally, there is the assurance given us through verification measures. We have achieved in the INF Treaty many of the kinds of verification measures that we wanted and that we believe will give us some degree of confidence that the Soviets will comply and that we have a much better chance of discovering significant violations by them.

In a society and a country as large and as closed as the U.S.S.R. and given their past record of cheating, we can never be 100-percent sure that we will detect any more of their cheating. I have no question in my mind that these verification measures are better than we have ever obtained before.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, there will be an American enterprise study, I am told, out tomorrow that will go into much more detail about all of these matters.

It must be understood, however, that even good verification procedures are of little use if we have no intention to react to violations. Our response to noncompliance, should it occur, and it always has with Soviet treaties in the past, is as important if not more important than our technical ability to detect violations.

We must be resolved well in advance what should be our reaction and our response to Soviet cheating. This, of course, would require support by the Congress because it will require appropriations.

Clearly, I think the INF Treaty leaves NATO in a strong military position. On the political side, the alliance comes out of this long process of deployment and negotiations stronger than ever.

I am amazed, frankly, that in the face of the really quite extraordinary alliance unity, unity that we worked most diligently to maintain for the past 7 years and that saw us through wrenching domestic debates, especially in Europe, all of these were reflected in the unity and the courage which the NATO nations deployed, despite the most intensive Soviet propaganda campaigns. I am amazed that in the face of all that so many people exhibit fears that NATO is about to crumble.

The clear political message that can be derived from this entire process is that the Soviets failed to crack the alliance. They have tried ever since it was formed. Today we continue to have disputes within NATO, and that is nothing new. That is because the NATO nations are very sovereign, very independent nations, unlike the Warsaw Pact nations, many of which are actually occupied now by Soviet troops.

Of course, to keep NATO strong and united we must maintain and modernize our military. They are simply NATO's next challenges.

In conclusion, I would like to make just a few remarks about the future.

Arms reduction agreements compel us to ask a simple question: When the missiles go, what is left? Is enough left to constitute a proper and an adequate deterrent?

The INF Treaty does not alter NATO's flexible response strategy. That strategy remains intact and strong, as it must. Such strategies, however, are not self-sustained. Since the birth of NATO in 1949, we have been concerned with maintaining the proper mix of forces, both conventional and nuclear, that make flexible response a credible deterrent strategy.

These concerns are with us today and are with us whether or not we have an INF Treaty. The key is that we cannot allow our force structure to stagnate, thinking that all our problems have been solved with this treaty or with the great strength that we have added in the past 6 years.

We just, just for one example, go forward with the 1983 Montebello decision which called not only for reductions in total numbers but for modernization of everything left of NATO nuclear and dual-capable weapons.

Nothing in the INF Treaty prevents us from fulfilling the Montebello decision, nor, indeed, does it limit us from taking a host of necessary measures to ensure our security, such as strengthening our conventional forces.

In this regard, it is important for us to speak out firmly against Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's recent threats. According to Mr. Shevardnadze, any attempt by the alliance to modernize its tactical- or battlefield-range nuclear weapons would, as he put it, scuttle the agreement and the achievements in reductions made thus far.

He goes further than this, of course. He states that modernization must not be permitted. Well, I would ask not permitted by whom? NATO security is not in Mr. Shevardnadze's hands, nor is it within his purview to dictate to us how we should see to that security.

The treaty does not prevent modernization. Quite the contrary. The treaty compels modernization, and I hope that Congress will vote the necessary funds for that soon.

These Soviet threats are nothing new, but NATO must reject them as it has rejected in the past such bullying and crude threats. Since he does not seem to have read it, I would recommend that the Soviet Foreign Minister borrow a copy of the treaty and refresh his memory as to its provisions.

Clearly, it remains the alliance's own decision whether it will or will not maintain deterrence in Europe. At my last meeting with the NATO defense ministers in Monterey, CA, in November of last year, their determination in this regard was as strong as ever, and we had a unanimous result throughout all of our deliberations expressed in the communique.

I have no doubt that, given continued strong leadership and encouragement from the United States and adequate funding by the Congress, the military modernization called for in the Montebello decision will be carried out successfully and on time, and I think that is urgently required.

One other point, if I may, sir, before I close. All of the worries and uncertainties that we all have as to Soviet cheating and whether the verification is adequate could be dispelled if we fund, complete and deploy the President's strategic defense initiative as soon as possible, and I hope that nothing will interfere with deploying SDI just as soon as we can.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you, and I will be glad to try to respond to your questions whenever it is appropriate.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberger may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Weinberger.

Going in reverse seniority, we now come to Mr. Harold Brown. You may proceed.

Senator HELMS. Before Secretary Brown begins, may I say to Secretary Weinberger I understand that congratulations are in order for you.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Thank you, sir.

Senator HELMS. The Queen of England announced her intention to knight the Secretary.

Are you going to become Sir Cap now?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, sir. The Constitution has some very harsh things to say about foreign titles.

Senator HELMS. I was going to counsel you about that a little bit.

Go ahead, Mr. Brown.

STATEMENT HON. OF HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is, as always, a pleasure to appear before this committee.

I would like to submit my entire statement for the record. It is too long to read. I will highlight a few points, if I may.

The United States-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, future arms control and reduction agreements for short- and long-range nuclear forces and for conventional forces as well, force structure planning and burden sharing—all of these need to be seen as part of a wider picture. The relevant context comprises the nature and needs of U.S. security and our alliance relationships both in NATO and elsewhere in the world.

These subjects are covered briefly and, I fear, sketchily in my written submission, and I will be dealing with only some of them in my oral presentation today. It overlaps some of the things that Secretary Weinberger has referred to.

It does not agree with quite everything that he said, although it does agree on the issue of the INF Treaty, and I am sure it overlaps what some of my other conferees will be saying today. So, I will try to highlight a few different things, but let me begin with the INF Treaty.

I would like to mention three kinds of issues: The effect on the military balance; the impact on interaction with alliance relations; and United States-Soviet relations. Those overlap, as do their political and military aspects.

I should begin by saying that I judge the treaty to be in the interest of U.S. security and that I urge its ratification without actions that would open it to reinterpretation or renegotiation from either side.

It is possible unilaterally to write a treaty that would be better if we were beginning from scratch. At some point in the real negotiation, it might actually have been possible to negotiate a better one. This, however, is the real world, and this treaty is a good treaty, helping U.S. security.

There are certain political problems flowing from it. There will be pressures for a rush for denuclearization at the battlefield level. There are European concerns about a perceived decoupling of the U.S. nuclear deterrent from the defense of Europe, and there is also a need to reexamine targeting so that the targets that would have been covered by U.S. INF forces are covered by other systems. These are all manageable problems.

The political disadvantages of not having a treaty or not ratifying the treaty that has been signed are very much greater, and there are political advantages flowing from the negotiation and ratification of the treaty.

The history of the negotiations has shown that alliance unity in responding to Soviet military deployments with deployments of our own can encourage and in this case has produced a fair arms reduction agreement.

The elimination of a category of nuclear weapons, although there are arguments for and against it, is, on balance, in this case a good idea.

The evidence that the alliance is prepared to negotiate nuclear arms reductions encourages public support of allied military efforts by convincing allied publics that their governments have a believable arms control policy. In turn, that helps to legitimize their defense policies and programs.

In military terms, it remains true that the Soviets can still attack all the targets that had been targeted by the eliminated missiles with other forces of their own. Targets that could have been hit by SS–20's can clearly be hit by Soviet ICBM's, for example.

From the other side, targets in Eastern Europe or the Western military districts of the Soviet Union that could have been hit by Pershing II's or GLCM's can now be hit by United States ICBM's, SLBM's, SLCM's or weapons carried in tactical aircraft. We are talking here about targets like airfields, conventional forces, and forward military command posts.

For us as for the Soviets, that particular rung of the escalation ladder will not be covered quite as well by other existing delivery systems. It will not be possible to cover them by intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles or intermediate-range land-based Cruise missiles; but within the terms of the treaty, additional substitute systems are possible to meet those concerns if that should be considered to be a military necessity.

So much for the military aspects, but what about the broader aspect? Does this INF Treaty decouple the United States from the defense of Europe? Will it lead to denuclearization and heighten the danger from what almost everyone agrees to be a significant conventional imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, though there is some disagreement on the degree of imbalance?

These political issues go to the heart of the alliance relationship. My own answer is that the United States is and will remain tightly coupled to the defense of Europe after the ratification of the INF Treaty. It will continue to be coupled through battlefield and other tactical and theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 4,500 of them.

It is coupled even more, in my judgment, by the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe. These would be immediately involved in combat by a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack. To think that the American nuclear capability would not be invoked to defend them is to suggest that the United States is not coupled to its own military forces.

Finally and not by any means least, U.S. nuclear and other military capabilities is coupled to the defense of Europe by its alliance with and commitment to the security of its NATO allies underlined by the United States own self-interest.

Well, if all of that is so, why have there been so many expressions of concern about the INF Treaty by pro-American European conservatives and indications by American opponents of the treaty of private objections by European military and political leaders?

The answer, I think, lies in a series of other events: One was the Reykjavik summit meeting, in which President Reagan enthusiastically agreed to the elimination of all ballistic missiles and perhaps, although stories vary on this, to the elimination of all nuclear weapons, an alteration which would clearly make the shaky conventional balance the decisive military/political element in the European balance. That is one reason.

An event of a completely different kind was the stock market collapse in October 1987. That must have affected European attitudes. That clearly suggested economic disarray. When the fundamental basis of both their military security and their economic well-being is called into question by policies and actions of the U.S. administration and related events in the United States, the stage is set for substantial allied concerns about other U.S. actions.

It is only fair to add that this is not the first U.S. administration to raise such concerns among our allies, but it is also fair to note that the Reykjavik summit negotiations, their scope and the magnitude of the October 19 stock market collapse were unprecedented.

In any case, confidence is further eroded when the administration, whatever administration, becomes weaker in its domestic political grip, as happened both in 1986 and in 1987.

Let me turn now to the issue of the INF as it fits into United States-Soviet relations. Military, it is a sideshow to the issues of strategic weapons, START, SDI, and the ABM Treaty, but it is significant in political terms, reintroducing arms control as an accepted element in the relationship and in abolishing the category of weapons.

Some of the verification arrangements, including cooperative activities and onsite inspections, could be helpful precedents in START and in strategic defense agreements, but we should not overestimate this advantage.

INF arrangements for verification are a great deal simpler than those for strategic weapons would have to be for equivalent confidence in compliance. There are, for example, area limits in the INF verification agreement. You cannot just go anywhere.

We can afford to have them simpler in the case of INF because there is so little incentive to cheat on INF. The missions of those forces can be carried out by other forces, and because the United States has declared the SALT II agreement that limits the number of Soviet ICBM's is no longer operative, the Soviets can build as many SS–25's as they wish to carry out the role of the dismantled SS–20's. Why should they instead choose to cheat on INF?

In political terms, the INF agreement and its effect on United States-Soviet relations is significant. It is the first significant arms control agreement negotiated since 1979 and, if ratified, the first significant one to be ratified since 1972.

It clearly has had a positive effect on making discussion of other issues between superpowers more feasible.

If the INF Treaty's ratification were to be derailed despite the modest nature of the agreement and despite its negotiation and support by a President with unimpeachable anti-Soviet credentials, it is hard to see how the Soviets or we could expect any significant arms control agreements in the foreseeable future.

Some members of the foreign policy community and perhaps some Members of Congress may think that would be a good outcome. I think it would be a very bad one and a dangerous one.

To conclude on the INF Treaty, the words "modest but useful" come to mind. There seem to be two kinds of agreements: Modest but useful; and fatally flawed. This one is modest but useful.

Future alliance military strategy and force structure decisions need careful political handling. A possible modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons and, if necessary, of permitted midrange systems, continuance of U.S. military deployments in Europe, improvements of the capabilities of alliance conventional forces, and consultation with allies on these matters and on future arms control and arms reduction negotiations will all need to be pursued.

In this context, both the ratification of the INF Treaty and the statements of policy by the administration, by Congress, even by outside witnesses who presume to speak with authority as past policymakers or present opinion leaders in influencing the future will have considerable importance.

I would like to turn just for a few minutes, Mr. Chairman, to the future conventional force balance in Europe and corresponding issues of force structure and arms control and reduction.

To begin with, I think we all ought to recognize that Soviet attacks across the NATO/Warsaw Pact, especially on the central front, have never been likely since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and that they are increasingly unlikely, especially in the present political condition of the Soviet Union.

In that sense, the detailed military configuration of the alliance has always been an insurance policy against an unlikely event, but we must always think about future possibilities, likely and unlikely.

The failure of reform in the Soviet Union or a continued economic and technological decline might lead to a situation of desperation; or there might be attempts by one or more Eastern European countries to break away from the Soviet bloc; or Western unity might decay and create tempting targets for individual territorial grabs with the bonus of disintegration of the alliance.

In a tense military political confrontation, the balance of military forces could matter a great deal. Even in comparatively relaxed situations such as now prevail, a degree of political intimidation can be and is exercised implicitly or explicitly by a sufficient imbalance in conventional forces.

How, then, should the alliance go about improving the balance of conventional forces in Europe? The answer to that depends on what the Soviets do as well, both unilaterally in their own force structure and dispositions and in arms control negotiations.

Both unilateral efforts and cooperative efforts can change the balance, perhaps stabilize it and thus reduce the risk of war.

The goal should be to give each side assurance that it could not be successfully invaded; that is, to make conventional forces dominant over conventional offensive ones. That is technically and militarily feasible, unlike the situation in the strategic nuclear case; but even though it may be militarily and technically feasible, there is still the issue of whether there is the political will and capability to carry out such a program.

In unilateral terms, there are at least four ways for NATO to improve the conventional military balance: Introduction of additional advanced technology into allied forces; increasing force size; changing strategy; and better integrating national forces and producing a more effective command control communication system.

But every one of those suggested improvements faces substantial practical, including political, obstacles. I outline those, but I will not go into them now.

Another way to go at this is conventional arms reductions as a way of improving stability and reducing the ability of the Soviets to attack successfully by rapidly advancing the front through Western Europe.

There are a lot of calculations about such a war involving varying assumptions about mobilization, political decisions with respect to reinforcement, and force capabilities.

As usual, such simulations are probably much more reliable in telling us how the results change with changes in these factors than they are in foretelling the outcome of a particular actual attack, which would depend on such things as leadership, morale, training, surprise, and the fog of war, all of which are difficult to evaluate and predict, much less include in the simulation.

The studies, however, do say that the outcome depends on the size of the forces, which is not very surprising; their armaments, location, and readiness.

A recent RAND Corp. study based on such simulations concludes that in order to reduce the ability of the Warsaw Pact forces to penetrate deep into NATO territory quickly by means of arms reductions, unequal and rather deep reductions would be required in the key firepower elements, tanks and artillery.

The reason is that the NATO forces barely cover the line from the Baltic to the Alps, with very little in the way of reserves. The Soviets have, on the contrary, large forces and reserves, more than they can funnel at any one time through the relatively few corridors that geography allows for an attack.

So, unless you reduce the Warsaw Pact forces below the number that they can bring to bear in a first echelon assault through those corridors, reductions on the NATO side merely make the force ratios at the critical points, and the outcome, worse for NATO.

All these factors suggest that conventional arms reductions would involve complex and lengthy negotiations which would affect and be affected by political relations between the West and the Soviets during and after the negotiations.

This raises some of the usual questions of the kind that Secretary Weinberger has addressed. Would strengthening alliance conventional military capabilities, or at least convincing the Soviets that the alliance will strengthen capabilities absent an arms control agreement, act as a positive lever in such negotiations, and how do we do that without shrinking defense budgets?

Would such a course make the Soviets less willing to negotiate reductions in their own capabilities?

Are the Soviet decisions on these matters, in fact, driven by internal Soviet political/economic/bureaucratic forces and personal ambitions?

My own judgment is that they are largely so driven but that a believable allied intention to strengthen Western capabilities unless the Soviets agree to a reasonable and verifiable reduction in conventional forces would be a useful lever.

I, therefore, believe that conventional arms reduction should be pursued actively and that we face a Soviet leadership willing to enter such negotiations seriously but one that will prove to be tenacious in safeguarding what they regard as their own security and their own advantages.

Let me now just say a few summary words in conclusion, Mr. Chairman.

I have tried to weave together the different overlapping issues of the state of U.S. alliances, the INF Treaty, future conventional military balance and arms reduction, and the changing world political, military, economic, and social context in which these issues must all be seen.

The United States and its allies have some severe deficiencies and some considerable advantages in the military and in the political competition.

Our own Nation finds itself in the new position of competing economically and not always successfully with our allies, at the same time as we negotiate with a new, articulate, innovative, but by no means assuredly benign Soviet leadership.

I think we can manage a transition to a stabler world situation. The INF Treaty is one small step in that direction. It is going to take skill, nerve, experience, and innovation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown may be found in the appendix.]

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Dr. Brown.

Dr. Schlesinger.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I will attempt to summarize my statement.

This treaty has been treated by many as the successful culmination of a long and arduous process. Others have treated it as the beginning of a process of unraveling of the NATO alliance.

I think there is some—some—possible truth in both. But the correct explanation lies much closer to the first.

I think that the Members of the Senate should have no hesitancy about voting for ratification of this treaty. There will be somewhat more hesitancy, I am sure, on the part of some Members of the Senate in terms of the impact on the force balance. But I want to stress that the overall impact of this treaty will benefit the military security of the West.

On balance, it will improve our posture.

I stress that it is "on balance" that we are talking about because too frequently in discussions of arms control, there is a tendency to look at the unilateral impact on American forces, rather than the overall impact. The benefits to the United States or to the West from arms control come not from the impact on American forces. That, of course, represents the sacrifice. It is the restraint or reduction that is placed upon Soviet forces and, in this case, on balance, we are benefited by the agreement.

We are benefited by the agreement, as other speakers have commented, because we have a 4-to-1 reduction. The Soviets have accepted a very favorable exchange rate from the standpoint of the West. They have accepted the principle of asymmetrical reductions. They have accepted the reduction of the number of warheads that they can throw against the congested populations of Western Europe.

All in all, this should be militarily beneficial to the alliance.

On the other hand, there is a political aspect, and, as you know, our European allies have been somewhat uneasy with the results of the INF agreement. One can say that this is a reflection of the mercurial qualities of our allies. After all, we have succeeded in doing precisely what they urged us to do some years ago, which was to eliminate the threat of the SS-20. But now they have turned around, and in private, if not in public, they express some apprehension.

Our British allies are much more solidly in support of this agreement than are our continental allies.

I think that the reason that we have seen this turnaround is, as Harold has indicated, the blow to allied confidence in American leadership and in American understanding of the underpinnings of alliance strategy for these many years that occurred at Reykjavik.

The willingness of the President of the United States seemingly to discard nuclear deterrence, however exaggerated that may be, came as a critical blow to allied confidence.

I should emphasize that one of the dangers that has come out of this treaty is the attack on alliance cohesion, and one of the things that the United States must proceed to do is to rebuild the confidence of our allies in the United States, in its commitment, and in its leadership.

This can be done in a variety of ways. We must stress that, irrespective of what Mr. Gorbachev may have said or may hope, there will be no denuclearization of Europe. Indeed, the American commitment will remain so long as nuclear deterrence is required for the security of Europe and it will be available to the Europeans.

We need to rebuild confidence.

It is more a question of politics and political perceptions than it is a question of military capability. Nuclear deterrence will be altered, but it should not be weakened by this agreement.

There has been much discussion of flexible response. Flexible response will remain the strategy of the alliance. We are still in the position to strike any of the targets previously targeted from the continent by other offshore weapons.

Now, I understand that in certain military headquarters in Europe and some of the capitals of Europe there has been doubt expressed about the continuity of flexible response. So, let me stress that what the Soviets are deterred by is the overall strength of the United States.

If the Soviet Union is not deterred by the 12,000 warheads in our strategic arsenal, they will not be deterred by 12,400 warheads when we throw in those that have been deployed on the continent of Europe.

Admittedly, these warheads will not be under the direct command of SACEUR, and that understandably causes unease in any military commander. SACEUR will now be in a position in which he is dependent on the actions of an Air Force general in Omaha, or, even worse, a Navy admiral in Norfolk. Those forces will not be under his command and control.

But, from the standpoint of the Soviet Union, the critical thing is the commitment of the United States and the strength of American forces.

Mr. Chairman, there has been much concern about the conventional balance, and I welcome that concern about the conventional balance. I would welcome measures taken by the United States and by its allies to improve the conventional balance.

But the conventional imbalance antedates this treaty. It will continue after this treaty, but its decisiveness should not be affected by this treaty. The nuclear deterrent will continue to be effective after the fulfillment of this treaty.

Mr. Chairman, there are two dangers in the treaty. One lies in what I have just said about the impact that has come about on alliance cohesion.

It is true that the problems of the alliance cohesion antedate the treaty; but the treaty exacerbates them. For this reason, I hope that the Government of the United States will see as its prime task in the post-treaty period to reassure our European allies.

A second problem with the treaty is that the verification regime is not rigorous. I do not think that that is a serious problem with regard to the INF Treaty itself, for a variety of reasons. The chief problem of the weaknesses of the verification regime would be if these were taken as a precedent for START.

Why is this?

In the first place, in INF, we are eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons so that any detected weapon in this category will be a violation.

Second, there is a flight test ban in the INF Treaty, so that any covert force will be of lesser value to the Soviet Union.

Third, since it deals with a very small, indeed modest, component of the Soviet Force, as with our force, the Soviet Union, under these circumstances, has a weak incentive to cheat.

If we look, however, at a prospective START agreement, all of these elements disappear in the first place, for we will be dealing not with an elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, but we will have to monitor hundreds of delivery vehicles in the classes affected.

Under those circumstances, there can be no total flight test ban. And, because one is dealing with the bulk of the Soviet forces, forces that can strike at their principal foe, the United States, the incentives to cheat, which are weak in the INF case, will be substantial in the case of the START agreement.

Therefore, the greatest weakness in this treaty, in technical terms, is the precedent that it may establish for a START agreement.

Mr. Chairman, let me close with three observations.

We have learned from our experiences in negotiating this treaty of the symmetry of intrusion. If we are to monitor what happens in the Soviet Union by intrusion, we ourselves are subject to having Soviet monitors here on American soil.

It is not a one-way street. And, as a consequence, what we earlier thought to be our clear and unequivocal desire to be able to monitor in the Soviet Union any time, any place, has receded. Understandably, we are not eager to have Soviets with a similar right to intrude on American soil.

Second, we have, as a result of our experience in negotiation of this treaty, understood better the tradeoff between verification and force categories. In this case, we are eliminating an entire category of forces. That makes it easier to verify. But we must recognize that the elimination of classes of nuclear weapons, which has been emphasized by the administration, is not generally a good thing.

The Scowcroft Commission told us quite clearly that a variety of classes of nuclear weapons are beneficial in that it complicates the hypothetical attack plan of a potential foe, and, therefore, adds to deterrence. In this particular case, the elimination of the entire category, because of the advantages to the West, may be beneficial, but one should not generalize from this case.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I close with the following observation.

Many people, including those who are hostile to arms control and those who are cautiously sympathetic to arms control, have expressed the worry that the signing of the INF agreement might lead to euphoria in the United States, to a letting down of our guard; that in this era of good feelings, we will be swept along to reductions of defense expenditures or to other treaties that are not as beneficial to the United States as this treaty.

This, Mr. Chairman, may I say at the close, is an appropriate admonition. The danger in this kind of agreement is not so much the technical details, but the euphoria that it might generate, and we must be on guard against it.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger.

Mr. Richardson.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLIOT RICHARDSON, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. RICHARDSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is always a great pleasure to appear before you, and it is particularly so today in the company of these gentlemen, who, among them, have exercised responsibility for U.S. defense over such a long period.

If we were to allocate time for testimony, Mr. Chairman, in proportion to length of tenure in that role, my testimony would be even briefer than it is going to be. As it is, though, I can claim some involvement with arms control issues going back to the very beginning of the Nixon administration, and in some respects with a continued degree of involvement since then.

As Dr. Schlesinger just emphasized, we are dealing here with the elimination of an entire category of weapons. We are doing so on a basis that has brought about, as has also been emphasized, a far larger reduction on the Soviet side than on ours. And it should further be stressed that the weapons we are eliminating would never have been deployed in the first place but for the objective of achieving this reduction on the Soviet side.

The decision taken in Brussels in December 1979, contemplated from the outset a two-track process, one of them being negotiation directed toward the reduction or elimination of Soviet intermediate-range missiles, the other contemplating the deployment of United States Pershing II missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles if the Soviets did not agree to a sufficient reduction to preclude that deployment.

This underscores the fact that from the outset, the alliance never had a clearly defined military objective for the deployment. It was envisioned from day 1 as a means of achieving the elimination of the Soviet weapons or at least their substantial reduction.

That mission has been fulfilled, thereby removing the justification for the original deployment of the Pershing II's and the GLCM's.

Second, I think it appropriately can be stressed that this agreement constitutes a powerful precedent in favor of the achievement of nuclear balance, or parity. This I think is perhaps the most significant aspect of the asymmetry of the reduction, because the net result is to recognize the legitimacy of the achievement of a nuclear standoff with rough parity on each side, and that, it is to be hoped, is a principle that will equally be applicable to follow-on negotiations in START.

Third, while Dr. Schlesinger has prudently called attention to the residual problems that remain in the area of verification, nevertheless, I think it fairly can be said that this agreement represents a far more sophisticated and comprehensive approach to verification than anything that had been believed possible before this. The very intrusiveness he touched upon, which is now making some Americans nervous, is, of course, something that we advocated for a very long time as fundamental to arms control agreement, and, as Gerard Smith has pointed out, had the Soviet Union been willing to accept that degree of intrusiveness back in the early 1970's, we might then have achieved constraints on the deployment of MIRV's.

It will, indeed, take ingenuity and resourcefulness to design and to administer the verification measures called for not only by this agreement but, more especially, by a START agreement. Nevertheless, the very possibility of stationing inspectors at the plants where these missiles have been constructed, utilizing highly sophisticated scanning devices, sensors, is a long step toward developing the kinds of assurances that would be needed in a more far-reaching agreement.

Fourth, there is the contribution to stability that is brought about by this agreement. It increases stability, it seems to me, in two respects: First, insofar as it removes what had been perceived, particularly in Europe, as a major Soviet advantage arising from its large arsenal of SS-20's and other weapons aimed at Western Europe. Second, it enhances stability to the extent that the weapons removed are weapons with a very short flight time.

The net result, I believe, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, is to create a genuine opportunity for further progress toward arms control. If there is anything to be said about the existing and immediate past situation, it is that it has represented an extraordinary degree of excessive investment by each side in the achievement of nothing but a stalemate, standing off the threat of the other side.

The principal benefit of the situation we now have is that it does provide effective deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons by the other side. But it does so at grossly excessive cost, and, of course, the interest of the Soviet Union in pursuing arms control is that it can contribute to avoiding the diversion of resources that has heretofore gone into intercontinental and other nuclear weapon systems, indeed conventional forces as well.

Our concern with the avoidance of such excessive costs is not as acute as theirs; and yet, for reasons well known to this committee, we have reason enough of our own to wish to reduce the burdens of our military system.

Insofar as its only effective role is to maintain a military standoff, it might as well be done more cheaply, provided that in the process we, so far as possible, enhance stability and do not introduce any new elements of instability.

I believe that these purposes are served by this proposed agreement, Mr. Chairman, and for these reasons, I join my colleagues in supporting it.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Richardson.

Mr. McNamara.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I, too, am very happy to have the opportunity to testify before you this morning on the INF Treaty.

Let me begin by saying that I endorse the treaty wholeheartedly and without reservation.

I believe it to be fully consistent with the national security interests of the United States.

Militarily, much attention has been given to the reduction in numbers. I do not believe that is of any great significance for the reasons that Secretary Richardson pointed to a moment ago. I think what is important militarily is the elimination of destabilizing nuclear weapon systems. The objective of arms control agreements in my opinion should not be primarily reduction in numbers—although I hope they will lead to that. The objective should be an increase in crisis stability. This is a modest step in that direction.

As has been said, it requires highly asymmetrical reductions. The Soviet Union must eliminate twice as many missiles and remove four times as many deployed warheads as the United States.

And as also has been said, the treaty establishes an unprecedently intrusive verification regime, a regime based on a combination of national technical means, onsite inspections and cooperative measures that will begin, again in a modest way, to lift one of the many layers of secrecy in which the Soviet society has been veiled.

In my judgment the treaty does not adversely affect the security of our allies. It does not compromise NATO's ability to deter Soviet aggression. It does not fundamentally change the military balance in Europe. It does not compromise NATO coverage of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact targets. It does not denuclearize Europe. And, most importantly, as I think each of us, each of my predecessors have stated this morning, most importantly, it does not reduce or undermine, directly or by implication, the American commitment to the defense of Europe. That commitment rests on a much broader base than simple weapon systems.

What the treaty does do is to move NATO toward reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, and that has been an objective favored by most military and civilian security experts for several decades. For that I think it must be praised.

NATO's existing plans for initiating use of nuclear weapons, if implemented, are far more likely to destroy Europe than to defend it. And a nuclear war in Europe would undoubtedly escalate to a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

Just 2 weeks ago, you received a report issued by a Commission chaired by Messrs. Ikle and Wohlstetter, signed by the former SACEUR, General Goodpastor, the former chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, General Vessey and the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, which makes that exact point.

That is why I, they, and others have long advocated that the United States and its NATO allies raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by establishing a more credible conventional deterrent for NATO.

Although I would argue that the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces is often exaggerated—most importantly by the United States and not solely by this administration, but going back several decades—NATO's relative strength could certainly be improved, especially the sustainability and effectiveness of the forces we already have in place.

General Rogers has written and testified that NATO could not sustain combat for even 2 weeks. I think that is a disgrace, after we have spent $2 trillion over the last 8 years to strengthen our security.

Moving toward greater reliance on conventional forces to deter Soviet aggression would mean a reaffirmation, not an abandonment, of our shared commitment to the defense of Europe, and reducing the emphasis placed on nuclear threats would undoubtedly make it less difficult to muster the political and financial support necessary to sustain adequate conventional forces.

I fear that in a world of finite resources and political constraints, the investment in nuclear forces over the last four or five decades has served not as a military backup to conventional forces, but as a political replacement for them. For this reason among others, the most essential element of NATO's flexible response strategy, raising the nuclear firebreak by strengthening the conventional deterrent—and that was stated to be a fundamental objective of the introduction of flexible response when I presented it at the meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers in Athens in April 1962—has long been neglected.

Should that require additional financial expenditures by members of the alliance, I think that such action could be taken within realistic budgetary constraints, even in this period of great financial constraint. But significant additions to NATO's conventional forces may not be necessary.

There is reason to believe that the Soviets are beginning to recognize that the substantial numerical imbalance between key elements of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces leads to political and military responses by the West which are contrary to Soviet interests.

Gorbachev has said the Soviets are willing to reshape their military forces to achieve what he calls "reasonable sufficiency," as contrasted to "superiority," and adopt a defensive posture, as opposed to an offensive stance.

Recognizing that the Warsaw Pact's numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, and helicopters are two to three times as great as those of NATO, Gorbachev has stated the Soviets are prepared to accept, in his words, asymmetrical, as opposed to equal, reductions in order to achieve balance.

I don't know what Gorbachev means by those phrases. Whatever he means, I don't know whether he has the power to move toward introducing his new concepts. Clearly, they are new concepts.

Therefore it is not clear how far or how fast NATO and the Warsaw Pact, through negotiation, could move toward a balance of conventional forces. But should we not probe the degree to which that is possible?

Let me conclude my statement with a few brief remarks on the political significance of the treaty.

First of all, none of us should underestimate the importance of the fact that President Reagan, an anti-Soviet, promilitary President, has negotiated a major arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. And, in doing so, he has acknowledged that a well-conceived, professionally negotiated arms limitation treaty can serve U.S. interests.

Should the treaty be ratified, as I hope and believe it will be, it will also contribute to restoring bipartisan support for the arms control process.

Second, the treaty may make its greatest contribution to United States national security interests as a stepping stone, a modest step forward, to more significant negotiations with the Soviets, directed both toward reducing political tensions, particularly in regional areas, and toward more substantial arms control agreements.

I have spoken to the possibility of initiating negotiations which may lead to a redressing of the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. But we should also push toward a treaty which would reduce the strategic arms, as has been tentatively agreed to by the two leaders, to some 6,000 warheads on approximately 1,600 strategic nuclear vehicles; and which would, at the same time, increase crisis stability by reducing the pressure for a preemptive strike during a period of tension.

Such a treaty appears within reach. If agreed upon, it would be truly historic. But I do not believe it will be achieved if either we or the Soviets try to limit one side's strategic offensive forces while permitting the other side an unrestricted opportunity to deploy strategic defensive systems.

Mr. Chairman, I would be very happy to try to answer the questions of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed, Secretary McNamara. I would add here that any questions we do not have an opportunity to ask here, the record will stay open for several days, as is the custom with all of these hearings, for those questions to be answered—without objection.

We will limit ourselves to 10 minutes. I would ask the timekeeper to press the appropriate button.

Senator EVANS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. As an idea, I wonder if we could proceed on the basis that those who have been here during or for a portion of the testimony of witnesses proceed in order of seniority, to be followed by those who have not arrived by the time the testimony has been completed. We have a habit sometimes of those arriving late, just in time for their own testimony, and then disappearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that is a question of their own choice, and I would not like to change the procedure at this time. But I appreciate the suggestion and thank you very much for it.

Senator EVANS. Maybe it is an admonition to those who are not here.

Senator HELMS. Herman Talmadge used to call it the "early-bird" rule.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Senator EVANS. I think it is a good rule.

Senator HELMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Weinberger, in your testimony you referred to a "decade of neglect" in which, presumably, our strategic modernization program was neglected. Yet, a great deal of the program undertaken in the 1980's was founded during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.

I did not myself personally agree with many of these steps, but they were taken in those periods—the modernization of the Minuteman; the preparation for deploying a survivable MX missile—still not really resolved; construction of the first Trident submarine; development of the D-5, the Trident II missile; development of the sea-, air-, and ground-launched Cruise missiles; the initiation of the work on the Stealth bomber; and the orchestration of NATO's decision to deploy the Pershing II and Cruise missiles.

I am just curious if you all agree that this was a decade of neglect or if there is any disagreement amongst the panel in this regard.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Were you directing the question at me, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I was directing it at you in the sense of what was your ground for saying that there was a "decade of neglect".

Mr. WEINBERGER. Basically the fact that during the period of the seventies—and it certainly is not a partisan thing because, as you pointed out, we had different parties in office during that decade—we went down over 20 percent in military investment, measured in real terms. This was a decade when the Soviets went up more than twice that amount overall. That is when a great deal of the conventional imbalance was worsened, and it was a period when we did not do what I think we should have done in the modernization of our strategic deterrent.

We did put a new warhead on the Minuteman, and we did talk a great deal about the MX. We have been talking about the MX for about 14 years now.

During this period, the Soviets have deployed four new strategic systems.

We also did nothing to modernize our airborne leg of the Triad. In fact, we cancelled the B-1 in 1977, I believe it was.

So, there were things that we should have done that would have left us in 1981 in a stronger strategic position and would have required a smaller expenditure of money to modernize all three legs of the Triad. It was our unhappy legacy that we had to modernize all three legs of the Triad, and that we had to do so instead of spread over a number of years, we had to do it virtually simultaneously.

People kept inquiring as to why we did not have priorities. We had priorities. The trouble was we had to have too many priorities to do all of the things that were required to do.

I can go on, of course, if you would allow me and if my time permitted. Sadly, I have to be back at 11.

But I would not see that this is totally and completely relevant to the question of ratification of the INF Treaty. The question of the INF Treaty, which I think should be ratified, developed because of the deliberate Soviet attempt to disrupt the balance, starting in 1977, by the deployment of the SS-20's.

We responded with a deployment in the 1980's of the Pershing II and the ground-launched Cruise missile. We were able to do that because of the rather intensive, and certainly expensive, addition of resources to the strategic elements of our defense and getting ready to deploy these weapons, so that when the NATO alliance held firm and agreed to the deployment, the missiles in question, the Pershing II's and the ground-launched Cruise missiles, were in place, in some situations in a matter of hours after their decisions, as in the case of Belgium and in the case of Italy, and so on.

So, these were vital things that we had to do, that I very much wish had been done before. But, as I say, it is not a partisan criticism. It is what we believe was a simple statement of fact, that we did not do as much in the seventies as we should have.

I mention this primarily because I hope it will be a lesson for us now, not to cut back to those same levels of inadequate military resources that can encourage the Soviets not to sign the treaty and not to give up their so-called nonnegotiable positions, but can encourage them to disrupt the balance again, as they did in 1977, when our investment was low and when they were convinced that they could do it without response.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I will preface, rather than terminate, my remarks with the observation that this is an issue not completely relevant to the immediate question before the committee.

I would observe, as you did, Mr. Chairman, that the Trident II program and the D-5 missile, the air-launched Cruise missile, the MX missile——

The CHAIRMAN. Could you hold the microphone a little closer.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. All of those were inherited in 1981 by the Reagan administration. They had been worked on during the Carter administration; several of them had been worked on during the Ford and even the Nixon administrations.

As to the specific question of ICBM deployment, which led to the issue of the window of vulnerability, the MX had been approved by the Congress in 1980 in a multiple-protective shelter mode, and it is by no means clear how that particular window of vulnerability is less open now than it was in those days.

But those are all side issues—I think important, but side issues.

About the INF, it seems to me that the most important thing to emphasize is the continuity of policy between the Carter administration and the Reagan administration.

The December 1979, dual-track decision, at whose adoption I was present, was faithfully followed through the rest of the Carter administration and through the Reagan administration. There was a whole series of appointed officials, civil servants, and military leaders who stuck to both parts of that decision and determination. The careful handling of the alliance by all those people and by diplomat Paul Nitze, assured alliance cohesion, forced the Soviets back to the table after they had walked away, and resulted in the treaty that you have before you.

I think that is to be applauded. It is the best kind of bipartisanship.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Does anybody else wish to respond?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Another question, perhaps more directly related to INF, is what effect would a failure to ratify the treaty have, if we fall down here and do not ratify it? What will be the effect upon the United States and NATO security?

Dr. Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, as I indicated, Mr. Chairman, there has been apprehension in Europe, I think unwarranted apprehension, with regard to the impact on the military capabilities of the alliance.

Now the Europeans are concerned not so much about what has occurred in the past, but they are concerned that this treaty be ratified. That is why their public professions of support for the treaty exceed their private expressions of support.

They want to see that the United States, having started on a course of action, is capable of fulfilling that course of action.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I would agree, Mr. Chairman, that the effect on Europe, including the effect on those who privately express concerns about the treaty, would be very profound and very negative if the treaty were to be rejected or encumbered by reservations that effectively would cause it not to come into effect.

I would think that in those circumstances, the Pershing II's and ground-launched Cruise missiles would wind up being removed anyway. The difference would be that the Soviet missiles would then not need to be removed.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Rogers has argued that the decision to deploy the Pershing II's and the ground-launched Cruise missiles was not taken as an answer or a riposte to the SS-20 deployments but because we had a gap in our spectrum of deterrence. The fact that the SS-20, he said, was coming on line at the time just made it more urgent that NATO get on with that decision.

Is that your understanding of the original reason for the INF deployment decision?

Mr. BROWN. Well, I suppose I ought to answer because I was there.

I do speak to this in my testimony, and I point out that the decision—and here I must differ slightly with my colleague, Mr. Richardson—was not solely in response to the SS-20 deployments. It was in part a response to the European perception that more coupling was needed, partly as a result of the neutron bomb decision, the failure to deploy the neutron bomb. The two really did not have anything to do with each other, but that is how political perceptions work.

At about the same time, however, and indeed, a little bit earlier, as a result of the speech by Helmut Schmidt at the IISS in 1977, a close association between our potential deployments of U.S. INF and the SS-20's was established.

Political and military leaders in their statements at the time tended to neglect this other issue, the issue of coupling.

I think that the situation now is that there are other ways to couple. Many of us argued to our European colleagues in 1977 that there were other ways to couple, that the 400 warheads assigned to SACEUR from Poseidon submarines were rather good coupling.

This is not a black-and-white issue. From where we are now, clearly, the association with the SS-20's is overwhelmingly the leading connection.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Senator Helms, our ranking member is next.

Senator **HELMS**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, the thing that has troubled me during the hearings thus far is that so many of the people who have come here attesting to the proposed treaty and saying it is just dandy and it is verifiable and so forth are the same people who came here with reference to SALT II.

Now, I was not here when SALT I was considered. That was a year before I was elected the first time. The rhetoric is about the same, and I say that with all due respect.

But now we know whether we could trust the Soviets then, or whether they were telling the truth, or whether our intelligence functioned properly, and that sort of thing.

Secretary Weinberger, right after President Reagan withdrew the fatally flawed and therefore unratified SALT II Treaty because of multiple—multiple—Soviet violations, you had this to say about the Soviets. I agreed with it then and I agree with it now.

You said, "Their ultimate hypocrisy is the recent statement that they will continue to observe SALT II's limits with their atheistic hands piously raised proclaiming another Soviet lie."

I guess I have to ask, has anything happened since then to cause you to believe that the number of SS-20 missiles proclaimed by the Soviets is accurate, instead of the Defense Intelligence Agency figure, which shows a secret missile force of about 300—300—hidden SS-20 missiles?

Mr. **WEINBERGER**. No, I don't have anything to dispute that, Senator Helms. The only point I make is that, first of all, there has been a lot of Soviet cheating in the past. Second, I think their whole definition of "truth" is totally different than ours. Their definition of "truth" is what serves the Soviet interest.

So, I think we can expect that they will try to cheat if it is in their national interest and they perceive it to be so to do that. I think that is why we need to have our guard up and why we should not feel that this treaty, though I think it should be ratified because it does make reductions that I think will be verifiable in the numbers that they have—I don't think we should have any reason to believe that this treaty signals a change in behavior on the part of the Soviets.

That is why I put in my statement that I think we should have in mind right now and be resolute in deciding what we are going to do in carrying it out if they do violate it and if we do find violations. By that I mean I think we should start resumption of manufacture that is forbidden by the treaty if they are going to do it.

Some people talk about whether it is a significant military violation or not. I have great difficulty in deciding what is significant and what is not if it gives them a military advantage, and I think there are ways they could do it.

I think it has been correctly pointed out this morning that they don't have much incentive to violate this treaty. But sometimes they violate treaties whether there is any perceived incentive or not, simply because it occurs to them that it is something they want to do at any given moment.

We have to bear in mind also, sir, and I think it is vitally important, the fundamental difference between the systems. It is not from the point of view of security so much that there is no freedom of speech, freedom of worship, or freedom of assembly, or freedom of press in the Soviet Union. We know all those things and all the talk that is going on now I do not think has changed the fact that there is nothing printed or written or said or done in the Soviet Union that the government does not want done.

All of those things are there, and they have been there for a long time.

The significant security problem is that in the Soviet Union, there are no proceedings such as this. When the Soviets decide that they want to increase the investment in military strength, or if they want to add 3,000 or 300 SS-20s or whatever, it is done when three, four, or five men sit around the table in the Kremlin and decide to do it. There are no editorials, there are no commentaries, there are no votes, there is no discussion. It just happens.

That is not a system we want to emulate in any way. But it gives them a major military advantage, and we should recognize how quickly they are able to do things, compared with our system, where we debate, as I say, for 12 to 14 years whether we are going to modernize one missile system.

So, I don't know whether they have 300 more hidden or not. They have some test vehicles and the intelligence estimates are difficult with the SS-20 because it is mobile and there are a lot of forests and other places in the Soviet Union where it could be hidden. No one has claimed that the verification is 100 percent perfect.

But, when you look at the whole balance, when you look at the fact that they will destroy, and we will be able to observe the actual destruction of something like four of their systems capable of carrying missiles to one of ours, and when you look at the fact that they do not have a great deal of incentive to cheat on this treaty specifically, when you look at the fact that the "what's left" question can be answered favorably--that is to say, there is enough left to deter an attack—those are the reasons I come down on the side of ratification.

But I do not think for one moment that we should believe that the Soviets have changed their spots or that they will necessarily do what they say they are going to do. They have cheated in the past. I think we can expect they will cheat in the future whenever they decide it is in their national interest to do so.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think they will cheat just to stay in practice. [Laughter.]

Yesterday, Secretary Carlucci was here, and he testified, as I recall, that one of the reasons that 100 elimination launchers are permitted by this treaty is because otherwise the 3-year elimination period would not have provided the Soviets with sufficient time to destroy all of the missiles covered by the treaty.

He then indicated that the Joint Chiefs had objected to having an elimination period longer than 3 years because they felt that more than 3 years would be too long to go without flight testing the Pershing missiles.

Now, if we could go 3 years without testing our Pershing II's and maintain confidence in them, could the Soviets, by the same token, go 3 years without testing their SS-20's and still have confidence in them?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I think they could.

They have tested for a long time. The SS-20 is an old system. It is now 11 years old, since it was deployed. There was a lot of testing before that and there has been continual testing and review of it during all of this period. So I think they would have somewhat substantial confidence that the SS-20's that they have, before they are destroyed, are deployable and usable.

With respect to the Pershing II, it is a much newer system. We have had some testing with it, but the testing that we have done has been very satisfactory. But, as with any of these systems, regular testing is needed to ensure reliability.

Senator HELMS. As you well know, President Reagan has reported to Congress that the Soviets covertly deployed SS-16's between 1976 and 1984, without detection. Does this suggest to you that during this entire 8-year period, there was no flight testing of the SS-16?

Mr. WEINBERGER. I'm sure there was testing of it, or testing of its components. But I think that it is possible for them to test without detection on our part. There are various ways of doing it without a formal nuclear explosion.

I think that they undoubtedly had to assure themselves of its basic reliability as a system.

Senator HELMS. This is what gives me difficulty I suppose about any treaty.

Now I am not opposed to arms control. That is like motherhood, everybody is in favor of it. But it has to work.

Let me move on, quickly, to another subject.

During your tenure as Secretary of Defense, you regularly had to base decisions on intelligence information.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Yes.

Senator HELMS. There were several intelligence agencies whose reports were available to you.

Did you ever have any reason to discount or ignore estimates, intelligence estimates, from the Defense Intelligence Agency that were given you?

Mr. WEINBERGER. No, sir.

There were frequently differences, doctrinal disputes, and there were frequently differences in methods of estimating and counting. Bear in mind, it was many years before we ever saw a picture of an

SS-20. They hid them very well in the various forests, under shrouds and things of that kind.

We had differences in those estimates from time to time. I did not ever feel that automatically DIA was right or CIA was right or that either was automatically wrong. When we had differences, I would try to reconcile them by getting representatives of both agencies in.

But I did not have any reason to think that DIA was basically wrong or anything of that kind. I think they are an excellent service and I think CIA is an excellent service. I think they both serve the Nation extraordinarily well.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Chairman, since Senator Adams has arrived before me and I was late in getting in this morning, I would like to yield to him for his questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Adams.

Senator ADAMS. I thank you, Senator Cranston, you are most kind.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome all of you to the committee. Many of you are old friends and have been fine public servants for many, many years. It is a great pleasure to see you here.

Secretary McNamara, I think I will start with your statement because you state a very important fact on pages 3 and 4. You point out that Ronald Reagan, an anti-Soviet and promilitary President, has negotiated a major arms control agreement, and in doing so, he has acknowledged what many of his supporters have long denied: that a well-conceived, professionally negotiated arms limitation treaty can serve United States interests.

Sir, should this treaty be ratified, as I believe it must, it will also contribute to restoring bipartisan support for the arms control process. I hope that will happen. I hope the outcome of the INF Treaty will be bipartisan support.

I support the treaty without limitations that might send it back to the Soviet Union, and I am grateful to all of the Secretaries this morning for assisting in that process. This treaty is both politically and militarily sound.

I would like now to turn to the subject that is on page 4 of your statement, which you and I have discussed before over the last decade many times.

First, I do not think there should be linkage between INF, START or any of the other items. But do you believe that 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is still sufficient on both sides to destroy the world, if ever used?

Mr. McNAMARA. Senator Adams, I have no doubt of that. But if I may take just a second to add to my answer, I hope that our primary objective is not to cut from 12,000 to 6,000 warheads, but, rather, to restructure the force—to restructure the remaining 6,000 Soviet warheads in ways that remove our fear of a "window of vulnerability."

I think the "window of vulnerability" argument has always been exaggerated. But it is a reality. Many of our people feel that. We must try to increase crisis stability, and, therefore, my answer to your question is twofold.

No. 1, I think the remaining 6,000 is more than adequate in numbers. No. 2, I hope on each side we will restructure to remove the other side's fear that they are vulnerable. By that action we will remove either side's incentive to preempt at a time of tension and crisis.

Senator ADAMS. I agree with that conclusion, and that brings me to the point that you have also made in point 4, which concerns me.

Any of the Secretaries on this question, who have a difference and who wish to comment on it, please just indicate with your hand and use my time to comment on it, because I think it is very important.

The easiest and cheapest way to overcome an SDI defense or some kind of overall defensive system, as opposed to what Senator Nunn has proposed as a limited system, is simply to build a lot of missiles and overwhelm it.

Isn't that correct?

Mr. McNAMARA. Yes, with one qualification. I believe it will be cheaper to build the offense than the defense. Therefore Paul Nitze's test, cost-effectiveness at the margin, cannot be met. However, it may also be cheaper to offset the defense by introducing countermeasures, and this may be even cheaper than expanding the offense.

So, either by introducing countermeasures or by expanding the offense, one will find it cheaper to offset the defense than to add to it.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I would want to disagree with that very strongly.

Senator ADAMS. I knew that you might have a difference, Secretary Weinberger. That is why I said to use my time, and Secretary Brown, I will certainly hear from you, too.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, I would try to be as brief as possible.

I think what you are talking about is the old, traditional, ABM ground-based defenses, which, in truth, could be overwhelmed and saturated by a great increase in offensive missiles. That is why I think the proposal to build another one of those ground-based traditional ABM systems is basically rather silly, because we know it won't work, and yet it is quite expensive.

Senator ADAMS. What about in the case of proliferation to nations that obtain nuclear weapons and threaten us?

Mr. WEINBERGER. Well, again, other nations that obtain nuclear weapons are one of the prime arguments for the kind of strategic defense the President has proposed, that is, a space-based kind that consists of several different methods of destroying Soviet or other incoming nuclear missiles outside the atmosphere of the Earth. That kind of system is being designed with the specific understanding in mind that the old arguments, that it could easily be overwhelmed by offensive weapons, should not be allowed to happen. Its design can be done in a way—and we are told that it can and that they are making very great progress that way—so that you will not be able to saturate it. That is the kind that we are working on.

Senator **Adams**. I wanted you to have a chance to say that, Secretary Weinberger. I completely disagree with you on that proposition, but I wanted you to be able to say it.

Mr. **Weinberger**. Well, that has been my fate. Occasionally people do disagree with me and it is always a source of surprise and disappointment. I wanted you to know that the system we are talking about is not one that is capable of simply being saturated and, therefore, would lead to an increase in offensive missiles. That is a common myth about the SDI that needs to be dispelled.

Senator **Adams**. Secretary Brown.

Mr. **Brown**. Any system can be saturated. The proliferation of offensive missiles is a straightforward and would be a successful way of countering a space-based SDI. It is probably not the cheapest way. Which way you would go at it depends upon the detailed nature of the defensive system.

Senator **Adams**. Dr. Brown, I call you "Dr. Brown," because I want you to state for the committee what your background was prior to becoming Secretary of Defense.

Mr. **Brown**. Well, it is a long and checkered career.

Before that, I was President of the California Institute of Technology. Before that, I was Secretary of the Air Force. Before that, I was Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Under Secretary job that was later renamed.

Senator **Adams**. I mean your educational background.

Mr. **Brown**. Well, I happen to have been educated as a physicist. I got a Ph.D. in 1949, from Columbia University, and subsequently worked in a weapons laboratory.

Senator **Adams**. I know that you would not state that otherwise, but I wanted to indicate that when you are talking about technical weapon systems, you approach it from that viewpoint.

Mr. **McNamara**. The record should show also that he was Director of the Livermore Laboratories.

Senator **Adams**. Yes, I was going to ask him that. You may refer to it as a checkered career, but a long career in nuclear weapons and their use and their abilities.

Mr. **Brown**. It is a long time since I was an active scientist, but in this company I may still pass as one. [Laughter.]

Senator **Adams**. Thank you.

I have a question to any of the Secretaries. I want to stress that my questions are not directed toward linkage. I think this treaty should stand on its own and certainly be ratified; but the opportunity of having this many people who have been this involved this long in America's security matters is one that I think the committee should take advantage of to the fullest extent possible.

There is a question regarding what the British and the French will do, and particularly the French, in terms of joining a military security system in Europe—their weapons, their nuclear weapons, having been left out of this treaty. Again, it is not linked.

What is the significance, and does any of you wish to make any comment to the committee on whether you think that France, with this new proposal of a German-French brigade and so on, and the discussions with the United Kingdom, is prepared to join in an integrated military structure?

Secretary WEINBERGER.

Mr. WEINBERGER. It's simply that they have had a number of discussions, they have had a number of meetings, they have reached agreement, as you indicated, with respect to one brigade. Obviously I think that anything that strengthens the defensive strength of Europe and agreements and added resources from France, from England and from Germany all are in that category, is a very good way of increasing the deterrence against the Soviet Union making an attack.

It is frequently said that the least likely attack is across the central front by the Soviet Union in NATO. The reason it is the least likely possibility is because NATO has been strong and united and has defensive forces that, while nowhere near the size of the Soviet forces, nevertheless, constitute a good deterrent.

Senator ADAMS. We have a sizable force, tanks and otherwise—as I remember it, 17 American and German divisions—in that central plain alone facing the pact forces.

Mr. WEINBERGER. There is no question in my mind, and I am really bemused by the statements that there is really no difference or no significant conventional balance in favor of the Soviets. I think there is a huge balance in favor of the Soviets and all of the intelligence reporting I have seen confirms that.

But, back to your original point, I think we should support, as I always have, any arrangement between France and Britain, between Britain, France and Germany, between France, and Germany, because they are all activities and actions, and I hope backed up by resources, that can strengthen the deterrent capabilities of NATO and help us answer the basic question of burdensharing and all the rest that is usually raised by people who would prefer to have us out of the alliance.

So I think these are all very good things, and I hope they continue.

I think it is particularly important that the Soviets gave up, as one of their original, non-negotiable demands, the insistence that France and Britain's independent nuclear deterrent be counted.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you.

My time has run out, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for going over.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want to add my own appreciation to each one of you for coming today. This is certainly a galaxy of public servants, and we appreciate very much the insights you have brought to these hearings.

I want to center the focus of my comments and questions on Secretary Schlesinger's testimony. It provides an appropriate context for the points that I want to make.

Dr. Schlesinger, you have mentioned that this treaty ought to be weighed always "on balance"; that there are some important positive features and some important liabilities.

I think this is an excellent recommendation to members of this committee, and to the Senate. So, frequently witnesses affirm that they are 100 percent for the treaty or 100 percent against it, suggesting that the intensity with which are approaches this treaty ought to help demolish it or shove it across the finish line. In fact, a more sophisticated approach suggests there are problems with the treaty. On balance, you come to the conclusion that it is important that we ratify it, and I agree with that.

But I appreciate the fact that you have sought to weave into your positive assessment of the treaty some of your apprehensions. You suggested that intrusiveness or the symmetry of intrusion, has given some heartburn to people in our country, who are in defense establishments.

We had always called for onsite inspection; now we have it, and it is a problem for us.

I think you could have moved on to meet some of the arguments which are made against this treaty. Some have argued that it does not call for enough onsite inspection or suspect challenges, or intrusions "anytime, anyplace," when, in fact, as you know and I know, many of the objections to greater intrusiveness were voiced on our side. This "symmetry of intrusion" will require some adjustment on our part.

Let me just follow through with one further thought before I ask a question.

With the deployments of the SS-4's, and SS-5's in the late 1950's, the Soviet Union had a monopoly of intermediate-range nuclear weapons directed against Europe, while, until 4 years ago, we had nothing on European soil that could reach the Soviet Union with the exception of aircraft.

The point of this treaty is to eliminate that monopoly.

Now, as you point out, as that moment for eliminating those systems covered by the treaty has approached, certain weapon systems have suddenly taken on presumed virtues and the character of apparent indispensibility. Nevertheless, we must remind ourselves of our original concern about the Soviet monopoly in those systems, a monopoly that is about to be removed, and this is a substantial accomplishment.

The problem, I suppose, relates to the adequacy of verification, that we actually achieve what we negotiated. Now, with regard to the verification, some technical points have been raised in this committee; the destruction of the launchers, the missiles, the reentry vehicles, the warheads, and, finally, the extraction of the fissionable material and the guidance elements have received a great deal of attention.

Why, in your judgment, should the negotiators on our side, and apparently the negotiators on the Soviet side, have agreed to extract the fissionable material and take it back to home base and retain the nuclear explosive devices rather than destroying them? In other words, how do you react to the charge that this treaty does not do away with a single warhead, that, in fact, the fissionable material remains and that the Soviets will recover 12 times as much of it as we will.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, Senator, that is a complex question. Let me start with the guidance systems.

We believe American guidance systems indeed are superior to Soviet guidance systems. There is expensive and high quality-equipment in there—accelerometers, gyroscopes and the like—and we neither want Soviet intrusion in the sense of observing the inner parts of those guidance systems, nor do we see any reason not to salvage equipment from those guidance systems, which we believe to be superior to those of the Soviets.

Second, with regard to the nuclear explosive, as you have pointed out, the heart of the nuclear explosive is the fissile material. Plutonium's half-life is 23,000 years. It will be around for a while. U-235's half-life is in the millions of years.

Now, we could, of course, put the plutonium in a reactor and denature it, but that would be very complicated. Moreover, the United States is probably shorter of fissile material and weapons-grade production than the Soviet Union. Therefore, we did not desire to do so. The Soviets would have greater reason for attempting to reduce our stockpile of fissionable material than we have of theirs. And we have not figured out a way of observing this destruction without permitting the Soviets to review what we believe to be our superior technology.

Senator LUGAR. How do you answer critics who would argue that even though the Soviet nuclear warhead designs might not be superior to our own, they could be readily adapted to other weapon systems not covered by the treaty; that, having removed one off an SS-20, you could shift it over to an SS-25 and bolt it right on?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think the answer to that is they could. But in the case of the United States, whenever we have a new missile system, what we do is to optimize the warhead, to take advantage of the peculiarities of that missile system to provide maximum yield, given the weights.

The Soviets presumably would want to optimize as well. If they do not want to optimize, if they are prepared to accept a nonoptimal warhead, indeed they can simply bolt these weapons on an alternative.

But for the last 15 years, Senator Lugar, the critical area for both sides has been delivery vehicles which this treaty constrains, rather than any shortage of fissionable material or of the capacity to produce as many warheads as we want.

Senator LUGAR. Secretary Brown.

Mr. BROWN. To follow along on that line, Senator Lugar, it seems to me that if you are out to abolish all nuclear weapons and quickly, then the suggestion that you ought to destroy the warheads makes sense.

But, as Dr. Schlesinger has pointed out, it is the delivery vehicles that threaten, and the Soviets probably have more than enough fissionable material to fill those.

The argument that has been made that this does not destroy a single warhead seems to me rather like saying let's not ban handguns because it is not guns that kill people, it is bullets. I am not sure whose ox I am goring when I say that, but it seems to me that is not a very good argument, and it is not a very good argument in this case, either.

Senator LUGAR. In the case of the launchers, there is, I suppose, a fairly high degree of confidence that the destruction of those can be verified.

Would you all agree with that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, indeed.

Senator LUGAR. And if, in fact, the point of this treaty is to eliminate this Soviet monopoly of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and the launchers are destroyed, and indeed there has been much testimony that we could monitor the missiles being destroyed—then essentially the problem of our committee has come down to this fissile material and to these nuclear explosive devices.

I suppose what you gentlemen are saying is that the problem was the launchers all along. To be sure, the Soviets already have SS-25's and we might retarget Soviet sites with our strategic systems. Nonetheless, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe required that we eliminate the Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear forces, and we believe there is a fair chance through this treaty that we can get that remedied and verified.

Is there any comment on that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think indeed we have remedied it. The reason I think that the Soviets are prepared to give up on these kinds of capabilities is that they have a perfectly adequate substitute in the ICBM's.

The United States is in a position in which it can get rid of this class of weapon, and it is highly desirable that we proceed to do so.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I apologize that I was not able to be here to hear the statements. I have tried to look through them.

I want to ask a question which I do not think was addressed, and that is your perception of why the Soviets entered into this agreement. I mean, if it requires asymmetical reductions on a 4-to-1 ratio, as Secretary Weinberger indicated a few minutes ago; and it excludes the French and British systems; and it is worldwide, so the possibility of the Soviets redeploying missiles in Asia is eliminated; and it is an agreement no one ever thought we would be able to attain; then I would be interested in your speculation as to why the Soviets agreed to it and how that plays on the evaluation we are to make of this treaty.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think it is quite clear, Senator, that Mr. Gorbachev needs a breathing space. I think it is quite clear that he has decided going head to head in military competition with the United States is not advantageous to the Soviet Union.

His motives are quite clear. There is the possibility that he may think that he can induce us into further agreements less favorable to the West and less favorable to the United States.

The real question is what does he intend to do with the breathing space, whether he plans to move toward a greater degree of stability in the relationship or he is merely seeking time to improve the capabilities of the Soviet Union for some future confrontations. That is an unanswered question.

Various people have clear answers to that—I am not sure Mr. Gorbachev has—and those clear answers are usually based upon ideological views of world history.

Mr. WEINBERGER. Senator, I think there is another reason, too. I would not disagree with that, but I think there is another reason, and this, I think, was their overwhelming desire to get rid of the

Pershing II, which could target, could reach targets in the Soviet Union in a very short time, and which has been their primary objective to having removed from the beginning. It was the deployment of the Pershing II that they tried hardest to stop. You will recall, during a preliminary phase of these negotiations, something called a "walk in the woods," which many of us opposed very, very strongly. The "walk in the woods" would have resulted in giving the Soviets what they wanted immediately, and then trying to work out something later on. Essentially that, obviously, is a very shorthand version of it.

But it would have been disastrous because that is the only thing they really did want at this specific time.

I think it is instructive to note what they do with any sort of breathing space they get. During the post-SALT II period—and this is one of the reasons why I opposed that so much—they simply went ahead and added some 4,000 warheads. The SALT II Treaty permitted them to do so. They did that without even violating it.

So, I think it is very instructive to note what they do do this time. But I also think the point that was made earlier in one of the statements today is that no one really knows how firmly seated Mr. Gorbachev is, and there may well be changes in policy that would preclude our getting this kind of treaty again. I think it is important for us to get it.

He is giving up quite a lot in order to get one thing that he urgently wants. I think that is why, basically, on balance I believe that ratification is important.

Mr. **Brown**. The long-term context is what Jim Schlesinger said: "The pressures on the Soviet Union have caused the present leadership to conclude that at least they want to explore the possibility of arms control agreements and an easing of political relations with the United States."

This treaty, of course, does not fully do that, but it is a first step. It was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. In order for the benefits to be realized in terms of resource diversion to other things and a looser, calmer political situation, there has to be movement on START and SDI and/or conventional forces.

In the short term, why this agreement, why did they give up so much? They gave up almost every point that they had stuck on. I think Cap Weinberger's point is a good one. They were, in my view, inordinately afraid of the Pershing II. They talked about it being able to wipe out Soviet central command and control.

Well, it can't reach Moscow, but it could conceivably at some future time have been extended in range. So they may have had a real worry there.

Finally, another short-term reason on their part is, I think, that they saw a chance to split the alliance. They tried to split it by walking out, but that did not work. When they came back because they had to, having lost that gambit, they still saw some chance to split it by the nature of an agreement—zero-zero, double zero, potentially triple zero.

I think the jury is still out on that. They clearly, partly as a result of the end game and the way we handled it, have gotten some advantage in splitting the alliance. I think that can be reglued. But I think that was part of their motive.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Did you want to add to that, Secretary Richardson?

Mr. **Richardson**. I would just like to add one brief comment, Senator Sarbanes.

I think it is realistic to view the actions of the Soviet regime under Gorbachev's leadership as reflecting the awareness, as I said earlier in my original statement, that neither side has been able to gain any significant strategic advantage by any of the initiatives taken over 40 years in the area of nuclear weapons development and deployment.

Every move has been countered by the other side. It is reasonable to assume that that process of move-countermove, action-reaction will continue indefinitely at continually increasing cost, and with increasing risks of instability.

What this treaty does is not just accomplish the elimination of intermediate range weapons, but the elimination of competition in intermediate range weapons. It would have been perfectly possible for each side to have gone on building more and more. So what the Soviet Union saves is the cost of the competition in this area.

On the face of it, that is a benefit to them, as it is to us.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Did you want to add to that?

Mr. **McNamara**. I will say just one word, Senator Sarbanes.

So frequently we take the attitude that if the Soviets are for an action, we are against it.

I think it is the case that they were concerned about the short flight time of the Pershing II's and its potential ultimately for destroying their command and control centers. I believe that is a major reason why they support this treaty.

If they are so interested, should we not have exacted a higher price? No, it was never our intention to use the Pershings in the manner the Soviets figured. We would be out of our minds if we began a war by knocking out their command and control system.

So, here is a case where we can move forward to increase crisis stability with benefit to both sides. It is a perfect illustration of a "plus-sum gain".

There are many other similar situations that we should be seeking out and moving toward.

Senator **Sarbanes**. The reason I asked the question is that I think there is a tendency to feel that if the Soviets support something we should oppose it. So, I do think it is reasonable to explore why they would be for this agreement particularly when the argument is constantly made as to how heavily weighted the benefits of this treaty are toward us.

Let me just very quickly put to you this final question.

We have discussed the potential impact of not ratifying this treaty on NATO and our relationship with our European allies. But could you touch a bit on what you think the impact would be elsewhere in the world, and in particular in Asia? As I understand it, the Asian countries are very pleased with the outcome we reached, a global zero as opposed to the earlier proposal under which the Soviets would have retained 100 INF missiles in the Asian theater.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think that the political effects would be greater than the military effects. This is an agreement that is visibly to the advantage, the military advantage of the West. The Americans have succeeded in their original objective of a zero solution, even though it was doubted initially when we put it forward that we could get it.

If we then get into the position of saying if the Soviets will accept it, then it cannot be very good, we will be seen as not being able to take yes for an answer. I think that the political consequences will be much greater under those circumstances than the elimination of this very limited number of weapons.

We are dealing with 3 percent of the force structure on either side.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Mr. **WEINBERGER**. Senator, if I may respond with just two quick points, I think if there were a failure to ratify, it would confirm a growing belief, not only in Asia but in other parts of the world, that there are really two Governments in the United States and that it is very difficult for our country to assume that any one decision by the government of the United States, represented by the executive branch, is going to be a decision that will remain in force. That has caused a great deal of concern and worry, as there is a growing perception that through funding or through failures to ratify or any one of a number of other things, there are, in effect, very major differences, even on foreign policy, which would be very desirable to try to minimize.

The other thing, of course, is that the agreement is one that does eliminate all of the intermediate threat to Asia—finally. It did not at the beginning, and it took a long time to get it into that category. I think they appreciate that very much, and if that were lost, then I think there would be very severe, adverse, negative reactions.

Mr. Chairman, as I did advise you, I am supposed to be elsewhere at 11, and I wonder if you could excuse me at this point.

I would be glad to submit answers to any questions in writing, anything that you would like.

The **CHAIRMAN**. All right. The record will stay open for that purpose, as I have said, for this whole series of hearings. So, for 3 days, for several days, Senators may feel free to ask questions in writing, and we do understand.

Good luck.

Mr. **WEINBERGER**. Thank you very much, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to say, as others have, that the collective experience and wisdom, as former Secretaries of Defense, has been invaluable in helping us and people throughout the country who are watching to understand not only the INF Treaty, but many of the other questions it has raised.

Secretary Brown, I would like to ask you, as a former member of the SALT I negotiation team as well as Secretary of Defense, your thoughts on verification and compliance. As you know, compliance has been an issue that has undermined the consensus of arms control over the years.

The Special Verification Commission, which will handle compliance questions in the INF Treaty, is one that is somewhat open ended.

I wonder, from your experience with the Standing Consultative Commission, as set up in SALT I, how you would analyze where it failed and where perhaps the Special Verification Commission could succeed.

Mr. BROWN. There are two separate, but related, issues, Senator Kassebaum—in verification and compliance.

Verification problems arise by lack of access, and differences in judgments in the intelligence community. Those sometimes cannot be easily settled, especially when those issues and those estimates are used by people with political motives on both sides of an issue in the United States to support their own ideological views.

It is inevitable and it is exacerbated by the habit that the Soviets have had from time to time of taking advantage of every ambiguity and every loophole to advance what they may have thought at the time were their immediate military interests.

I think that this treaty does go beyond its predecessors in access. And verification, under this more cooperative regime, should be easier.

This does not mean perfect; but easier.

Compliance issues occur when there has been a clear violation—let's say the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is as clear a violation of the language of a treaty of this sort as I can find.

The problem then is whether the United States profits by abrogating the treaty that has been violated. This depends on the nature of the violation, the circumstances of the two sides, whether each is able to take advantage of an abrogation. In the case, for example, of the ABM Treaty, it is pretty clear to me that in the near-term, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs has pointed out, the Soviets would be in a better position to take advantage in the short term of an abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

So, what we have to do with respect to noncompliance it seems to me, is formulate responses that are proportionate and which help us.

I think Secretary Shultz, in his testimony, went through a discussion of that, and I find that a useful starting point for such considerations.

Having a new Special Verification Commission, which can be called on to meet at any time, seems to me a way of easing the compliance problem, by getting an early start on differing interpretations and getting an early explanation of suspected violations before they become a public item in the United States and an occasion for political dispute.

So, I think that this treaty and its verification and compliance provisions are a step forward in solving two difficult problems. But I would not want to mislead you by saying that they take care of everything. They do not.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You do not feel that it is a problem that the SVC is not clearly defined at all?

Mr. BROWN. It is undefined, and in my more cynical moments, I sometimes think that its existence as a separate entity is largely so as to avoid using the SCC or any other artifact of previous arms negotiations as part of the mechanism for this one.

But, whatever the reasons, I think the SVC does have to be more carefully defined.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

Secretary Schlesinger, in your comments you mentioned that verification should not be used under INF as a precedent for the START, any START agreement, and that it would be a danger to think—am I phrasing that correctly?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. Quite correctly.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I would like to ask you for a moment on the connection that you see between INF and START and how important is achieving a START agreement to making the INF Treaty strategically significant?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think that the INF Treaty rests on its own bottom, as it were. The achievement or nonachievement of START will not significantly affect the benefits to the West on balance of the INF agreement.

We must be cautious about START.

We do not have to be as cautious about the INF agreement simply because it deals with so small a portion of the force structure.

Senator **Kassebaum**. But does not the ultimate impact of INF somewhat rest on a START agreement?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think that the INF Treaty may help us in the direction of a START agreement. We must be cautious about the dimensions of such an agreement. But the worry that we have had about the Soviet Union over the course of the last decade or longer has been the growth of Soviet counterforce capabilities, which lie in their strategic forces.

The goal of a START agreement should be, as Secretary McNamara has said, to increase strategic stability primarily by getting at those Soviet counterforce capabilities most clearly embodied in the SS-18.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Do you have some concerns about verification being achieved for the START systems?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think the point we should understand is that the verification regime for INF is not the most rigorous in the history of the world, as has been stated; that the INF verification regime is quite weak. It is a breakthrough, to be sure, to have United States monitors in the Soviet Union. But the terms of the agreement—I think that Elliot Richardson mentioned that we would be stationing monitors at production facilities. We do not. We will have monitors at Votkinsk, which is an assembly plant. The Soviets, at least in principle, can assemble someplace else.

The purpose of the challenge inspections are to monitor what the Soviets have told us. Those are the designated deployment areas.

There are some 20,000 square miles, or thereabouts, in those deployment areas. But there are 11 million square miles in the Soviet Union.

If the Soviets wanted to cheat—and I have raised a question whether they are so motivated in this case—surely they would not cheat in the 20,000 square miles in which we have the right of inspection.

So I think one ought not to exaggerate the efficacy of this verification regime. It is satisfactory, given the outcome of the treaty.

When we look at the START agreement, all of the reasons for our having confidence in verification in this agreement, the ban on flight tests, the disappearance of an entire category of missiles and the weak incentives to cheat disappear. Therefore, we will need to have an entirely different verification regime.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. The bell is about to go off, but let me get back to something for just a minute.

Mr. Brown, do you think we should try in any way to clarify the SVC?

Mr. **BROWN**. I do not think that need be done in the ratification process. But I think it does need to be done before the first meeting takes place.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. Before the first meeting of the SVC takes place.

Mr. **BROWN**. Yes, of the SVC takes place.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Cranston.

Senator **CRANSTON**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I feel that the presence this morning of such a wealth of experience in directing our Pentagon in several Republican and Democratic administrations gives us a very remarkable opportunity to get informed, balanced, bipartisan advice. I want to thank each of you for your presence.

What I want to do is to elicit this distinguished panel's views on key questions to the strategic doctrine which are raised by the proposed INF Treaty.

First, a bit more on the verification matter that Nancy Kassebaum was asking about. I would like to ask you a question, and if you agree with the way I put it, just indicate that there is no difference of opinion in what I am going to say.

Should we approve INF, even if we know we might not be able to detect all violations, provided we are confident we would detect militarily significant violations and violations that would threaten our security, I assume that we feel we should proceed under those circumstances.

Is that correct?

[No response.]

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. [Nods affirmatively.]

Mr. **McNAMARA**. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator **CRANSTON**. If there is no objection to that, let me move on to another statement like that.

Can I assume that all of you feel that we should not condition the achievement of one national security goal, specifically ratifying the INF Treaty, on the achievement of other desirable goals, whether relating to arms agreements or matters like withdrawal from Afghanistan, compliance with Helsinki accords, or whatever? You would oppose, I presume, linkage of that sort.

Mr. **BROWN**. I would.

Dr. **SCHLESINGER**. Certainly in this case.

Mr. **McNAMARA**. I certainly would.

Mr. **Richardson**. I agree.

Senator **Cranston**. One specific matter: am I correct in assuming that you would oppose any specific linkage that would require that full and final implementation of INF—by that, I mean dismantling of the final schedule of missiles to be done away with—be contingent upon progress or actual achievement by then of adjustment to the size and nature of United States and U.S.S.R. conventional forces?

Mr. **Brown**. I think that latter is a desirable goal, Senator Cranston.

I think that linking it in this treaty would damage the country by preventing the treaty from going into effect without improving the chances of making the conventional forces more even on the two sides.

So, I would be against linking them.

Senator **Cranston**. I assume there is no disagreement with that view.

[No response.]

Senator **Cranston**. On force asymmetries, I want to explore briefly to what degree, if any, force asymmetries are in and of themselves an impediment to arms agreements.

We all know about the asymmetries that exist between our forces and those of the Soviet Union in conventional and nuclear terms. Do you believe that the United States can reach arms agreements, even where such asymmetries cannot be eliminated?

Unless you state otherwise, I would assume you agree that that can be done.

Mr. **Brown**. I think we can reach arms control agreements that improve our security and that under some circumstances allow some asymmetries in forces. What counts is the expected outcome of a conflict, and you can have asymmetries without the expected outcome being adverse.

The Soviets are going to press us rather strongly on what they regard as an asymmetry; namely our advantage in attack tactical aircraft.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. And naval forces.

Mr. **Brown**. Yes, and naval forces, which are less relevant to the central front in Europe.

You can have balancing asymmetries, or you can have asymmetries that may not be balanced, but do not affect the outcome.

I think in any such negotiation, you are going to have to accept that.

Senator **Cranston**. Do you each feel that it would be unwise to attach to the INF Treaty any provisions which would bind our negotiators as to the manner in which they should approach the START Treaty?

If you do not state otherwise, I will assume that you feel we should not adopt any such provision.

[No response.]

Senator **Cranston**. Let me now ask in a different way a question for whoever chooses to answer.

Does the INF agreement in any way undercut the 1983 Montebello decision to modernize NATO's theater nuclear forces?

Mr. BROWN. It certainly does not in any formal sense. Article 14, which is the closest this comes to a noncircumvention clause, certainly does not prevent that.

It may have some political effect, or some people may try to use it politically to prevent modernization. But that is a different matter.

I think some of us will instead try to use it to ensure modernization, and that will have to be thought out as a political issue.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It eliminates one class of modernization, short-range or intermediate-range missiles. That's it.

Mr. BROWN. Land-based.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Land-based.

Mr. BROWN. Land-based Cruise or ballistic, yes.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. McNamara, I agree with the statement you made when you were responding to Senator Sarbanes concerning the matter of our setting out to destroy Soviet command and control capacities. You said—and I forget your exact words—that it would be a big mistake for us to undertake to do that.

Mr. MCNAMARA. I did.

Senator CRANSTON. I agree with you.

Would you please explain why it would be a mistake?

Mr. MCNAMARA. Yes.

I think the question of how to use nuclear weapons with benefit to our Nation is a question that no one has an answer to. But, in any event, most authorities would agree one would not start the use of nuclear weapons by destroying the other side's ability to limit the nuclear exchange. This means, therefore, one would not start by destroying an opponents command and control facility.

However, that is one of the greatest fears each of us has, and we must recognize that.

So, in this particular case, that was a serious concern of the Soviets. They have expressed it to me and perhaps to many of you.

I believe it was a baseless fear because I do not believe an allied commander would have initiated a nuclear exchange in that way. But, by eliminating that fear, we reduce the risk to us that at a time of tension, fearing that we would destroy their command and control system, they would preempt our move by striking against the Pershings.

That is why this INF Treaty is far more important in terms of increasing crisis stability, than it is in the numerical reduction of nuclear weapons.

Senator CRANSTON. If there were a reduction of either side's command and control apparatus, I assume that it might prove impossible not only to limit the nature of the conflict and the use of nuclear weapons, but there might be no way to stop it.

Mr. MCNAMARA. That is a great danger.

Mr. BROWN. Well, it depends, of course, on how much of it is destroyed. If it is all destroyed, then the use of the force cannot be executed.

But what is far more likely is that the senior levels would be destroyed, and that would make it much more difficult to stop or to limit or end the conflict.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cranston

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. I have no questions at this time, and I think it may be Senator Pressler's turn.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Good morning, gentlemen, and thank you very much for giving your expertise to our country with your long years of service.

I would like to ask you what you would recommend to a Senator if he or she felt strongly about attaching a conventional forces agreement in principle, at least, to this treaty. Of course, one would offer an amendment to that effect, which I intend to do.

But I am very worried that the next treaty, the START Treaty, will also go forward without a conventional forces agreement.

It seems as though we are overlooking the fact that the Soviets have a 3-to-1 or a 4-to-1 superiority. I know the recent Armed Services Committee report suggested that there are other ways of measuring it—the quality of officers, and so on and so forth—and you could argue that ad infinitum. But I think everybody would agree that in chemical weapons and conventional weapons—and it has already been touched on this morning—the Warsaw Pact has a substantial advantage, however you slice it.

How would you recommend proceeding? I think we are losing our trump card, here, our negotiating strength, if we do not attach it. People say "Well, that will come next." But once we ratify, I am fearful the White House may well present the Senate with another agreement that does not include an agreement in principle on the conventional force imbalance.

Now, you can say "Well, there are 25 countries involved." But still there are only two principal players. You can say that 25 countries were involved in this agreement that we have before us.

Everybody seems to be making excuses, if you will excuse the expression, pushing off, just "pooh-poohing" the conventional forces issue and the chemical forces problem.

I recall as a Congressman here many years ago, Secretaries of Defense saying they were putting the INF in to protect the lives of servicemen.

I am just afraid that we are not going to get the conventional thing under control.

Now, I have always been for the arms control process, and still am. But somehow this agreement was negotiated without touching the conventional forces. So how do we get the ball on the bat, so to speak? How do we get the conventional forces brought into this?

Mr. BROWN. My own judgment, Senator Pressler, is that you are not going to be able to press the Soviets into conventional force reductions of an unequal kind on the basis that they are going to get more out of a strategic arms control agreement than we are, and so, therefore, they have to give some unequal concessions on the conventional side.

I think that the levers that we have on conventional force reductions, to the extent that they exist, are, first, a Soviet leadership understanding that resources of a major kind are going to be made available from diversion of conventional arms, to investment or consumption, much more than from strategic arms. Strategic arms take 15 or 20 percent of the military budget. Conventional arms take the other 80 percent.

Second is a continued push toward conventional arms agreements, by the Soviet leadership, in order to ease the political relations between itself and the United States, and its allies. And, to the extent that they are motivated by those matters, then we can have a successful conventional arms negotiation.

In other words, I don't see any useful or desirable way to create the linkage that you seek.

I think that conventional arms agreements will be achieved, if at all, on their own. What we can do, I think, to encourage a conventional arms negotiation that we would regard as successful is to make it clear to the Soviets that if there is no conventional arms control agreement—and I include not only force structure here but also controls on operations, which are another way to reduce the risk of a conventional war—that there will be a unilateral action on the part of the United States and the alliance that reduces whatever imbalance there is on the conventional side.

Now, that is a tough problem given financial constraints. But it seems to me this would have far more effect than anything that might be written into this treaty or said by the Congress, the Senate, or the whole Congress, about linkage between this treaty or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and conventional arms reductions.

Mr. **McNamara**. Senator, if I may add to that, General Secretary Gorbachev has, in effect, invited us to participate in negotiating a redressing of the imbalance in conventional arms. We have not yet accepted the invitation.

One of the reasons we have not is we don't know what we want. So, we do not, at the moment, need pressure on the Soviets to move toward conventional force negotiations. We need to make up our mind what is in our interest and then move forward.

It is going to be an extremely difficult negotiation. I strongly urge you not to try to link ratification of the INF Treaty to that.

These two stand apart. If the INF Treaty worsened the military balance and required to avoid a worsening in the military balance some change in conventional forces, then they might be linked. But these are separate issues today.

Mr. **Richardson**. May I add a word, too, Senator Pressler?

I agree with what has been said. I would like to restate Harold Brown's point in a slightly different way.

I think you have to look first at the question of whether or not the bargain embodied in the INF Treaty gives each side a rough equivalent of what it gave up. Given the reduction in the number of Soviet launchers as against ours, for one thing, I think it would have to be said that we have not yielded so much that we can say to the Soviet Union, "You owe us something else over and above what is embodied in this agreement."

It would only be if we had some residual disadvantage that we could expect to get compensated for that it would make any sense to link conventional arms negotiations to this agreement. But if, as I believe, what we have is an agreement in which what has been given up and what has been gained by each side is roughly equivalent, then the agreement has to stand on its own feet, and that is the more true, as Bob McNamara has just pointed out, because its net effect is not to shift the military balance to our disadvantage.

Senator **Pressler**. Let me ask another question. There is some information provided to me here that is well known, that the Soviet general staff has a directorate responsible for coordinating strategic deception. This administration has found the Soviet Union in violation of various arms control agreements.

In contrast to that, there is a general belief that since Secretary Gorbachev's visit here, there is a new thaw, a new wave, and all of you four have dealt with the Soviets at one level or another.

The Politburo still does not elect anybody unless they are pretty sure that the person believes in basic Communist doctrines, which is world domination and waving a red flag, so to speak. But still, we are dealing with the Politburo, even though this fellow smiles and is very friendly.

They have a directorate of strategic deception. It has been in all of our papers.

In your judgment, is there really a change in Soviet basic policy here?

Mr. **Brown**. The basic policy of the Soviet leadership is, first, to stay in power; second, to expand Soviet power and influence in the world.

That is not going to change.

This does not mean that we cannot negotiate with them or make deals with them. It does not mean that they may not—as I think they may now be doing—change their tactics. They may even have concluded that the way to advance Soviet power and influence in the world is not primarily through an attempt at military superiority.

Many people have been saying they have had military superiority, and the Soviets may not be satisfied with what that has got them, in view of their weakness in the ideological competition, their abysmal economic performance, their lag in technology.

So, they may be willing to negotiate a draw for the time being on the military side and concentrate more on the other things. This does not mean that they are (*a*) willing to give up power; or (*b*) willing to give up the attempt to expand Soviet power and influence.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Senator Kerry.

Senator **Kerry**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Most people have asserted that for this treaty to have the meaning that we want it to have, we need to quickly move to START and we need to get strategic reductions.

Let me ask you whether each of you believes the administration is correct.

I think they have set out a 5-year restriction on deployment of SDI, but after that are prepared to say no other restrictions.

I would like you each to comment on whether or not you think the administration is correct in holding out on strategic force reductions in order to have no limitations on SDI, even if it meant not having any START reductions as a result.

Secretary Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the administration is correct, as a matter of bargaining strategy, to augment Soviet concern about the SDI if it intends to get a better price for limitations on strategic defense.

My greatest concern about Soviet forces lies in their counterforce capability. It should be our principal intention, in my mind, in a START agreement to reduce radically that Soviet counterforce capability.

I would not invest much of our bargaining capital in preserving SDI if it is at the cost of failing to get an appropriate reduction in Soviet counterforce capability.

Therefore, while we may want to make the attractiveness of the Soviets paying a higher price for a strategic defense restraint, we ought not to fall in love with strategic defense to the extent that we fail to get what is most necessary in a START agreement.

Reductions by themselves are not enough. We must get a reduction in Soviet counterforce capability, and there are signs that is not the direction in which we are going.

Mr. BROWN. I would agree with what Jim Schlesinger has said about the goal of START negotiations. Any reductions there should be directed at stability, which means a reduction of Soviet counterforce capability.

The negotiating wisdom of proposing an automatic self-destruction of the ABM Treaty at the end of 5 or 7 or 10 years it seems to me is questionable. You can argue it both ways.

It depends, as Jim said, on whether it is a genuine bargaining chip that you use to get something more important or whether you take it as a principle of faith.

I myself believe that a situation that allowed the Soviet Union after 5 or 7 years to embark, if it wished, on a very extensive antiballistic missile deployment would be dangerous to the United States. So, I am against an automatic termination of the ABM Treaty, which, as it now stands, is of unlimited duration.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Senator Kerry, I think it would be "disastrous"—and I really mean that word—to destroy the ABM Treaty, now or 5 or 10 or 20 years from now.

I think those views would be shared by the chiefs. I would strongly urge the Congress to probe the chiefs on this. I don't believe they have been as yet. I think it would be contrary to our interests to ever limit our offense in the face of an unlimited Soviet defense. This is what we would face if we destroyed the ABM Treaty.

It is because of that situation that six former Secretaries of Defense—the four here plus Mel Laird and Clark Clifford—all signed a statement to that effect.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I should say that I don't think that those are the views of the chiefs. The chiefs are against any deployment under current conditions; but they have endorsed the possibility of an SDI deployment at some future date. I think that their views are somewhat at variance with what Bob McNamara said.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Well, I would urge the Congress to probe those views. I don't believe the chiefs will ever accept a substantial limit on the offense in the face of an unlimited defense. I certainly would not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would just add, Senator Kerry, that many of us who have been critics of the SDI would, I think, in all honesty have to recognize that the administration has done a remarkable job in turning it into a very powerful bargaining chip.

Our residual worry is that they won't spend it to buy the maximum possible concessions in the reduction of Soviet counterforce capability, as has been pointed out.

On the other hand, if we credit the administration with optimum skill in the conduct of the negotiating process, they obviously cannot confide in us in advance exactly when and how they are going to use the chip. Indeed, the more effectively they convey the perception that it is not a chip, the greater its value.

I don't know what way there is out of this except perhaps that if this administration maximizes its value, the next administration will be able to cash it in for the largest possible concessions from the other side.

Senator KERRY. Your answers prompt me to want to ask a followup question. I know that I am not going to have time with four of you, however, and there is another area that I want to come back to.

So, let me ask the other area first, and then, if we do have time, I will come back quickly.

When Ambassadors Kampelman and Glitman were here, I asked them about the effect of START and the INF, which leads to it, on our future force structure. They basically declined to answer the question and said you really have to ask the experts.

Well, we have four experts here and I would like to ask each of you to comment on this, if you would.

Post-START, based on what has been testified to and submitted to us by the negotiating team and what has been written about publicly, the United States and the Soviets would be guaranteed some 4,900 warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's. That is down from the current 8,900.

The Joint Chiefs are suggesting a post-START deployment of some 16 Tridents, which means a total of about 3,200 warheads—if you have 16 Tridents.

That leaves 1,700 warheads available for land-based ICBM's.

We now have 50 MX missiles, and the Air Force, as you know, wants to go up to 100.

So, after START, if you have 100 MX missiles, that is 1,000 of our 1,700 total land-based missiles. I hope you are following me here.

If the remainder—that leaves you some 700—if your remainder are deployed on triple-headed Minutemen, which is what is being talked about, then you are talking about a little over 300 targets left, with the Soviets having about 3,300 warheads aimed at them, because of their land force configuration versus ours, which has always been a huge differential.

Now, I have never believed that much in the theory of the window of vulnerability because of our Triad, et cetera. But do we not, then, with a 10-to-1 deployment, following a START Treaty under its current configuration, have we not really created a window of vulnerability as to our land-based force?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If one believes in the window of vulnerability, this certainly opens——

Senator HELMS. Would you hold the mike closer.

Dr. SCHLESINGER [continuing]. This certainly would open it somewhat wider. You point to the greatest potential danger in a START agreement, that it will not achieve greater stability, but, by contrast, it would increase the number of Soviet RV's, or accurate counterforce RV's, in relation to United States aim points. That diminishes that outcome.

Senator KERRY. Could that not be rectified by instead deployin say, a single warhead on a Midgetman, for instance?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It could be rectified in a number of ways. For one thing, we probably should seek to have a smaller number of warheads per Trident submarine. By reducing the number of tubes in the submarines we can move in the direction of single-warhead missiles—either the Minuteman or, if we should go in that direction, the so-called Midgetman.

But the one thing that we should do in such an environment is not to allow the reductions to increase strategic instability.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. May we hear the other answers? I would not ask any followup questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BROWN. The maintenance of a survivable land-based ICBM force is, in my view, important. It is not precluded by the START limits, as now understood. But it will require unilateral decisions by the United States on its forces, on its force structure.

The reductions in number of warheads per Trident submarine, as Jim has suggested, is one idea, and a good one. The others having to do with the land-based forces themselves, depend more in my judgment on basing than on which missile you use.

If you have a completely invulnerable ICBM, it really does not matter all that much whether there is one warhead on each of ten missiles or 10 on 1 missile. After all, there are 200 on the Trident submarine, which is one target, and we don't worry very much about that.

The multiple aim point or the multiple-protective shelter approach is one way; the carry-hard is another way; hardened mobile is a third way. The one that seems to be being adopted; namely, rail mobile MX's, is survivable providing you get 2 or 3 hours' warning, which does not fill me with confidence.

Mr. McNAMARA. Senator, these hearings can have a great effect on public understanding of the appropriate objectives of arms control.

The public, I think, is mesmerized by numbers. They ought to understand that the objective of arms control should be to increase crisis stability. The situation you have outlined, which, as I understand it, is a possibility under the present instructions to U.S. negotiators, would be a major step backward. It would increase the "perception" of vulnerability. Perceptions are important. Jim mentioned "the perception of a window of vulnerability," implying it was not a reality. I agree with him. We are not and would not be vulnerable. But the force structure Senator Kerry referred to could lead the public to a perception of vulnerability.

And, as I have said, that would be a major step backward.

These hearings can inform the public on what the proper objectives of arms control should be. They should be to reduce tensions, increase crisis stability.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I don't really have anything to add to that, Senator Kerry.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Evans.

Senator EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This has been a fascinating and very useful presentation. I wish all members of the committee had been here for the entire exchange. I think it would have been very useful.

First, Secretary Schlesinger, you mentioned in your paper and in several of your remarks that you would hope we could have better verification regimes, that this one was slim at best.

What would you suggest as being a better verification regime—let's take first the INF Treaty—knowing that whatever we ask would lead to a request for equal treatment on our side? In other words, however intrusive we want to be, we are going to have to expect the Soviets to be as intrusive.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that basically this is a satisfactory verification regime, given the weakness of Soviet incentives to cheat and our desire not to allow the Soviets to intrude in the United States.

What I am concerned about is that this verification regime be regarded as a talisman that makes us complacent about the outcome.

The real problem lies in the START area and in the START area we are going to have to have much greater rights of intrusion in order to deal with presumed violations.

Senator EVANS. What rights of intrusion would you suggest specifically, knowing that they would be the same rights of intrusion by the Soviets into the United States?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the position that the administration took some years ago on this issue, which is a challenge—anyplace, anytime—will probably be the right regime for START. It is not necessary in INF.

At the moment, our challenges apply to a very minute proportion of the total Soviet land mass.

Senator EVANS. You are not worried about a challenge any place, any time, by the Soviets being destructive or a problem for us?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It will be a problem for us. That is the price we are going to have to pay to have greater confidence that the other side which—let me put this delicately—has a greater capacity for effective cheating than we do, will be effectively restrained by that START agreement. That is the price we will have to pay.

Senator EVANS. Are there comments from any of the other Secretaries here on that specific point?

Mr. BROWN. I think it is going to be a big problem because there are plants and sites that we don't want the Soviets in. We don't do very well at keeping secrets, but there are occasional ones that we have managed to keep, and it would be a mistake to give those away.

I would myself seek restraints on and examinations of potential deployment areas, rather than of production areas for that reason.

My own belief is that an undeployed system, an untested system, an unmanned system, that is stuck off in a warehouse or a lumberyard somewhere does not do very much to change the military balance.

So, I worry less about those than I worry about possible covert deployments. I would work on those.

Senator EVANS. Secretary McNamara, did you have a comment?

Mr. McNAMARA. Senator Evans, I think that we are never going to have a perfect verification system——

Senator EVANS. No, of course not.

Mr. McNAMARA [continuing]. Particularly when we put on the limits that we are going to insist on. We will never accept Soviet inspection "in the United States anytime, anywhere"—never.

That means that they are not going to accept it.

That means that some "cheating" can take place.

I think we need in advance to estimate the extent to which undetected violations can take place and how we will counter such violations when we detect them. There are ways to do that.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty, passed by the Senate in 1963, dealt with that situation, and the START Treaty is going to have to do the same thing. I believe it can.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would make one brief point, following up what Secretary McNamara just said.

I served on the Verification Panel, so-called, that met under the auspices of the National Security Council in 1969–70 to develop an approach to verification of SALT I. One very important conclusion which contributed to the development of an approach to verification that we felt reasonably confident with was the point that the question you have to address is not whether there can be some cheating, but whether there can be enough cheating so that, before it is detected, it will have had a cumulative result sufficient to shift the strategic balance.

This I think is a very important point to keep steadily in view, because the actual contribution to a shift in the military balance resulting from even fairly substantial numbers of weapons in a given category can be relatively small.

In any event, I think it is worth reemphasizing that it is within that very general area that we should ask the question whether or not the potential for cheating is sufficient to lead us to lack confidence in the overall benefits of an agreement.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If I may, I would read one sentence, Senator Evans, from the President's National Security Strategy Report. "In a world with fewer ballistic missiles, however, Soviet incentives to cheat would be greater."

Senator EVANS. I find it rather ironic in the whole nature of these arms control discussions and agreements that those who start out being the greatest opponents usually start out on the basis that we cannot verify because they want to cheat, and find themselves quickly hoist on their own petard when they say "My God, we can't have this intrusive a verification regime." Someplace along the line we will have to find that narrow path between too intrusive a regime, insofar as our own security interests are concerned, and one that is sufficient to catch, as Secretary Richardson points out, at least most of the cheating that otherwise might go on.

Let me turn from that. You have answered many of the very specific questions that I had during the questioning by others.

What if we decide that the Soviets are so engaged in cheating and duplicity, that they are so untrustworthy that no arms control agreements are really signable or even concluded, and that we would oppose any arms control agreements and just proceed from where we are now?

In your best estimate, what kind of future would we have ahead of us? What would our response have to be? How would we act, how would our allies act and how would the Soviets act under circumstances that say no arms control agreements, we cannot trust you and we won't sign any?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think the environment would be poorer for the United States. It would be poorer politically because the allies expect or insist on our continuing negotiations in a serious way with the Soviets on arms limitations.

But, more particularly, some arms control agreements are good, some are not good. We have to learn to distinguish between the two. I don't think that anyone would seriously have wanted us to proceed with the deployment of the ABM systems in 1971-72 on both sides. It would have added to the strategic problem on both side.

I think that the INF agreement clearly is to the advantage of the West and the United States. That does not mean that other arms control agreements will be to the advantage of the United States and its allies and, therefore, we should avoid them; but we cannot cease participating in the negotiating process.

Senator EVANS. They are all subject to the same cry, however—cheating, duplicity, and we can't trust them.

Secretary Brown.

Mr. BROWN. In the short run, it seems to me that we would suffer considerable political damage in our relationship with the allies and the United States-Soviet relationship, which is now at best sweet-and-sour, would turn very sour indeed.

I am not sure that we would then embark on an enormous rearmament or superrearmament program, simply because of the budgetary realities. And I am not sure that the Soviets would either, right away.

So, in the short term, it seems to me probably the problems would be worsened political relations and missed opportunities for stabilization.

In the long run, I think that you would have made the future considerably more dangerous.

Mr. MCNAMARA. If I may add to that—Harold could have spoken to this better than I—we are facing very rapid changes in technology, and those changes can affect the design of military weapons. I am certain that, without arms control agreements, we would seek to accelerate the application of that new technology to military weapons, as would the Soviets. Without arms control agreements we will have a far less stable military relationship in the future than we have at present.

Senator EVANS. Thank you very much.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

Mr. **Richardson**. I really would like to add one brief word, Senator Evans.

You are really dealing with a balance of risks. There would be significant costs of passing up an agreement or aborting the process of arms control negotiations simply because of concerns with cheating. The whole history of the arms race tends to support the belief that an agreement is more likely to be observed than not. I made this point earlier, but I think it is worth restating.

The unlikelihood of a calculation that a massive effort to conceal weapons system development and bring it to a point where these weapons are usable on short notice, once their existence has been uncovered, is worth more than all of the very real counterconsiderations that made it desirable to stabilize the arms race, I think, is a realistic consideration tending to reduce worries about massive cheating.

To the extent that this consideration does reduce those worries, then, for reasons I won't take time to elaborate, the affirmative benefits that flow from arms control negotiations, including the political as well as the economic benefits, become proportionally larger.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

I think everybody has had a first round, so now we come to the second round.

I would like to follow up with this line of questioning—actually more of a comment and then a question.

About 20 years ago, I wrote a book, "Power and Policy," and one chapter was devoted to the theme that no nation complies with a treaty that is really against its national interest. The secret of success is to make sure that all treaties or agreements are to the advantage of both sides.

Following this same line of thought as was in a previous question, I wonder if any of you gentlemen can think of a treaty that has been honored by a country against its own interest.

The only instance I can think of is when Great Britain entered the war, World War II, when it would have done better to stay out for 6 months or a year, but did so to help Poland as a matter of treaty compliance.

Can any of you recall a case of a treaty being complied with when it was against the interest of the country to do so?

Dr. **Schlesinger**. I think that the British support of Belgium in World War I is right on the mark.

"You are going for a scrap of paper," is what the German Foreign Minister observed at that time.

The **Chairman**. She did the same thing in World War II, too, when she entered on the side of Poland.

Dr. **Schlesinger**. The British were not bound in World War II, save that the political situation after Munich led them to be forced into involvement.

The **Chairman**. Can any of you think of any other exceptions when a treaty has been honored in violation of a nation's interest?

Senator **Helms**. [Nods affirmatively.]

The **Chairman**. Senator Helms?

Senator **Helms**. SALT II. [Laughter.]

The United States has been abiding by it.

The CHAIRMAN. That's a question of opinion.

Senator HELMS. And that was not even ratified.

The CHAIRMAN. But, otherwise, I gather the instances are rare. The most important criterion in my view used to judge an arms control agreement is whether or not it reduces the risk of war.

I was wondering how you felt that the elimination of the INF missiles affect the calculation to initiate hostilities? Would any of you have a view on that?

Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I would think that it would have really a rather modest effect in that regard.

The Soviets, as we all have said, have enormous other forces that can do the same thing. It is true that their conventional and chemical capabilities with the short-range forces, that is, the 500- to 1,000-kilometer missiles, is reduced by this, and there are scenarios that begin with an attack by those systems on NATO airfields, nuclear storage sites, and command centers.

In that sense, I think it is made somewhat more difficult for them. But I regard it as a rather marginal effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Carrying that thought further down the road, do you think we have reduced the risk of nuclear war specifically?

Mr. BROWN. I think only in a rather general, political sense. I think the way in which this treaty contributes to a possible future development of East-West relations that reduces fears on both sides has that effect. But I would be hard put to say because this target cannot be hit by this system, there is now a much lower chance of nuclear war. There is not a higher chance.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. A modest contribution to crisis stability, but only a modest one.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The question of what is an acceptable level of verification has really been at the heart of this issue for some years.

I think you, Secretary Brown, defined for our committee the question of adequate verification when you said, "Any Soviet cheating which would pose a significant military risk or affect the strategic balance would be detected by our intelligence in time to respond effectively."

That is a pretty good definition, in my view.

What is your view of the verification standard which should be applied to arms control agreements? The same standard?

Mr. BROWN. Yes. I think that is a reasonable standard.

There is no way that verification, by itself, is going to provide you with the will to take the necessary actions. All it can do is provide you with the information.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see any difference between what the administration, the present administration, has advanced now, as opposed to what was enunciated by you during the SALT II hearings?

Mr. BROWN. They use a different word. I think they use, what, "effective," and we used "adequate." I seem to recall a colloquy with Senator Helms about what adequate meant.

But I don't think there is any operational difference between what the present administration is talking about and what we meant.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you account for the Soviet——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Excuse me, but may I add to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. We now live in a world of mobile missiles, and verification of mobile missiles is inherently much more difficult than verification of silos. Therefore, the requirements for verification are becoming increasingly more severe.

Mr. BROWN. But the standard is the same. The method may have to be better.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The method has to be improved as we move into this new environment.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you account for the increased willingness of the Soviets to go even further than we are apparently willing when it comes to intrusive verification, when they were the ones who always said "nyet" in the past?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that that is primarily a change in leadership.

We are dealing with a much more flexible Soviet leadership than we have ever experienced. Sometimes this is quite convenient from our standpoint, and sometimes it is somewhat embarrassing.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we basically relying on our intelligence capabilities, rather than on onsite inspections, to detect any Soviet efforts to produce or deploy the SS-20's, the shorter range missiles?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The brief answer to that is yes, Mr. Chairman.

What we are doing with onsite inspection is simply checking on what the Soviets told us. If the Soviets choose to cheat, they are going to cheat in places in which they have not previously deployed weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am delighted to see all of you here. I have enjoyed your testimony.

Let's get down to a couple of technical questions. I am going to ask all of you this.

All of you know that the first two stages of the SS-20 and the SS-25 are just about identical, and that the launcher for the SS-25 is a few feet—I guess 10 feet—longer than the launcher for the SS-20.

One of the details that bothered me, though not the only one, is what happens with respect to these launchers.

Do you know any reason from a technical standpoint why the Soviets cannot use SS-25 launchers in current or modified form to launch SS-20's?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I am not sure what the motivation would be, and I would think that the Soviets would have to test.

Senator HELMS. Well, I'll tell you what the motivation would be, Mr. Secretary. SS-25, as you know, is not covered by this treaty, so they are home free on that one.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is quite right.

Senator Helms. They can build the launchers, and I am just as confident as I am sitting here that they have squirreled away *x* number, 100, SS-20's. If they have not, they sure have had a marked change in their code of ethics.

Senator Cranston. Yes, that is absolutely correct.

Senator Helms. Are you timing me? [Laughter.] I object. [Laughter.]

You have touched on this. Under the treaty the United States is allowed to have onsite inspection at a number of declared locations in the Soviet Union. But, as you said, Secretary Schlesinger, that represents about 0.3 percent of the land area that we will know anything about.

I appreciate your agreement that the verification procedures fall short of perfect, and I suppose as long as we have one country trying to show good faith and another one trying to practice deceit, it is endemic to the treatymaking business that somebody is going to lose.

But are we permitted to inspect those facilities where the Soviets may produce new SS-20 launchers?

Dr. Schlesinger. No.

Senator Helms. We are not. So, they can build the launchers willy-nilly, you see.

Dr. Schlesinger. That's right.

We have inspectors at the assembly point. We chose that in order to avoid the ambiguities of the SS-25 and the SS-20.

Senator Helms. Yes.

Well, while we are on this subject, Mr. Chairman, yesterday we had a friendly dispute concerning the ratio of missiles to launchers supported by the much talked about Beecher article in 1976. I was perplexed, certainly puzzled, by some of the statements made. But that is neither here nor there.

But after that little exchange, I asked the staff—as a matter of fact, I circled the wagons and I said get busy. Members of the staff who are professionally trained in intelligence analysis were asked to go back to the data and make the analysis all over again.

I don't think it has been said any time in the record, Mr. Chairman, but Mr. Beecher is Mr. William Beecher, the author of the article in question. He is a journalist, or was. Still is, as a matter of fact, according to Rudy Boschwitz. He was a journalist at the time he wrote the piece. But what has not been mentioned is that he was an Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1973-75, and, therefore, well informed on defense matters.

Nor should it be assumed that this Senator introduced into the record just an arbitrary footnote in a Ph.D. dissertation. As a matter of fact, I believe the gentlemen here will acknowledge that the Beecher piece is sort of a historical and significant milestone in arms control journalism. It certainly set off a lot of discussion, a lot of dialog.

This dissertation by Mr. Beecher, when published for the first time, was recognized then and is recognized now as accurate. It is the data that is significant, and not Mr. Beecher's conclusions.

Second, this data can be analyzed both in terms of what was known in 1976, what was known about the Soviet practice and military deployment, what is known today, and that is why the citation is not only to Beecher, but, as I tried to emphasize yesterday, also is to various press, including more recent articles.

The distinguished chairman may recall that I asked and received unanimous consent to include two or three additional articles, and they were included in the record.

Now, I won't proceed here much longer, but the analysis showing a high ratio of missiles to launchers was intended to show the range of reasonable opinions about the number of SS-20's produced in the first place. I did not even use a worst-case scenario.

But, having said all of that, as I said earlier, I asked the staff to go back and check their figures, and the new analysis reaffirms that the Beecher article supports a high ratio of missiles to launcher, a ratio which, if extrapolated to the present day, showed that reasonable people think we should examine carefully the conservative analysis which today is the consensus of the intelligence community—that is to say, the consensus of everybody except the CIA and the State Department.

So let us look at the data in Beecher. Beecher revealed for the first time the following: First, that the SS-20 has three warheads; second, that the increment of SS-20's deployed would carry 1,000 warheads; and third, that the number of SS-20's were being produced in 1976 was 1,200.

Therefore, we must ask the question: How many SS-20 launchers are to be deployed initially if 1,200 SS-20 missiles are being produced? The answer is found by dividing three warheads per missile into the 1,000 initial increment of warheads revealed by Beecher. This gives 330 SS-20 launchers.

The next question is this: What is the ratio of SS-20 launchers to SS-20 missiles? By simple arithmetic, all you have to do is to divide 330 launchers into 1,200 missiles. The exact ratio is 3.63, which rounds out to a ratio of four to one. Thus Beecher, based on initial data in 1976, was very close to the ratios of five to one which other writers are saying today. By itself it does not imply five to one, but in the context of estimates resulting in high ratios it is very supportive and very credible.

Finally, it is common knowledge that the Soviets use Five Year Plans for their military programs. Thus the 1,200 SS-20's being produced in 1976 were part of the 1976-80 5-year plan. In 1980 through 1985, the same increment of SS-20 launchers were deployed as in the first 5-year plan, according to the DOD publication, Soviet Military Power. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that twice as many missiles were also produced. Using Beecher's number of 1,200, that would make 2,400 by the time the 5-year plan was completed in 1985. If you subtract about 150 missiles for testing, you end up with 2,250 missiles, the number in the chart.

I make no claim and never have made a claim that 2,250 missiles have been detected. It is, however, a reasonable estimate that needs to be verified or knocked down. Its assumptions need to be compared with the intelligence estimates which Admiral Crowe testified to before the Armed Services Committee last week. Finally, it is much more reasonable than the absurdly low number proposed by the CIA and the Soviet Union.

Senator HELMS. I yield back any time that I may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I just have one question that I would like to address to you that follows up on the matter that Senator Kerry first brought up.

I wanted to do this with Secretary Weinberger, but, unfortunately, he had to leave. I would like to read a quote from Secretary Weinberger, which seems to me to underscore the need for limits on defense. He once said, "Even a probable Soviet territorial defense would require us to increase the number of our offensive forces."

My question is this, Isn't the question of strategic defense either going to have to be resolved in the context of a START agreement or else remain as a constant liability within such agreement or a possible barrier to such an agreement?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, if there is a workable strategic defense. There may be some skepticism about that.

Senator CRANSTON. Which we do not know, of course.

Is there any dissent from those "yes" answers?

Mr. MCNAMARA. Senator Cranston, I don't believe the United States will ever accept deployment of a Soviet strategic defense without major changes in U.S. offensive forces unless the deployment of defenses by the Soviets is in accordance with an arms control agreement limiting those defenses. But no human mind knows how to write such an agreement.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. That is the only question that I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. This concludes the hearing.

We thank all of you Secretaries for coming down. I would add that every Secretary from 1960 on was invited to be here, and we particularly thank you for having accepted our invitation.

We will reconvene at 2 in this same room, when we will consider some noncontroversial nominations and the slightly less noncontroversial Contra aid package.

So, we will meet again here at 2.

The committee is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene, February 3, 1988, at 10:01 a.m.]

THE INF TREATY

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Dodd, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, and Pressler.

The Chairman. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order. I will forgo the normal opening statement for the sake of time, but will retain the right of reply if the ranking minority member wishes to make an opening statement.

We have with us today Ambassador Burt, Ambassador Keel, and former Ambassador Galbraith. I would suggest that we start off with a panel now. We are going to have to leave in about 20 minutes to make a rollcall vote, but we will be right back. And if Mr. Burt would care to get underway, we would be delighted. Ambassador Burt.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD R. BURT, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Ambassador Burt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you are aware, I have submitted a statement for the record. I am prepared to briefly summarize that statement or go directly to questioning, as you please.

The Chairman. I think a brief summary would be a good idea.

Ambassador Burt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think what I will do is just briefly excerpt the main points of my statement. And I would like to begin by underlining what I think is a very important fact.

The INF Treaty has clearly not solved all of the problems of European security. At the same time, the treaty has solved one major problem confronting the NATO alliance, and that is the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile.

The Soviet deployment of that missile represented not only a new military challenge to the alliance, but it constituted a broader strategic threat.

Against the background of Soviet conventional superiority, and in an era of overall strategic nuclear parity, the deployment in the 1970's of the SS-20 was the culmination of a series of Soviet steps designed to decouple the defense of Europe from the United States.

Now, beginning in 1979, the alliance addressed the SS-20 threat in a unique way. Rather than simply building up a counterforce capability to the SS-20, NATO found it necessary to proceed along a dual path of deployments, coupled with an arms control offer.

Now, this so-called double-track decision has been subjected to a great deal of criticism. The complex linkages of the double-track decision were difficult to manage, even within the U.S. Government, not to mention the alliance as a whole.

But the important point, I think, to underline is that the double-track approach succeeded. And in succeeding it conclusively demonstrated Winston Churchill's dictum that we must be prepared to arm if we wish to disarm.

I would like to emphasize this point, Mr. Chairman. For it is perhaps one of the most important results of the INF process. During the early 1980's, unilateralism was a strong force in both the United States, but particularly in Western Europe.

The unilateralist thesis was that a freeze on Western nuclear forces, and specifically a renunciation of INF deployment, would prompt the Soviets to exercise parallel restraint.

The INF experience has convincingly shown that real arms reductions can be achieved only through negotiation backed by strength. The arguments of the European peace movement, which were so appealing to European public opinion only a few short years ago, have thus been discredited.

As for the agreement itself, it is possible, of course, to dream up a better accord than the one we have. It would be nice, for example, to have the Soviets dismantle all their SS-20's while we retain some of our Pershing II's and ground-launched Cruise missiles.

But a negotiated agreement must represent a balance of interests and concessions. So, the issue before you is not whether this is the best imaginable agreement, but whether our negotiations have achieved an outcome that serves U.S. and allied interests. And my answer is "Yes."

If there are risks associated with this treaty, they do not flow from its provisions. What risks there are flow from the wrong lessons that people in Europe, and especially in West Germany, might draw from the INF experience.

One of the most damaging wrong lessons that could be drawn from the INF experience and which many on the West German left are drawing, is that this treaty represents the first step toward the denuclearization of Europe and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence.

Mr. Chairman, a denuclearized Europe would represent the height of Western strategic folly. By stripping away NATO's nuclear deterrent, Western Europe would be exposed to the full brunt of the Soviet Union's conventional offensive capability.

The INF Treaty, by removing some 400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe, does not alter the alliance's strategy of flexible response. Nor was it meant to. The United States, after the treaty is fully implemented, will continue to deploy some 4,000 nuclear weapons throughout Europe.

Now, if the left has some mistaken ideas about what the treaty means, so do many on the conservative side of the European political spectrum.

It has become popular for West German conservatives, for example, to argue that the treaty strategically "singularizes" their country by virtue of the fact that after INF reductions short-range Soviet missiles in East Germany will still be able to strike targets in West Germany.

But West German singularization is a myth. Prior to SS-20 deployment, nobody argued that West Germany had been singled out as a nuclear target. And we are now getting rid of all the SS-20's.

In fact, the singularization argument vastly exaggerates the impact of the INF accord. While West Germany, after INF elimination, will still be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, so will the rest of Western Europe, and indeed the United States.

The idea that the remaining United States nuclear weapons in Europe could only be used on German soil is also wrong. After INF withdrawals, we will still possess a considerable number of nuclear munitions based in Europe, at sea and in the United States, that can threaten targets throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet homeland.

I am confident, Mr. Chairman, that in the end Europeans and Americans alike will draw the correct lessons from the INF experience. European leaders, such as Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Thatcher, have expounded these right lessons.

They have defended the continuing validity of the strategy of flexible response, and have expressed confidence in the solidity of the United States-European security partnership.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, in assessing this treaty, we must address the consequences of a failure of ratification. The INF Treaty is unique in many respects. But most importantly, in my view, because it flows out of a collective commitment that NATO governments have made to their people.

That commitment, made by President Reagan in 1981, was clear and simple. If the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate its unwarranted SS-20 threat against Europe, NATO would forgo the deployment of INF missiles.

Throughout the entire course of INF negotiations, and particularly during those very difficult days of 1983 when U.S. INF deployments began, the United States and its key allies reaffirmed this commitment.

In other words, we were able to deploy because European publics had faith in NATO's pledge to seek the removal of all INF missiles. If, in having now achieved this goal, we were to repudiate NATO's longstanding commitment by repudiating this treaty, the consequences would be extremely serious.

Not only would it be highly unlikely that we could maintain public support for keeping U.S. missiles in Europe, but over the longer term the credibility of the NATO alliance would be more broadly called into question. If I were Mikhail Gorbachev, I doubt I could think of a more welcome development. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burt may be found in the appendix.]

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Do you have an opening statement, Senator Helms?

Senator **HELMS**. If I may have a couple of moments.

The **Chairman**. We will pause for a moment to hear from the ranking member.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. We are pleased to have here this morning two distinguished Ambassadors who have had experience with European opinion.

Much of the discussion of this treaty has taken place as though it were solely a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which it is not.

It is a highly significant fact that the administration did not even submit the basing agreements, for example, with the European countries, submit those to the Senate as treaties for advise and consent.

I think that tells us something about the Government's attitude toward NATO. And I hope NATO will bear in mind that there are some of us who have concerns about them. In any case, I think that European thinking about the treaty is extremely important. Not necessarily the official statements of European government officials, but the real attitude.

I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, earlier during these hearings about a distinguished editor of Figaro, circulation 900,000. I think it is the largest circulation on the continent, perhaps, certainly in France. He said they had a lot of doubts, a lot of doubts about this treaty.

But the fact is that Europe does not have much choice in the matter, as the situation stands, even though the treaty removes the principal deterrent that they have against Soviet aggression.

So, we have had many cables and other communications saying thank you for at least raising the question. These cables have come from people who are concerned overseas. They feel, many of them, that we have backed the Europeans up to the edge of the cliff. And that the only thing they can do is to say that the view looks grand, beautiful.

Even a lot of opinion here in the United States that seems to be saying by implication, nobody gets up and says it forthrightly, they say the treaty is bad for the NATO alliance, but it will embarrass the allies if the treaty is not ratified. And I guess they feel like they have been backed up to the edge of the cliff, while we over here feel duty bound to push them over.

But in any case, Mr. Chairman, there are going to be some questions raised, and I am delighted at long last that, I believe we have one witness scheduled this morning who may take a little different view of the treaty.

In any case, I appreciate both of you coming here. And I say hello to Mr. Burt.

Ambassador **Burt**. Hello, Senator.

Senator **Helms**. It is always good to see you.

Ambassador **Burt**. It is good to see you, Senator.

Senator **Helms**. Thank you very much.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Helms. I would just point out that on the record certainly every one of our NATO allies has supported this treaty.

And on Friday, there will be some representatives of NATO countries here under a subcommittee hearing conducted by Senator Biden, who just was in Europe, sampling the temperature there with regard to it. And also Senator Byrd is leading a group next week over there. So, we will be able to hear them.

Senator HELMS. If my distinguished chairman would yield, what choice do they have but to say, you know, "This is a fait accompli."

And as for this hearing that is coming up, I do not believe you are going to, I have written you a letter about the composition of the witnesses. It is just as one-sided as it can be. And I know the chairman does not favor that. But anyway, we will get to that later.

The CHAIRMAN. We will, and I think we ought to bear in mind that the viewpoint of the opinion polls in the country is about 80 percent in favor of the treaty too. But the witness composition is not quite 80 percent.

Senator CRANSTON. May I say one word, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator CRANSTON. I think the witnesses have been sort of one-sided up until now because the preponderance of opinion among the experts is that this is a sound treaty. And they are, therefore, supporting the treaty.

Europeans are free to express their views. They do express their views, and both publicly and privately. And I emphasize the "privately."

European leaders of all the nations over there have generally expressed support, both publicly and privately, for the treaty, with no major discrepancy between their public and private conversations with Members of the U.S. Senate.

There are greater doubts, certainly in France, than in the rest of Europe. And I think that both of you recognize that, and others do. But even in France, I think the evidence is pretty strong, the preponderance of support is for this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator HELMS. The Senator is always positive, and sometimes right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are very fortunate to have the former Ambassador to France, to Paris, with us here today. If Mr. Galbraith would care to digest his testimony, and then we will get on to questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. EVAN G. GALBRAITH, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE

Mr. GALBRAITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for allowing me to appear before you today.

I might say that, before beginning, just to touch on the fact that my background includes having lived in Europe for over 20 years, and I have done business literally in every Western European country.

And in addition to serving as the U.S. Ambassador to France from 1981 to 1985, I served on two other occasions in the Government over 3 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, and later as the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce during the Eisenhower administration. I am a graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School, and currently am an international investment banker.

I would like to address first the question of verification under the INF Treaty, and to state categorically that verification is impossible. It is not just difficult, it is impossible.

And this must be so because the SS-20's are mobile and we do not know how many SS-20's have been produced. And I have asked you to think about it. How can you verify the absence of the SS-20 unless you know how many to look for?

Our intelligence community has produced a wide range of estimates. And it is important to understand about these estimates that they are based only in part on hard intelligence and they are based largely on assumptions.

The fact is, we simply do not know how many SS-20's are in existence today, or will be produced in the future. There could be several hundred SS-20's stored in sites we cannot inspect.

And our right of inspection covers only a small fraction of the Soviet Union, and it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would convenience us by storing the SS-20's in the areas we can inspect.

Now, when confronted with this unassailable logic, the administration officials that I have talked to have said, "yes, but." Now, these "buts" include the number of concealed SS-20's would have no military significance.

Would 200 or 300 SS-20's have no military significance? Then why are we paying so dearly by giving up our key deterrent, the Pershing II? The administration cannot have it both ways.

The SS-20's cannot be significant for the purpose of entering into this treaty, but insignificant when it comes to violating it.

The next "but." The SS-20, if stored clandestinely, will not be properly tested and its crews will not be properly trained. This rather lame rejoinder barely merits comment, but for the record let it be noted that other missile crews, Soviet missile crews, those operating the SS-25's, for example, can also be proficient in launching the SS-20.

The SS-20 needs no further flight testing, and can be properly maintained for years. And even as it moves into obsolescence years down the line, those weapons will still remain lethal and capable of fulfilling their mission, namely to intimidate and terrorize Western Europe.

Third point of the administration when confronted with the fact that the treaty is not verifiable, we are told, and I gather in this testimony, we are told that cheating would be too costly.

Why? The SS-20's can be stored in banal containers or in the SS-25 canisters at existing military bases not subject to our inspection. This cost is infinitesimal in comparison with constructing new missiles, and the cost will be lost in the Soviet defense budget.

This is another red herring. And in fact, the element of cost is an incentive to cheat. Simply storing several hundred SS-20's is much cheaper than producing, for example, a MIRVed SS-25.

Now, in summary on the verification point, I would say that the administration has submitted this treaty to the Senate with a certification that it is verifiable. And in fact, it is not.

And I do not believe that the U.S. Senate should be a party to what I think amounts to a deception of the American people.

Now, turning to the substance of the treaty, in my opinion the loss of the Pershing II is even more devastating than the impossibility of verification. The Pershing II is regarded by most Europeans who focus on these matters as a key deterrent to Soviet aggression. And its deployment reinforced the will of Europeans to maintain an effective military force against the Soviet Union.

The underlying problem in Europe is the fact that almost no one believes the United States would use its strategic nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of defending Europe. For to do so would cause a Soviet nuclear attack on the American people and its cities.

Consequently, most Europeans think the Soviets are not deterred in Europe by American strategic weapons. Therefore, Europe is wide open to a Soviet nuclear, conventional, or chemical attack, unless there are United States nuclear weapons on the ground in Germany.

Most people are convinced that the Soviets must assume in that event that if there were, for example, a Soviet breakthrough, the United States would use its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, if only to prevent the United States troops from being slaughtered. Moreover, the use of tactical nuclear weapons need not be necessarily escalated into a strategic exchange.

Now, the loss of belief in the American nuclear umbrella has given rise in Europe to a sense of defeatism, appeasement, and a fundamental longing to want to opt out. This is manifested in Germany, for example, by the Greens, the leftwing of the Social Democratic Party, and much, I am afraid to say, of European youth in general.

The Germans in particular have been assaulted by Soviet propaganda, about nuclear holocaust, Germany burning, Germany as a nuclear battlefield, et cetera. And all of this has had an adverse effect on Germany's will to resist.

However, the Pershing II helped restore European faith in the West's ability to stand firm. The American nuclear umbrella was restored. Now, with this treaty we are on our way to withdrawing it.

The ink was barely dry on the INF Treaty before Gennscher, Shevardnadze, Honneker, and others, began discussing the elimination of the remaining nuclear weapons in Germany. The INF Treaty sets us on a slippery slope, and we will not stop sliding until Germany is denuclearized, neutralized, and demilitarized.

By ratifying this treaty, you will destabilize Germany and Western Europe, and threaten the existence of NATO. And to what end? The purpose of the SS-20 is not to fire them. The Soviets are not mad. They do not wish to start a nuclear war. They wish to dominate Western Europe without firing a shot.

And the SS-20's were deployed to intimidate, to terrorize, and ultimately to force the Europeans to opt out of any effort to resist the Soviet domination of Western Europe. Soviet terror is not going to be diminished one wit by the elimination of the SS-20.

The SS-24 and SS-25 and other nuclear weapons can also be targeted on Europe. And the grisly Soviet propaganda war will continue. And the erosion of Western resolve will continue.

We are asked if this fatal scenario that I am outlining today is possible. Why is it that European leaders favor the treaty? The answer lies in the confluence of favorable public opinion polls in Europe, and the disarmament policy of the Reagan administration.

Government leaders have concluded they cannot resist politically the combination of these two forces. Reality is often overcome by public euphoria.

As Prof. Jeffrey Hart points out in his recent book, "From This Moment On", Chamberlain was, after his agreement with Hitler in Munich, a national hero. He could have been elected in a landslide, had he not been a gentleman and had he called a snap election. And during this period, Churchill could do nothing.

And a New York Times editorial written in the dark days of 1940 persisted in this sort of attitude. And I quote, "After all Neville Chamberlain tried to bring peace to Europe. He tried boldly, bravely, when other men had shrugged their shoulders. Was it not better to have tried and failed than never to have tried at all?"

The answer is "No." Certainly not by relying on the word of tyrants. And only through strength can the tyrants be kept at bay.

I would also like to speak to those like Henry Kissinger who have said the treaty is a major mistake, but think it is too late, the damage is done, and not to ratify would not stop the withdrawal of the Pershing II's.

We might as well go ahead, they say, and ensure that the SS-20's are also withdrawn. Other opponents of the treaty fear that rejection could lead ultimately to the election of the SPD in Germany.

But is it wise to suppress the truth? Is it not better to speak out as Churchill did after Munich, even if into the teeth of public opinion? Maybe with the truth we can salvage ultimately the Pershing II's. The loss of Germany through neutralization would be a disaster.

We must do everything possible to prevent it, and this treaty will aid and abet those forces who would have it come about. I urge that the Senate either reject the treaty or postpone it until the American people can be given a chance to appreciate its adverse consequences.

Perhaps it will become an issue in this election year, and the next administration will be better placed to judge it objectively.

Last, people ask me, Can France replace the United States as the nuclear guarantor of Europe? Perhaps. France will soon have the necessary military hardware, and French military leaders to a man are adamantly opposed to this treaty.

I gave a speech 3 weeks ago in Paris attended by a number of French military leaders, and they all came to me with, practically with tears in their eyes hoping that I could do something to stop what they regard as this mad process toward denuclearization of Germany.

And they see a neutral empty Germany sitting across the Rhine, as opposed to an armed Germany filled with American troops. They see this empty Germany between them and the Soviets. And they know it will be up to them, and they are, to say the least, nervous about their new responsibility.

But the question with France is intertwined with Germany. The question is whether or not Germany will accept France as its nuclear guarantor instead of the United States. And if so, will French nuclear weapons be sufficiently credible to stop the erosion in Germany of the will to resist.

On this point, Mr. Chairman, I have grave doubts. And I am at your disposition for questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Galbraith may be found in the appendix.]

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much, Ambassador Galbraith.

There is a rollcall vote going on now on the nomination of Judge Kennedy, soon to be Justice Kennedy. So, I would suggest the committee go into recess for a few moments, and we will be right back.

But before going to recess, the ranking member is recognized.

Senator **HELMS**. If you would just let me make one comment. I believe, Mr. Ambassador, that in your distinguished career you have had the longest duty as a European Ambassador of anybody that has testified before this committee. Is that correct?

Mr. **GALBRAITH**. I do not know, Senator. I know Supee has been there for some time. But there are plenty of people around who have had long tours of duty.

Senator **HELMS**. Well, you are no novice.

Mr. **GALBRAITH**. No, I have spent most of my adult life in Europe.

Senator **HELMS**. I know that. What you have said here, if we can go back to the editorials about Munich, not only the New York Times, but everybody said give peace a chance, why it is like motherhood. Everybody is in favor of peace and motherhood.

But the core of what we are trying to find out here is does this treaty lead to peace, or does it lead to something else?

The **CHAIRMAN**. Let us go into recess now, and we will find out when we come back. This committee will be in recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The **CHAIRMAN**. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order. Ambassador Keel, I understand, is on his way here. But I will take my 10-minute turn now and ask a couple of questions of the witnesses who have been kind enough to be with us at this point.

Ambassador Galbraith, I was struck with your views on verification, that verification is impossible. I believe Ambassador Nitze, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Carlucci have told us that effective verification is quite possible.

I think we all agree that 100-percent complete verification is not possible. I am wondering if you can enlarge a little bit on what your definition of verification is.

Mr. **GALBRAITH**. Well, my definition of "verification" is that we can establish that the Soviet Union no longer has a sufficient number of SS-20's available to them and to their control for future use after we have had the elimination procedures completed.

There is no doubt in my mind, and I believe in the minds of most of the people in the intelligence community that it is highly possible and probable that the Soviet Union will be able to keep several hundred SS-20's in military bases which are not subject to our inspection.

And the root of the matter is threefold. One, we do not know how many there are in the beginning, so the elimination procedure does not help us in determining whether or not they are all gone.

Second, these missiles are mobile and their launchers are mobile, and they can be moved and stored in any number of places.

And third, the Soviet Union is an enormous haystack, and it is impossible for us to effectively verify those places where they could be stored by the Soviet Union, from which they could be rather quickly put into operation.

They talk, in my conversations with the administration, they kind of gloss over that. They acknowledge that, but they say there is no motive for the Soviets to cheat. I think there is a great deal of motive for the Soviets to cheat, and I would be happy to discuss that if you like.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there is no question that they could bury some of these missiles in the bottom of a salt cavern somewhere.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, it does not have to be that far.

The CHAIRMAN. But they would still not be suitable for immediate use. I think if they were brought up and used, very quickly we could find that through national technical means.

Mr. GALBRAITH. No, no, they could be on military bases not subject to our inspection. They do not have to be in a salt mine somewhere.

They can be in a conventional shed, they could be stored in SS-25 canisters, they could be deassembled and put into commercial canisters, commercial containers. There is any number of ways the Soviets can effectively store these without our being able to survey them.

Our surveillance is not able to penetrate through the roofs and through metal containers. It is not a very difficult job, and I do not think you have to be a rocket scientist to understand this.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be your reaction, Ambassador Burt, to this line of thought?

Ambassador BURT. Well, Mr. Chairman, in fact I think you do have to be something of a rocket scientist to understand it, in the sense that verification is in fact a highly complex problem.

It is one that the U.S. intelligence community has a substantial experience in handling. I think that the question of verification comes down to what standards you are prepared to live under, and what degree of access you can achieve in an agreement.

We have seen in the progression of negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviets that there have been evidence of Soviet violations. But at the same time, what is striking to me through this whole period is that those violations have been violations on the margin.

They are nevertheless serious, and in the past we have been dependent solely on national technical means of verification to detect Soviet violations.

I happen to believe very strongly that one of the principal virtues of this agreement now before the Senate is that we have taken the verification process a good deal further than we have in the past in negotiated agreements with the Soviets.

I was heavily involved early on in this administration, both as Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe in discussing the problem of how one would actually verify an agreement eliminating all INF systems.

And quite candidly, if you had told me in the early 1980's that we would have succeeded in achieving the degree of intrusive verification which we have in this agreement, I would not have believed it.

And I have to go by the judgments of people in this administration, in the intelligence community, and in the policy community, who have a great deal more expertise than I do on this specific subject, who have concluded that given the very rigorous verification provisions of this agreement, that whatever Soviet activities that were undertaken inconsistent with this agreement did occur would not be militarily relevant.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Mr. Chairman, I might add on that question, I was involved to the extent of trying to urge the French to support our deployment of the Pershing.

As you know, it was a close call in Europe getting the GLCM's and the Pershings deployed. And in the course of which I was asked by the French if we could inform them as to how many SS-20's we thought the Soviets had.

I got back all kinds of answers. Different ones from the military, different ones from the CIA. There was a wide divergence. Finally, after examination, it was very clear we did not have any idea how many they have. And I do not think anybody today can get up and tell you within 100 missiles how many there probably are.

It all depends on what assumptions you want to make. It is like estimating the GNP. It depends on what figures you pump in there for unemployment, interest rates, et cetera, et cetera.

When you pump in certain assumptions, you come up with another number. But nobody knows what those assumptions are.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I think Ambassador Burt wants to comment.

Ambassador BURT. Mr. Chairman, let me just make an aside, which is I hope we do get to the subject of European attitudes toward the agreement.

To be quite candid, I would not try to speak for Evan Galbraith, but speaking for myself, you can get better experts on the subject of verification up here before this committee.

But I do know, through the whole process of discussing this issue with the Europeans, and one of my jobs in the past was chairman of something called the Special Consultative Group, where we consulted on a regular basis with the European countries directly involved.

By the way, not the French, because, of course, they never actually supported the original 1979 double-track decision.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Mitterand did.

Ambassador BURT. They were never signatories.

Mr. GALBRAITH. But they publicly supported it.

Ambassador BURT. And they were not members of our Special Consultative Group. But we did track the deployments of Soviet SS-20's very carefully.

And I must say, all through the period of the 1980's there was a consensus within both the U.S. Government and European intelligence circles that we had a very detailed understanding of how SS-20 deployments were taking place.

Now, that does not mean, of course, that you got every last missile. But it did mean, in my view, that we were correct within, above 95 percent certainty of what the Soviets were doing with that system, where it was, what sites were operational, what sites were not operational.

And the result of that, the result of our ability to understand that program was one of the reasons that we were successful in actually getting the Europeans to undertake deployments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think the point that needs to be stressed is that the arguments on behalf of this treaty are exactly like the rhetoric of SALT II.

The same Senators are saying the same thing. Boy, this is great. And it would be terrible if we do not. And they were ready to vote for it. They did, in many cases, those who were here then, and who are here now, they voted for SALT I. And now they are coming and saying, you know, "You are almost unpatriotic if you do not support this treaty."

Now, Mr. Galbraith, you stated, and I tried to write it down, "the SS-20's," and I am quoting you, "can be stored in banal containers or in SS-25 canisters at existing military bases not subject to our inspection." Is that roughly what you said, or exactly?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes. That is correct. And that would account for the fact that, as Rick was saying, we had good intelligence on the deployed missiles.

Senator HELMS. Right.

Mr. GALBRAITH. The deployed missiles we could observe through imagery. But those that were not deployed we could not observe, and we do not know how many they made and how many they have stored and not deployed.

Senator HELMS. Now, I have a diagram here somewhere, hold it up.

[The diagram referred to appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. This is a new one.

Senator HELMS. Yes. Do you not think I could do good art work? Now, this diagram shows an SS-20, an SS-20 in the canister, and an SS-20 in the SS-25 canister.

And that is the point I have been trying to make since these hearings started. They say, "Oh, that does not matter, forget it, it is not going to happen." The Soviets would not have the incentive to do this, that and the other, which is reducio ad absurdum as far as that is concerned.

Is it not true that the SS-25 is about 10 feet longer than the SS-20?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Something like that. I think it is 3 meters, yes.

Senator HELMS. And the same diameter, I might add, according to the information we have. So, we cannot tell from the outside of an SS-25 canister whether there is an SS-25 in there or an SS-20.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I do not think there is any doubt that the Soviet Union has a number of ways to cause their nondeployed SS-20's to be withheld from our view.

They could store hundreds of them in places we just cannot inspect. And there is no question about that. Our right of inspection is just an infinitesimal part of the Soviet Union and the Soviet military bases.

Senator HELMS. Now, let me move along.

Ambassador BURT. Senator, could I come back to something here?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sure.

Ambassador BURT. It is not really an effort to change the subject, but it comes back to a point you made which I think is very important.

You talked about how this debate is the same as the SALT II debate, and the same people are supporting the agreement.

Senator HELMS. In terms of the rhetoric.

Ambassador BURT. I understand that. But I want to make an important distinction, because I think there is an important difference that is worth thinking about. And it goes directly to this issue of the Europeans.

I think that the SALT II Treaty and the INF agreement are in fact very different agreements. Not just in terms of the rhetoric. Because the INF agreement, for all practical purposes, in my view, is not simply a United States-Soviet bilateral agreement.

This agreement really is an agreement that has been negotiated by and for, not simply the United States, but by the alliance as a whole. First of all, this agreement flows out of an alliance agreement taken on December 12, 1979, to seek an arms control accord and to deploy missiles.

Senator HELMS. Yes.

Ambassador BURT. And second, when President Reagan announced in November 1981 that our goal in these negotiations was the elimination of all INF systems, this proposal was not a U.S. proposal, it was a proposal that was worked out laboriously with the allies. And every important development in these negotiations took place with the backdrop of intense alliance consultation.

The point I am trying to make, Senator, is that for better or worse, and I am not making the point of whether it is a good agreement at this stage or a bad agreement, I am making a political fact, that this agreement is viewed in Europe as their agreement as well as our agreement.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I disagree with that.

Ambassador BURT. They have all, from beginning in November 1981 onward, and I am talking mainly here about the deployment countries, the five countries that had the guts to go forward in 1983 and deploy those missiles on their soil against tremendous opposition, all of those politicians staked their political careers to the concept that if we could get an agreement that eliminated all these systems that that was their aim and their goal.

Senator HELMS. Well, I appreciate that, and I do not have much time. But, you know, opinions are like noses, practically everybody has one.

Let me ask another question of Mr. Galbraith. I will say that there is a great similarity, I say again, in the rhetoric of SALT II and the rhetoric here.

Now, let us get to the business of the folks at home, what they believe about what the folks in Europe believe, based on the constant hammering by politicians and the news media that everybody in Europe loves us.

Now, when I hear or read a statement that everybody is on board in Europe, I get a little bit suspicious, because that is sort of like the little old lady from Chapel Hill who says that everybody from North Carolina hates you, me, you know. And in the next election they apparently did not hate me too bad.

But I asked my staff to find out what is being said in the European press. And nobody has alluded to that. Especially in the French newspapers.

Now, let me just ask you, what does that headline say?

Mr. GALBRAITH. "Europe Naked."

Senator HELMS. Right. Yet we hear, oh, everybody is on board. Do not worry about this treaty. The Europeans love it. They know it is all for them. And all that good stuff.

Now, I understand, Mr. Ambassador, and I think you said this in your statement, you have talked to a great many leading French military and political figures about this treaty and found that they are opposed to it.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Oh, there is no question about it. They regard the treaty as leading to the demilitarization of Germany. And the prospect of seeing a demilitarized Germany between them and the Soviet Union is appalling.

They want Germany to remain capable as a military force, and they think this treaty will erode the will of those people to maintain a military force. The Germans do not have nuclear weapons of their own. They never will.

The French do, so their attitude is different. The Germans have to depend on somebody else. Up until today, up until recently, they have depended on the American strategic nuclear umbrella. But today they no longer believe in it.

The issue of this treaty is not who has got how many weapons to blow up this or that. The question is, to what degree this treaty is going to adversely or reinforce the will of the Europeans to continue to maintain a military capability that is able to deter the Soviet Union.

And I submit that this treaty is going to erode that will, and it is going to, in a high stakes, high-risk deal, cause Europe to move toward neutralism. And this is exactly what the Soviet Union has been trying to do since the end of the war.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, please let Richard Burt have a comment.

Ambassador BURT. I appreciate that, Senator, because this is one of these classic examples where I have the opportunity to fundamentally disagree with my friend, Van Galbraith. And I will be very blunt.

I can think of nothing that would lead more forcefully to Europeans rethinking their security ties to the United States than a failure on our part to follow through on the commitment that we all made collectively 7 years ago to seek the total elimination of these weapons.

And let me explain why, just very briefly. Unlike the French, the Germans, the Dutch, the Belgians, the British, and the Italians took an enormous risk 4 years ago, in the face of hundreds and thousands of protesters in the streets, and you remember seeing that, I assume, on newsreels at the time, took the political risk of deploying those weapons against leftwing opposition in the streets.

They were able to take that risk by making a commitment to their people. They told their people that they trusted Ronald Reagan, and they trusted the United States. They said that the Americans have given us a pledge that they want us to deploy so that their negotiators in Geneva will have the necessary strength to achieve the elimination of these weapons.

Now, I would not want to ask those brave leaders, Mrs. Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, and others, to now tell their people that it was all a con game.

That we were never really interested and serious in achieving an arms control agreement, that having achieved the very result we promised 7 years ago, the elimination of these weapons, that we are not now going to enter or ratify an agreement.

Under those circumstances, just one more sentence, Mr. Senator, under those circumstances, how could we ask those governments and those people to trust us in the future to follow through on very important public commitments?

The **CHAIRMAN.** Thank you very much, indeed.

Ambassador Keel has joined us, I am very glad to say. Maybe he could come to the table. If he cares to make a very brief statement, fine. Otherwise, we will just continue the questioning, and Senator Sarbanes will be the next questioner.

Do you have a brief statement that you would care to make?

STATEMENT OF HON. ALTON G. KEEL, JR., U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Ambassador **KEEL.** I would, Mr. Chairman, like to make a very brief statement, if I may. If I could, I would enter the text into the record.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Your full statement will be entered into the record.

Ambassador **KEEL.** I would like simply first to thank you for this opportunity to testify before the committee, and, in particular, to talk about the alliance viewpoint, not only on the treaty, but also on the way ahead.

I think the most valuable contribution that I can make in my remarks is not on the details of the treaty, or even the background of the negotiations, or even the security benefits. You have had ample testimony on that.

The best contribution, it seems to me, that I can make is to try to convey to you a sense of what the allied governments do think about this treaty and also what the alliance sees as some of the challenges ahead.

Very briefly, there have been a number of people, Mr. Chairman, who have been willing to characterize European viewpoints. But, I must say that I do not have the luxury to speculate on what those positions are. I, as the U.S. Representative to NATO, sit in those councils on a daily basis. And, I talk with the official representatives of those allied governments formally and informally, officially and unofficially, in public sessions and in closed sessions.

I can tell you that unequivocally, the position of the allied governments is that this treaty is an alliance success story. And that this treaty is in our security interests. And, in fact, recognizing, as they do, the prerogatives of the Senate and our constitutional process, there is a clear view that, not only should the treaty be ratified, but that in must be ratified. In effect, a failure to do so would undermine all of the positive benefits and lessons that we have learned and accomplishments that we have achieved through this treaty and through the process.

This process, to a large degree, has discredited the so-called peace movements, and it has brought credit to this alliance and to those leaders who have exhibited the political courage to stand up for the decisions for this process.

Now, to somehow abandon it would do the opposite. It would discredit the alliance and, in fact, revive the disarmament movements.

This does not mean, Mr. Chairman, that the alliance and the allies do not realize there are some challenges ahead. There are clearly some challenges ahead, and we have to guard against a false sense of euphoria in the wake of the INF Treaty. We have to continue doing what we have done that has brought us this result. We have to continue to carry out those efforts that, in fact, assure us that our approach, now proven, of strength, realism, and dialog, will remain valid.

So, yes, we have to continue conventional force improvements and nuclear force improvements. We have to continue to show that we are willing to take advantage, where appropriate, to advance U.S. and alliance security interests through negotiations.

The alliance is, in fact, now busily engaged in a number of forums to assure that we carry out those necessary activities, recognizing, again, that there are some challenges ahead.

But I have no lack of confidence in our collective agreement, Mr. Chairman, to meet those challenges. And INF, far from weakening our position, strengthens our position in terms of our ability to meet those.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Keel may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Keel.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burt, you have been our Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany for how long now?

Ambassador BURT. Almost 2½ years, sir.

Senator SARBANES. In his statement, Ambassador Galbraith says, and I quote him: "The INF Treaty sets us on a slippery slope and we won't stop sliding until Germany is denuclearized, neutralized, and demilitarized. By ratifying this treaty you will destabilize Germany and Western Europe and threaten the existence of NATO."

That is a very dire scenario. Since you have been our Ambassador in Germany for the last 2½ years, I would like you to address Ambassador Galbraith's assertion.

Ambassador **BURT**. Senator, I think I would make three points.

The first point is I think that Ambassador Galbraith's description and others' descriptions of the situation in Germany and the security debate there is vastly exaggerated.

I think people have made a sort of cottage industry about wringing their hands about the Germans for nearly 40 years, and we forget the contribution that the Germans are prepared to make and do make to the alliance as a whole.

We forget that a country the size of the State of Oregon, with a population of 60 million people—that is a very densely populated country—not only fields a substantial army, in fact the biggest army in Central Europe—500,000 men—but hosts 400,000 foreign troops on its soil. Here we should not just focus on the American component, but the Canadian component, the British component, the Belgian, and the French components. It hosts several thousand nuclear warheads on its territory. It permits foreign forces to maneuver throughout the country as a whole. It permits seven different air forces to fly at very low levels over its territory.

The Germans are not going neutralist.

The Germans are prepared, and have shown over time that they are prepared, to contribute in very important ways not only to their own security, but to the security of the alliance as a whole.

Whether you are looking at the actual contribution that they make to the alliance or the opinion polls that are taken on a periodic basis in Germany, I think one has to conclude that there is a stronger consensus now, in the Federal Republic of Germany, that that country belongs in the West, it belongs in the alliance, and that its key security partner is the United States, than at any time in the last 20 years.

One of the reasons, Senator, in my view that this is the case is what Ambassador Keel just told you—that the INF story, for the Germans, is a success story. It is important to recognize that this INF issue has, from its inception, been a German security issue.

We would never have taken the December 1979, decision to deploy and seek an arms control agreement in the absence of Helmut Schmidt's speech back in 1977, where he expressed concern about the SS-20. The very fact that we ended up deploying missiles not only on German territory, but other countries, had to do with the desire of the Germans not to be singularized, but to be part of a broader process.

The key turning point in my view in this whole issue was the courage demonstrated by the Germans in 1983 to begin deployments. I must say that when people talk about "Munichs" and somehow describe this agreement as a "sell-out," that is an affront to the courageous leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany and other European leaders, who were willing to deploy in order to achieve an agreement.

So, there is no whiff of cowardice here. What, in fact, we see is political courage.

I think talking about neutralism, denuclearization, is an affront to governments and an ally that has been prepared, time after time, to make very real sacrifices in a situation which is really unique. We should never forget—and I will conclude here, Senator—we should never forget that the Federal Republic of Germany is a divided country. As a result, it faces very special pressures that I think sometimes we forget across the Atlantic.

It is the most exposed NATO ally, and geographically and militarily it faces a very real military threat.

Third, unlike the British and French, they don't have their own nuclear deterrent. So, they face a very unique security situation, and their capacity, I think, over time, to sustain support for NATO and a close security tie to the United States is, to me, a very real accomplishment.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Could I make one comment on this particular point? I promise not to be as lengthy.

Senator SARBANES. Well, let me put a question to you, and maybe in the course of responding to that question, you can encompass your comment. Then it is a question that I want the others also to pick up on.

My question, first to you, Ambassador Galbraith, and then to the other two panelists, is what is the scenario you envision unfolding if this treaty were to be rejected?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is an election issue coming up—what is it, Rick, in 3 years, 2 years, the federal elections in Germany?

Ambassador Burt. In 1990.

Mr. GALBRAITH. In 1990. I think, as the scenario will unfold as a buildup to that election, primarily, there will be an active role for the Greens to promote further denuclearization: there will be an active effort by the SPD's foreign policy platform to promote further denuclearization. It will ride on the euphoria.

We have been warned against euphoria here today.

Senator SARBANES. Which euphoria?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Euphoria.

Senator SARBANES. Of what?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is a kind of sense that the euphoria created by this treaty——

Senator SARBANES. No, no.

The premise of my question was that the treaty were not ratified.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Oh, if it were not ratified?

Senator SARBANES. Yes, that is the premise of the question.

The question I put to you——

Mr. GALBRAITH. I'm sorry.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Was what scenario you see unfolding if this treaty were not ratified, if this treaty were rejected.

Mr. GALBRAITH. There will be a substantial outburst by the Soviet Union that we did not follow through with our agreement. This theme will be picked up by the neutralist groups within Germany.

I am not suggesting that the reaction to not ratifying is going to be tranquil. There will be a negative series of charges against the United States.

But the point I am trying to make——

Senator SARBANES. Do you think we would be able to deploy the remaining weapon systems that are scheduled for deployment under the current NATO arrangements, which were planned before the treaty was reached?

Mr. GALBRAITH. We don't need further deployment of the Pershings. They are deployed.

Senator SARBANES. And how about the other weapon systems? Do you think they would be deployed?

Mr. GALBRAITH. There is some deployment, and some in the Netherlands and Belgium that have to be continued on.

It may not be.

Senator SARBANES. I see.

Mr. GALBRAITH. But the point is more in Germany and keeping what we do have.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the existing deployments would stay there?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think we have a chance, whereas if we go ahead and eliminate those missiles voluntarily, as a result of this treaty, then I believe we put ourselves in an irrevocable position and we'll never get those weapons back.

If, for some reason, the Soviets decide to go ahead and reveal that they have extra SS-20's, if they violate the treaty and we attempt to reassert the status quo, those missiles will never be redeployed.

I think the best thing to do is to keep the missiles there and try, through telling the world the truth, that it is in the best interest of Western security to maintain them because they deter the Soviet Union.

Senator SARBANES. Ambassador Burt.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I would like to pick up on the comment that you asked about in terms of Ambassador Burt's point, and he focuses on the courage of the political leaders at the time of deployment.

I think it is true. It was courageous in the sense of the definition of "courage" of going against your political constituents. But there is one thing different this time.

The United States is in favor of getting rid of the missiles; that is, we are going along with the public stream. At that time, we were fighting the public stream.

We gave a reinforced posture to the incumbent leaders of Germany and the other countries, the sort of push that was necessary for them to express their political will. This time they no longer have the United States to support them against public opinion. In fact, it is just the opposite.

So, the scenario now is much more difficult for those political leaders. They cannot sit there and fight public opinion by themselves, without the United States aiding them.

So, they are going along with the tide, just like the British people did——

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would interrupt here to say that we are trying to limit each Senator, so that we can absorb your wisdom, to 10 minutes. I know there are two more brief replies forthcoming.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Anyway, I will just terminate by saying that I think today the public opinion is clearly for getting rid of the missiles and is clearly in favor of some rapprochement with the Soviet Union, just like British public opinion was in favor of Chamberlain going and making a deal with Hitler.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I would like it to be possible for the committee to have the benefit of a brief response from Ambassador Burt and Ambassador Keel on the question of what the scenario would be if, in fact, the treaty were rejected.

Ambassador BURT. Senator, I will be very brief and just discuss Germany, and then perhaps Ambassador Keel can address the other allies.

First of all, on the issue of what would happen to the missiles, I think, first of all, it would not be possible to continue any new steps in the Federal Republic involving the missiles. And there are a number of things that we would want to do if we were not going to eliminate those systems.

So, any new steps would not be possible.

I think it would be highly unlikely that we could keep the existing deployments in the Federal Republic of Germany.

I would not want to be too definitive on it, but it would be very, very difficult, indeed, for any German government to explain, after they had the opportunity to achieve what they, for 7 years, had been telling their people they wanted to achieve, why those missiles should stay.

So, the net result would be a Soviet SS-20 monopoly. Our INF systems would be gone, and the Soviets would clearly maintain their deployments.

More broadly, though, and as I said in my statement very briefly, more broadly, I think there would be some very serious damage to the United States-German security relationship. In other words, the problem in INF would spill over into other areas.

We would come under greater pressure on the whole question of chemical weapons. We are facing some very difficult decisions over the coming decade on other nuclear modernization questions, short-range nuclear weapons. It would be more difficult, I think, to maintain a United States nuclear presence in Germany, and I am afraid, without sounding as though I am intervening in internal affairs, but that group of people in the Federal Republic of Germany, who would like to see a loosening or a distancing of the Federal Republic with the United States, who would like to see the ties that we have successfully built up over the years severed, that group would be stronger and they would have more leverage, and the traditional friends of the United States would be undercut.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador KEEL. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief.

Let me tell you what the allies tell me, Senator, in response to that question in terms of, more broadly, what would be the consequences of either abandoning or rejecting this treaty.

The first thing they point out is, whereas the INF Treaty, the process, has been unifying for this alliance and has brought about and demonstrated political solidarity, a rejection would provoke disunity, and, in fact, discord; that the governments would feel betrayed and their people would feel betrayed.

Second, instead of vindicating our approach of strength, realism, and dialog, it would discredit that approach, and it would revive the unilateral disarmament movements in Europe.

Third, it would, as a minimum, badly shake the confidence in U.S. leadership. They recognize that U.S. leadership is a joint venture with our system of both executive branch and legislative branch. It would shake their confidence in United States leadership as a Western leader in dealing effectively with the Soviets and, being the leader in showing the way to advance Western security objectives.

Finally then, their view is that, as a minimum, it would certainly put at risk any further deployments, and in fact call into question the resolve of allied governments to even keep the missiles that are now in place.

That is what they tell me in response to that question, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

We will now go into a business session for a moment.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee proceeded with a business meeting.]

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the committee resumed its hearing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As witnesses have pointed out, there is a profound disagreement on what the rejection of this treaty might mean militarily for the alliance or, for the politics of Germany and NATO. I want to continue to pursue that issue for a moment.

We had testimony yesterday from the former Defense Secretaries that essentially the SS-20's provided the Soviet Union with a monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear weapons for a long period of time, and that it was the courage of the NATO allies, starting with the two-track decision in 1979, and then deployments in 1983 and subsequently which began to mitigate the military and political import of that monopoly. And, finally, of course, we have arrived at the consummation of this treaty which would eliminate that monopoly at apparently some advantage to ourselves.

Now there clearly is disagreement as to the advantages and disadvantages of this treaty. Ambassador Galbraith has pointed to the verification problems, as he perceives them. Clearly these are problems that have to be addressed by this committee and clearly by those enforcing the treaty.

What disturbs me is the prospect, as Ambassador Burt has testified, that in the event we should reject the treaty, ultimately we will revert to a condition in which the Soviets possess the monopoly they had before the whole negotiating exercise commenced.

In short, through rejection of this treaty and the resulting devastation of morale in NATO, as well as the political consequences to European leaders with whom we have worked, it may become impossible not only to complete the deployments called for in the 1979 decision, but, in fact, the Pershing II's and GhCM's already deployed may not be allowed to remain in place. This might occur, given the fact that our allies are democracies. One may argue that the people in these allied countries are wrong, that their leaders are misguided, that sound policy is being undermined by popular opinion. But, in due course, popular opinion brings about changes of leadership and changes of policy.

If Ambassador Burt's analysis is correct, rejection of the treaty could leave us with a Soviet monopoly of SS-20's, to be met by a disorganized and dispirited NATO alliance.

I simply want a comment from Ambassador Galbraith, as to why this scenario is untrue.

In other words, what leads you to believe that the outcome of rejection of this treaty would not be, in fact, a continuation of the Soviet monopoly of SS-20's for some time to come?

Mr. GALBRAITH. The SS-20 was succeeded by the SS-24 and SS-25. Those weapons were developed subsequently to the SS-20, and once the SS-20 is eliminated, the mission of the SS-20 will be picked up by those weapons and the other Soviet weapons, the mission being, namely, to intimidate and terrorize Western Europe into some sort of accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Losing the SS-20 does nothing for the Soviet Union in terms of its primary mission, that is, intimidation.

We clearly, by definition, are going to get rid of the Pershings if the treaty is ratified and we find ourselves without the Pershings, subject to the same intimidation that was upon us by the SS-20's.

So, we have lost our deterrent and gained nothing in terms of lessening the Soviet effort on the main issue in this whole arena; namely, what is the effect on Europe to resist the Soviet Union.

So, the SS-20, as such, does not make that much difference.

If we do not ratify the treaty, we at least have a chance. I cannot sit here and tell you that we will be able to maintain the Pershing in Germany or the GLCM's in other countries in the teeth of public opinion the way it is. I don't know.

But at least we have a chance.

But if you ratify this treaty, we have no chance at all. The Pershings are gone, the GLCM's are gone, and the Soviet Union still has an array of weapons that are sufficient able, not only from a military point of view, but I don't think that is the point, but primarily from a psychological point of view they can continue their browbeating and intimidating of Western Europe.

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador Burt, do you have a comment?

Ambassador BURT. I think I would really like to make just two points on this argument.

I don't really think you can argue in 1988 that the removal of the elimination of the 1,600 warheads, Soviet warheads, in the INF category—I won't say "warheads," Senator, I will say "weapon systems"—that is, the SS-20 and the SS-22's or SS-12's and SS-23's, is militarily meaningless.

It would be very inconsistent for us as an alliance to spend 10 years focusing on the problem, the perceived problem created for us and our security by the Soviet SS-20 and then turn around and say it doesn't really matter.

It does matter.

The SS-20, the SS-23 and the SS-12 are tailormade weapon systems for fighting a conflict in Europe. They are intermediate range nuclear forces, and it is just not good enough to say that other systems, like the SS-24 and SS-25 could play those roles, because they cannot.

The SS-24's and SS-25's are intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Mr. GALBRAITH. They can be targeted at Europe.

Ambassador BURT. That's correct. They can be targeted against Europe. But if you target them against Europe, that means you cannot target them against the United States.

In other words, the problem with the SS-20—and I want to clear about this because I spent many, many years worrying about it—is that the SS-20 was clearly designed in a period of overall United States-Soviet strategic parity and Soviet conventional superiority, it was clearly designed to achieve superiority in a specific category of weaponry, in the intermediate category of weaponry, and thus, threaten to decouple the security of Europe from the United States.

That is why the SS-20 was very much, in my view, a political instrument that the Soviets had deployed in an effort to decouple Europe from the United States.

We have dealt successfully with that specific threat. This does not mean that we have dealt successfully with every Soviet threat. After this agreement, we will have to confront the problem of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe. We will have to continue to confront the problem of the Soviet central strategic buildup.

But I think that dealing with this one specific area is a real achievement and should be seen as such.

Senator LUGAR. The Secretary of Defense testified that there will be a considerable number of nuclear weapons left committed to Europe on the NATO side after implementation of this treaty, in addition to the independent nuclear forces of France and Great Britain.

Picking up on Ambassador Galbraith's thought, the Soviets might retarget their strategic nuclear weapon systems on Europe. Yet the comment has been made to this panel that the United States has already committed SLBM's to NATO that would not have to be retargeted and which will remain after the Pershings and the Cruise missiles are denied us under this treaty.

What is your overall view of that?

After all, both sides apparently have retargeting abilities, but we will retain some missiles committed to Europe after this treaty, that apparently are dedicated to support of the alliance.

Do you have a comment on that, sir?

Mr. GALBRAITH. First of all, those nuclear weapons are under fire today. There are discussions going on in Germany, and the Foreign Minister of Germany, Gennscher, has expressed a willingness to talk about getting rid of those weapons. Then, if that happens, this is the so-called triple zero. If those weapons go, then we are in the point down that slippery slope that I was referring to.

Senator LUGAR. I am not talking about the short-range systems under 500 kilometers, but, rather, those at sea- or air-launched systems.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think the point that is essential here, apart from what happens in the future negotiations on these weapons, is this. The Soviet Union wanted to get rid of the Pershing II. That is the key instrument that they feel has given Europe, for the first time, a nuclear, an American nuclear umbrella; the first time since several years ago that the Europeans became convinced that the American traditional nuclear umbrella, manned by strategic weapons, had disappeared.

The Europeans no longer believed that we would use our strategic weapons solely for the purpose of defending Western Europe.

So that is when this deterioration set in—not believing in the traditional American nuclear umbrella caused the growth of the appeasement movement in Western Europe.

Now, when the Pershings were planted, that stopped that "rot," if you will, and the Pershings played an enormous role in reinforcing our allies in terms of being able to maintain a military posture against the Soviet Union.

You pull that weapon out and the Soviets will have achieved a major victory. They will have gotten rid of the single weapon that bothered them the most in their path toward dominating Western Europe without firing a shot.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Did you have a comment on that, Ambassador Burt?

Ambassador BURT. Well, I want to be brief, but I would just say that I agree with Van Galbraith in a certain sense, that the Soviets were extremely worried about the Pershing II, and we understood that. That is why, as an alliance, we knew we had to deploy a weapon system like the Pershing II, to achieve our goals, announced in 1981, of eliminating the SS-20 threat.

We believed that unless we deployed systems like the Pershing II and the ground-launched Cruise missile that we would not be able to cope with the SS-20 threat. So, that is very much the logic of the decision.

But you have to view the deployment of the Pershing II and the ground-launched Cruise missile as part of a double-track concept. We would never, ever have been able to deploy those missiles in Europe in the first place had we not been prepared to seek an arms control agreement, limiting and possibly eliminating, those weapons. That was the whole understanding in the first place.

Senator SARBANES. Would the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Senator CRANSTON. Certainly.

I yield to Paul Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Do you agree with the assertion that the Europeans are convinced that the United States would not use its strategic force to defend Europe?

Ambassador BURT. Absolutely not.

Senator SARBANES. I am very concerned about the acceptance of that proposition.

Now, to the extent it is asserted by Americans, and particularly by Americans in positions of responsibility, it only increases the likelihood that the Europeans will, in fact, believe it.

But even under the structure of flexible response, as I have understood it, our position has always been that strategic force would be used, if necessary, for the defense of Europe.

Assertions to the contrary, when made by Americans, I find very worrying.

Ambassador BURT. Senator, I think there is a problem of responsibility. There is also a problem of logic.

I remember very clearly that, when we were at the point of deploying the INF systems in Europe, the Soviet Union made a statement saying that if their homeland were ever struck with United States INF systems, their response would be retaliation against the

American homeland. This I think underlines a very important point.

I think, from the Soviet perspective, whether or not they are struck by a land-based ICBM, a submarine-launched ballistic missile, or a European-based mobile missile, if it strikes their homeland, it is going to be a strategic attack.

I don't understand how, logically, on the one hand you can argue that our strategic forces are no longer credible in providing protection for the Europeans while, on the other hand, systems based in Europe are.

Why is a United States President going to be more likely to launch a system based in Europe against a target in the Soviet Union than a system based at sea?

So, I think the logical point is that our deterrence is based on having a mix of capabilities—conventional, nuclear, some in Europe, and strategic. It is based on the problem that the Soviet Union must face in using force against our allies—the real possibility that that use of force could lead to escalation, leading to a central strategic exchange.

I must say that I agree very much with you. I know that there have been for many years intellectuals, particularly in France, and Charles de Gaulle, in the 1960's, of course, said that an American President would never trade New York for Paris or for Hamburg. But the fact is that the French have their own nuclear capability, so they do not have to rely on the American strategic guarantee.

But that is not the case for other European allies, particularly nonnuclear ones, like the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is very important for me that, in addressing this issue, we do not create a self-fulfilling prophesy and bad mouth our strategy of flexible response.

Senator SARBANES. I have imposed on Senator Cranston's time and I very much appreciate his generosity.

Senator CRANSTON. That's quite all right.

Ambassador Galbraith, you said in your opening statement regarding the INF Treaty, "I state categorically that verification is impossible."

I cannot, we cannot get into classified details of how we verify the absence or presence of SS-20's in an open session of this committee.

I have studied this issue, as have others on the committee. I am a member of the Intelligence Committee, so I have felt it particularly important that I focus on this matter.

We will have a bipartisan report on verification to this committee and to the Senate from the Intelligence Committee.

The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, five former Secretaries of Defense, the head of the CIA all say that we can detect any militarily significant violation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our Commanding General in NATO support the treaty.

I simply want to say that I will stick with that lineup against a former Ambassador who, in effect, likens Ronald Reagan, who made him an Ambassador, to Neville Chamberlain, the notorious appeaser.

Pershing II is not the "key deterrent." Its loss is not devastating.

As Ambassador Burt put it, diplomatically, former Ambassador Galbraith's charges are "vastly exaggerated."

After the Pershing II is gone, we have ICBM's, we have FB-111's, we have NATO subs in the Mediterranean, we have SLBM's worldwide, and a lot more.

Ambassador Galbraith, you say on page 5 of your testimony, "The answer is not by relying on the word of tyrants."

Now, we do not rely on the word of tyrants. We do not rely on the words of the Soviets. We verify.

I know of no one advocating that we rely on the words of the Soviet Union—not the President, not the Vice President, not the Secretary of Defense, not the Joint Chiefs, no Member of this Senate has suggested that we rely on the word of the Soviet Union.

Can you name any American leader who has suggested that we rely on the words of the Soviet Union?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, Senator, the fact is, and I think this will come out in your deliberations if you cross-examine the various members of the intelligence community, we do not know how many SS-20's there are.

Senator CRANSTON. You are not answering my question. I asked you a specific question.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I am leading up to that.

Senator CRANSTON. Let me repeat my question.

Can you name any responsible American leader, or any American leader, who has said we should just rely on the word of tyrants, or, in effect, rely on the word of the Soviet Union? Please answer that question.

Mr. GALBRAITH. In connection with this treaty, we have had a discussion with the Soviet Union on how many SS-20's will be covered by this treaty.

Senator CRANSTON. Of course we have.

Mr. GALBRAITH. The figure that is finally arrived at depends on Soviet data that has been submitted to us.

We had a number which was different than the Soviets', and as I understand it, it was even smaller. We, in effect, are relying on Soviet data for this particular treaty, and I would put the Soviet Union in the category of the tyrants that I was talking about in connection with my testimony.

So, I have given you an example, Senator, of where today we are relying on the word of tyrants.

Senator CRANSTON. That response states how little the witness knows about verification.

We, of course exchange data——

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, I would——

Senator CRANSTON. Let me finish my comment. I did not interrupt your opening statement. I just want to state that we, of course, exchange data. We give the Soviet Union data; they give us data. But they don't rely on our data and we don't rely on their data.

We have various means for checking up on the data—many, many different means of checking up on the data. So, no one is relying on Soviet statements, and the witness is unable to name anyone who has suggested we rely on Soviet statements.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. **Galbraith**. Well, I don't agree with the characterization of what you have just said, Senator.

I think the United States, in entering this treaty, is relying on the good faith of the Soviet Union to conduct themselves in accordance with its terms, and I think it is unwarranted, given the history of Soviet activities, to do so.

Senator **Cranston**. If that were the view of the Joint Chiefs, that we were simply relying on Soviet statements, I don't think they would be supporting this treaty.

Mr. **Galbraith**. Well, the fact is we don't know how many weapons there are, and I would be interested, when you have your deliberations with the intelligence community, if you could impart back to the public exactly how many SS-20's there are, and you will see when you look into this that there is a difference in terms of what the DIA came up with and what the CIA came up with. Secretary Weinberger and others alluded to that yesterday in the testimony. There is no question about the fact there is a difference of opinion amongst the intelligence community as to how many SS-20's are produced and the reason why there is that difference is simply because we don't have enough hard intelligence and people have to make assumptions about certain key elements in deciding how many there are, and people make different assumptions. So, we come up with different numbers, and we just don't know unless we rely on what the Soviets tell us.

Senator **Cranston**. Those assumptions are not based—and we do make some assumptions—but they are not based, by any means, totally or significantly, on data supplied to us by the Soviet Union. They are based upon a number of other intelligence gathering capacities that our country possesses.

Mr. **Galbraith**. Well, I wish you would make clear——

Senator **Cranston**. Let me finish my statement, please.

Mr. **Galbraith**. I'm sorry, Senator.

Senator **Cranston**. We have many different ways of learning what we need to know about what the Soviets have, possess, produce, deploy, and so forth, and, finally, we have had testimony that knowing the absolutely precise number of SS-20's that the Soviets have is militarily insignificant.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Mr. **Galbraith**. Could I make just one request—that after your deliberations, I wish you would announce publicly how many SS-20's there probably have been produced by the Soviet Union.

The **Chairman**. My own view is that nobody knows and nobody will know.

Mr. **Galbraith**. That's my point. I agree Senator.

Senator **Helms**. Exactly.

The **Chairman**. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for missing the opening statements.

Ambassador **Burt**. I thought you had a comment at the end of yours which is worth repeating, in that the debate on which the Senate is now embarked is not simply about the INF Treaty, but it goes beyond that to overall U.S. commitment to Europe.

I think this is a good opportunity to discuss that, and I think the points you make are very positive points.

I would like you, or Ambassador Keel or Ambassador Galbraith, to comment on the fact of your perception of whether the Western Europeans view the Soviet threat differently from the United States.

Are there differences there that we should be cognizant of as we analyze this?

Ambassador BURT. I think there are differences, and it is very difficult, Senator, to generalize. I think it is probably appropriate for me to focus on the Germans. They are obviously crucial here, but I want to defer to my colleague, Ambassador Keel, to discuss the alliance as a whole.

I think what I would emphasize is that the Germans are in a unique position. They rely on the United States to a remarkable degree for their security. They rely not only on this question of a nuclear commitment that we have been discussing today, our willingness to use and threaten to use nuclear weapons in their defense, but also they rely on a significant American troop presence.

Now, not surprisingly, given this tremendous American presence in a small, crowded, divided country, there is a debate about German security, and that debate inevitably leads to a debate about their ties with the United States.

There is a major desire on the one hand to see progress in East-West relations. On the other hand, there is a sober realization that they can only make this progress in close cooperation with the United States.

That has been, in my view, what the INF process has been all about. The double-track decision was an effort on the one hand to deal with a discrete military problem, which was the Soviet deployment of the SS-20, and on the other to seek an arms control solution to that problem.

The threat, in my view, of not ratifying this agreement would be the threat to the fabric of the German-American security cooperation. It would not be that the Germans would deemphasize the Soviet military threat, because I think the Germans have a very clear understanding of the Soviet military threat. The threat would be, instead, a feeling that they had lost a reliable partner in the United States and a tendency for some people on the left side of the political spectrum and on the conservative side of the German political spectrum to conclude that in the absence of American reliability, the Germans might have to seek some kind of alternative security arrangement with a superior military power to the East.

So, the sense of confidence and reliability on this question of INF, in my view, is terribly, terribly important. I will just emphasize again that it is not so much the feeling that there isn't a Soviet military threat; it is more a feeling of how do you deal with the threat. If you feel confident about your partnership with the Americans, you are prepared to take risks like INF deployment. But if you do not feel that confidence, then you have to look for alternative arrangements.

That is where, in the long term, the German-American relationship could be put at risk.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I think that is a very important point, Ambassador Burt, and I think when you speak of confidence and reliability, let me carry this then perhaps a step further, and maybe, Ambassador Keel, you would want to answer.

Can you explain how we coordinated, for instance, our negotiating position. Have we sought input from our NATO allies to the extent they feel comfortable?

Obviously, perhaps maybe even going a step further, there was some uncertainty after the Reykjavik summit that we had not shared some of these thoughts with our NATO allies

Ambassador **Keel**. Let me try to respond to that, Senator.

I think that it is valid, if one goes back to what I call Reykjavik I, which was the October Reykjavik summit. Since then, people have lost sight of the fact that there has been another Reykjavik event, and that was the June Reykjavik, where the alliance endorsed the double zero for INF.

But back in Reykjavik I, there were some anxieties, quite candidly, in Europe, as a consequence, and there were some concerns as to whether there had been sufficient consultations prior to that meeting. They were raised to me when I was in the White House. And they have been raised to me now as U.S. Ambassador to NATO.

But those concerns were not about INF. That's point 1. They were much broader concerns: They had to do with the possibility of an evolving American view of its own strategic security interests that might be separate and apart from European security interests. That was basically their concern.

Since that October Reykjavik, Reykjavik I, the U.S. administration certainly heard that message. An extraordinary amount has been done to address those European concerns that were raised, again, not INF-related.

In fact, the administration has made it very clear since that time that the American strategic interests are inextricably linked with European security interests and vice-versa.

If you look back on INF, in particular, I find the charge by some that INF has been negotiated over the heads of Europeans to be absurd.

Just in the last 2 years, there have been over 60 high-level consultations at NATO headquarters—that is the council in which the INF consensus was formed—including the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State on numerous occasions, the Secretary of Defense, our Geneva negotiators, Max Kampelman, Mike Glitman and Paul Nitze. There have been over 60 of those formal negotiations with the allies.

After all of what has happened since Reykjavik I, leading up to the June Reykjavik and the alliance endorsement of the double zero, what the allies have told me, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Vice President when he was over there recently, is—the words they use are—there has been an unprecedented commitment to consultations in the alliance.

So, what concerns they did have have been addressed, and they never have been related to INF and to the INF process.

Ambassador **Burt**. Senator, let me just add one very quick point, and that is——

Mr. **Galbraith**. I have not had a chance to respond yet.

Ambassador **Burt**. I'll be brief.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I would like Ambassador Burt to follow on.

Ambassador **Burt**. I just wanted to say not as Ambassador to Germany, but when I was Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Director for Politico-Military Affairs, I think Ambassador Keel is correct in his characterization of this unprecedented process. It really is a unique chapter of the history of the alliance.

Whatever one concludes about the treaty, as a process there has never been a more genuine effort on the part of the U.S. Government to bring its key allies into the actual decisionmaking effort on a highly complicated and sensitive subject.

As Assistant Secretary, I suffered from continual jet lag because I was as much in Brussels as I was in Washington. We created communications links from the very highest level of government down to some of the lowest, so that every key ally involved in this process, every key ally that was there, that was in on the takeoff in December 1979—and those are the members of the integrated military system, 14 countries at that time—every single one of them was aware of where we were going and had an opportunity to contribute in that process.

So, in a sense, one of the real benefits of this process, as far as I am concerned, is that we have created a network, a legacy of cooperation, which we can extend into new areas.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Ambassador Galbraith.

Mr. **Galbraith**. Senator, I will be very short.

You asked what the difference in attitude was toward the Soviet Union between the United States and our various European allies, and I think you have put your finger on a very important point.

The difference is, based upon those who have nuclear weapons and those who do not.

The French feel very secure because they know that they could, as they put it, "declencher la guerre nucleare." They could cause a nuclear war to take place, and they know the Soviets know that, thus the Soviets won't come against France.

They have the conviction, the French, that they could drag the United States, if you will, into a nuclear war. Thus, the Soviets will never attack France.

Now, Britain has the same capacity, if you will, to drag our strategic weapons into the war.

Germany does not, and they have to depend on something else. Thus, their attitude is different, and their attitude is based upon to what degree they have confidence in the fact that we, or France, or Germany, would use their weapons in order to solely defend Germany.

I am sorry to report, and it is so lamentable, but I just think that we are dealing with an illusion if we think the Europeans truly believe that we would use our strategic weapons to attack the Soviet Union solely in the defense of Western Europe, knowing that to do so would cause the destruction of large American cities and our people. I don't think there are many people in the United States today who would stand up with a straight face and tell you that we would use our weapons for that purpose.

In any case, whether we do or do not, the point is what do people fear. De Gaulle was convinced that you should not rely on the Americans. The British were convinced that you should not rely. It is not a question that we are cowards; it is a question of just protecting yourself for the future because you don't know what the attitude of a future President will be.

Now, the Germans could never build up that unilateral capability, if you will, of triggering off a war, so their attitude, Senator, toward the Soviet Union is different. I think that is why you see a difference in the forces of appeasement in Germany compared to almost none in France.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Senator Pressler would yield just a tiny bit of time for a followup.

Senator PRESSLER. I would yield.

Senator KASSEBAUM. You feel very strongly about this, Ambassador Galbraith.

When you were Ambassador to France—I think you were there at that time when President Reagan proposed the zero option—did you express this concern at that time to President Reagan?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I expressed the euphoria that we were going to get, that we had a shot at getting the Pershings deployed, because I could detect the erosion that had taken place, as manifested by the SPD's change and the strength, the growing strength, of the Greens.

To me, getting the Pershings deployed was a major victory. I think it is one of the major achievements of this administration. I only had a tiny little part in it in that I had the mission to urge the French to publicly support it.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Did you urge the President to reconsider the zero option?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I was opposed to the zero option and I so would state it. I did not tell the President face to face, but I put it down on a piece of paper, that I was opposed to it. It was put forward, as I looked upon it and as the French looked upon it, as a method of achieving something that we otherwise wanted independently of the SS-20 because of this underlying erosion problem that I was referring to.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

I appreciate your yielding to me, Senator Pressler.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to this committee.

Let me say that in my view, there really is no question of this treaty not being adopted by the Senate. I think the debate or the discussion will be on amendments or reservations or other conditions. In my judgment, there is no question that it is going to be approved. The train is moving.

The question is how many votes will there be for some amendments.

In that context, I would like to learn a little bit more about the French thinking on this. Of course, the French are the French. They are very independent.

I know about the things that De Gaulle said and so forth. But what is it that the French are trying to achieve? They do not seem to have groups like Chatham House, or people such as we have who go around making speeches on arms control.

What is the French national interest today in being so independent on nuclear weapons policies?

Mr. GALBRAITH. They are not great believers in arms control. They went through the 1920's and 1930's and saw arms control being a leading cause of the rise of Hitler and the ultimate defeat of France in 1940 and the abject position that England found itself in when it ultimately had to go to war to contain Hitler.

So, they have a living experience of how arms control failed and led to a war. So, they are convinced, and De Gaulle, who was an outspoken opponent of the laxist military effort during the 1930's, De Gaulle attempted to take steps which would cause this never to happen again, by making every effort, at great expense to the French nation, to build an independent nuclear force. They regard nuclear weapons as having maintained the peace and freedom through the period since the end of the war.

They are proud of their nuclear weapon system. They are convinced they can keep the Soviets at bay. The only thing that bothers them today, and they are very nervous about it, is because of this treaty and because perhaps of other treaties, they may have to replace the United States as the nuclear guarantor of Western Europe, and that is what France is moving toward in its rapprochement, its military rapprochement, with Germany. It is an enormous responsibility for a French president, a French prime minister, to tell the French people that from this day forward, we have the responsibility not only for defending France in its vital interests, but we have decided that we must defend Germany; and if we do not do so, Germany will become a neutralized force; that it is better in our interest, French people, to put the nuclear weapons at the eastern frontier of Germany.

This is the issue that is moving forward today.

I have talked to a number of French leaders about it. The prime minister said recently, in terms of whether or not France will guarantee Germany, he said, "Ca finira comme ca"; that is to say, it will finish in that way.

The question then is will the Germans accept France as a credible deterrent? I think they have lost faith, many people in Europe, as I said earlier, in our ability to deter with our nuclear weapons, and the question is will the Germans believe that the French will also be capable of defending Germany, and will the Soviets believe that they are so capable.

Senator PRESSLER. What about that?

I would ask Ambassador Burt, what is the current German thinking in terms of France's independent approach to this, and do they depend on the French for part of their protection? Will they say that?

Ambassador BURT. Well, no, they won't, because the German Government has been very clear in briefing me on their discussions with Paris on security cooperation, that there is no intention nor is there any desire for France to replace the United States as a nuclear guarantor.

I am also told, and I have seen public statements by senior French officials, that there is no desire on the part of the French to supplant the United States, the American role, in the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany.

So, I do not really accept Van Galbraith's conceptual framework here. I suppose closer Franco-German security cooperation. I think that there are benefits arising out of that.

I might say in my own view—and I will probably get into trouble for saying this—I support it not so much because it is going to stop this drift toward German neutrality, which I do not see; I support it more because it is a de facto way of finally bringing the French a little bit back into the alliance, as a whole. I think the French do have a broader role to play.

But I don't see this process as in any way detracting from the German-American security relationship. They both can coexist and play a very constructive role.

Senator **Pressler**. Yes.

Ambassador **Keel**. Senator, maybe I can just make a very brief comment here, too.

I also find myself unable to support Ambassador Galbraith's premise here. I do not think the French have any objectives at all of providing a nuclear deterrent to Germany or being a substitute either for the United States or for the alliance.

In fact, quite the contrary, and they have said so publicly. This is not a matter of my speculation.

They have also said so in the councils of the alliance. So has the Federal Republic of Germany, substantiating just what Ambassador Burt has said.

Certainly the French are a very proud country and people, and they like to be independent, and certainly they like to view themselves as having an independent security. They like to view themselves as being a leader in Europe, and especially on security issues.

But, even the French have said publicly recently that, while they are the ultimate guarantor of their security, the ultimate guarantor of their survival is a United States, an American nuclear deterrent. They have said that publicly. So, it is not a matter of speculation.

Senator **Pressler**. Moving to conventional forces and comparing France's attitude and Germany's, first of all, I believe very strongly in the arms control process, but I have been very disappointed that the conventional forces were not included in this treaty. I know that you can debate that for a long time; it is a different subject; there are more countries involved, et cetera.

But, aside from all that, what are the basic fears of Germany and France in terms of the conventional imbalance? I know that such a thing as a Russian ground invasion seems far afield at this point in time. But specifically—and we'll start with France, which is further away, and then go to Germany—without the conventional force thing being addressed in an amendment and with the possibility of a START agreement being reached without dealing with conventional forces, how would you assess this situation?

Mr. **Galbraith**. First, let me say that I would like to be clear on the point that I don't believe the French want to replace the

United States as the nuclear guarantor of Europe. I was simply alluding to the fact that, as a result of this treaty and other losses of nuclear weapons, they may be obliged to do that, and I think that if they are confronted with that obligation, I think they will assume the responsibility. I hope they do. It is one of the hopes that I have, to be able to maintain freedom and peace in Western Europe.

Now, going on to the conventional question, the French feel basically that the Soviet Union conventional forces cannot be stopped unless there is a true possibility that the Soviets will trigger a nuclear response.

So, they regard the nuclear weapon as the key deterrent to a conventional Soviet attack.

The French would be in the forefront of trying to work out some reduction in forces of conventional weapons of the Soviet Union. But I don't think there is anybody in France who is involved with military affairs who believes the Soviet Union is going to accommodate us on this issue, because France looks upon the threat as largely the one that I alluded to; namely that the Soviet Union will use all its military capability, including its conventional forces, to intimidate Western Germany into neutralization.

So, they look upon the conventional forces, the preponderance, the overwhelming firepower of the Red Army, as being a device by which the Soviet Union is attempting to dominate Western Europe without actually engaging in a war, and they are convinced that they are vulnerable in Germany because they do not have their own nuclear weapons, and that, if it is necessary, France would hope that they would have the resolve to become the supplier of the nuclear weapons that Germany will never have.

Senator PRESSLER. May I just hear Ambassador Burt's reaction to that.

Ambassador BURT. Well, again, I just object to this notion that German neutralization lies right around the corner.

We should not get into invidious comparisons, but the fact is that, in absolute terms, the Germans spend more for defense than the French. They have deployed on their own some of the best, most modern, conventional arms in the world—the Leopard II tank, the Tornado strike aircraft. They have a conscription system. The Chancellor of Germany recently extended the length of the draft.

Ambassador Galbraith has mentioned the Greens Party. If you look at the Greens Party today, it is in disarray. In fact, one of their leading members is supportive of NATO membership.

As I have pointed out in my statement, the peace movement—and Ambassador Keel did as well—the peace movement, the unilateralist movement in Europe peaked, in my view, in the early 1980's.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Exactly. That stopped it.

Ambassador BURT. When we deployed, we broke their back.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Exactly. I agree with that. Now we are going to take it away.

Ambassador BURT. No. No, because we now make the argument with this agreement, like Churchill said, not Chamberlain, Churchill said that if you want to disarm, you must arm.

We can make that argument because it works.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Thank you for making my point.

Ambassador BURT. No.

We can demonstrate that, having deployed, we can reach an agreement. If we don't now go forward with that agreement, then—then—the unilateralists will come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, indeed.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me apologize to our witnesses. I was here earlier, but we have about four different things going on simultaneously, as is the case normally here, with hearings on Black Monday, and polygraph markups and the like. So, I apologize for coming in and out on you.

Let me just pick upon this last point.

Ambassador Burt, on page 4 of your testimony, in the second paragraph you say, "If there are risks associated from this treaty, they do not flow from its provisions. What risks there are flow from the wrong lessons that people essentially in Europe and in West Germany in particular might draw from the INF experience." And you go on to point out that they must understand public opinion, that is that public opinion in Western Europe must understand that we cannot afford to reduce defense spending in the face of what is still a very real and potent Soviet threat.

It seems that almost implicitly in your testimony, you are conscious of things that are going to have to be done in light of this agreement if it is ultimately to be successful and to avoid the scenario that Ambassador Galbraith has described.

Now, while the Greens may be somewhat in a disarray, the SPD, which is not that far afield, embraces its own"Ost-Politik," the notion of seeking accommodation with the East, rather than with the West, moving in that direction.

What specifically should our Government be doing other than praying that the SPD does not win an election, to avoid the possibility. We had, what was a very difficult battle on the Euromissile issue, and one that we prevailed upon, thank God, but, nonetheless, was a tight call and caused an awful lot of concerns. In the future we may have a call within the NATO alliance for a significant increase in defense spending to deal with the Soviet threat—to use the Churchillian line, "to disarm you must arm". What should we be doing, in other words, to keep the cohesion with our German ally?

Ambassador BURT. What I think we should be doing is getting across the right lesson of this process.

Now, that lesson is that the only way we were successful in achieving this outcome, an outcome that every single NATO government endorsed in 1981, the only way we achieved that was by following through with deployment, and that looking ahead in the area of conventional forces, chemical weapons, or any follow-on nuclear negotiations, the only way we can achieve progress in those negotiations is by giving the Soviets incentives to negotiate.

Now, there are two wrong lessons. One I think is going to be a lesson drawn by people on the right, which is we don't need to negotiate; all we need to do is deploy.

But my fear is that, having made this case, having proven the unilateralists wrong—and they all said, by the way, they all said Reagan isn't interested in an agreement, don't you see what's happening here? We're only deploying these missiles and we'll never get an agreement.

Well, we proved those unilateralists wrong.

So, we have to preserve, I think this concept of defense and negotiation as we move ahead.

On the other hand, with the left, we have to avoid—and I think Ambassador Keel was correct—we have to avoid the sense that this agreement represents a fundamental turning point within the alliance, that we have achieved it because somehow Mikhail Gorbachev's military doctrine has changed or somehow there is no longer a military threat, or that we can now, following this agreement, relax.

What it means is that we have to walk a tightrope. And we can do it. We did it.

We did it very successfully over the last 7 years.

Mr. GALBRAITH. With the help of the U.S. Government.

Senator DODD. I want to ask one other question, and then I would like you both to respond to this.

Would you support this treaty, this INF Treaty, if the status quo were to be maintained?

In other words, can this treaty stand on its own, without a commitment for increased defense spending on the part of the Europeans, or a successful conclusion of START talks? Would this treaty, in other words, if nothing else were to happen, but basically maintaining the status quo, be a treaty that should be supported?

Ambassador BURT. Yes.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think it is a very important question.

First of all, the response as to what we should do, we certainly, above all, have to keep, Senator, what we now have. The missiles which have a shorter range, below the existing treaty, are very important deterrents because we can strike Soviet military bases that are close-in with those weapons.

This, to me, is the immediate threat; namely, the talks that are going on with the SPD, with the East Germans, Gennscher's apparent attitude, Schevardnadze's warning that we can't modernize and that we have to get rid of the existing weapons. I noticed, incidentally, that Shevardnadze received the Order of Lenin for what he has achieved in this treaty. I think somebody is wrong. They think it was an extraordinary act that he achieved.

So, we have to keep what we've got, and then I think we have to encourage the French to go forward with their existing modernization of nuclear weapons, which includes a tactical nuclear weapon, called the Hades, which can shoot across Germany, as opposed to their existing tactical weapons, which don't have enough force.

Perhaps those will become important deterrents, and all of the modernization that people talk about in terms of nonnuclear weapons. But the trouble with all of this is, to the extent that we do anything other than maintain the status quo, to the extent that we respond to the Ikle report or any of these other initiatives to modernize our weapons, it is going to cost a lot of money, and I think there is going to be a lot of resistance, not only here, but in

Europe, to spending that money. It is just a fact of life, right or wrong.

I do not believe that we should let the security of Europe hang on the thread of the existing short-range nuclear weapons. I think that is what we are doing by getting rid of this system, these systems.

We are relying, focusing, on a group of short-range weapons which, in my view, may well go as a result of the existing euphoria.

We have been told time and time again—I noticed the other day in the hearings that euphoria overall, that this is our enemy. I agree. The euphoria is taking place. There are people, as a result of saying President Reagan and Gorbachev are getting together, who feel today relaxed. They think that maybe we don't have to do these things anymore, we don't have to keep it up, because the Soviet Union has evolved, and that the President is acting as if he believes it.

So, I believe the ability of Europe and the United States to do some of the things that are necessary is problematical, and I think it is a terrible mistake to rely on the fact that we will be able to keep those few short-range nuclear weapons that we have because they are going to be under an enormous amount of pressure from the Soviets and the whole apparatus from the SPD, as you point out, to go.

I just think, to put us in that condition, wherein the next step will be achieved and, thus, Soviet domination will ultimately take place, is a terrible mistake, and we have no compensation for absorbing this risk. The risk-reward ratio is way out of order here because the SS-20, which we are getting in the deal, has, since all this deployment took place, been replaced effectively by more sophisticated weapons, the SS-24, the SS-25. They do the SS-20's work. So, when that is gone, we don't gain anything. And we have lost the Pershings.

So, the risk-reward is all wrong. I believe that your question about what we do now is most important, and I appreciate your having brought it up.

Senator DODD. Ambassador Keel.

Mr. KEEL. Senator, I guess I find myself on the other end of that argument as well, as I did previously.

I differ with Ambassador Galbraith and his response.

The INF Treaty clearly should and can stand on its own merits. This is not to say that we, as an alliance, and we, the United States, do not have some challenges ahead. This is for certain.

One of those is guarding against making some bad decisions.

Those challenges, though, for the most part have been there. The operative question is whether the INF Treaty and the INF process strengthens our hand in meeting those challenges or weakens it.

It is very clearly my view that it strengthens our hand, because it, in fact, demonstrates to our publics that our approach works. This approach that we have echoed over and over here today and that other witnesses have echoed, is an approach, simply put, of strength and dialog; that we can accomplish results that are in our security interests as long as we are willing to maintain and to exhibit the resolve to assure that we have an adequate military posture.

Then we can accomplish results at the negotiating table.

So, that lesson has been validated with the INF result. That public confidence, that public trust, has been rewarded.

That strengthens our hand in meeting the challenges ahead, in my opinion. It does not undermine it.

Senator DODD. Ambassador Burt.

Ambassador Burt. I would just say that I think it is very important in making these arguments that they have some factual basis. There have been a few assertions here that I simply do not accept.

I think it is fundamentally wrong to argue that U.S. deterrence in Europe is now based solely on the presence of some short-range nuclear systems in Europe.

Mr. GALBRAITH. That's an opinion, not a fact.

Ambassador BURT. Well, the fact is that this agreement, that after this agreement, we will have 4,000 nuclear weapons remaining in Europe and most of those weapons will not be short-range weapons. We will maintain significant stockpiles of air-delivered nuclear munitions on a range of different aircraft that can hit targets beyond the Federal Republic of Germany, deep into Eastern Europe, and, in fact, into the Soviet homeland.

Second, I think this retargeting issue really has to be addressed.

How can you argue on the one hand, as Van Galbraith argues, that the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25, which, as I pointed out before, are intercontinental range systems, have replaced the SS-20, and somehow not argue, then, on the other hand that we cannot do the same? We have a whole category of strategic weapons. Some of those weapons are now assigned to SACEUR. We have other systems, whether they are sea-launched Cruise missiles, air-launched Cruise missiles, land-based ICBM's, a whole range of sea-based ballistic systems, that can play that same role.

I think that we have to recognize that in taking 400 weapons out of Europe and keeping 4,000 there, and at the same time maintaining a U.S. troop presence of 300,000 troops, to argue that somehow the security or the deterrence in Europe hangs on the threat of short-range systems is a vast exaggeration.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator DODD. Can I go on, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. We have Senator Pressler waiting and I am waiting, too, and your time is up.

Senator DODD. Oh, I apologize. I did not see Senator Pressler. I will have to come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. I will yield to Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. I have just one last question that may sort of tie this together, and you may want to respond to it. It has to do with the organic relationship.

A week or so ago, Henry Kissinger, appearing on a local TV show—let me read the quote to you because it has to do with this notion of the organic relationship.

He said:

> The presence of the Pershings and the Cruise missiles in Europe established an organic relationship between the defense of Europe and the defense of the United States—that is, the Soviets cannot be sure if they attack Europe with conventional weapons that we would permit our weapons to be overrun without using them. Now

the defense depends on weapons that are not seen, that are far away, and where we are negotiating a 50-percent cut in them.

Mr. **Galbraith**. I would agree with that wholeheartedly. I think being on the ground is essential because that makes the Germans feel that the Soviets feel that we would use them, thus the Soviets won't come.

They are convinced that that weapon, the Soviets must assume that we would use that weapon in order to defend our own troops. The Germans and Europeans do not feel that the Soviets must assume that we would use our strategic weapons in order to defend Western Europe solely.

I think Henry Kissinger has made a fundamental distinction here, and that is one fundamental reason why this treaty is fatally flawed.

Senator **Dodd**. Why is that wrong, Ambassador Burt?

Ambassador **Burt**. Well, I think Henry Kissinger is correct in recognizing the need for the physical presence, Senator, of a substantial mix of nuclear capabilities on European territory.

My point is that there will remain a substantial number and mix of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe following the implementation of this treaty. We are not denuclearizing Europe.

We will continue to possess nuclear artillery. We will continue to possess nuclear arms, short-range systems, like the Lance. We will continue to possess a variety of air-launched munitions, which will be delivered, or could be delivered, by strike aircraft.

So, what Van Galbraith said—excuse me, what Henry said—that the Soviets could not rule out the possibility that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used in the event of a conflict in Europe will remain the case.

You cannot make the case, it seems to me, that we have only had nuclear deterrence in Europe since 1983 and the introduction of Cruise missiles and Pershing missiles. Of course we had nuclear deterrence in Europe before 1983.

In my view, what we have done with this agreement is we have essentially reestablished the status quo that existed in Europe prior to the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. And nobody, with the exception of Charles de Gaulle, was arguing that American deterrence was failing.

Mr. **Galbraith**. But I think Henry Kissinger would tell you that you cannot go back to the SPD, as it existed prior to the deployment of the SS-20's and the dual-track decision. It has moved in a direction that is way over into what we'll call the appeasement, peace camp, if you will, and to resurrect that is foolish.

I would just make one comment and take just a minute.

I don't think it is a question of what weapons we still have. It is really a question of what is the impact on Germany and Europe of the withdrawal of this Pershing, which they have regarded as a very key deterrent and which my esteemed colleague said a few minutes ago that it stopped the peace movement dead in its tracks.

I agree with that. It did stop it, and now we are getting rid of it. All the weapons that remain were there before this deterioration started to take place, before we deployed the Pershings.

So, the point is not what weapons are there today. The question is what is the impact on the Europeans when this Pershing is eliminated, and I say it is very negative and not worth the risk that we are running by doing it.

Senator **Dodd**. Ambassador Keel, did you have a comment?

Ambassador **Keel**. Just a brief comment, Senator.

I must say that I am surprised at the quote by Dr. Kissinger.

The organic bond clearly between us and the alliance is not manifest in any one weapon system or even material means. It is a common bond of common values, common beliefs, and common interests.

Manifestations of that bond clearly are the U.S. military presence, in terms of troops, and a balance of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe: And that has been the case, and was the case, before the 1979 decision.

What the SS-20 modernization decision on the part of the Soviets did was threaten to call the military balance in theater nuclear systems into question. Their attempt, frankly, was to raise questions about that military balance in the theater nuclear arena. The dual-track decision expresses that precisely, that the concern was the superiority of the Soviets in the theater nuclear balance.

So, our objective was, in fact, to thwart the Soviet objective of calling into question the balance, and not an attempt to establish an organic bond. That has been extant.

If one were to believe that the only thing that keeps the organic bond between us and the alliance is the Pershing, then one ought to oppose this treaty, if that is one's position. I do not believe that, and that was not our objective.

Senator **Dodd**. I want to be careful. I have cut into so much of my colleague's time, I am going to have to give him my time the next time around, which I will be glad to do as well.

Why don't I end here and if you want to comment further, maybe you can respond to Senator Pressler.

I thank my colleague from South Dakota, and I will in the next goaround defer and return those 10 minutes to you, my good colleague.

I appreciate the responses to those questions.

Senator **Pressler**. I just have one more question in general, and that is this. After this treaty goes into effect—and it will go into effect, I hope with some amendments—what will be the situation?

Ambassador Burt, you mentioned that there would be 4,000 nuclear warheads left in Europe. You indicated that most of them would not be short range, or which?

Ambassador **Burt**. Well, there is a mix, and I don't want to get into the numbers in too much detail. There is a mix of air-delivered munitions, missile-launched——

Mr. **Galbraith**. Mines.

Ambassador **Burt**. No, there are no more mines. They have been removed.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much. I have a question.

It is a question of perception. I am wondering if the European countries perceive the Soviet threat very differently from us. I am always a little shocked when I realize how little they contribute, compared to the United States. For example, in GNP, as you know better than I, we spend about 6.5 percent of our money on defense, and they spend about 3.5 percent on an average. And yet, they are closer to the Soviet threat.

Nobody talks about the Soviets occupying or dominating the United States. It is referred to sometimes as striving to occupy and dominate Europe. I am wondering what reason each of you would give for this and for the difference in perception, that those people in those countries, who are most immediately exposed to the danger, see it, from the viewpoint of expenditure, as about half as dangerous as we do.

Let us start with Mr. Galbraith, and then Mr. Burt and Mr. Keel.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, I think they operate within a political ceiling. There is a sense of perception of their own constituencies as to how much they are willing to spend.

As they feel that the people feel that the Soviet Union is less of a threat, then the willingness to spend money against that threat diminishes.

So, I believe that the low figure is due in part to the fact, particularly in Germany and in other countries that are not with nuclear weapons, I believe that the figure, in effect, represents a sort of public opinion that the Soviet Union is probably in the last analysis not the threat that requires any more than the type of expenditure that we are making.

France is a little different.

The CHAIRMAN. But don't we operate as a democracy, where we are rather guided by public opinion, and if public opinion assesses the threat as less, maybe it is less. Maybe you gentlemen assess it as more; but the fact of the matter is that they do assess it—and you confirmed that—at less.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I think it is true. We do have to be guided by public opinion. But there is such a thing as leadership. I think the leaders in a country have to go out and influence public opinion, especially when national security interests are being jeopardized.

I do not think that the public opinion is the test that leaders should ultimately turn to. We have to make a decision ourselves as to the nature of the Soviet threat and tell the people, as opposed to giving signals to the people that we can deal with the Soviet Union because they have become something other than a totalitarian, expansionist society.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Burt.

Ambassador BURT. Well, Senator, I think that part of the problem—and I think there is a problem; people call it the burdensharing problem—is politically rooted in European politics. In part, there is a very strong consensus for a welfare-state system, where the government is spending a great deal on providing services to the population. Part of it I think has to do with coalition politics in many European governments, which makes it difficult for any single government to engage in the kind of military buildup, for example, that the Reagan administration was able to do in the early 1980's.

That said, though, I want to say that I think there is a lot of disinformation and misunderstanding about the burdensharing issue that needs to be——

The CHAIRMAN. About the what issue?

Ambassador **Burt** [continuing]. About the burdensharing or the defense spending issues that you raise.

There are 100 different ways to look at the question of burdensharing, and you, in fact, happen to have picked the way that looks best from our perspective, from the American perspective, and that is by looking at defense as a percentages of gross national product.

If you recognize, for instance, that for a number of reasons we have given up conscription, we don't have a draft, and that a large part of our defense budget is, thus, made up of personnel costs and manpower costs, because we have to go out on an open market and compete for people to come into the military services, and the result of that is that manpower related costs make up over 50 percent of our defense budget; and you then look at all the European countries, at least the continental European countries have a military draft.

Thus, if you look less at input, in terms of defense spending, and more on military output, you will find that they are much more efficient than we are, because they don't have these large manpower costs.

And so, I think one has to be a little bit careful in talking about burdensharing. Also, in terms of trends, given the nature, I think, of our political system, defense spending in the United States has been very volatile in the last 15 years.

If you look at U.S. defense spending, it looks like a roller coaster over the last 15 years. The Europeans have, I think, taken a more constant approach to the problem, and it is very gradual, but, nevertheless, a steady improvement.

So, if you look at most indices of spending and military output, you will see that the Europeans are doing more.

Now, in my view, they are not doing enough quickly enough, in that they do need to do more. But I think it is incorrect to sort of view the Europeans as "free loaders" on this issue. I think their politics tends to work on these problems a little bit differently than ours.

Our ultimate objective should be that they take on a greater share of the burden.

The **Chairman**. I don't know if any polls have been taken, but my hunch is—and we will look around for one, the staff of our committee—my hunch is that if one were taken, the assessment of the danger of Soviet domination of Europe is greater in the United States than it is in Europe. What would be your view.

Mr. **Galbraith**. I think that is true. I would think that is true.

Ambassador **Burt**. May I just say that I think it really would depend on where you took that poll, because it is hard to generalize.

The **Chairman**. Well, I am talking about in the United States a cross section, and in the NATO countries and Europe.

Ambassador **Burt**. But, again, you will get vast differences, say, between what public opinion is in Greece or Spain or the Federal Republic of Germany.

The **Chairman**. On the average. On the average is what I am saying.

Ambassador Keel.

Ambassador Keel. Senator, I would just elaborate on what Ambassador Burt has said. I know you are familiar with this.

This whole burdensharing issue is an old issue, but it is one that is going to continue to be with us.

It is very difficult to come up with a measure to really determine what the true burden is of providing for Western security. It is not simply GNP ratio. It is not simply real gross or absolute dollars. It is much more complex, and that part of it is, for example, brought about by the fact that some of these European countries have conscription and we don't, and, as a consequence, their defense dollar goes further, in terms of buying actual equipment.

Part of it has to do with the fact that they provide a lot in terms of host nation support, hosting our dependents, hosting our military personnel, hosting our exercises, both on the ground and in the air, and so forth.

But, having said that, it is very clear that they are doing more in general than the public is commonly aware of here in the United States. But they are not doing enough. And I think we, collectively, are not doing enough. So we have to do better in terms of seeing what equitable burdensharing is.

The Chairman. The answer to my political question as to what is the reason for the difference in assessment—I would hope that we would agree that the assessment differs here as opposed to in Europe itself. Why is it the closer you get to the danger, the less the assessment of the danger?

Ambassador Keel. Senator, I am not sure that that premise is true.

Ambassador Burt. No.

Ambassador Keel. It really depends on how you go about doing that polling and who you ask.

For example, if I ask my colleagues, the European representatives to NATO, they have no less a sense of the threat than I do. I know that from my daily contacts.

If you go in and poll locally, I don't know how the polls will come out. It could come out that they have less of a perception of a threat. But I think then you have to look at the psychology of why that might be true. Part of it has to do with the fact that within our Western systems, we want to think best; perhaps the closer you are to that threat, the better you want to think in terms of what the prospects are for your future.

The Chairman. I think we have a "Daddy knows best" theory sometimes, and we should not be too ashamed in following public opinion. I think that perhaps is where we may differ a little bit. If public opinion is strongly in one direction or another, as a democracy, I am inclined to pay attention to it.

Anyway, my time has expired.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Sarbanes. First of all, let me say that I think this point on conscription is an important one. Obviously, if we are going to compare percentages of GNP spent on defense, we need to factor in the equation that the United States is paying significantly for personnel, while other nations have a system of conscription, which enables them to get personnel at a lesser cost.

It would seem to me that if some of these other factors were taken into account, we would have a more realistic comparison of their relative contributions.

I just wanted to ask two questions.

First of all, when the United States was seeking deployment of the Pershing II's and the Cruise missiles, we presented it on a dual-track basis, as I understand it, the other track being the negotiating effort that would be made for the elimination of the SS-20's, is that correct?

Ambassador BURT. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES [presiding]. Ambassador Galbraith, when you were trying to build support for the Pershing II deployments, I take it you presented the administration's position, which was this dual-track strategy. Is that correct?

Ambassador GALBRAITH. Yes.

I told the French Government that this was the basis on which we were acting, that it was a NATO decision and we were doing that. I was quickly told by the French that they did not like the idea of the double option because they were afraid that the Soviets might accept it.

So, I transmitted the message, but it was clear to me—and I reported this back several times—that the French thought it was a bad idea from the beginning.

Senator SARBANES. You are now suggesting that we should in effect say, "Well, that was all just a game"?

Mr. GALBRAITH. No, no.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, we would be saying we sort of tricked you into deploying these missiles by holding out this other track, but now that the other track has been realized, we are not going to proceed on it. What does that do for our ability to deal with these countries?

Mr. GALBRAITH. I am saying that since this dual-track decision was established, there, in effect, are successor weapons to the SS-20 that carry on the mission of the SS-20, and we should not be estopped from keeping our Pershings there until those systems also are absent.

Senator SARBANES. Do you mean the intercontinental systems?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, there is a whole series of them that have been built since then.

Senator SARBANES. Not a theater system, though?

Mr. GALBRAITH. Well, the SS-23——

Ambassador BURT. That's part of the treaty.

Senator SARBANES. But those would be eliminated under the treaty.

Mr. GALBRAITH. I know. I am just saying there is a whole series of systems that were built, and the two that fall outside of the category of this treaty are the SS-24's and the SS-25's.

Senator SARBANES. Well, those are ICBM's.

Mr. GALBRAITH. Yes. But they are mobile, unlike the previous ICBM's, the SS-18. And one is on rail and the other is on road. And they are in many ways more devastating, and there is no inconvenience at all in targeting an SS-24 or an SS-25 toward Europe. So, the mission is the same.

Senator **Sarbanes**. So you see no problem with having sold the deployments to our allies on one basis and now simply denying that basis?

Mr. **Galbraith**. Because these successor weapons should be treated the same way as the predecessor.

Senator **Sarbanes**. OK. I see.

I wanted to ask Ambassador Burt and Ambassador Keel this question.

You assert that this effort at closer Franco-German military cooperation does not have as its goal a French nuclear guarantee role, and that both the Germans and the French have made that very clear, is that correct?

Ambassador **Burt**. That's right.

Ambassador **Keel**. Yes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Let me ask you this question.

Would the assertion by some that the purpose of closer Franco-German military cooperation was a French nuclear guarantee role, leading to a broader perception that that was in fact the objective, actually make it more difficult to achieve such military cooperation?

Ambassador **Keel**. Maybe I can begin.

I think certainly that kind of assertion would have a number of harmful effects, much beyond just the Franco-German cooperation.

We can't afford a perception, quite honestly, that there is an alternative to the alliance and to the alliance security arrangement because there really is none.

Not only is there not an alternative to the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and the concept of flexible response and extended deterrence, there is no alternative to the security arrangement that we now have with this alliance, which is celebrating its 10 anniversary next year.

So, we cannot afford a perception that the Franco-German military council, the defense council, that is being established, is an alternative to that.

In fact, the Paris and Bonn Governments are very careful to say that it is not, and certainly that it is not intended to be an alternative to the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

So I think those kinds of assertions or inferences are very harmful.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Ambassador Burt.

Ambassador **Burt**. I would just dwell a little bit on the Franco-German elements of the issue. In the Federal Republic of Germany, we do not want to see the emergence of an American faction and a French faction. We don't want to see a debate between those elements in the Federal Republic of Germany who say we should base our security on the United States and those other elements who say that we should base them on the French.

In fact, there was such a debate back in the 1950's, and it was a disruptive debate. So, I think both the United States and the French Government, and with the Germans, have tried to act responsibly as we see this positive dialog go ahead, so that that does not happen.

I have not been Ambassador to France, but I notice my colleague has not been averse to discussing situations in Germany and I might make a comment on the domestic impact in France, which is this.

The French, as Ambassador Galbraith pointed out, are fairly blessed by having a consensus on defense policy. It is a consensus that extends from the Socialists over to the conservative side of the political spectrum. I think one reason, in my view, that they have such a consensus is they all understand that their nuclear capabilities are designed primarily and principally for the defense of France.

I know French Government officials and others have told me that any French Government is going to be very wary before it tampers with that defense consensus and raises the possibility of extending that deterrent because it could become very controversial.

I am not passing judgment on whether that is a good thing or a bad thing. I am just saying that there are important domestic political implications of this issue both in France and in the Federal Republic.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene this afternoon at 2:02 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

[Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Adams, Lugar, Kassebaum, and Murkowski.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will please come to order.

We are very glad indeed today to welcome Gen. John Galvin. As Commander in Chief, European Command, General Galvin is our senior military commander in the European theater.

Because of his position, he has numerous contacts with the top military and civilian leadership in Europe, and will be able to inform our committee as to current perceptions among European leaders, and give us his judgment as to the military implications of the INF Treaty.

General Galvin, we note in your statement that the INF treaty has many features that will be beneficial to the Western alliance. But it also imposes risks as well as benefits.

The Senate must see both sides of the coin, the benefits and the risks, before passing judgment. And you have the key task of overseeing the West's military efforts to deter attack by the Warsaw Pact. It will be important to receive your informed judgment that under the treaty you will be able to carry out your mission of deterrence and defense.

Finally, the committee will want to receive your view on plans previously made for the modernization of the forces which will remain following the elimination of systems called for in the treaty.

The symbolism and ultimate value of the treaty would be undermined if it turned out to be a thinly veiled excuse to inject more nuclear weapons into NATO. General Galvin, would you proceed please.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, VOIHINGER, GE

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be here. I have submitted a statement. I will summarize only the conclusions of that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you, sir. The statement will be printed in full in the record.

General GALVIN. Thank you, sir. First, having been in command now for 7 months and having had the experience of 10 out of the past 15 years in Europe, I have studied the strategy anew, the strategy of flexible response and forward defense, and I think that it is an adequate strategy in order to carry out the mission that I have of deterrence of war in Europe and defense if, God forbid, that war ever should come.

That strategy encompasses first of all the plan of direct defense, followed by deliberate escalation, followed by general nuclear response, if indeed anything like that were ever necessary.

I find that in the direct defense we do have the wherewithal to execute that. The deliberate escalation, which would mean a resort at a certain point to nuclear weapons, if necessary, that capability is available to us.

And, of course, the general nuclear response which are not entirely within my command, is something that I find, at least from my point of view, to be adequate. And I consider us to be prepared to deter or defend in Europe today.

The strategy, in other words, is viable. And I do not think that even in the considerations of the INF Treaty there is anything that we need to do to change MC-14/3 or the strategy of forward defense and flexible response.

At the same time, the threat from our adversary, the Warsaw Pact, has not changed. Even though we have heard a great deal, and we have seen a great deal of General Secretary Gorbachev and his approach in perestroika and glasnost and the rest of his new philosophy, none of that has had any effect in terms of changes, palpable changes, that we can see in the Soviet military orientation.

The Soviet Union, the military of the Soviet Union, for the past three decades at least, has had a single aim, and that is to create a large military force capable of moving very large units over long distances in short periods of time without pause in the offensive.

This is what the Soviets feel that they learned from Zhukov, at Leningrad, Stalingrad, at Kursic, and all the way to Berlin. This is where the Soviets have concentrated ever since the end of World War II.

None of that concentration has stopped, and in fact the Soviet production of military capability, that is military equipment, has been on a rising curve over the past 5 years, more so than it was in the time before that. So, any force comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is unfavorable at this time to NATO, as it has been in years past.

I would like you to know that since I have been in command I have asked my staff to make a study of all the archives and all the studies that have been made that show what is commonly called the balance, which is in effect an imbalance.

We have looked at 169 separate studies of NATO versus Warsaw Pact, from all kinds of think tanks and experts the world around. Of those, we feel that about 25 are valid studies.

But those studies, nevertheless, do not show a preponderance of power on the part of NATO as compared to the Warsaw Pact. And our own view of this in Allied Command Europe still shows that the Warsaw Pact ratios, when compared to NATO, are 3-to-1 in tanks, 3-to-1 in artillery, and 2-to-1 in combat aircraft. So that the threat to us has not changed.

At the same time, I feel that the INF Treaty that we have now, if it is ratified by the United States, it will still allow me to do my mission, which has been assigned to me in the command of NATO forces, as well as in the command of U.S. forces, and that is to deter war. And in the event that that deterrence somehow fails, to defend in Europe.

There are risks that are inherent in the INF Treaty. Those risks are that if a euphoria that comes about as a result of the treaty would result for us in a lack of modernization, the modernization which would have to continue regardless of whether we had a treaty or not, then we would have a problem.

Or, if the INF Treaty were to start a move which eventually would end with a loss of all NATO theater nuclear weapons in Europe, then that would indeed be a risk. And that would indeed be bad.

Or if for some reason there would be an indication to the other side that there is a lack of fighting will, or cohesion, on the part of NATO.

Now, those things I do not tie directly to any kind of INF Treaty. I think that all of those risks are risks that we run in a number of ways. But I do feel that there is the possibility that some people would think that we do not need modernization. Or some people would think that we do not need to maintain the theater nuclear force.

And those are risks that I hope we will overcome as we work on the INF Treaty. I nevertheless say that the treaty that is before the Senate at this time should eventually be ratified by the United States.

In terms of the need for modernization, there is a need to modernize the nuclear force, and that is the need for a tactical air-to-surface missile, a need for a surface-to-surface missile which falls not in the area of the treaty, because I do not believe that in any way we should try to circumvent the treaty.

But in the area below the treaty, that is zero to 500 kilometers, we need a follow-on to the Lance missile that will be used in that area, because the Lance missile will soon become obsolete.

We also need a number of other modernization efforts in the nuclear area. One of those is the air-delivered nuclear bomb. We are now getting a modernization of the nuclear artillery. But we need the Congress to lift the restriction right now on the number of modernized rounds because we need a somewhat higher number.

In the area of conventional modernization, we need the kind of things which can work, especially in what is known as follow-on forces attack, and that is the capability to execute a reconnaissance for intelligence collection, and to have better intelligence evaluation. And then the capability to use that intelligence, especially with systems such as the multiple-launch rocket system.

We also need some communications, and some effort in the area of remotely piloted vehicles, and some other areas which I have noted in my statement. Some of these fall in what is called the conventional defense initiatives.

I applaud the congressional decision to produce the binary round in the chemical area, because I feel the threat of retaliation is our best protection against chemical attack.

I feel that we need to maintain the theater forces in Europe. We need to seek conventional reductions. I believe that is an area in which we need to move and make a strong effort with the Soviet

Union, and the rest of the Warsaw Pact, to get what I believe is possible, an asymmetrical reduction to parity in the conventional forces.

I believe we need to keep the U.S. presence in Europe, because if we are going to go into conventional arms negotiations, it would not be a good idea to make any kind of concession on U.S. force presence at this time. I think we need to emphasize alliance cooperation.

But in sum, Mr. Chairman, I feel that our strategy is correct, that arms control should be very much a part of our strategy in the future, that Europe is important to the United States, and U.S. leadership is definitely important to Europe. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Galvin may be found in the appendix.]

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, General Galvin, for your crisp testimony, and the way you are completely in command of all the details. I appreciate it.

In your testimony you say, I believe, that you support the ratification of the INF Treaty. But that it poses a risk of creating a momentum that would stop modernization of conventional and nuclear forces.

And I believe you also add that, "if military modernization proceeds as currently planned, NATO strategy of flexible response and forward defense will remain viable, that I will still be able to carry out my mission of deterrence of defense."

Now, are you conditioning your support for the treaty on any future assumptions, any assumptions about the future NATO modernization?

General **Galvin**. I really do not want to condition my support for the treaty, because I think that the importance of signing this treaty and ratifying this treaty at this time is vital to NATO.

At the same time, there is the question of modernization. It can really be set aside, modernization is something that for the last 100 years, at least, when we entered the technological age, we all realized that we need.

We are not fighting today with the weapons of 1865. We are in need of keeping up with the modernization. We learned in World War II, for example, that if a fighter plane was built that was slightly better than other fighter planes, it would soon sweep the skies.

This is now true of submarines and tanks. If a tank is built in such a way that it fires accurately one second faster than an opposing tank, that is a great advantage. This kind of technological modernization is absolutely essential, whether we have a treaty or not.

But I must express a worry that I have that somehow a connection would be made which should not be made between this treaty and modernization, and that people might say, "Well, we have this treaty, we really do not need to emphasize modernization anymore." I would not like to see that happen.

The **Chairman**. Right. But in sum, you support the INF Treaty unconditionally.

General **Galvin**. I do.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. And does the INF Treaty make your mission more or less difficult?

General GALVIN. I can complete the mission under the INF Treaty.

Whether is it more or less difficult will depend on what kind of modernization I am able to convince people that we need, or that people are able to convince themselves that we need. And it will definitely depend on what happens to theater nuclear forces in the immediate future.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, it has been said that our failure to ratify the INF Treaty could wreck the alliance. Would you agree with that? In other words, what would be the impact if we do not ratify the treaty?

General GALVIN. If we do not ratify the treaty, we will have, it would have a severe impact on the alliance.

I am not saying by that, Mr. Chairman, that anybody in the Senate, that any Senator should feel that there is some need to ratify the treaty regardless of anything else. And I do not think that there should be pressure along those lines.

I think obviously the treaty has to stand on its own. I personally feel that the treaty does stand on its own. But I do say that if the treaty for some reason were not ratified, and if we were not able to convince the rest of the NATO nations that that nonratification had very strong logical support somehow, we would have a very severe negative in the other 15 nations of NATO.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Will this treaty require NATO to take any previously unplanned steps to strengthen its conventional forces?

In other words, does the passage of this treaty force the development of conventional forces?

General GALVIN. No, I do not think it forces any unplanned steps. In fact, what I am concerned about is that planned steps might not be taken.

And as you know, I am sure it has been mentioned a lot of times that we did have what are called now very often the Montebello decision. But we have had decisions back in the 1960's and 1970's and 1980's, some of which have come to fruition in terms of satisfying the needs and requirements of the nations in the defense and deterrence roles, and some of which have not.

I do believe that we need to keep moving in the modernization area, as we move into the immediate years to come.

The CHAIRMAN. On a more specific line, would you concur or not that the maintenance of our troops in Berlin is to act more as a trigger than any effective opposition that they could offer?

General GALVIN. We have a plan for how we would respond if anything happened to the forces in Berlin, which consist of the United States, French, and British forces there. And I think it is a good plan.

I do not think of Berlin as a trigger. I do think that if an all-out attack came out of East Germany, Berlin first of all would be vitally important to us from an intelligence point of view. But second, Berlin would be obviously threatened. And we have a plan to take care of that.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with the earliest parts of your testimony, talking about the relative balance between the East and the West, did you crank into your studies at all, your analysis, the differing reliability of the Warsaw Pact?

Maybe we no longer call them subject nations, but satellites, as opposed to our own allies who are, I would think, in the case of conflict, would respond with greater vigor.

General GALVIN. This is an emerging study, it needs to look at that. We have not looked at that particular point yet. I do believe that is a very important point, and I think there is a difference in reliability between the nations within the Warsaw Pact and the nations in NATO.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think that the Russians would have to develop a tank with guns pointing in both directions as they moved up.

General GALVIN. What the nations of the Warsaw Pact, how they would respond, will depend to a great degree on what kind of an attack, or what kind of warfare would be involved.

And I think that while there is question of reliability, there are some scenarios that I have looked at under which the Warsaw Pact nations would be quite unified.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be an example of that?

General GALVIN. I think that if the Warsaw Pact nations were convinced that the only choice they really had, if they were convinced first of all that the Soviets were going to win some kind of an attack, if they were convinced by some kind of early victory, early series of minivictories by the Soviets, if the Soviets were able to execute a surprise attack and gain something by it, that there would be more unity on the part of the other Warsaw Pact nations than perhaps if the initial efforts were blunted and were unsuccessful and turned into disasters.

The CHAIRMAN. My understanding of the doctrine of defense is that if the defending force has a force about one-third or one-half the attacking force, they can hold their line. Now, some might call that the Maginot Line theory.

But in general, I thought that the attacking force had to be about double or triple the strength of the defending force. Is that a correct statement?

General GALVIN. Well, that is something that we have used for a long time in studies that has gotten a great deal of misinterpretation as it has branched out into the fields of the think tanks.

What that started out with years ago was the idea that if two forces were equal, if they were equal, and one force was defending against the other, then at the point of attack the attacker would have to have better than 3-to-1.

But it also, of course, meant that the attacker would have to denude parts of the rest of the line in order to have this force at the point of attack.

And that is one of the reasons why the defender could defend against a 3-to-1 attack, because he then could move his reserves without feeling he would be threatened by some new attack on another flank or another part of the front. But all of that assumes that the two forces are basically equal to start with.

Now, what has happened is that certain people have distorted that to say, that means that if a country is three times as big as you are, and has three times the military force you do, you can still defend against him because you are the defender. That is not the idea at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Galvin, in the discussion we had this morning with the panel, we established the fact that panel members disagreed on the military importance of the SS-20's and their removal from the Soviet arsenal.

Specifically, as I dealt with the question of the previous Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear forces area, and the efforts to end that monopoly through deployments and now with the treaty, Ambassador Galbraith asserted that the end of the SS-20's was not so consequential as I might have thought, whereas Ambassador Burt asserted that it was.

Because Soviet SS-25's can be retargeted and would provide the same politically intimidating qualities as the SS-20's, the real loss in Ambassador Galbraith's judgment was removal of the Pershings, the only thing that was meaningful apparently to the Soviets in the equation.

From your military experience, what factors would have to be weighed in any Soviet decision to retarget Europe with the SS-24's or SS-25's, and how likely it is that the Soviets would do that? And likewise, what capacity does the U.S. and NATO have to retarget Soviet and Warsaw Pact systems previously covered by the Pershings and GhCM's?

General GALVIN. Senator, first of all, I think we have to take this from the point of view that while this is a very, very important treaty, the INF Treaty, nevertheless, it deals with less than 5 percent of the nuclear warheads that one side has ranged against the other in this confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Next, the SS-20 is a strategic weapon as far as the Soviets are concerned. If you look at the difference in organization, the Soviets actually had the SS-20 in what they call their strategic forces.

They do not have an army, navy, air force, and marine corps. They have an army, navy, air force, strategic rocket forces, and then the air defense forces. That SS-20 was in the strategic rocket forces, not in the front forces.

So, there is a difference between the way that we viewed our Pershing II, which was a theater nuclear force, and the way that the Soviets viewed the SS-20, which was a strategic force.

They will, of course, now do the best they can with what is left. That is what any military man would do. That is what I will do also, and that is what NATO will do. After the treaty is over, I do not believe that anybody should try to circumvent it.

But we will do the best we can with what is left. Certain stones will be removed from my defensive wall. The Pershing II, ground-launched Cruise missile. I will do my best to adjust the stones that are remaining. That is not circumvention.

It is not circumvention on the part of the Soviets either. The Soviets are already doing that, just what you said. They have the SS-25, which is a road-mobile strategic missile. They have the SS-24, which is a rail-mobile strategic missile.

They will now retarget some of those into Europe, probably. I cannot say that for sure. I do not have access to their documents. But I know in my heart that is what will happen.

Now, that means, of course, that they have already been targeted on something else or they would not have been built. Maybe they were targeted against Asia. Maybe they were already targeted against some target in Western Europe.

But now, what the problem for the Soviets will be, they will have to reprioritize all their targets, they will lack the flexibility that they had before. So that is important to us.

But once again, when you look at the overall importance of it, it is as important as, well somewhat more important than the proportions of the weapons involved, which is less than 5 percent.

Now, the treaty is another matter. The fact that we are getting this turnaround, and the fact that we will have the verification, and the fact that there was an asymmetrical aspect to it, those are important on a different plane.

Senator LUGAR. How would you respond to the argument that, even if the Soviets temporarily are inconvenienced by retargeting SS-25's on Europe, they would simply build many more of them, and that ultimately we are simply faced with another arms competition in another realm; in short, the treaty has not made a whole lot of difference?

General GALVIN. The treaty does not make much difference in those areas, Senator, and that is why we need to look at additional arms reduction in our strategy.

And our strategy, our overall national strategy, global strategy, should take into account arms reduction and arms negotiations. That means to move toward the strategic arms negotiations. It also means to move toward the conventional negotiations.

Senator LUGAR. Now, given the fact that only a very small percentage of nuclear weapons are covered by this treaty and the prospect of further buildups in systems with ranges not banned by the treaty, what is the prime reason that, on balance, you come down strongly in favor of this treaty?

General GALVIN. First of all, I believe that, as a soldier, I have to first answer the question to myself, would the resources that the governments give me, can I or can I not do my mission?

If I can do the mission, then the question of the rest, that is should we have treaties or not and so forth, is basically not my question. It is a political question. However, I obviously have a great interest in it.

I find that I can do my mission of deterrence. I feel that we have enough nuclear weapons left in Europe, where we have, as you know, over 4,000 nuclear warheads.

I can do the nuclear part, if that is necessary. That would be where deterrence fails. And if that ever were to happen, I can accomplish that. And through the threat of those nuclear weapons and the threat of the conventional force, I am convinced myself I have enough deterrence so that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact will not feel that they could attack and gain more than they would lose in the first place. So, therefore, I support the idea of the treaty.

Now, another aspect of that is this. We now have the treaty up for consideration. If after having gone all through this we would then say, no, we do not want this treaty, either we would have to have some very, very solid reasons to explain to our fellow alliance members out there, or we would lose in many ways.

We would lose the cohesion of the alliance, because the other countries would say, what is this? Why did we come this far and then do this? Why has the United States done this? The United States must know something we do not know. There would be, I think, some level of consternation.

So, since I am really concerned as a soldier and a military man about the fighting will of the people that I would lead, I do not want to see anything like a lack of cohesion, a lack of that will.

And I think now that the treaty is wrapped up in that question. And so, at the same time, I do not think we should blindly approve a ratification of a treaty that is not worth it. And I, up to now, think this treaty is worth taking a chance on.

Senator LUGAR. Are you testifying, as a military man with considerable military experience, that the military posture of the United States and NATO will not be harmed by this treaty?

General GALVIN. That is right. I have 10 four-star generals that are subordinate to me, among others—10. Some of those are United States, and in my NATO hat, obviously, they are NATO.

In terms of those immediate subordinates, I have discussed this matter with every one of them. I have said, "Do not tell me what I want to hear, tell me what you think. Do you think we can carry out the mission and your part of it that you have to do?" All of those generals have said "Yes."

Senator LUGAR. And they are looking at the military threat to their own specific regions and their ability to carry out their assigned missions?

General GALVIN. That is right. They looked at the military threat to Allied Command Europe, which is their organization and mine.

And they looked at the part they have to do in Allied Forces North, Allied Forces Central, and Allied Forces South, and United Kingdom Air. All of those things fall under my command.

Senator LUGAR. Well, General, how could you come to this point of view if you thought there were 300 or 400 SS-20's clandestinely deployed in the woods and that the verification procedures were inadequate?

General GALVIN. Senator Lugar, let me talk about 300 or 400 SS-20's hidden in the woods.

I assume what you mean is that somehow after ratification, these would still be around, and the Soviets would not have indicated that.

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

General GALVIN. That, of course, would always be a worry to me, and I would never take at face value, unfortunately in my lifetime I do not think I would ever take a Soviet figure, number at face value.

But at the same time, I have looked at all of the intelligence that is available on this question, and I do not have anything that I could take to The Hague or take to the Soviet Union and say, "You are cheating on this and withholding weapons that should belong under the treaty."

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. General Galvin, one of the post-INF Treaty issues is whether the shortest range nuclear systems should remain in Germany, would remain.

This morning our former Ambassador to France, Mr. Galbraith, testified that he believed there was growing opinion in Germany that they should be removed, support for the triple zero option.

Would you care to comment on how you believe our allies feel about this? And particularly the Germans?

General GALVIN. Taking the Germans first. There is some feeling in Germany that with the removal of the longer range weapons, while we keep the shorter range weapons, that this would confine the war to Germany, if we had a war.

I said a feeling of some people in Germany. Definitely not a feeling of all people in Germany, by any means. I do not know exactly how much some is. And that is one of the things that I am looking at all the time myself.

First of all, we are saying, if there came a war, the Germans in this case, the ones who have this kind of thought are saying, if there came a war, then Germany might be hurt worse than the others.

That first if is very important. One of the things that I solidly believe is that the reason that there will not be a war, and there will not be anyone getting hurt in West Germany is because we have those nuclear weapons.

In the 40 years that we have had them, we have not had a war. In the hundreds of years before that, we never went more than about 20 years without a war in Western Europe, ever since it has been an entity that could be called Western Europe. So, that is the first thing.

But after that, it is true that the geographical position of Germany puts Germany in the front lines. But Germany is not in the front lines alone. Not even in the first trench alone.

There are more than 326,000 Americans, there are British, there are Dutch, there are Belgians, there are French who are stationed in Germany. Not just saying they would put troops there if there were a war, as you know. They are actually stationed, all of those people in Germany. So that there is a shared threat there.

Now, some Germans say "Yes," but we would be the target of a war. If a war came, I do not think that Germany would be alone as a target for a war. The United Kingdom, for example, would be a great big aircraft carrier, just as it was in World War II, and it definitely would be a target.

I do not think that we in the United States could expect that we would not share the risk of being a target in a war, in a nuclear war, in any kind of a war. And that is why I believe we ought to make sure first of all that the war never comes. And that is the primary dedication of my command. That is, to the deterrent aspect of this.

I think that there is a shared risk here that goes beyond the simple risk that some Germans seem to be emphasizing.

I would say, not to try to go down through all the other countries, you did mention the other countries of NATO, I would simply say that there is, as always in an alliance—by the way this alliance has lasted longer than any other—there is always a certain amount of selfishness in any country.

I think that is probably a collective selfishness of a nation that is to be expected. I am not referring now to Germany. I am saying that is every country. And so that sometimes you hear a message of alliance cohesion, but sometimes that message also has self-interest involved in it, whether it be United States self-interest, British self-interest, or any other.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you see the arrangements that the French and the Germans have made, or the Germans and the British, to be in any way undermining NATO, the NATO alliance as a whole?

General GALVIN. No, Senator. I do not think it is undermining. I think that it is a good thing.

I think anybody who knows the history of the past 100 years of Europe would say that if the French and Germans are getting together, that has to be basically good.

Now, this past week, as you know, the French have also indicated that they want to get together with the British. They had not indicated that earlier, and I think that is very good also.

I think that if it means that the countries of Europe are saying to themselves, we need to do more to show our defense and to deter war, I think that that has to be good. I do not think it is interfering with NATO.

If it were interfering with the alliance somehow, then I would worry about it more than I do right now.

Senator KASSEBAUM. One of the things that is important, I suppose, at this time is to assure our NATO allies of our commitment.

We have over the last certainly 5 or 6 years increased our defense budgets significantly, and made allocations for quite a build-up of support for our NATO forces.

I wonder, because this has been called into question, if you could give us some fairly detailed information on exactly how our conventional defenses have been improved by the increased funding that has been given to our defense budget?

General GALVIN. Our conventional defenses have improved.

Of course, by the way I should say about the increased funding, you are right. Since the beginning of the 1980's there was an increase in funding. But if you go back and look from the 1970's and 1980's together, that increase does not look as big by any means.

In fact, it is not as big as most of the other NATO countries over the past 20 years. Most of the countries have had a bigger increase than we have had in that period.

However, we have brought in the air, we have brought in the F-16 and F-15, which are vital to us. We have also improved those aircraft with certain electronic capabilities over that time.

On the ground, we have continued our sustainment. By the way, in the air also the idea of sustainment, forward stockage, in other words the stockage of equipment that units that are in the United States would use if they went to Europe, that is on the increase over this period.

The days of supply, in other words the stockpiles of ammunition have increased during this period. There have been a lot of minor equipment changes such as radios, radars, other things that have come in to the conventional forces.

I could give you a long list of those. I do not think that is what you want. I am saying there has been a substantial increase in the capabilities of conventional forces during this period, on the ground, in the air, and at sea.

Of course, this has been unfortunately more than matched by a Soviet increase. The Soviets have in the last 5 years really turned on the steam in this area. They are building a number of different submarines at the same time. They are coming out with newer tanks during this period we are talking about. And they have done a lot with increased numbers of aircraft that are quite dangerous to us.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Are you comfortable with our capability at this juncture?

General GALVIN. I am comfortable with our capability at this juncture, both in the conventional and the nuclear side.

I do think that, this is assuming obviously that the normal modernization will go on into the future, that we will not somehow stop and say, "Well, everything we have now is about right." I would not want to see obsolescence hurt our posture.

But I am comfortable with where we are. I think that we have put a great deal of effort into improving our defenses over the past decade, and it has been quite good.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yesterday former Secretary of Defense McNamara mentioned a statement by General Rogers that we only had 2 weeks of effective fighting capability now in our NATO forces. Would you care to comment on that?

General GALVIN. I could fight for a long, long time if the other side was not so big. This is one of my problems. You always have to take into account the other side.

One of my favorite sayings, when Winston Churchill once got mad at all his generals he said, "Even the best of tacticians on occasion has to take the enemy into account." We have a very good force over there.

But we are outnumbered 3-to-1 in tanks and 3-to-1 in artillery, and 2-to-1 in aircraft. But nevertheless, outnumbered the way we are, we could still give a very, very good account of ourselves.

We have some sustainment problems, though, and we have some reinforcement problems. For us, not only the United States but from Canada, from England, we have to get across some water and get there to fight. We do not have everybody in place.

So, depending on how the decisions would be made, the mobilization, the reinforcement, the sustainment, I cannot guarantee anything better than a short period of good fighting right now. After that, it would be kind of up for grabs.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Will there be some advantage to have the French now entering into some arrangements with the Germans?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Galvin, this morning Ambassador Galbraith asserted that the INF Treaty would put the Germans on a slippery slope toward the denuclearization, neutralization, and demilitarization. Could you address that assertion?

General **Galvin**. Yes. First of all, I have the greatest, most profound respect for the Germans, having lived there for about 10 years, now and then, over the past couple of decades.

I think the Germans are a very disciplined people. I think they are very, very concerned with the defense of their country and the security of their country. I think that they are a staunch and strong and reliable ally.

I do not think that we are going to see a Germany that wants to be associated with the verbs that you came up with there such as denuclearized, neutralized, and otherized. I think that that would not happen.

Germany is a sovereign country with ideas of its own, of course, as a member of NATO. But Germany is dedicated to the defense of the alliance area. And I do not feel that Germany is moving in that direction at all.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Well, I put this question to the panel this morning, I would like to ask it of you.

What scenario would you see unfolding if this treaty were not ratified?

General **Galvin**. If the treaty were not ratified, I think that that would, first of all obviously be some good reasons why. I would assume there would be some very good reasons why the treaty was not ratified.

And there have to be two scenarios here. One would be all the alliance members of NATO would agree with us completely that the treaty should not be ratified and everyone would move on from there, basically where we were before.

But if the treaty were not ratified and all the other members of the alliance did not feel that that was the proper move to make, in other words felt that ratification was going to happen, and if they were disappointed, and if they were disunified because of this, then I think we might see a problem.

But that is taking the treaty in a vacuum, and I do not think we can do that. And I do not want my statement to threaten that, we have gone this far, we must ratify this treaty.

I think obviously the treaty has to be taken on its own logic and within its own situation. But I think those would be the two scenarios.

Senator **Sarbanes**. It seems to me that since so many, if not all, of the objectives that we set out to achieve in this treaty at the time that the negotiations were undertaken have in fact been realized, not to ratify it would become very difficult to explain to our European allies.

General **Galvin**. I would agree with that, Senator. That is the way I feel about it.

Senator **Sarbanes**. In fact, do you think the concern that Ambassador Galbraith raised, about sliding into denuclearization, neutralization, and demilitarization, might in fact receive an even greater impetus if the treaty were not ratified?

Would that not play directly into the hands of those who want to move in that direction?

General GALVIN. It might. I think that there are two sides to this that I would see, Senator, to elaborate somewhat on the question. That is, if we ratify the treaty, but somehow this causes a euphoria in which we say, "Let us do away with all nuclear weapons in Europe," I would see that as very bad.

On the other hand, if we do not ratify the treaty, I would think we would have a problem. So, what I hope happens is that the United States ratifies the treaty and that the United States also as an alliance member supports the continued theater nuclear presence in Europe, because that is our deterrent capability.

And that is my primary mission, and that is why I am so strong on that particular point.

Senator SARBANES. I wanted to focus for a moment on the burdensharing part of your statement, because I think it is a very important issue. And I think many of the points you make need to be kept in mind when one is considering the burdensharing question, including the point that many of these countries have conscription and we do not, which would affect the percentage of GNP expended on defense.

I think there is a growing feeling in this country that we are carrying a disproportionate security burden. That feeling is intensified when you broaden it on a global scale and extend it to the Pacific area.

In fact you say on page 15 of your statement:

> But, given the global interests of the United States, it is likely that our defense spending levels will always exceed those of our more regionally oriented allies.

It seems to me that might argue for our allies to be doing more, or at least as much as we are doing, in their own regions, since we are carrying global responsibilities from which they obviously benefit.

Would you comment on that?

General GALVIN. I think that that is true, that our allies need to do more. I think that we also need to do more, speaking of regionally, for instance.

Senator SARBANES. Do they need to do more relative to what we are doing?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Speaking of regionally, we for example provide less security assistance than some other countries do, several other countries within NATO, security assistance to other countries which are democratic countries. So that there is some regional responsibilities that these other countries feel.

First of all, it has to be said over and above anything else that we do more as a percentage of GDP than any of the other countries do for NATO. But if you look at our growth, that is the growth of defense procurement, the growth of resourcing of defense over the period 1971 to 1985, which is what my figures cover in that paper, our growth is about 1 percent, while, non-U.S. NATO budgets inceased on average nearly 2 percent.

Senator SARBANES. But you cannot look at the growth figures unrelated to the underlying base from which they are drawing.

General GALVIN. That is why I said that over and above anything else I would say that it is true that the United States provides a greater proportion of its GDP to defense resourcing than the other nations of NATO.

But I find that there is some mitigation, if you want to use that term, for this. One is the one that you mentioned. Another one is that if you are the primary producer of military equipment such as aircraft and for the past 20 years other NATO countries, if they want an aircraft they usually buy it from the United States.

Well, when we buy an aircraft from ourselves for defense, we have bought an aircraft that people earned money to build and paid taxes and so forth and so on. There is quite a difference of buying an aircraft that we ourselves have produced and having another country buy an aircraft that they did not produce, the United States produced.

The cost in there involved is more to the other country than it is to us. Or let me put it another way: There are some hidden benefits.

So, there are some aspects of this, and those are two, that would be deserving of consideration as we look at the whole question.

I would have to go back as I started out and say, our GDP percentage is larger.

Senator SARBANES. My time is about up and I would just make this observation. I think the points you make are good ones, but I think we need to address and evaluate the perception that the burden is disproportionate.

Now, if in fact that is not the perception we need to make that clear. If it is, we need to correct it, because it is not a healthy thing to have it continue.

General GALVIN. That is true, and it would apply, of course, not equally to all countries by any means. There is a difference between the sacrifices and the burdens Germany makes and the burdens that the Federal Republic shares with us than there is maybe with some of the other countries.

And I think personally myself, I would say that in many respects the Federal Republic of Germany has a greater burden of defense that it shoulders every year than the United States does even.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Adams.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Galvin, and I appreciate very much your support for this treaty. I think it is extraordinarily important that the military command in Europe address some of the statements that we have heard. My goal is I am sure the same as everyone on this committee and yours, which is to produce stability in a new generation as it comes into the Soviet Union and in the United States, that we manage crisis and that we avoid a war or a crisis that to me means the end of the world.

Now, I am concerned about the statements that are constantly made, and I think I heard you refute them as I was coming in—I was at another hearing—that our conventional forces really are not strong militarily in Central Europe.

I have been told by private sources that we are facing in a 3- or 4-day mobilization period, we have 17 divisions of Americans armed with Leopard tanks and M-1's facing about 19 Soviet and potentially East Germany divisions, and that we would more than give a good account of ourselves in those first early days of fighting.

Do you confirm that?

General **Galvin**. I think we would give a good account of ourselves, I absolutely feel that. I think that we would fight very, very well as Americans and as an alliance, that we would fight very, very well.

Senator **Adams**. I have not tried to go to the other sectors of the alliance, but I would appreciate it if you would comment overall. But most of the focus that we have heard about has been the Central Plain, and it appears to me that, as I have heard people say and I think I heard you say it in your testimony, that the Germans are very good at fighting tank warfare, and I think we are, too.

And we are not going to have an immediate breakthrough of Russian divisions if they are anywhere close to even 2-to-1.

General **Galvin**. I think what you said is exactly true. I suppose if I put it in my own words that I would use as a military commander, we could take on the first echelon of the Warsaw Pact and give much better than a good account of ourselves.

Senator **Adams**. That is my understanding, that we are really pretty damn good in Central Europe, are we not?

General **Galvin**. We are, until the second echelon shows up. We are damned good. We have some sustainment problems, though, that are still there. We have some problems that we need continual modernization.

I always have to bring up those two points, modernization and sustainment. We do not have levels of stockage in Europe that I would like to see. We do not have the combat service support, in other words the supply organizations and the maintenance organizations in the United States in the Reserve and in the active force, that I would like to see.

Senator **Adams**. I am going to stay right on that subject with you. What we want to concentrate on as a matter of policy, then, is airlift, sealift, and reserve movement, as you say, the second echelon, because they get there faster than we do.

Are you advocating airlift and a certain amount of sealift?

General **Galvin**. I am advocating sealift and a certain amount of airlift. I depend more on sealift in the long haul. I am advocating sealift, sustainment items, that is supplies, and better combat service support, that is supply organizations and maintenance organizations and medical organizations that are up to strength.

But I still say——

Senator **Adams**. For the second echelon?

General **Galvin**. To fight that sustained second echelon battle, that is right.

Senator **Adams**. All right. The second thing that always bothers me was testified to by two of the Defense Secretaries. So, please explain it to me. I cannot conceive how we can escalate in an actual combat situation to the use of atomics without keeping this escalation from moving out of hand, particularly if we destroy command and control posts on both sides and this is left to field commanders.

Do we not just all of a sudden have a series of atomic explosions which are horrendous, which rapidly escalates to submarine-launched missiles and air Cruise missiles, and just the whole thing just goes out of hand?

General GALVIN. Those are decisions we would have to make at the time. And the first thing I would say about this is that the unknowns that you mention are the things that have deterred war in Europe.

That is why the Soviets, every time they think about anything like that, if indeed they do, they say to themselves: We cannot judge exactly how that one would turn out.

Now, that is the first time that that has happened in the history of Europe. Always before that, even smaller sides attacking bigger sides would say: "What the hell, we can do it, we can do it." And they would try it.

The Germans, for example, attacked the Russians and the whole rest of Europe at the same time, even though they were smaller than the Russians and smaller than the French. But that was a conventional war.

Now there are two things that are really inhibiting to war. One is that the man in the street—and he has one ear of the political leadership in any country, while maybe the military experts and others have the other ear—the man in the street is very, very afraid of nuclear weapons and he does not want nuclear war to come.

On the other hand, even in the other ear, the military talking to political leadership are also, if not afraid of them—and they are afraid of them—they also feel that the improbabilities, the impossibility of understanding how it would turn out, makes it so that they cannot give the kind of advice that would say, "Let us go, let us try to do it."

So, first of all, there is that. Now, if, God forbid, for some reason all that deterrence failed and we had to use nuclear weapons, then what we would have to do is make a decision.

And by the way, I would not make that decision. My subordinate commanders would make a recommendation to me. I would make a recommendation to the North Atlantic Council. That recommendation from there would go to the President of the United States and to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the decisions would be made at those levels, either modifying this or providing the decision directly as it was recommended.

And then it would be, can we use—and the question would have to come at that time: Can we use a nuclear weapon to stop this war and be fairly well assured ourselves that this does not mean an escalation to something more general? That would be the first thing.

Now, the strategy of NATO, to which the United States has subscribed, is that if necessary we would go beyond that point to a general nuclear response. That is what the strategy says, direct defense; deliberate escalation is the second phase; and general nuclear response is the third phase.

Now, that is a strategy of threat that says, that is what we would do. The thing is, would we do that? That is the question for the Warsaw Pact to try to decide.

Senator ADAMS. The only reason we are involved in the conventional here is because testimony comes before us and statements are made that without the SS-20 we have no ability to maintain the NATO alliance or defend ourselves. And many of us take the position that the removal of the SS-20 enhances our security in that area.

I am informed—and I do not want classified information, but I am informed that in West Germany right now there are more tanks than Hitler had at any point in World War II. Is that correct?

General GALVIN. There are more tanks in Allied Command Europe than Hitler took into France for example.

Senator ADAMS. What we are dealing with are two things. First, I like your description of it—that we are trying to create uncertainty in the mind of anybody that might attack.

And, second, that the general force strategy of the Soviet Union has been a concern of NATO, an offensive strategy based on the old Stalin notion that we do not want to fight on Russian soil, plus a 4- or 5-to-1 advantage before taking on such an attack.

Is that not the kind of qualitative thing that we have been looking at?

General GALVIN. That is the major portion of Soviet strategy. Their strategy would be to do what you say and at the same time to try to keep it conventional, with an overwhelming conventional attack.

And part of that strategy would be to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe on the side of NATO, to get them out of there so that the overwhelming conventional capability would be able to be brought to bear, either in an attack or in intimidation.

Senator ADAMS. Are you satisfied that the negotiations that we have restarted on mutual force are focusing on the appropriate parts of the qualitative changes in, say, offensive Soviet posture and potential use of our defenses?

General GALVIN. I think we have started in the right direction. This is if you are talking about conventional force reductions, and I think you are——

Senator ADAMS. A long time, but that we are started in the right direction in those discussions?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator ADAMS. I will not ask you about mutual assured destruction and whether offensive and defensive weapons change that because we had other witnesses testify on it.

My time has run out, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, General. I appreciate your forthright testimony.

General GALVIN. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Adams.

We have all had a question except for Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am going to pass, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are coming around for our second round, and I have a couple questions I would like to ask. Is it correct that NATO spends more on defense than the Warsaw Pact, or is that an incorrect statement?

General GALVIN. That is a correct statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the ratio, do you know?

General GALVIN. That is a very difficult question, as you know. I know the Soviet Union, puts something over 15 percent of gross national product into weaponry.

The CHAIRMAN. Who has more active duty and reserve manpower in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, NATO or the Warsaw Pact?

General GALVIN. The Warsaw Pact does.

The CHAIRMAN. And would you include France and Spain in that calculation?

General GALVIN. No, because the French military forces are not committed to NATO, and neither are the Spanish.

The CHAIRMAN. But would it not in fact, if there were any kind of general hostility, be inconceivable that the French would not commit their forces?

General GALVIN. It is inconceivable, and in that sense—I also put this in a qualitative way. I would not put Spanish forces in because the Spanish forces so far have said they are committed, that is the ground forces, to defend Spain, not NATO, or at least only that part of NATO.

If you add the French forces in, the manpower balance is still somewhat in favor of the Warsaw Pact.

The CHAIRMAN. And when it comes to air superiority, do you think the Warsaw Pact can gain air superiority over NATO, or do you?

General GALVIN. The Warsaw Pact has about a 2-to-1 ratio in combat aircraft to NATO.

The CHAIRMAN. When it comes to the infantry and the ground, antitank weapons, do we have more or does the Warsaw Pact have more?

General GALVIN. In terms of the tank as an antitank weapon, the Warsaw Pact has more on a ratio of about 3-to-1. If you add in all the antitank weapons on both sides plus all the tanks, I do not have that figure. I could try to find that.

An antitank weapon, for example, could be also an aircraft, which is a very good antitank weapon. But if you mean, for example, antitank missilery or antitank guns——

The CHAIRMAN. Antitank vehicles.

General GALVIN. And antitank vehicles, there are some of those.

I do not know a figure like that, because—and there is a great difficulty, unless you take—well, there is a great difficulty in this because artillery also figures as an inhibitor of tank movement, and so forth.

But if, Mr. Chairman, you are asking that in the full mix of combat do we still have the preponderance of what we might call armored mobility on the side of the Soviets, I would say, on the side of the Warsaw Pact, I would say "Yes," the preponderance is still on the side of the Warsaw Pact.

Senator ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a moment for one quick question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator ADAMS. General, I have heard it said, not talking about numbers but in terms of aircraft and qualitative abilities, that NATO has, tactical air superiority in the first 2 weeks in Europe. Is that incorrect?

I do not need the numbers. I just want to know, tactical or nontactical air superiority over the battle front.

General GALVIN. We do not have tactical air superiority over the battle front in the first 2 weeks or at any other time, that we can say we can get tactical superiority. We can get probably local superiority in certain areas that we want to cover in corridors and so forth, and that is what we would have to do.

But we do not have superiority over the entire front.

Senator ADAMS. Over corridors, but not the front?

General GALVIN. Yes, we can gain local superiority, and so can they.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for interrupting.

The CHAIRMAN. General Galvin, how will the announced pullout of the F-16's in Spain affect the security of the alliance?

General GALVIN. It will hurt the security of the alliance by a substantial amount if it were pulled out and, let us say, brought back and taken off the books. It amounts to—in an unclassified thing, I would say it amounts to more than one-quarter of the combat fighter strike aircraft, of the strike aircraft in the southern region.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a little confused, but as I read the stories the problem is that the F-16's are very close to Madrid and the people are complaining in Madrid. If it was moved to another part of Spain, would there still be that problem? Or is it that they should not be in Spain at all?

General GALVIN. The position of the Spanish Government has been that the wing must leave Spain, as I understand it. I hesitate here because, as you know, Ambassador Bartholomew is our negotiator on that and I have not been directly into that.

My understanding is that there is no room for the 401st to be in Spain at all according to the Spanish.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, you mentioned earlier in your testimony the Montebello decision. Would you try to outline for the sake of the record your understanding of the Montebello decision, and the obligations undertaken by the alliance?

General GALVIN. The Montebello decision was a decision that took place, first of all, in Montebello, Canada, in 1983, when the defense ministers of NATO got together and issued a communique, when NATO—an official NATO communique came out saying that we among other things, need modernization on the nuclear side and conventional side.

And it listed certain general areas where that modernization should take place. It was a result of an earlier meeting and then of course it was followed up, the latest time being in Monterey, CA, a few months ago.

All of those meetings had to do with the questions of the balance of nuclear weapons and also the questions of nuclear and conventional modernization.

Senator LUGAR. There is a general impression that the modernization effort has not moved forward very substantially, that there have been hangups along the way, either political or financial.

Could you describe or at least characterize the progress made in implementing the Montebello decisions, and what sorts of barriers exist to full implementation?

General GALVIN. The Montebello decisions have been reasonably well carried forward, both on the conventional side and on the nuclear side. On the nuclear side, for example, one of the decisions was to build and field a modernized nuclear artillery round that was better than the other round.

By the way, part of the decisions were also at that time to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons in Europe by well over 1,000.

That artillery modernization has taken place. There was a limit placed on the number of modernized rounds, which I would like to see the Congress lift, but that is another question.

There was a modernization of—aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons. That was also done.

There were things that were to be done in what we call follow-on forces attack, in other words striking the second echelon if an attack began against us. Some of the work in that area has already been done.

I would say that a substantial amount of modernization has taken place as a result of things that happened at Montebello. I followed those things up, by the way, with a more formal request to countries, which is called force goals.

This is a biennial request which I make to the United States and the other 12 countries of allied command Europe based on that kind of guidance. And the response to that has been quite good. There are still large gaps.

If you look at percentagewise in terms of what we thought Montebello meant and where we are right now, I would say we are maybe 20 or 30 percent of the way along the road. But that is substantial, and we just need to continue what we are doing, not to add something new because of the INF Treaty that we did not have, just to go along the lines of what we said we needed.

It was a good long-range forecast and I think we should still follow it.

Senator LUGAR. So, just to reiterate, each year you attempt to further the Montebello decision by sending these force goal requests to each of the NATO members?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator LUGAR. And you are charting, therefore, what gaps remain. And that influences, obviously, the requests that you make?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, it does.

Senator LUGAR. And in noting that about 30 percent of the force goals may have been achieved, does this assume the Montebello decisions were long range or at least intermediate range in nature?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. That all parties knew this would be a rather lengthy process?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir. And right now, for example, at Monterey we reaffirmed the Montebello decisions. And then in the spring now, there will be two meetings, of the nuclear planning group and another group that is a nonnuclear meeting.

Both of those will occur before next summer, and those will get more specific, and should be interesting meetings, in which we see what precisely the countries are going to agree to do in the immediate future.

I hope when those meetings occur that there will not be some kind of euphoria about INF and everyone will say: "Well, the danger is all over now, we do not need to do these things." I am a little bit worried about that. I guess that is why I keep bringing it up.

Senator LUGAR. General, in the Armed Services Committee hearings on the INF Treaty there has been considerable preoccupation with article 14 of the treaty. There has been some mention of this article in this committee, along with the fear that article 14 might constrain fulfillment of the Montebello force goals.

Most witnesses has come to the conclusion that our modernization programs would not be constrained. The Secretary of Defense, as I recall, testified to that effect.

Have you examined article 14? And does it constitute a barrier to the achievement of the force goals laid down in the Montebello decision?

General GALVIN. I have looked at article 14. I am no lawyer in this and I am not the final word, obviously, on what article 14 means. I do not know who is, by the way.

But I do not see really major problems with article 14. I do wonder if article 14 means that in the area of 500 to 5,500 kilometers on ground-launched missiles, whether that would mean we would not be able to cooperate in joint efforts with other countries.

I know it means we cannot build a certain type of missile ourselves, and I do not know if it means we cannot cooperate with someone else. It probably would be a good idea to know that, for whatever it is worth.

And there could be other ramifications of article 14, Senator. I really am not an expert in it and would hesitate to go down in history as saying anything in particular about article 14 in a way that could be definitive, because it is just too hard for me to read that treaty and understand that article that way.

Senator LUGAR. Well, for obvious reasons it is an important consideration for you and for this committee, as Senators think about ratification of the treaty.

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. I would ask you to pursue, at least for your own professional knowledge and responsibility, the meaning of article 14 and, as you come up with a judgment, to inform members of this committee?

I ask that respectfully, because when we get to the floor of the Senate article 14, for a variety of reasons, will be the subject of a considerable amount of debate. And therefore the judgments of those who literally are on the firing line, with the responsibility for the fulfillment of our NATO force goals, will be very important.

I appreciate that you may not have immersed yourself for the moment in this area. But at some point you will need to, because at some point interpretations of article 14 will likely influence your own recommendations and requests to NATO members on force goals.

General Galvin. I do need to do that, and I have asked a lawyer to look at article 14 for me, and he did. And what he said is what I have told you, and that is that there is the possibility in article 14—now, this is one lawyer's view—that the meaning of article 14 would be in the sense that we could not get ourselves involved in cooperative efforts with other countries in the ground-launched missile in the range from 500 to 5,500 kilometers.

Senator Lugar. Well, there appears to be some disagreement among expert witnesses on that point. So, I do not want to carry forward the point at this time. But would you review that issue and be responsive to the committee, as you try to clarify article 14 with the Department of Defense and the Department of State, so that there is some common understanding in the alliance?

General Galvin. Yes, Senator, I will do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

The meaning of Article XIV of the INF Treaty is of concern to US European Command in three primary areas: 1) Article XIV should impose no restrictions on ongoing modernization programs for remaining NATO nuclear forces; 2) Article XIV should support the position that our continued modernization and restructuring do not circumvent the INF Treaty; and 3) Article XIV should protect our ability to continue existing patterns of cooperation and to engage in cooperative modernization efforts with our Allies.

I recently reviewed the approved US Government position on Article XIV which can be summarized as follows: Article XIV Simply reflects the duty of each party under customary international law to comply with the Treaty. Article XIV is not to be viewed as a "non-circumvention" provision nor does it affect existing programs of Allied cooperation (i.e., the FRG Pershing 1A program). Also, Article XIV does not preclude cooperation with our Allies in modernization or prohibit production and transfer of non-treaty limited components such as guidance elements, technology or blueprints.

After review, I find the USG interpretation eases my concerns about Article XIV and is a reasonable position for dealing with Alliance cooperation issues.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Adams.

Senator Adams. No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Kassebaum. General, I would like to pursue for a minute the conventional weapons. And you make a point in your prepared remarks about the importance of conventional arms control.

You mentioned also that the Soviets have really turned on the steam in improving the Warsaw Pact's conventional strength in Europe. Do you think indeed that they have escalated their defenses there? And if so, is their interest in conventional arms control for public relations purposes?

How serious do you think they might be in really looking at conventional arms control? And what do you think the prospects are for any successful negotiations?

General Galvin. Well, Senator, I find it somewhat ironic that in the time of Gorbachev's control as General Secretary the conventional forces have enjoyed a higher production of military capabilities—and I am talking about aircraft and weaponry and so forth—than even before that. The curve, in other words, slanted upward a little bit higher—not a little bit, but——

Senator **Kassebaum**. Tanks as well?

General **Galvin**. In tanks as well, yes, ma'am. And I find that ironic.

I do not know why that should take place at this time, when he seems to be talking about cutting down on the threatening posture of the Soviet Union. Maybe there is a realization that we might go into conventional arms reductions and he is establishing a better position from which to do that, a better base.

I do not know. But the fact is that everything I find in the intelligence that is available to me is that the Soviets have actually increased production in the past 5 years over what they were doing before.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Do we work closely with the NATO allies in establishing priorities within the needs of the structure? By that I mean, I think you have some very persuasive points in your statement about stockpiling and the need for additional warehouse space and some of these things that we do not think about that often, I suppose the sort of nuts and bolts of some of these.

Are these priorities that are laid out within the NATO structure?

General **Galvin**. Yes, Senator. First I have a structure called the Conceptual Military Framework which provides guidance to nations on deficiencies that need correction over the longer term. There is also a NATO Defense Planning System which . . . embodies what is called country chapters. In those country chapters, the defense capability of each country and goals for improvement are established. I send a team of staff officers to the country, say Norway, and they study the situation of that country today.

And they come back and say: Here is how Norway looks in terms of its defenses and its industrial capabilities and the possibilities that it has to provide for better defenses. Then I create from that—and this is all in a two year cycle—a set of force proposals eventually adopted as NATO force goals for that country to achieve.

We then go through a series of meetings and argue with the country, saying that these force goals are, in our opinion the military improvements that must be achieved. Then the country comes back to us with a form that is called the Defense Planning Questionnaire. This annual questionnaire is really a series of detailed questions and answers addressing a country's defense capabilities and plans.

In effect it says in a formal way, signed off by that country's prime minister or the minister of defense, this is what we will provide to NATO on how we will respond to your force goals. Now, there are always differences.

By the way, we do this with the United States, too.

Senator **Kassebaum**. This is what the United States will do or what NATO will do?

General **Galvin**. This is what all the NATO countries will do. I used Norway as an example, but any of the countries would do depending on the status of that country and so forth.

Each one has to come back and respond to force goals, respond not just to me, but to the NATO military and political authorities as well and a report goes to the North Atlantic Council.

So, in other words, each country responds to all the others every year on its 5-year plan for defense. And that country can be criticized by the other countries either for not doing enough or for not having the right set of priorities or for leaving some vital requirement out. Through this process we influence NATO's defense spending so each country can better support NATO military requirements as a whole.

We have a series also of areas that we consider to be key and vital to the defense. Each one of those is analyzed. So, that is the way the NATO process works.

There is a different process in my command of U.S. European Command, which is the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines in Europe. It works somewhat differently. It has been affected lately, affected in a positive way, by the JCS reform. But it works somewhat differently.

Senator KASSEBAUM. A lingering controversy in our NATO budget considerations is really the balance in the pursuit of advanced technology, which of course we talk more about, I think, and it is more headline-grabbing, versus the more standard needs, our stockpiles, improving our readiness capability and the sustainability, which I thought was interesting in your written comments.

Do you feel we have correctly balanced those needs?

General GALVIN. Not entirely, but I do feel that I have had, for example, this year just a few weeks ago my chance to say at the defense resources board, which is a meeting of all the CINC's and all the service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense together, prior to the submission of the budget, which is another thing that has been brought about really specifically by the Secretary of Defense, but it goes in line with the JCS reform.

And all of us as CINC's were able to come in there and say: "This is where we still feel, even after submission of our integrated priority lists and so forth, that we are not getting the support we should get from the services."

Then the services were in the room. The chiefs of the services were there, and they could argue this out with us and say: "You do not understand; we are already making great sacrifices for you," and so forth.

I feel right now that, yes, we do need to do just what you said, Senator. We need to put the appropriate amount of emphasis on sustainment and not make sustainment pay for emphasis in other areas.

I would have to add parenthetically that I am satisfied that I had my say in this year, and that the budget this year does do that.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So, you feel comfortable with the reflection of the priorities in the recommendations you are making?

General GALVIN. Yes, I do. We still have a long way to go, but I am comfortable that this year and the ensuing years we are pointed in the right direction to correct our deficiencies.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, your timing is magnificent. And so is mine. I apologize.

I prefer to do the best I can in coming and going, and will not take the time of the committee at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there are no more questions here.

Senator MURKOWSKI. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, but I am not going to belabor it. I am sure the perception of my colleagues follows that of my own in many ways, and the record will indicate the concerns and questions that were addressed to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN Thank you very much indeed, General Galvin.

The record will stay open for a day or two so that any further questions can be asked of you for the record. I thank you and congratulate you for the succinctness and openness of your testimony.

And the committee will meet again at 10 tomorrow morning, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee is recessed, adjourned until 10 tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10:00 a.m., on February 4, 1988.]

THE INF TREATY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Cranston, Adams, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, and Pressler.

Senator SARBANES [presiding]. The committee will come to order. Chairman Pell has been held up, but will be along shortly. He has asked that Senator Lugar and I proceed with getting the hearing underway.

Today the Committee on Foreign Relations is very pleased to have as its witnesses Admiral Crowe, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Trost, Chief of Naval Operations; General Welch, Air Force Chief of Staff; and General Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The independent, and I repeat, independent, views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be of particular importance to the committee as it weighs the military implications of the INF Treaty for the United States and NATO.

Accordingly, we look forward to receiving from you your informed judgments as to the current state of NATO's security, as well as your judgments as to whether this treaty is fully consistent with our own national security interests and with the security of the alliance.

Gentlemen, you represent the highest military levels in the United States, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.

I see our chairman has arrived. He may want to add to my opening remarks.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. I am very grateful to you for having started. Without reading your remarks I can know in advance I am sure I agree with them, and welcome you.

And I apologize for being late. It is not my custom. But you and I were at the same breakfast, only you had more efficient transportation, I think, in getting here than did I. [Laughter.]

I do apologize to all of you for being a few moments late. And I thank again Senator Sarbanes for getting the hearing underway, because all of us are interested in your testimony.

If you would move along just as Senator Sarbanes suggested, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral CROWE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Pell and I were both at the prayer breakfast. I thought it was appropriate, Mr. Chairman, that I do some praying before I came here this morning.

We welcome the opportunity to testify on behalf of the INF Treaty. I have submitted a statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, and I believe that each Chief of service also has a statement. With your permission I will submit that and will only summarize it this morning.

I might say as a prefacing remark that Senator Sarbanes stressed the word "independent." I assure you, Senator, that the views you will hear this morning from the Chiefs are their own, their sincere views, and their independent views.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will just summarize my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Please, and we hope to hear also from your colleagues, because I realize this is a joint presentation.

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral CROWE. Clearly, the North Atlantic Alliance has evolved dramatically since World War II. In particular the predominant position of the United States gradually changed as the European nations recovered economically, assumed a larger role in NATO, and reached out to the world in general.

Yet our political and military participation in NATO still makes a crucial difference. Certainly the U.S. strategic umbrella is vital to NATO. Especially for allies possessing no nuclear arsenals of their own.

Part and parcel of European expectations is a viable linkage between continental based conventional forces, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic systems.

Similarly, the allies are deeply interested in preserving the transatlantic coupling. Our military presence of 300,000 troops in Europe, and our maritime strength are central elements of that partnership.

Moreover, I would argue strongly that the U.S. role in shoring up international peace and security outside the treaty area contributes heavily to NATO's well-being, and the members willing to put their forces on the line in this fashion should receive credit in the realm of burdensharing.

NATO's general military objectives have remained constant and consistent from the outset. To deter a pact assault, to defend forward if attacked, and to restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

The strategy for achieving these objectives is set forth in MC 14/3, a NATO document which was adopted in 1967 to provide a more credible replacement for the earlier doctrine of massive retaliation.

Under the new flexible response, no one proposed to fold the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But much more emphasis was placed on direct defense by conventional forces and the selective and discriminate use of theater nuclear weapons.

Such a strategy, to be successful, depended on constant and adequate investments across the spectrum of weaponry from conventional to strategic. It is a lesson NATO has had difficulty absorbing.

On the other hand, the Kremlin has continued its policy of steady improvements at all levels, and over time has confronted NATO not only with strategic parity but an adverse balance in theater nuclear and conventional forces.

As a consequence, the JCS, after a number of years, has been disturbed about the adverse military balance and the high level of military risk in Western Europe.

Of special concern to the Chiefs is the low level of sustainability items and munitions supporting non-U.S. formations, as well as shortcomings in infrastructure and command, control, and communications.

Despite NATO's progress in other areas, these deficiencies have lowered the nuclear threshold and increased the risk of general escalation.

To help relieve these problems, the United States and NATO have for some years been engaged in a serious arms reduction dialog with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The result has been two SALT agreements, and in the case of conventional weapons 14 years of frustrating talks. That is, MBFR.

Unfortunately, these efforts did not prevent the Kremlin from deploying intermediate-range missiles capable of striking every nation on and around the Eurasian continent. Consequently, by the late 1970's, NATO moved to the dual-track decision, followed ultimately by INF negotiations, a global solution, and the treaty we address today.

This brings me to the treaty itself. Each party to the INF accord, the United States and the USSR, each party has agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate- and shorter range missiles and related support structures and equipment.

This includes ground-launched ballistic and Cruise missiles within the range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Existing classes of missiles to be eliminated by the parties are specified by type in the treaty text.

Overall, nothing about this document makes Europe safe for another conventional war, nor does it eliminate the risk of a nuclear war. Yet successful implementation of this agreement will reverse a 40-year buildup, during which Western Europe has become the most militarized region in the world and eliminate completely two classes of very destructive, short warning nuclear weapons systems.

The INF Treaty clearly validates the proposition that the United States and its allies must negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. In this regard, deployment of U.S. Pershing missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles to Europe made the crucial difference.

Had we not done so, the Soviets would have retained a decisive advantage in intermediate- and shorter range missiles. Instead, they have agreed to give them up.

Obviously, Moscow would not have signed a treaty conferring enormous military advantages on the West. Nonetheless, there is substantial benefits for the United States and for its allies.

The Soviets have agreed to an asymmetric reduction in military capabilities, favoring the United States in numerical terms by a ratio in the neighborhood of 4-to-1. This asymmetrical reduction is politically significant. A very valuable precedent for future arms negotiations.

Militarily, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe surrenders the ability to hit some important targets with ground-launched missiles; in particular, aim points deep inside the Warsaw Pact and in the Soviet Union itself.

There is little doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing the Pershings because of their rapid, accurate, deep-strike capability. That was an influential element in moving them toward a double-zero approach.

On the other hand, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters. They will no longer have the capacity to hit with ground-launched theater ballistic missiles Great Britain, Spain, France, Italy, and a large part of Turkey.

Or to strike with these weapons many of our prepositioned major equipment sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe, thereby enhancing our ability to reinforce NATO.

Next, this agreement excludes all strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, while eliminating the ground-launched intermediate- and short-range missile threat to these same systems.

Additionally, we have long been worried about the Soviets attacking NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are. But at least two of the significant shorter range delivery systems with CW capabilities, that is the SS-12's and the SS-23's, will fall out of the Soviet order of battle as a result of the INF accord.

Finally, a key factor is the global reach of this treaty. With the SS-20's, the Soviets can range virtually all of mainland Asia, plus Japan, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and a portion of Alaska. Our Asian friends and allies are greatly relieved that the INF Treaty will erase this threat.

With respect to verification of compliance, this agreement relies on two basic methods. National technical means will be the principal method of regularly monitoring Soviet compliance with the treaty. And the parties have in turn agreed not to interfere with each other's national technical means.

To buttress these systems, the treaty includes the unprecedented right of onsite inspections set forth in the inspection protocol. That is, baseline, closeout, elimination, short notice inspections. And also portal monitoring of selected facilities.

Of particular U.S. interest is the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk, where SS-20 missiles formerly were assembled.

Under this treaty we will witness the actual destruction of around 1,700 deployed and nondeployed missiles of the U.S.S.R. In this regard, the total ban on ground-launched intermediate- and shorter range missiles simplifies the detection process. The discovery of even one missile will demonstrate noncompliance.

While no verification system is perfect, the total web of all intelligence resources, plus organizational and equipment improvements already in train, provide high competence that we can effectively assess and verify Soviet compliance with the treaty over time.

Suffice it to say, our discovery of violations would run counter to everything General Secretary Gorbachev is trying to achieve in his public diplomacy. In this broader political context, cheating on the INF Treaty would be a very risky business, and involve extremely high stakes.

Throughout, we must maintain a strong resolve to blow the whistle on Soviet noncompliance and to deploy such forces as may be necessary to offset any military advantage they might seek to gain by breaking out of the INF accord through violations.

Equally important is an understanding of what the treaty does not do in terms of NATO defense. As to arms control, it is only a first step if we are to reduce the worrisome imbalances between East and West.

The treaty has little impact on NATO's fundamental strategy. The United States will retain a spectrum of capabilities to selectively execute NATO strategy of flexible response.

Further, no arms control treaty has ever prevented the Soviets from shifting resources from one military pocket into another. Undoubtedly, this aspect of the arms control process is frustrating to parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic.

It would be a grave mistake, however, for the United States and its NATO allies to cut back on force improvement programs allowed by the INF Treaty while leaving the Soviets a free hand to pursue their own military agenda.

More to the point, it is imperative for the alliance to take stock of its military posture at this time and to examine preparations for the long haul. As mentioned previously, NATO has historically had difficulty keeping pace with Soviet building programs and improvements in their theater nuclear and conventional postures.

Within NATO councils, this challenge has within recent years provoked a number of steps. The 1983 Montebello decision to reduce and modernize NATO nuclear forces in Europe, the conceptual military framework designed to give the alliance a fully integrated concept for defense, recent force goals supporting the conventional defense improvements program, and cooperative research and development programs encouraged by the Nunn-Warner amendment.

Overall, these NATO efforts provide an excellent bridge to the future. As a leader of the alliance, the United States likewise must seriously address the crucial issues confronting NATO. And there is no better time than now, as we implement the INF Treaty.

What the Chiefs prefer, of course, is to develop an integrated concept for the future that strengthens all of NATO, lays out a course for our representatives to pursue in alliance councils, guides U.S. investment strategy, and receives the strong support of the Congress.

We are working hard to bring together such a concept in the Pentagon now. Part and parcel of this approach is recent work by OSD on long-term competitive strategies—a concept design to get the most out of our acquisition process.

As Secretary Carlucci's report to Congress on support for NATO strategy in the 1990's notes, competitive strategies is not a substitute for NATO conventional defense improvements. The allies must move forward to correct critical deficiencies in infrastructure, munitions, C3, sustainability, and a number of other areas.

We intend to continue to press our NATO friends to see the conventional defense improvements through to completion. Still, the two efforts have one thing in common. Both call for the exploitation of new technologies to blunt the initial attack and to counter follow-on forces of the pact.

Concurrently, the JCS believe that it is essential to press forward with nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress. For the most part, the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems permitted by the treaty, and bolstered by NATO's common R&D programs; for instance, a tactical missile system follow-on to Lance, with possible adaptation of the multiple launch rocket system and artillery-fired atomic projectiles. Plus, a tactical air-to-surface missile to enhance the effectiveness of dual-capable aircraft and to provide greater survivability.

Again, I stress, many of these systems build upon common R&D efforts already underway. Depending upon warhead selection, these weapons can be used as theater nuclear forces, or to strengthen conventional units, or both.

Likewise, the JCS are examining in conjunction with their NATO counterparts the in-theater disposition of our European-based forces, which are not covered by the INF Treaty, to see if these force patterns make sense in the light of new circumstances.

Overall, we are trying to get as much deterrence and defense as possible for NATO out of technologies embedded in the coalitions ongoing programs. Essentially, mature technologies, which can be fielded over the next few years. In my view, as we approach those years, we cannot afford business as usual.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, it is important to underscore the consequences of not ratifying this treaty. As Secretary Carlucci observed before your committee, we could expect to see a continued buildup of Soviet intermediate- and shorter range missiles in Europe and Asia, deployment of the already-tested SS–20 follow-on weapon, and the SSX–4 ground-launched Cruise missile, and further momentum in fielding the recently introduced SS–23.

Certainly, that would be a quantum step backward for NATO. For NATO, and also in our arms reductions efforts, which have been striving asymmetrical agreements designed to enhance United States and allied security.

Thus, the JCS have unanimously concluded, Mr. Chairman, that on balance this treaty is militarily sufficient and effectively verifiable. In turn, they believe that this accord is in the best interests of the United States and its allies and strongly recommend its ratification by the U.S. Senate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Crowe may be found in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Crowe. And maybe your colleagues, if any of them wish to make a brief statement.

Admiral CROWE. I think they have summaries, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Vuono, General Welch, please proceed in your order of seniority, whatever it is, I do not know.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CARL E. VUONO, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General VUONO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity also to appear before you today to express my support for ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and address its implications for the military capabilities needed to ensure that the alliance can continue to execute its strategy and achieve its security objectives.

The INF Treaty does not change the strategy of the alliance, which has served us so well through some dangerous times. While I remain uncomfortable with the relative NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities, the requirements for deterrence and defense can still be met.

The treaty is equitable and verifiable, and therefore I support its ratification. The treaty will enhance Western security by reducing the threat to NATO forces, territory, and installations, while also reducing the threat to United States friends and allies in Asia.

It establishes a precedent for asymmetrical reductions. And, the treaty includes the strictest verification regime in the history of our arms control negotiations.

With an eye to the future, I also believe the utility of this treaty in our continuing search for security will be determined by what we do in its wake more than it will be by the treaty's own considerable merits.

NATO can and will maintain its strategy without INF missiles. But it will also have to continue to improve and adapt its other forces. Deterrence depends not only on force capabilities, but also on Warsaw Pact perceptions of NATO's will to execute the strategy.

This in turn requires a strong and healthy transatlantic bond. The presence of substantial modern U.S. combat forces on the continent, in my view, is a major contributor to alliance capabilities and cohesion, which we should not underestimate.

We must ensure that the military forces required to execute our strategy continue to be adequate when compared to the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.

The strategy requires continuing the nuclear modernization efforts initiated by the 1983 Montebello decision of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group in order to maintain the deterrent value of our forces. And I believe Congress must lift legislative restrictions that currently hamstring our nonstrategic nuclear programs.

On the conventional side, the all too evident growth in Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities have impelled NATO to make substantial improvements in its conventional capabilities in the past several years. But much remains to be done.

We are not yet closing the gap, and visible, effective, conventional force improvements are essential investments we and our allies must make to maintain deterrence. Security in Europe can also be enhanced, in my view, by negotiated reductions in the conventional threat.

If the Soviets recognize that their prospects for entering the 21st century as a prosperous nation will increase by reducing the threat they pose to their neighbors, then conventional arms control may become an increasingly important parallel path to enhancing security.

Conventional arms control must be viewed as a complement to, but not a substitute for, our commitment to modernize our conventional forces. Our alliance's key objective in any conventional agreement should be an improvement of NATO's capability to defend itself, and therefore to deter war.

We should not hesitate to demand major changes in Soviet capabilities. Their forces have been deliberately designed, sized, structured, and deployed for theaterwide offensive operations. We can and should adjust to a changing threat; but to changing capabilities, not merely to stated intentions.

The INF Treaty, in and of itself, is a good treaty. But treaties are not ends in themselves. The INF Treaty is but one step in the process of securing peace with freedom. Subsequent steps must make sense in light of our security needs.

In conclusion, I support ratification of the treaty, as well as the continued nuclear and conventional force modernization that our strategy of flexible response demands. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Vuono appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Vuono. General Welch.

STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General WELCH. I would just add a few comments, Mr. Chairman.

In my view, the provisions of the INF Treaty improve NATO's balance of theater nuclear forces vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, and also permit the alliance to continue to improve its forces, to continue to underwrite the flexible response strategy in the years to come.

Those forces must operate both to deter the Soviets and to fulfill our objectives, should deterrence fail. My concern is not whether the treaty permits sufficient forces to do that, it clearly does. My concern is with the necessary program and budget support to provide those forces, and that is a separate issue entirely from the treaty.

I would agree there are legitimate concerns about the possibility of Soviet cheating. But I would emphasize the verifiable benefits to the alliance of the Soviets' destruction of deployed systems capable of delivering some 1,600 warheads, and the total of deployed and nondeployed systems capable of delivering some 3,000 warheads.

So while it is possible in spite of that destruction for the Soviets to retain a small cheater force, it would present them with formidable difficulties in maintaining them for any period of time in any posture that would be militarily significant. And the military utility of such a force would be limited.

We have insisted on a verification regime that is sufficient to reveal cheating, or any cheating that would significantly affect our deterrent posture. However, I would add to comments that you have already heard that both the ability to detect cheating and the will to respond to cheating is necessary to make such cheating unprofitable for the Soviets.

Overall, it is my assessment that the terms of this treaty serve the national security interests of the United States and our worldwide allies. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Welch appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Welch. Admiral Trost.

STATEMENT OF ADM. C.A.H. TROST, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral TROST. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I would like to respond just very briefly to both and add my personal endorsement to the ratification of this very important treaty, and to address very briefly some of the maritime aspects of NATO forces, which are not normally part of the consideration of some of the dialog.

In my view, we have to keep in mind that even with entry into force of the INF Treaty, NATO will still retain reliable nuclear and conventional forces that possess capabilities which can effectively deter, and if necessary respond to, Soviet aggression.

The role of NATO's maritime forces and the contributions of those forces to NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent posture will be critical in a post-INF threat environment. Our carrier-based dual-capable tactical aircraft, our missile submarines, and our sea-launched Cruise missile capable surface combatants and submarines, all unaffected by this treaty, continue to remain available for employment in NATO's strategy of flexible response.

As Admiral Crowe noted earlier in his testimony, the Soviets have demonstrated an emerging concern about NATO's maritime strength. That concern is reflected in a growing number of Soviet proposals to curtail naval activity under the guise of military detente in Northern European waters. General Secretary Gorbachev's call for an arctic zone of peace encompassing the Baltic, the North, the Norwegian, and Greenland Seas, and Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov's call for a ban on antisubmarine activities in areas of the north and west Atlantic are specifically directed at NATO naval forces. Similarly, the General Secretary's warning that U.S. deployment of sea-launched Cruise missiles jeopardizes negotiations between superpowers on a 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear weapons is directed at Soviet concern over United States and NATO sea power.

NATO's wartime success is critically dependent upon sea lines of communication in the Atlantic for rapid reinforcement and resupply, as well as on those in the Pacific for sustained support. The Soviets know that, and understand that Western maritime strength is the guarantor of those sealines, and thus is the principal barrier to the global strategic objectives essential to their preferred strategy.

In a post-INF era, naval forces will also retain their inherent mobility and flexibility and their ability to apply discriminate force where necessary, essentially remaining under national control and requiring no other government's approval to operate in overseas areas. They remain free to respond quickly and unilaterally to crises that threaten U.S. national interests.

There will still be major imbalances between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional and nuclear forces after the provisions of an INF Treaty are effected. Those imbalances should be redressed in my view, and as previously stated by the chairman, primarily by deep and asymmetrical cuts through the demobilization of preponderant Soviet forces that can be brought to bear on the central front or elsewhere on the Soviet periphery within militarily significant timelines. In that regard, one of the most salient aspects of the INF Treaty for the future is its affirmation of the principle of asymmetrical reductions reflected in the treaty requirement for the Soviet Union to eliminate a greater number of weapons systems in order to achieve parity with the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to express my views on this subject, and let me again assure the committee that our views are personal and independent.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Trost appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Trost. General Gray.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ALFRED M. GRAY, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

General GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I, like my colleagues, have submitted a prepared statement. I would just very quickly summarize and say that any arms control agreement in my view must, of course, carry with it two precepts.

One would be that we must not allow a change in the military balance with respect to the superpowers, and we have to keep this within the global context. And second, of course, we have to have a regime for verifying these efforts.

My concerns are primarily that we keep this global balance, that we remember that we have to look at NATO not just as a continental military problem, but one indeed that has global implications.

The role of the sea services, particularly the amphibious forces, is predominantly on the flanks of NATO, the watery fronts of NATO, if you will, where we, through our capabilities, our operations, our training, our interface, provide a major reinforcement capability. And we also increase the uncertainty with respect to the Soviet Warsaw Pact by a major dimension.

The kinds of forces that we use to help protect the sea lines of communications to operate on the flanks of NATO are the same kinds of forces that we need to help protect the vital interests throughout the globe.

And therefore, your Marine Corps must concentrate on aggregate usefulness throughout this entire effort. And when we look at the force restructuring that must accompany the efforts to preserve the stability after the INF Treaty, should that be ratified, I would urge that we not take a myopic view with the central region of Europe, but keep in the mind the global aspects of this entire topic.

Having said all that, it would be my view that a treaty that reduces tension, and I believe the INF Treaty does, amongst the superpowers is a good one. And I support it, again, with the hope that we will look at it with a view toward maintaining our global balance of power. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Gray appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Now, we will limit ourselves, each of us, to 10 minutes for questioning, and I would like to start off by saying that the green light means my time is going on, a yellow light means 1 more minute left.

For the record, Admiral Crowe, the question is getting an answer specifically from each one of your colleagues and you that we may have to refer to in the course of debate, and as we move along with this treaty.

So, Admiral Crowe, standing alone, do you consider this treaty in line with our national security?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I think the approach that we have used in considering each of these efforts that we are engaged in is that each must stand alone on its own merits or demerits, that linkage with other things is not necessarily a good thing, and that it should benefit the security of the United States and our allies as we consider each arms control effort. That has been the approach of the Chiefs consistently. And to answer your question directly, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And could I assume that the answer would be yes for the other chiefs.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I would like for you to poll them, if you would.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us poll them. General Gray, would it be yes?

General GRAY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Trost.

Admiral TROST. Yes.

General WELCH. Yes.

General VUONO. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all very much. You already touched, Admiral Crowe, on the question of failure to ratify the treaty, that it would have a harmful effect on our military posture.

Would each of your colleagues agree with that? That not to ratify it would be harmful to our military posture? General Gray?

General GRAY. It would be my view that if we do not ratify the Treaty, it will cause us further imbalance in terms of military posture. And also a major impact in the geopolitical area.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Admiral Trost.

Admiral TROST. I concur, Mr. Chairman, that it would be adverse to our military balance. And also I concur with those who say it would be politically devastating with respect to our status in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. General Welch.

General WELCH. I think that is clearly true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Vuono.

General VUONO. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the most important criterion used to judge an arms control agreement has been whether or not it reduces the risk of nuclear or conventional war.

Do you believe that the elimination of the INF missiles will affect the calculation to initiate nuclear hostilities or a conventional war? I guess Admiral Crowe should answer that.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I certainly believe, as I said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, that it is in our interest that the reductions made on both sides favor the United States and the allies. And I would hope that yes, it does reduce the risk.

Now, the risk of nuclear war and the calculus of deterrence is very complicated. I think that when you address that question you must take into account a great many things besides the INF Treaty.

That was the thrust of my comments in my statement that had to do with NATO. We, for example, are not pleased with the balance in NATO today. And I am not just talking about theater nuclear weapons. I am talking about conventional weapons; I am talking about the whole spectrum of weaponry.

We believe that the risks are too high and the balance is adverse. And that we should be correcting that imbalance, as an alliance.

And with regard to the INF Treaty, while I believe it will be a wise thing from our standpoint, we will not necessarily be satisfied with the balance even after the INF Treaty is implemented. And we will not be satisfied with the level of deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any, I will not say demurring comments, but supplementary comments?

General GRAY. I would add, Mr. Senator, that in my view it is the strategic nuclear defense that is the deterrent, and it is the prime capability for deterring the holocaust we call nuclear war.

With respect to the removal of the intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, my own view is that that will be helpful, because it indirectly takes away some of the coercion and threatening capability that the Soviet Union holds over our NATO partners in that region.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Now, you suggested in your statement, Admiral Crowe, that modernization should come in the nuclear and conventional forces in NATO, but it is not assured.

Therefore, the committee must know whether your support for the INF Treaty is conditioned on this modernization. And more generally, I assume that we agree that the support at the highest military levels, which is you, for this treaty is unequivocal, unqualified, and unconditioned.

In other words, if the modernization does not occur, your support is still behind this treaty. Would that be a correct statement?

Admiral CROWE. That would be my view, Mr. Chairman. But I must warn you, you are going to hear an awful lot out of the Chiefs, at least out of me, about modernization.

The CHAIRMAN. That is understandable.

Admiral **Crowe**. I want to see it today whether we have an INF Treaty or not, and I want to see it after the INF Treaty.

But no, my approval and support for the INF Treaty would not be conditioned on that. And I would appreciate it if you would ask all of the Chiefs.

The **Chairman**. General Vuono.

General **Vuono**. Let me say that my support of the treaty also is not contingent on the modernization. However, the modernization of our conventional forces and our nonstrategic and strategic nuclear forces is critical.

We have been saying that, Mr. Chairman, for some time. And you will see in the Army programs a reflection of that to include those conventional systems that we must have, even before the INF Treaty and the improvements that we need in the nonstrategic nuclear systems.

So the modernization to give us the additional capability we need is essential.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. General Welch.

General **Welch**. I would just point out that the treaty does not create the need for modernization, nor does it obviate it.

I believe very strongly that the ongoing modernization programs, most of which were, and in the case of the Air Force, all of which, were identified well before there was any real promise for successful negotiation of the INF Treaty.

I would be greatly concerned if there were any suggestion that there is something about the INF Treaty that would allow us to stop that modernization or that would preclude that modernization, because I feel very strongly that we cannot afford to let that happen.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. Admiral Trost.

Admiral **Trost**. I would absolutely endorse the statements that you have already heard. Modernization is a necessity, pre- or post-INF Treaty.

I think the greatest danger to the ratification of the treaty or the result of the ratification of the treaty could be a sense of euphoria that overlooks reality, and says suddenly we have no need for our conventional capabilities, or to modernize those capabilities, which we must do to stay abreast of the threat.

The **Chairman**. Thank you. General Gray.

General **Gray**. I would concur with that. The modernization requirements, and I can speak somewhat freely here since our own programs are not involved, are clearly stated and needed. And they are based upon the aggregate threat that the Soviet Union and her friends pose to the Free World as we know it today, and independent of the arrangements that are included in the INF Treaty. And so I would urge that those force adjustments be accommodated.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, General Gray. This would be a more general question addressed to Admiral Crowe.

Do you think the prospects for conventional war are better or worse now than they were, say, 10 years ago?

Admiral **Crowe**. I do not see high prospects for a conventional war in the immediate future. A very personal view, Mr. Chairman.

But I consider that the calculus, as I said, of deterrence, and also of addressing those kinds of questions involves a great many uncertainties. Of course, by definition, our business is to be prepared for the possibility of war. And I do not rule it out in any sense. I do not rule out a major confrontation or hostilities with the Soviet Union. While I think the prospects or the probabilities are low right now, I would not rate them as zero by any means.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I would assume that the fifth armed service of the United States, the Coast Guard, would agree with your view.

Admiral CROWE. That last view I expressed, yes, sir. I do not want to represent the Coast Guard, though, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Understood. Thank you. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe in your testimony, you stress, and the chairman's questions have brought this to the fore, that the JCS believes it essential to press forward with the nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and that are currently in progress.

And you say, for the most part the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems permitted by the treaty. And you cite a tactical missile system that is to be a follow-on to Lance, and a tactical air-to-surface missile.

In these hearings, article 14 of the treaty, the so-called but misnamed noncircumvention clause, has come into focus because it is not clear precisely which modernization activities might continue and which might not under this treaty.

At least, this has not been clear to all Senators who have been raising the question. In your judgment, with regard to the modernization efforts that you believe essential for our defense and for the strength of NATO, are there any ambiguities in the treaty that you believe ought to be cleared up in the course of testimony?

And I raise this as an open question that may still be resolved by an authoritative statement by the Secretary of Defense, or by the Chiefs with the Secretary, which clarifies our point of view as to article 14, and what it permits.

This issue comes to the fore especially because of the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Shevardnadze, to Germany, and statements which he made which lead some of us to believe that the Soviet interpretation of article 14 might be different from our own.

Do you have a comment that would be helpful to us as we proceed in these deliberations?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I am not so sure it will be helpful to you, Senator. It is a very legal, or at least it can take a very legalistic turn. And I do not think anyone at this table professes to be a legal scholar or authority in that regard.

But our approach to the treaty has been, and we share this with the civilian side of the administration, that article 14 is not a noncircumvention article, and that it is just an obligation to carry out the provisions of the treaty.

And we, or I should say I, have interpreted the treaty, since I have been associated with it, as applying to those systems which are specified in it and not as preventing us from carrying out modernization actions that were underway prior to conclusion of the INF Treaty.

I had some conversations with Soviets during the summit, and constantly I was told that modernization would be permissible.

Never did that thought, that this treaty would prevent modernization, come up in the discussions that I had.

Now, I was not in the negotiations. Do not misunderstand me. But I do believe similarly that no matter what interpretation you put on the treaty, and no matter what we do, we will hear a great many statements out of the Soviet Union attempting to prevent us from modernizing or moving forward or improving our forces.

We have seen that now for 40 years. INF or no INF. And I do not anticipate that that pattern will change, unless Mr. Gorbachev, in the radical or revolutionary steps he talks about, changes the attitude, mood, and policy of his government. We have not seen that as yet.

So I am hesitant to put any credit to the fact that they are complaining. I do not find it particularly unusual or alarming. But I would like some of my colleagues to speak to that. Because what you say is a very important point. And we cannot afford to see our modernization stopped by Soviet polemics.

Admiral TROST. I would like to comment on that, if I may, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Yes, Admiral.

Admiral TROST. I look at that article as saying that the two sides, the two parties to the treaty, agree not to build, test, or deploy weapons of the type which are eliminated in the treaty.

I have noted an increasing amount of rhetoric from the Soviet Union, from Soviet officials, especially when they are visiting outside of the Soviet Union, aimed at those capabilities which we have which concern them, in our case, sea-launched Cruise missiles.

They have quite a campaign underway, and, as I noted in my brief introductory statement, a campaign to capture other capabilities by denying us the opportunity to employ our forces in areas where they see them as a threat to any adventures they might want to carry out.

So I think we need to be very careful not to box ourselves in with our own legalistic determinations, where that was not the intent of the treaty when negotiated.

Senator LUGAR. To follow through on that, Admiral, do I understand that you would not be in favor of illuminating or pinning down precisely the modernization projects we understand to be permitted by the treaty, lest other modernization requirements arise that we have not yet thought of.

I do not mean to put words in your mouth, but I am trying to suggest that disputes may arise in which the Soviets charge that we are deliberately circumventing the treaty through various modernization programs.

Perhaps we need to assert at the outset those programs of modernization that we think are clearly permitted. This is the gist of my suggestion.

Admiral TROST. I see what you are saying, and I would note that the treaty does very clearly delineate those missiles by type which are eliminated under the treaty itself.

The treaty also does not require the NATO countries to unilaterally abrogate the Montebello agreement, which very clearly sets forth our intent on the need for modernization. I have no doubt, nonetheless, that the Soviet Union will continue to attempt, at least in world opinion, to plant the seeds of doubt as to whether or not what we may be doing in any specific instance is valid and legal under the treaty.

I think we have to be very careful not to tie ourselves, even to just those things we have now talked about. Those are the near-term projects on which we should move forward.

Senator LUGAR. Let me just conclude by saying that I favor these modernization programs. I am not trying to think of ways in which they can be eliminated.

Prior to the time we get to the floor with this treaty, I would hope that, collectively, you would be thinking, along with the Secretary and others, about this potential problem area and how it ought to be clarified authoritatively when we come to the floor for final disposition on this treaty.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, may I add one thing?

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Admiral CROWE. I believe germane to your question, of course, is what the Soviets are doing.

We will be watching that very carefully, because I think what you do rather than what you say suggests what you think and how you look at the world. As you come closer to the ratification process, some of this would have to go into a closed hearing or in a classified area. But we would be glad to keep you apprised of that.

Senator LUGAR. Well, your advice and information will be very much appreciated, because it will surely influence the course of the debate.

Yesterday we heard some testimony from current and former U.S. ambassadors as to the military utility of the SS-20.

It was suggested by one witness that the SS-20 was primarily a political weapon, and that the Soviets will simply compensate for its elimination by retargeting SS-24's and SS-25's on Europe.

And further, since this treaty contains no limits on how many SS-25's and SS-24's could be produced and deployed, in essence the Soviets had not really given up a whole lot in this treaty. The other side of the testimony was that, by eliminating our Pershing II's, NATO has given up a great deal.

Let me just ask for your military judgment about the military utility of the SS-20.

And second, how readily do you believe the Soviets would be able to retarget, using SS-25's or SS-24's, those sites previously covered by the SS-20's? What utility is there for them in doing so and what are the drawbacks?

Admiral CROWE. I would ask General Welch to speak to that.

General WELCH. Yes, sir. The SS-20 is clearly a very well designed, very efficient weapons system for its intended purpose. And it is a three-warhead missile which has the kind of ranges required to cover the targets in Western Europe.

The Soviets have made a tremendous investment in fielding that number of SS-20's for that purpose. Clearly, those targets can be covered with other means, just as all of the targets that we have covered with GLCM and Pershing II can be covered with other systems.

But for the Soviets to give up that capability, acquired at considerable expense, and then to cover it with another approach which is much less efficient and much more expensive, would not seem to be a very sensible approach on the part of the Soviets.

As to the relative merits of what we gave up, we did give up 108 deployed, highly responsive, accurate ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets gave up 1,215 of the same kind of warheads of about the same quality. So I think that, while everything you postulate is possible, it does not make any sense from a military standpoint.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I have never understood why the Soviets are so concerned, et cetera, about our 108 warheads and we are very blase and bland about their 1,200. It does not make sense to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The first question I want to ask goes back to something I said in my opening statement and which Admiral Crowe picked up on earlier. On occasion it has been asserted that the testimony of the Joint Chiefs to the Congress was being given, in effect, within guidelines set by the administration.

My understanding has always been, and the Chiefs have always asserted this, that when they come before the Congress, which is an independent branch of the government, and are asked for their testimony by congressional committees, that they give that testimony as reflecting their own independent judgment and not necessarily as part of "the administration team."

They may in fact agree with the administration or they may not agree with it. Whatever the case is, the testimony they give reflects their own independent judgment.

And I would like to hear from you if that is the premise under which you are testifying here today.

Admiral CROWE. It certainly is, Senator. And could I say in elaboration, first of all, throughout the deliberations which preceded the INF Treaty—and I am talking about in the councils of our own Government—the Chiefs have been strong participants.

We have, in those preparations, had an input, and I believe that we think we have been influential—now this obviously involved at times a spirited dialog—and there have been a number of issues where we have taken positions and those positions have been adopted, and we felt very good about that.

We feel we were in the action. And I can say unequivocally that I have not witnessed pressure on us from our civilian masters or otherwise. And at least I know for myself, I can say this is a very genuine, sincere, and independent point of view, and any inference otherwise is dead wrong.

I would like to hear my colleagues.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I am obviously not making that inference, but I want to get this on the record in order to put it to rest in case someone else should make that assertion.

General VUONO. Senator, we have not only been involved, but we have been very, I believe, influential in some of the positions that have been taken in regard to this treaty. I have been a Chief since June 23 and we have spent a great deal of our time collectively and individually on all aspects of this treaty.

I would not come before you and urge ratification if I did not believe with my whole heart that it was the right move and in the right interest of this country.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

General Welch.

General WELCH. I have never been accused of not saying what I think, Senator. [Laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. Admiral Trost.

Admiral CROWE. I can testify to that. Both of these gentlemen, they tell me what they think all the time. [Laughter.]

Senator SARBANES. Admiral Trost.

Admiral TROST. I would further note that any taskmaster who attempted to get this group of five individuals in line on something on which they had basic disagreements would have a tough time indeed.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

General Gray.

General GRAY. Well, clearly I have obviously never rolled over in my life.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Now let me ask you about the issue of the conventional balance, on which I know you have some concerns. It is not clear to me why, as some have argued, eliminating the Soviet present advantage in Euro-missiles would make the conventional situation any worse for the West.

In other words, I cannot understand how the conventional problem which you have discussed is made worse by this treaty, since the treaty corrects one form of imbalance and would therefore seem to me to improve our overall security position.

Could you address that argument?

Admiral CROWE. You go ahead.

Admiral TROST. I think the conventional imbalance, which clearly exists with or without this treaty, has to be a factor in the deliberations that precede any agreement to reduce our capability. In this particular case, as we have noted, we feel we have an asymmetrical gain by the execution of the provisions of the INF Treaty.

The conventional imbalance remains. Now, there will be a point in deliberations about further reductions of arms wherein that becomes a driving factor if not corrected. And clearly, we would not be in agreement to a treaty which exacerbated the imbalance which now exists.

We will be supportive of efforts on a continuing basis to reduce that conventional imbalance.

Senator SARBANES. Could you address, Admiral Crowe, the Asian dimension of this treaty? You make some reference to it in your testimony, but there has been a very heavy focus on the European dimension of this treaty, for obvious reasons. I think it is important to develop more fully the impact this treaty will have on our Asian allies.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I appreciate your bringing it up because I think you are right, in that the rhetoric swirling around the treaty has, for one reason or another, more or less focused on Central Europe and tended to overlook the global aspects of the treaty and also the tremendous achievement of the United States in eliminating those Soviet weapons in the Far East.

When I was the Commander in Chief Pacific, when I visited Japan, Korea, and most of those countries out there, the first question that I was asked almost in every session by governmental leaders was: Will you please bring me up to date on the SS-20 threat, and what is the current number, et cetera? And what is going on? We are concerned about it. We hope that you can manage to eliminate that threat.

It was very, very serious to them and very close to the bone.

Of course, the character of the negotiations were that the Soviets resisted discussing Asia and I think probably the negotiations were prolonged because the United States did insist that it should benefit our Asian allies as well as our European allies.

I consider it one of the more salient virtues of the treaty, that it does eliminate that threat in the Far East. And incidentally, we have no quid there. Our quid was in Europe. And I can assure you that it was received with great relief throughout Asia.

Senator SARBANES. I think a very important aspect that has not been talked about much is the achievement of a global zero, and it is particularly significant since the prior negotiating position would have left some INF missiles in place in the Asian theater.

Admiral CROWE. They were certainly proposing that, and I assume would have preferred if they could have relocated missiles and kept them in that part of the world, which would not have been very satisfactory to us.

This is a much better outcome.

Senator SARBANES. Admiral Crowe, in the portion of your statement where you address the verification regime in this treaty, you say:

> In this regard, General Welch's statement contains an excellent commentary on the difficulties of maintaining a viable force of missiles from initial production through years of operational deployment even when allowed to do so in an open fashion.
>
> In the case at hand, the INF Treaty breaks a critical link in this cycle by banning all flight—testing of ground-launched intermediate- and shorter range missiles. Detecting such tests happens to be one of our strengths—but not the only one.

General Welch, I wonder if you would develop that point a little bit. This really speaks to the assertion that perhaps not all of the missiles have been declared, that we cannot be absolutely certain that some have not been concealed somewhere.

Could you address that question, particularly in terms of the process of development and testing to which reference is made here?

General WELCH. To do so briefly, Senator, certainly as you speculate on the possibilities of Soviet cheating and what levels of Soviet cheating could be hidden for what periods of time, there are some levels of cheating that you might consider significant where missiles could be hidden in a totally nonready status.

For example, you can speculate, although there is no evidence of this, you can speculate that one could keep a given number of missiles stored in some hidden location and never take them out, without any training, infrastructure, without ever testing them, and therefore you could maintain that kind of a force.

But that kind of a force would be useless. In order to have any confidence that your missile force is a viable, ready force, it has to be exercised constantly. Your people must be trained constantly.

Unlike airplanes, you do not fly missiles. So throughout the lifetime of a missile, you constantly test the missiles and we constantly find things that have to be upgraded.

We find things that did not last as long on the shelf as we thought they would. I could give you a long list of examples in the Minuteman missile, in our own GLCM missile, in the Pershing II missile.

So it is simply not practical to hide a missile away and leave it on a shelf for a long period of time and not exercise the system that supports that missile and not train the people who will operate the missile and not actively test the missile.

Just as an example, we fire the Minuteman missile, which has been around for 20 years, about eight times a year. And we fire those eight a year to maintain our confidence that that missile still works. And we constantly, over the years, have found things that have to be fixed, modified, or upgraded during the course of that testing.

So it is simply not practical to maintain a military capability without doing all of those things that I just described.

Senator SARBANES. And this treaty actually prohibits the testing from the very moment the treaty goes into effect, even though it has a 3-year phaseout period for the missiles, is that not correct?

As I understand it, the prohibition on testing, which would lower one's confidence in the capability of any undeclared missiles, begins right from the start of the treaty. Is that correct?

General WELCH. Absolutely.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, General Welch, I would like to follow on that question of verification for a moment, because you stated, Admiral Crowe, in your testimony that it would eliminate completely two classes of systems. And we have had a lot of questions raised during the course of the hearings about whether indeed they would be hidden and whether there could be the necessary verification.

The former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Perle, testified yesterday that as a matter of fact he felt there were drafting errors and loopholes that could enable the Soviets to maintain a secret illegal force of medium range SS–20's after the accord takes effect, and is recommending that the Senate change the treaty to reflect these concerns.

Others have testified that, because they cannot test, this moots the issue.

Could you respond to this whole question?

Admiral CROWE. Why do you not take it General Welch and I will follow up.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Maybe there is nothing further. Maybe you feel that answers it as far as testing.

General WELCH. Well, let me expand just a little bit, not very much. I think we have all agreed that it is possible for the Soviets, if they were motivated to do so, to hide a certain number in a certain condition for a certain period of time.

I really do not think there is any disagreement over that. I think the speculation is about how many, in what condition, for what period of time. Those are the conditions that I just discussed.

After a very careful look at this and all of our own experience with operating these kinds of systems for a number of years, it is my conclusion that it is not practical for the Soviets to hide significant numbers in any useful state of readiness for a significant period of time.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So all of you feel comfortable with the treaty as it stands in this regard?

General WELCH. I think the right way to say that is I am never comfortable with the Soviets. I think the right way to say that is we think the treaty has an effective verification scheme that makes it difficult, costly, and unprofitable for the Soviets to cheat on any significant scale.

Senator KASSEBAUM. And if there are violations, we could withdraw from the treaty?

General WELCH. I think the important thing for us to express on that particular issue is that we will respond. We do not need to tell the Soviets how we would respond. The Soviets need to be convinced that the United States will respond if they cheat.

And if they are convinced that we will respond, then it is unprofitable for them to attempt these things that we have been describing. I do not think it is useful for us to try to describe how we would respond. In fact, it is better for them simply to be convinced that we will respond.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, the statement in my statement was that, if the treaty is successfully implemented, we would eliminate those classes. It was not intended to imply there would be no cheating or violations of the treaty. I think we all would agree with the manner in which General Welch characterized that problem.

I am not familiar with Richard Perle's testimony. It seems to me very difficult to eliminate totally the prospect of cheating. Maybe you could make a ban on cheating, I do not know.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Not very successfully, I am sure. I think General Welch's comment that we have to be determined—if there is indeed cheating, we have to be prepared to be decisive in our response.

I would like, General Welch, to ask you to elaborate on a point that you made, that it does not make too much sense militarily for the Soviets to use the SS-25 on SS-20 targets.

Could you expand on that for the record?

General WELCH. Yes, I would. They clearly designed the SS-20 very specifically to cover that target set, targets of that range requiring that size warhead. Consequently, they were able to produce a three-warhead missile. Even so, it represents a very significant investment.

We have a very significant investment in the systems we are giving up.

I would clearly agree that all of those targets can be covered by SS-25's. But the SS-25 is a single-warhead missile with an intercontinental range, a much less efficient, much more expensive way to cover those targets. So when I say it does not make any military sense, I mean that I have difficulty trying to postulate a reason why the Soviets would negotiate away those 1,215 existing, deployed warheads, if they then intended to cover those with 1,215 SS-25's. That is a very expensive way for them to eliminate 108 NATO warheads.

In fact, if we can generate those kinds of trades we ought to try to get more of those.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

Admiral Crowe.

Admiral **Crowe**. Senator, may I just elaborate. It is not an easy process to retarget. That in itself upsets a pattern and a concept they have been practicing for quite some time, and it is not a cost-free operation.

You just do not turn a few dials. You change your staffing, your planning, your operations, et cetera. And also, any targets—that is, any missiles you retarget to cover those aim points are taken away from something else, something else that we assume is of value to the Soviets. Otherwise they would not be targeted there.

In fact, we have good reason to believe those targets are of value to the Soviets. So I want to emphasize that to change those patterns to cover these SS-20 targets is at a cost. It is not cost-free to the Soviets.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you.

Just to follow on a moment to Senator Sarbanes' question about the role of the JCS in consultation on what our negotiating position would be, in 1987 the posture statement of the Joint Chiefs pointed out the importance of Pershing II's and GLCM's—and perhaps this has already been raised in your hearing before the Armed Services Committee—that it provides a major deterrent to conventional, theater nuclear, and chemical attack and are essential to the strategy of flexible response.

General Rogers has testified it was not in response so much from a political standpoint to the Soviets' position on the SS-20's, but was a necessary system to fill a gap in our whole flexible response deterrent strategy. Could you address this?

Do you believe indeed now that the elimination of the INF missiles harms our flexible response strategy? You testified that it does not, but we would like to hear your thoughts at this point.

Admiral **Crowe**. Well, we have never pretended, as my statement makes clear and as I think General Welch's comments do, that this is cost-free to us. Obviously, we lose some capability when we give these things up, and some capability that is very good for us and offers us some advantages in that, for example, the Pershings are rapid, prompt, and accurate.

We are never going to negotiate a treaty where we do not give up something. But we believe that in this particular case the trade-off has been very favorable to the United States and that it is a bargain that would be difficult, in fact not wise, for us not to take up; and that the balance that we are seeing with the implementation of the INF Treaty is better than the one when it started.

It is not that we lost no capability. Obviously we are going to lose some, but they lose more. And we feel that it is a dynamic equation. And as I said earlier, it is very difficult for me to understand why they must be worried about 108 missiles of great accuracy and we are blase about 1,200 of great accuracy aimed at us.

Incidentally, in the support area, it is very shallow and very narrow behind the front in Western Europe. As I mentioned in my statement, some of the missiles they are eliminating have chemical capability, which is a source of great concern to our commanders in Central Europe, particularly those missiles that can reach airfields, reach ports, et cetera, in that support area.

They have given up the ability to hit our support area in Great Britain. If we were to fight in Europe, this area would be absolutely vital to us. They would have to retarget it with other kinds of missiles and weapons.

So it is a dynamic equation and we believe one that is very favorable to us.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would guess that you believe modernization is a key and a very important key to filling this position, though, with the removal of the INF missiles?

Admiral CROWE. Well, as we have said consistently, we believe modernization is imperative.

Senator KASSEBAUM. One way or the other.

Admiral CROWE. Yes, to keep our deterrent updated. This is true, incidentally, across the board, in strategic, in theater, and in conventional weapons. If you are going to stay in this game, which moves very rapidly, modernization is imperative over the years.

I do not think it is necessarily linked to INF, but I think, given the balance in NATO Europe, it is vital.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, as a member of the Budget Committee, I wish I could continue on the budget discussion for a moment. But my time has expired.

Admiral CROWE. Just trust us, Senator, and give us lots of money. [Laughter.]

General VUONO. Senator, you will see this again in our budget.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

First I want to thank each of you for your presence. It is a remarkable opportunity for us and for the country to have the opportunity to hear from you and to ask you questions about this vitally important matter. You are a great resource for all of us.

Admiral Crowe, I am delighted that you stated in your prepared statement this—and I want to read it to reemphasize it: "The JCS have unanimously concluded that on balance this treaty is militarily sufficient and effectively verifiable."

That is very helpful to us in the light of the various charges about the difficulty of total absolute verification which we know we cannot achieve. But it is good to have your statement that you believe it is adequately verifiable.

I am also impressed, Admiral Crowe, by your statement—and I want to read this again, just to emphasize it. Re the cost of cheating to the Soviet Union, you state:

> Our discovery of cheating would run counter to everything General Secretary Gorbachev is trying to do in his public diplomacy, that is improve the Soviet image, revitalize the Soviet economy in cooperation with the West, and achieve more open-

> ness and candor in Soviet society. In this broader political context, cheating on the INF Treaty would be very risky business and involve extremely high stakes.

I think that is a very constructive and helpful statement.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, that does not mean they will not cheat. It just means it would be a very high stakes game.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, I know.

Admiral CROWE. And I think we are very worried about the Soviets.

Senator CRANSTON. I am also impressed, General Gray, by your cautions about verification, where you said, with regard to verification:

> It is not a cure-all for ensuring that a stable military balance is maintained. More pointedly, we should not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security by overly optimistic hopes concerning verification. True military balance will ultimately rest on the readiness and war-fighting capability of our country's armed forces, not on our monitoring capability.

In other words, you are saying that, while we believe it is adequately verifiable and we will do our best to verify, that we cannot rely on that; we have to rely on our war-fighting capacities?

General GRAY. That is correct, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

Admiral Crowe, in re the risk of Soviet cheating and what that would mean to their efforts to present a different face to the world, Gorbachev as we know has made some very appealing statements about their desire to work out our mutual problems and have a different relationship.

I gather from various statements that are made in the course of these hearings and in the hearings before the Armed Services Committee that we have not yet seen the change in their approach to doctrine that would back up those expressed changes of purpose.

Could you state what actions by the Soviet Union in terms of their military posture and apparent intentions would be helpful from our point of view and be a verification in fact of a change in intent that has thus far been only stated by their leaders?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Senator, I think you are correct in that we have not seen any tangible evidence of some of these more dramatic statements that we have heard. In other words, we have seen the building programs continue. We have seen the deployment patterns much the same. We have seen the exercise levels remain high. And we are facing a confident, aggressive potential adversary on the ground, who does not seem to be changing either his attitude or otherwise.

We of course would like to see, as you say, some positive indication that there are changes afoot. And I think, as do all Americans, we welcome some of the statements that have been made by the General Secretary, and we would prefer a more stable situation on balance.

We feel—let me say, I feel, and I would like to hear my colleagues comment in their particular areas, where they follow these events very closely, that there are more, many more weapons, men, and equipment deployed in Central Europe than need to be for a defensive posture on behalf of the Soviet Union.

In fact, it is obviously an offensive posture. If they are serious, we would like to see some dramatic changes in that. That would be the first evidence: some redeployments, some drawdowns.

We are not saying the Soviet Union should emasculate its defenses and make itself vulnerable. But it does not need all of this equipment, all of these people, all of these troops, all of these munitions that it currently has deployed to do that.

Senator CRANSTON. Is it fair to assume that perhaps their offensive posture is in accordance with the philosophy that the best defense is a good offense, that you want to have the fighting elsewhere if there is going to be fighting?

Admiral CROWE. I think that is very consistent with the Russian character, yes, I do, and their history.

Senator CRANSTON. Is it logical to think that there are changes that they could initiate that would be in keeping with the statements by General Secretary Gorbachev that they could take unilaterally, or is it more likely that any changes in their actual posture and actions will come out of negotiation, where there are quid pro quos involved?

Admiral CROWE. Five years ago, Senator, I would never have predicted that we would have an INF Treaty with the asymmetric reductions that we are addressing or discussing today. So I am reluctant to say that anything is impossible.

But I do believe, as you implied, that probably the best prospects for this are tough, hard negotiating and forging ahead. I do not know that it will come voluntarily.

My colleagues may have some comments on that.

Senator CRANSTON. The INF advances did come out of negotiations, not by unilateral movement.

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator CRANSTON. Do any others of you have comments on this?

General VUONO. I agree with what the chairman said, and I think it is difficult, as we say, to speculate. But I would think that changes will come out of the negotiations.

Admiral TROST. I would like to add, with respect to your question about steps that they could take to, I suppose, indicate their sincerity behind the Secretary General's comments.

I think there are a number that they could take very openly if, in fact, there is to be a move away from the investment in the continued fast pace of modernization of their existing conventional forces toward more investment in a civilian economy. And that certainly has not been demonstrated to date.

We see a continuing rapid pace of modernization across the board, to a degree that we in our judgment feel is far more than is required even for the good offense that makes a good defense.

We also note their continued involvement external to the Soviet Union's immediate sphere of influence, to continue to provide both political, economic, and military support to such important areas as Central America, Africa, and Afghanistan.

So I think there are many steps they could be taking that would show a sincerity on their part. I also very firmly believe that, if we fall off in our own modernization efforts, we will have lost the bargaining chip that I think has brought them to the table this time, and that is that they saw an increasing capability on our part and they are concerned about our potential to improve our capability faster than their own, even though they have a very, very substantial capability.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you.

General Gray, in your remarks you spoke of the necessity of not allowing a change in the global balance, of preserving the global balance or maintaining the global balance. Is it correct to infer from that that you feel that in global terms we do have a reasonable balance in power at the present time?

General **Gray**. Yes, I do, Senator. I believe that we are a true global power, and my own view is that the Soviets are a global power, primarily because of their nuclear and military capability and far less in terms of their political structure or their economic capabilities.

But regardless of that, I think the balance is in our favor. And I am very concerned that, whether it be euphoria, whether it would be other subtle changes or interpretations of changes, my own view is that I do not see in the near or the far term any change in what the leadership of the Soviet Union stands for in terms of their global aspirations. Therefore, I think that we have to be most prudent and most attentive.

There is no question that Mr. Gorbachev is influencing far and wide around the globe with his approach. And there are, as some of my colleagues have said, things that they could do in the military sphere to appear to want to back up this new dialog.

You could pull back certain forces to the Soviet Union. I do not know how many Soviet forces are required in the Warsaw Pact nations to keep them under thumb, but they could pull some forces back.

But in my view, even this morning, they are on the move throughout the globe. There are a hell of a lot of them, doing things in the Philippines today. They are very interested in South Korea, with the Olympics and this and that.

They are very active throughout the globe. In my view, there has been an aggregate increase in the threat in the world arena. And we must be very attentive to this. We must make sure that we can deter and deter through uncertainty in their eyes any adventurism that may occur throughout the globe, and not just with respect to the European nations.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much indeed.

Our ranking minority member, Senator Helms, is recognized.

Senator **Helms**. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

It is seldom that you see an assembly of such distinguished Americans as we have here this morning, and I personally thank you very much.

Let me say to you, Admiral Crowe, that you have never been more eloquent than you were this morning.

Admiral **Crowe**. Thank you, sir.

Senator **Helms**. Now, I was thinking about another distinguished American of some years ago. He once said: "I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience."

I know of no way of judging the future but by the past. It is in that spirit that I want to pursue a line of questioning. And I hope as much as may be possible a yes or no answer, because frankly I already know the answers, but I want to have them for the record.

But if you feel the need, any of you, to elaborate or extrapolate, feel free to do so.

Admiral Crowe, article 4 of the proposed treaty says: "Each party shall eliminate all its intermediate range missiles and launchers of such missiles, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures, or support equipment shall be possessed by either party."

That is in the treaty, is it not?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Fine. Now, this is a global prohibition, is it not?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. For example, the Soviets could not move any missiles prohibited under this treaty to another part of the Soviet Union, is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. If they abide by the treaty.

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir. And that includes the SS-4's, the SS-5's, the 20's, the 12's, the 23's, the SSC-X-4's, all the rest of them, is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. And we have the right to inspect any sites under the terms of the treaty where missiles of these classes have been based in the past?

Admiral CROWE. Just the declared sites, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Admiral CROWE. The declared sites, the agreed sites that are specified in the memorandum of understanding.

Senator HELMS. Yes, yes. And that means that the Soviets cannot have, if they abide by this treaty, intermediate range forces of these types anywhere in the world, does it not?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, that is correct.

Senator HELMS. If they do other than that, they are violative of the treaty?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Now, I believe it was in October 1962 President Kennedy went on nationwide television stating that the Soviets had installed SS-4's and SS-5's in Cuba. I remember that broadcast well.

Then the President showed aerial photographs of the missiles in place. Do you remember his doing that?

Admiral CROWE. I remember the incident, yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. It is kind of hard to forget, is it not?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir. Everyone remembers where they were.

Senator HELMS. You bet.

Later, President Kennedy asserted that these missiles had been removed. Now, did the Soviet Union ever make a promise, a commitment to the United States, that the United States would be allowed onsite inspection in Cuba—and this was in 1962—to verify the removal of the Soviet SS-4's and SS-5's?

Admiral CROWE. No.

Senator Helms. I think your aide may want to check. I think they did make the commitment. It would be under a UN supervision. But you can supply that for the record.

Admiral Crowe. All right, I will. I thought you meant in connection with this treaty. Is that right?

Senator Helms. No, no. I am talking about back then, did the Soviet Union ever promise.

Admiral Crowe. I understand now. I would like to supply that for the record.

Senator Helms. Very well.

[The material referred to is classified.]

Senator Helms. Did the United States ever have the opportunity to carry out such an onsite inspection of the INF sites in Cuba, as promised by the Soviet Union? Does anybody know?

Admiral Crowe. I would like to supply that for the record, Senator.

Senator Helms. Well, the answer to that is no, but I would like it to be confirmed in writing, if you will, to the committee.

Admiral Crowe. Yes, sir.

[The material referred to follows:]

During November and December 1962, United States and Soviet representatives met at the U.N. to try to develop a U.N. resolution or declaration formalizing the resolution of the crisis and instituting U.N. supervision of the Soviet withdrawal. The effort was finally abandoned.

In his news conference of November 20, 1962, President Kennedy stated that the Cuban Government had not permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive weapons has been removed. He was asked whether the U.S. requirement for "adequate verification" meant that the United States would insist upon onsite inspection. President Kennedy replied: "We have thought that to provide adequate inspection, it should be onsite. As you know, Mr. Castro has not agreed to that, so we have had to use our own resources to implement the decision of the Organization of American States that the hemisphere should continue to keep itself informed about the development of weapons systems in Cuba."

Thus, this Soviet offer could not be implemented in light of the failure of the U.N. talks and the refusal of the Cuban government to cooperate. Accordingly, the United States relied upon national technical means and verified that the Soviet Union actually complied with the understandings by removing the missiles.

Senator Helms. This brings me up to Patrick Henry's observation. I think it is essential, imperative as a matter of fact, that we apply the past to the future and not make the mistake of assuming all of a sudden the rattlesnake has shed his rattles and shed his fangs.

Under certain circumstances, could the Soviets place an SS-20 launcher with a missile inside of it in the AN-124 Condor transport plane? It would fit, would it not?

The answer is yes, is it not?

Admiral Crowe. Yes, sir.

Senator Helms. And they could fly it to Cuba and offload the missile without our having any ability whatsoever to detect it, is that not correct?

Admiral Crowe. I would like to answer that for the record on a classified basis.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator Helms. Thank you.

Now, should there be a mechanism in this treaty—and this is just a for instance. Should there be a mechanism in this treaty to detect Soviet violations of the INF Treaty in Cuba? It is 90 miles off our shores.

Admiral CROWE. Given the evidence we have now, in my view, nothing is required beyond the unimpeded use of national technical means of monitoring, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Well, I think the Senate may be given an opportunity to make a judgment on that.

Admiral CROWE. That is their privilege.

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Can you gentlemen of the Joint Chiefs—and I respect all of you highly. Can you assure the committee that there are no Soviet SS-4's and 5's in Cuba today?

Admiral CROWE. Would you speak to that?

General WELCH. I think I can assure you, Senator, that there is probably no place outside the Soviet Union where we focus more national technical means to monitor than Cuba, and there is probably no place that we look at more frequently than Cuba.

So I would think that, yes, I can state that we have high confidence that we know whether or not there are Soviet missiles in Cuba. And I really cannot say any more than that in an open forum.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, we can discuss this in a closed session, and I understand the constraints that you have.

On March 8, 1982, the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified to Congress that the Soviet Union was violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, and the Chairman said: "We interpret Soviet actions in Cuba as a violation. In my judgment, they"—meaning the Soviets—"have gone beyond the 1962 accord."

Now, Admiral Crowe or any other of you fine gentlemen, I have this question for you: Have Soviet offensive force deployments to Cuba since 1982 given the Joint Chiefs any reason to change this assessment stated in 1982 that I have just read into the record?

Admiral CROWE. You are talking about violations of the agreement with Kennedy, is that not correct?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Admiral CROWE. We do not have any evidence that would refute the statement made at the time, no.

Senator HELMS. Either—assuming that he was accurate, and I think he was, it has either changed or it has not. And all I am asking is, has it changed or is it pretty much the same?

Admiral CROWE. Today you are saying?

Senator HELMS. Yes, sir.

Admiral CROWE. I would like to furnish the answer for the record on a classified basis.

Senator HELMS. OK. I do not want to walk you up to the precipice of classified information, but a whole lot of it is unclassified.

[The material referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. I have one final question. The Soviet offensive force deployments to Cuba since 1982, have these deployments given you any reason to change the assessment which I just referred to?

And you may want to answer that in a closed session as well.

Admiral CROWE. All right, sir, I would like to.

Senator HELMS. Is that your wish?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

[The material referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have several other questions. I will either submit them in writing or wait for a second round.

But in any case, I do thank you for your forthrightness and your candor. And my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Helms. I would add to you that on Wednesday, February 17, we will have an opportunity to look at verification in closed session with the CIA, the DIA, and the NSA.

Senator Adams.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of you for being here and certainly welcome you. It is, as Senator Cranston said, a remarkable and important opportunity for the American public and the U.S. Senate to receive the benefit of your views.

And Admiral Crowe, we appreciate particularly your forthright approach. I want to follow up on the question of Senator Kassebaum, and I will do it in a form that you can submit the answers in writing, so I will not take all of the questions in oral form.

I am in support of this treaty and I do not want it to go back to the Soviets. I think, as has been well stated by a number of you, we have received a significant military advantage in the total number of missiles reduced, and it should not be connected to our modernization program or connected to other things.

But I am concerned because, as Senator Kassebaum pointed out, Richard Perle and a group from the American Enterprise Institute have said we ought to change this pact and send it back.

So I will submit to you, Admiral Crowe—and I know this will be done by the committee to the Secretary of Defense and it can be a joint response, but I would like to submit to you the American Enterprise Institute study for your comment. I would like one of the staff members to give you a copy, so that we can have your answers to it.

I do not happen to agree with them, but it is far more important that your opinion be stated than simply mine alone.

So I will ask, Mr. Chairman, that the staff give the American Enterprise Institute paper that is the basis for this challenge that was mentioned by Senator Kassebaum to the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Crowe, we had the opportunity yesterday to talk with General Galvin, and I said I wanted to ask this today. I want to follow through with a line of questioning. Despite the generalized comments that are made on conventional forces in Europe, I believe we have, a damn good force in the Central Plain of Germany of United States and German divisions. They are well armed, and could at least stop a first echelon attack by the Soviet divisions that are facing us at this point; even though they may have a numerical advantage, we have a quality force and could absorb at least a first attack with the German and United States divisions that are there.

Admiral CROWE. Well, we certainly do have a quality force, and I will ask General Vuono to elaborate on that. But Senator, I want to say also, of course, that we worry about the entire FEBA.

Senator ADAMS. I am going to go to that in a moment, but I want to get to that first.

General VUONO. Without a doubt, we have a superb quality force in Europe, as we do elsewhere today. It is well trained, well equipped, well organized, and a well led force.

But you have to go into more details on the answer to your question to get to the point that we were making earlier about the importance of the modernization of that force.

Senator ADAMS. I understand that, and I am going to ask this question now to any of you. But Admiral Crowe, since you are chief I will direct it to you, but certainly anyone else who wishes may comment on it.

We are faced with the problem of priorities in military confrontation. Do you believe that the European confrontation with the Soviet Union is the most dangerous point of conflict where we should concentrate our resources as a first priority?

I know you want every place covered, but we have to have some idea, if we are going to make effective judgments about a modernization program based upon what you tell us about the points of confrontation.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, experience tells me that there are some strong views at this table on that subject, and I think you should hear from everyone.

But first of all, I would like to say that I am not so sure we would rate the confrontation in Western Europe as the most likely crisis.

Senator ADAMS. I think that is a better way of phrasing it perhaps.

Admiral CROWE. If it ever came about, though, it would be a very, very significant one, and we must of course take that into account in our calculations.

The Chiefs in general have a global approach, because we believe that the United States has global interests and that we have commitments and interests that we must protect around the world. And so we do look at our military problems in a global fashion.

Having said that, I would like to give you some other comments.

Senator ADAMS. Do any of the other Joint Chiefs wish to comment? General Vuono.

General VUONO. I would just say that we take a global approach, and I think we have improved our forces globally, as we pointed out earlier. But I think it is important to remember that NATO in my view deserves to remain our first out-of-homeland priority, because it is the linchpin of the defense of the Western world.

And if you look at the salient threat over there, it tells me that it is extremely important as our first priority outside of the United States.

Senator ADAMS. Does anyone else want to comment? I am not requiring it at all.

General WELCH. Let me just make a very quick point. We face a constant problem of likelihood versus consequences. The least likely conflict is stategic nuclear war, but the disastrous consequences mean we can accept very little risk there. We must have very low risk.

The likelihood of a major war in Europe is fairly low, but the consequences are so high that we simply have to concentrate on deterring that.

The most likely conflict is low intensity conflict, but the consequences are less disastrous. So when we think about where we put our resources to deter conflict, it is always this constant balance of likelihood versus consequences. That is a very complex set of questions.

Senator **Adams**. Do any others wish to comment?

Admiral **Trost**. Other than adding agreement to what has already been said, I think it is important to keep in mind that our overall deterrent posture depends on our global posture, both strategic and conventional. If we have that adequate balance and that adequate strength, we are then ready to counter and decrease the likelihood of conflict in any area and at every level.

General **Gray**. I would like to just add that the balance in my view is the key. There is no question that the situation in Europe, as well as in northeast Asia, in my view is one of a static defense kind of requirement. We have major national security defense needs there.

We also have vital interests around the globe. So the great trick, if you will, Mr. Senator, is to balance this out. We cannot, for example, perhaps win the war in NATO at sea, but you can sure as heck lose it there. So there is a maritime part of this equation as well.

More importantly, even within NATO, in the north you have military imbalance and we have to do things to shore that up, and you are now. We have pre-position programs in central Norway, you have capability to shore that up.

In the southern region, it is a political imbalance, so we must move there a little more delicately and try to shore up this Greek-Turkish straits problem and that kind of thing.

My main caution is not to be myopic with the Central Plain of Europe, but to look at it in the broader strategic and theater context. We have enormous flexibility that we can bring to bear, and I think that we must look at this very carefully.

And it is not just a matter of so many tanks or so many airplanes or this or that. It is an aggregate strategy that we have to come up with.

Senator **Adams**. It is a qualitative problem, is it not, General, because you made a comment that I did want to follow up on at least in my next line of questioning. And since you are addressing the forum at the moment, I will continue with it.

I have always felt that there was a considerable concern about the Soviets because of forward positioning, not only because of the Stalin theory of fighting on somebody else's ground, but to what degree qualitatively can you depend upon Hungarian, Czech, and East German divisions to carry out a unified attack structure after a first echelon blunting.

It seems to me that our alliance may qualitatively have more interests in common than the pact.

General **Gray**. That is very true. And that is the kind of thing we have to continue to shore up, for example.

In Scandinavia, they would like to be reassured you are going to come. And when you demonstrate that will, you bolster them up. And those kinds of things are worth, in my judgment, divisions of people.

So I think that again we have to have the balance. Uncertainty is the key. If we can, through our qualitative capabilities, keep uncertainty, so that the price is too much for the bearer to take, that is deterrence.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry, Admiral, did you have a comment?

Admiral CROWE. You have put your finger on a very important point. We should never overlook the fact that they have very serious problems, militarily and otherwise.

Senator ADAMS. That is why, Admiral, and I will just state this from this Senator's viewpoint, I do not want to have linkage to this treaty.

I think we have some very complex problems with mutual reduction of force. I think, as General Welch has touched on earlier, we have significant problems in mutual reductions of weapons.

But these things are possible, and let us not get into linkage in this treaty. Let us move to them in an orderly fashion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Adams. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Joint Chiefs.

We are very appreciative of the service that you collectively have given to our country. Let me add, Admiral Crowe, to what Senator Helms said about your prayer this morning at the national prayer breakfast. I got here late because the power of prayer could not get me out of the Hilton parking lot.

First of all, I am concerned about parts of this treaty and where they will lead. Last December the President said that we will have to increase defense spending to make up for the conventional force imbalance in Europe. The New York Times said that we have given our allies assurances we would do that in the chemical area and conventional area.

In the last 2 weeks there seems to have been a turnaround in terms of the administration's views. They have instructed everybody to say that we will not need an increase in defense spending to shore up our NATO allies, to make up for the elimination of INF missiles.

I noted an item in yesterday's paper that stated the Joint Chiefs originally had said it would mean an increase in spending for modernization, that there would be recommendations for modernizing other missiles and to strengthen our troops in Europe.

What will your recommendation be regarding this? Now, I put this in the context that when I was a U.S. Congressman, two Secretaries of Defense came to my office and urged me to vote for the INF because it protects the lives of U.S. servicemen in West Germany.

Tying that argument to the present situation, will we have to increase our defense spending in Europe to protect the lives of our troops as a result of this treaty?

Admiral **Crowe**. Senator, we have discussed that some this morning already. I believe we have each expressed the opinion that today we need more expenditure conventionally in Europe.

We do not have a balance that we are satisfied with. And if you implement the INF Treaty we will not be satisfied with the balance. But that is separate and distinct from the merits or demerits of the treaty.

It has to do with the situation in Europe and the Joint Chiefs' appreciation of what that situation is. We have recommended for a number of years that we do more modernization, that we redress the imbalances, and we are going to continue to do that. And we think it is imperative.

Senator **Pressler**. I am in no way arguing with you. I know that has been your position. But the implementation of the INF Treaty would augment that argument, would it not, in terms of conventional troops?

The arguments from a military point of view would be that we need to augment or modernize, or whatever the term is that means spend more——

Admiral **Crowe**. But I believe our position is not because of the INF Treaty that we must do that, but I would defer to my colleagues.

Senator **Pressler**. Well, I would like to ask each of you, just a brief summary of your views, will the INF Treaty make you feel that we should do more in Europe in terms of protecting the lives of our troops?

Admiral **Trost**. I will start by saying "No." With or without the INF Treaty, we have a continuing need for modernization and force structure improvements at a level somewhat greater than we see right now.

The implementation of the treaty will not change that need or cause an augmentation of that existing need.

General **Vuono**. The requirements for modernization for the force were there before the INF Treaty, and they are there now.

Senator **Pressler**. Yes, I know that.

General **Vuono**. And the programs that we need, speaking specifically now in the Army, we need today, and we are not asking for any addition to those programs as a result of the INF Treaty, but it is key and essential that we understand that there is a modernization requirement for conventional forces, and has been a requirement and it is still there.

General **Welch**. I think perhaps budgets speak more clearly than rhetoric.

The programs that will be in the Air Force budget request post-INF are the same programs that are in there in response to high priority requirements from SACEUR, before there was any real hope of negotiating an INF Treaty.

And the single exception is the TASM, and that is simply because we had not completed the technical work required to institute the program. But that requirement also, which is a high priority requirement specified by SACEUR far predated the INF Treaty.

So my point is that all of these things that you quoted and all of these things we have been talking about in terms of both theater nuclear and conventional capability improvements were in the program. Not just in our minds, but in the program before the INF Treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. Good. Let me ask you, Admiral Crowe, affirmatively or negatively, do you agree that the Soviets could possibly circumvent the INF Treaty by exploiting one of the following loopholes?

The Soviets could deploy a three MIRVed SS-25 ICBM now undergoing testing, thereby creating a variable range triple threat, super SS-20 completely outside the INF Treaty? Would that not be a way they could circumvent it?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, they could. I am not aware that they are testing three warheads on the SS-25 right now. But of course, they could, irrespective of that.

Senator PRESSLER. All right. Could the Soviets cheat by developing an SS-23 and an SS-12 tested with a range of less than 500 kilometers but actually having greater range?

Admiral CROWE. I think that would be difficult for them to do. I think we could detect that.

Senator PRESSLER. Could the Soviets cheat by deploying a SCUD-B, believed to have a range greater than 500 kilometers?

Admiral CROWE. You understand that for intelligence estimates of the maximum potential ranges of those missiles, the system we use is to try to determine the size, and other technical parameters and then conclude what the range would be on a full load of fuel, not the maximum they test at which is the treaty criteria.

Senator PRESSLER. Do you think we could detect that, if they did that?

Admiral CROWE. I think we would have a very reasonable opportunity to detect it, yes.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, I have been concerned about the verification, and as has been mentioned earlier, parts of our country are theoretically off-limits to onsite inspectors. I know we insisted on that in the negotiations. But they are really available.

Recently I read in the paper, and I am going to put it in the Congressional Record, that the Czechoslovakians had a truck that went around the United States with a collapsible airplane, and one of the networks had a piece on them camped somewhere near our San Diego naval base.

So our country is very open to inspection, whereas the Soviet areas that are off-limits to the onsite inspectors are really off-limits to everybody. Does that concern you?

Admiral CROWE. From a verification perspective, I mean, our country is open and I like it that way and I want it to remain that way.

And I think that it is something that we have to take into consideration when we implement this. And I could talk to you about some of the measures on verification, some of the steps that we are taking as we implement this treaty. But I would prefer to do that in closed session, however.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes. I am sure we will have that opportunity.

General GRAY. Could I just add, Senator, that the verification for the INF, we have looked at that very carefully, and that regime appears, I believe, to us, to be adequate and workable.

When we start later with START and verification, I think that is a whole new order of complexity. But we look at it from the INF Treaty standpoint, and I think it is safe to say that we were satisfied with it.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, we are going to hear from Gen. Bernard Rogers. There is an amazing thing about the military high command, and it should be that way.

When they are in office they have to respond to the White House and the President. Gen. Bernard Rogers takes a different view of this, and that has intrigued me because he is not a man given to marching out of step, so to speak.

General GRAY. Nor am I, sir. I am speaking as Al Gray. I have never talked about this to the White House. I have not the slightest idea who to talk to about it in the White House.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, if you said some things, the White House might call you in. In any event, General Rogers will be testifying.

One concern is the conventional forces, and I have advocated an amendment on this very strongly. Is a 1-to-1 ratio of troop levels, or however you measure it, realistic?

If we sought to amend this agreement by seeking an agreement in principle for a 1-to-1 ratio on conventional forces in Europe, would that be a realistic thing?

Admiral CROWE. Not in my view, Senator. I think it would hold up the INF Treaty, and I think it would be a matter of tremendous complexity to negotiate over a long period of time. And perhaps the treaty we got in the end would not be as satisfactory as we have now.

I would like to repeat what I said earlier, that I believe, or at least my view is that these treaties should stand on their own merit. Either stand or fall on their own merit.

And if it does not, in the context of that treaty alone, does not improve the security of the United States and our allies, we should not endorse it.

I would like to say one thing, though, about the previous question. Senator, we have not been subjected to pressure on this. This is an independent, sincere, and genuine view of all of the Chiefs. And if there has been any kind of arm-twisting, I have not seen it.

Senator PRESSLER. But it is your independent view, aside from the White House, that the INF Treaty will not increase the necessity a bit for conventional spending in Europe?

Admiral CROWE. I think the necessity for conventional spending in Europe is very high right now.

Senator PRESSLER. Yes, but that is not the question.

Admiral CROWE. And it will remain so, but it is not linked to this treaty. Yes, sir, that is my view.

Senator PRESSLER. That is very interesting. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pressler. The first round is now done.

I have to be like the janitor, stay till the end, so I will defer to the ranking Minority Member.

Senator HELMS. What he is saying is he is going to cut out the lights as he leaves.

Let me continue along with the counsel of Patrick Henry, who talked about having only one lamp by which his feet were guided. On October 10, 1984, the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control stated in an official report, which was received by those of us in Congress, let me quote from it.

"The Soviets breached a unilateral commitment by sending offensive weapons, intercontinental nuclear delivery-capable bombers, nuclear-delivery capable fighter bombers, and various kinds of nuclear missile submarines back to Cuba beginning in 1969." Do you agree with that, Admiral?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator HELMS. Then on March 8 of 1982, the CIA Director said, the 1962 agreement had been violated for 20 years. Is that correct? Do you agree with that?

Admiral CROWE. I would prefer to provide a written answer to that for the record on a classified basis (see attached insert).

Senator HELMS. I wish you would, so we could have the benefit of that.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. Then on March 11 of 1982, the Undersecretary, the then-Undersecretary of Defense, Mr. Ikle, testified before Congress that the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, "had been eroded away to nothing" by Soviet actions. Do you agree with Fred Ikle's statement on that?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know that I do. That is a very sweeping statement as well. I know it represents his view, yes.

Senator HELMS. Well, let us see how sweeping one by President Reagan is.

On May, 1982 the President stated in a national and televised press conference—that was before the three networks said that he did not have anything new to say—the President said the only place he, and he was referring to Brezhnev, could install them, and he meant Soviet nuclear weapons, in this hemisphere would be in Cuba, which is Brezhnev's satellite now.

But this would be in total violation, the President said, of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. And he went on to say, you know, there have been other things we could think are violations also of the 1962 agreement. Was the President right in saying that?

Admiral CROWE. Well, he said that they could install. Yes, he is right.

Senator HELMS. Of course. He was talking about nuclear weapons that would be in Cuba, and this would be in total violation. OK.

On September 14, 1983, for the second time, the President confirmed that the Soviet Union had violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement when he said, and I am quoting him, "That agreement has been abrogated many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing of what can only be described as offensive weapons, not defensive there." Do you agree with that?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I would agree with that.

Senator HELMS. Now, the Soviet nuclear missile submarines referred to in the GAC report are the SS-N-21's. Are they not?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know the specific weapons system they were referring to.

Senator HELMS. I am sorry?

Admiral CROWE. I do not know the specific weapons system. You said the GAC report?

Senator HELMS. Well, I will need for you to comment for the record on that.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. And also on the followup, and maybe some of your people back there know the answer to that. I think I do.

Aside from the fact that these are submarine-launched, operationally speaking, is this not the same missile as the SSC-X-4? And I am talking about the SS-N-21 and the SSC-X-4. They are essentially the same weapon, are they not?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. I believe that is correct. I will confirm that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Yes. The SS-N-21 sea-launched Cruise missile and the SSC-X-4 ground-launched Cruise missile are essentially the same missile.

Senator HELMS. Fine. Can the SS-N-21 be fired through the torpedo tubes of the Soviet *Foxtrot*, the *Victor*, the *Golf*, the *Echo* class submarines?

Admiral CROWE. It can be fired through a torpedo tube, but I do not know if it includes all of those. It does go in the torpedo tube. There is no question about that.

Senator HELMS. Admiral, I am sorry, I did not hear you.

Admiral CROWE. I said it is a torpedo-fired weapon.

Senator HELMS. So the answer is yes, then?

Admiral CROWE. Well, I would rather not discuss in open session on whether if all of those submarines can fire that weapon.

Senator HELMS. Well, if somebody will make a list, then we will follow it up with a written question. I think it is essential that we have it for the record.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. Now, are these not precisely the submarines known to have been operated from Cuba, every one of them?

Admiral CROWE. Soviet submarines have visited Cuba, yes.

Senator HELMS. Is there a distinction between visiting and operating from?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, I believe there is, Senator. You can forward deploy, operate in and out, do patrols. I would call that operating.

Visiting is to visit, maybe do some joint exercise, and return home.

Senator HELMS. Well, let us leave out the visiting, then. Have these submarines operated out of Cuba?

Admiral CROWE. I think they have visited.

I will be glad to provide you with a classified answer for the record on their operations from Cuba.

Senator HELMS. OK.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. If they go down there and operate for a little while, that to me is operating.

Admiral CROWE. We monitor them pretty closely, Senator.

Senator HELMS. Pardon?

Admiral CROWE. We monitor them pretty closely.

Senator HELMS. Well, I am glad to hear that. Does the United States have any means of determining whether the SS-N-21, with nuclear warheads, is present in Cuba today? Can you tell if there were one or six or three or whatever? Can we detect, or do you want to answer that in the closed session?

Admiral CROWE. I would like to discuss that in a classified answer to you, Senator.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. Was the SS-N-21 tested from ground launchers in the Soviet Union?

Admiral CROWE. I would also like to address that in a classified response.

[The information referred to is classified]

Senator HELMS. Could any SS-N-21's be taken off Soviet submarines in Cuba and launched from ground launchers in Cuba?

Now, that would be a simple matter for them, would it not?

Admiral CROWE. If they have the right equipment.

Senator HELMS. Well, that is presumed.

Admiral CROWE. We would detect that sort of thing, possibly.

Senator HELMS. You said you would detect it possibly?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. I would prefer to elaborate on that in a classified answer for the record.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator HELMS. That gives me a little heartburn. Do you think that the SSCX-4's, which are specifically banned by this treaty, are also banned in Cuba?

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator HELMS. If the SS-N-21's are converted to SSC-X-4's in Cuba, would that be a violation of the Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. According to me, yes.

Senator HELMS. Is there any mechanism under the Treaty under which we could detect such a violation?

Admiral CROWE. Not specifically prescribed in the Treaty. But yes, there are methods for detecting it.

Senator HELMS. Well, I do not want to get subjective on this. But tell me if I am wrong. I think you are uncomfortable when you said possibly, you qualified it.

I do not think you are comfortable about the role that Cuba can play in assisting the Soviet Union to violate this treaty, if the Soviets decide to do it.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, we have the same problem with monitoring systems and following systems in Cuba and around the world that was described earlier, and that is we have no system that is so perfect that we are going to find everything that is going on. But we are comfortable with the risk that, before it is militarily useful, yes, we will detect it.

Senator HELMS. Well, I say with all respect to you, sir, these other places around the world to which you referred are not 90 miles off our shore.

Admiral CROWE. I understand that. I am very familiar with that, Senator.

Senator HELMS. And I know you are. Thank you again, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Cranston?

Senator **Cranston**. I know we cannot get into all of these matters in open session. But I think I can ask you one question that you can answer with a yes or a no, more or less.

We detected Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, when our monitoring capacities were far less sophisticated than they are today. Is there less reason to believe we could not do it now?

Admiral **Crowe**. No.

Senator **Cranston**. What type of intelligence information would give us indications of any hypothetical Soviet introduction of SS-20 missiles in Cuba?

General Welch testified to the fact that we constantly and thoroughly monitor Cuba as much as or more than any other place on earth. I am referring to the actions that they would need to take regarding launching sites, training of personnel, transporting equipment and all of that.

Given our capacities and the thoroughness with which we use those capacities in, around, and over Cuba, is it not a logical presumption that we would detect preparations in Cuba for such deployments?

Admiral **Crowe**. I would say yes. I would solicit General Welch opinion as well.

General **Welch**. I would agree that to have any kind of significant force, that means the launchers, the launchers are very distinctive, it means training, and the training is closely monitored.

And while you can speculate that indeed you could hide a few missiles in Cuba for some purpose, to make those operational and significant, I think, would be detected fairly quickly.

Senator **Cranston**. It seems to me that we have here another straw man that has been erected, one that is not that difficult to knock down.

Admiral **Crowe**. Cuba is only 90 miles away, but they still have to abide by the laws of military physics.

Senator **Cranston**. Yes. Do any of you know if the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters preclude not only stationing of submarines in Cuba, but the refueling of submarines in Cuba?

Admiral **Crowe**. I would like to take that for the record please, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Kennedy-Khrushchev letters do not specifically address this. However, as noted in the GAC report, "* * * in September and October 1970, exchanges between then National Security Adviser Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin and other Soviet officials further delimited the permissibility of basing nuclear-weapon-carrying submarines in Cuba." President Nixon subsequently explained that "* * * in the event nuclear submarines were serviced, either in Cuba of from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding * * *"

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much.

I would like to read a brief item from the New York Times of Monday, October 1, 1984, an article by Wayne S. Smith, who is one of the United States foremost authorities on Cuban matters, and in relationship to negotiations that went on there and thereafter. He served as the U.S. interest section chief in Havana from 1979 to 1982.

He asked this question: "Are the Russians violating the agreement?" In reference to the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement. Or, "Did they violate it?"

From the article:

> The answer is none of the above, for there is not an accurate statement among them. An understanding most certainly exists, and it has not been abrogated.
>
> The core of the understanding is outlined in the message sent by Mr. Khrushchev on October 26, 1962, and in Mr. Kennedy's response of October 27. The terms of the deal were clear. If the Russians would remove their offensive weapons systems from Cuba, the United States would lift its naval blockade and promise not to invade. That was the sum of it. There was no prohibition on the stationing of conventional forces in Cuba. Et cetera.

No mention of other acts that might be undesirable from our point of view, are not covered by the Khrushchev-Kennedy letters.

Returning now to matters that I was discussing with you in my last opportunity. A recent net assessment of the military balance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff I understand concluded that a Warsaw Pact attack against Western Europe would be highly risky and logically improbable.

I would like to ask if that is an accurate understanding, and if you could elaborate on the reasons for that conclusion, if that was in fact the conclusion?

Admiral CROWE. Well, the net assessment concluded that the probabilities of an attack in the foreseeable future were low, barring some traumatic change in the international environment, Senator.

One of the salient conclusions of the assessment, of course, was that the level of uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets was very high as to success and wisdom of such an attack. And that this, and the prevailing climate, led us to the conclusion that this deter them. But with full recognition that a change of a crisis nature could very well change that conclusion.

General VUONO. And that conclusion could be changed as the Soviets modernize. And if we are not able to continue our modernization program across the board.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you think it would be wise or unwise to make full and final implementation of INF contingent upon progress toward or actual achievement of adjustments in the size and nature of U.S. and U.S.S.R. conventional forces?

Specifically, would it be wise or unwise for us to insist on a one to one ratio in conventional forces or any other specific ratio, as some have suggested before implementation or ratification of this Treaty?

General WELCH. I think it would be unwise. As has been stated before, the treaty stands on its own merits. It is beneficial to the U.S. and NATO allies on its own merits.

I see no merit to complicating the process or delaying the Treaty in hopes of a breakthrough after 14 years of hard, but so far not terribly productive, negotiations on conventional arms reduction.

Senator CRANSTON. General Galvin assessed the need for both conventional and strategic improvements in the NATO force structure in order to maintain the doctrine of flexible response.

What I want to ask is whether such improvements would, in part, run the risk of creating a new arms race or arms contest at cost and danger outside the INF area?

For example, if we introduced large numbers of nuclear standoff missiles for our aircraft in Europe, would not the Soviets be likely to try to compensate by increasing their capabilities in the same area?

Similarly, if we seek a major upgrading of our conventional forces, can we not expect the Soviets to do the same?

Which leads then to this question. To what degree would desirable adjustments in U.S. and USSR conventional forces in Europe be achieved by, instead of increases at considerable cost and expense, instead appropriate reductions in forces on both sides?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, first of all you are going to see what you described there, no matter what we do.

In the wake of this Treaty you are going to see the Soviets improve their forces, and barring some traumatic change. As we talked about earlier, if we begin to see evidence that they are going to do otherwise, all right.

But we have not seen that, and certainly history does not suggest it, and our experience does not argue that. The emotional word that was used was arms race, which is always an objection for us doing anything.

It does not deter the Soviet Union whatsoever, when it comes to building arms. And we already see evidence of them modernizing into the future. They are out on the margins of technology now trying to improve their technological position.

Of course they are going to be improving their ability of their dual-capable aircraft. Dual-capable aircraft are going to be more prominent in their scheme as a result of this Treaty. And they are going to improve both the aircraft and the weapons systems.

And to assume otherwise would be very, very dangerous, in my view. And what we are doing does not mean we are in an arms race with the Soviet Union, as my statement points out. NATO has had difficulty over the whole history of the alliance of keeping pace with the Soviet Union.

What we are trying to do is defend ourselves and keep the level of uncertainty high. We are not matching the Soviets weapon for weapon, man for man. We never will. Officers of my generation have learned a long time ago that if we ever go to major combat with the Soviet Union, we will go outnumbered. That is a fact of life for us. We try and compensate for that with quality systems, and modernization and updating.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, it is an obvious fact of life that they will be modernizing and we will be modernizing.

Admiral CROWE. They will. They already are.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, that both sides will. But basically my question was, to what degree could we achieve our aims in maintaining an adequate deterrence by mutually negotiated reductions rather than by modernization and increases?

General GRAY. I would argue that flexible response is the key, and that demands a steadfast commitment to the modernization of the conventional capability. And I do not think you should link the treaty, or subsequent negotiations.

I can see no sense in beginning to negotiate away conventional power where they already have a considerable margin of superiority negotiating any more nuclear or modernization capability, until you begin to make decisive asymmetrical changes to the balance of power.

In other words, they are going to have to give up a heck of a lot more than we should, because they are the ones that have created this imbalance.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, well, plainly, asymmetrical changes are in order. And acceptable from our point of view. And we have to hope acceptable from their point of view.

And they have demonstrated their willingness to agree to asymmetrical changes and reductions by agreeing to INF.

General GRAY. For the first time.

Admiral CROWE. And yes, sir, we would like to see that practice continue, of course. And the Chiefs as a body have been consistently willing to explore these other opportunities.

We see asymmetrical reductions as a very favorable development, if in fact they continue to develop.

General VUONO. But I would only add that you cannot wait on negotiations on asymmetrical reductions and not continue our efforts to improve our capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral CROWE. Of course, our INF experience suggests that if you want that kind of negotiation, the best way to do it is to be strong, modernize, and go ahead.

That is what we did in the INF agreement, and I think it was instrumental in getting the Soviets to the table, and successfully concluding the agreement.

General GRAY. I think additional linkage is a recipe for inaction.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I want to pursue a little bit more this business of what our options will be when the treaty goes into effect, and I expect it will, concerning conventional forces in Europe.

I am a little confused because I have the Department of Defense NATO Strategy in the 1990's, and so forth, which is the report that came out of the Pentagon. And I presume it was signed off by everybody.

The report says that the INF Treaty would be fine, provided, emphasis added, provided that we vigorously pursue the necessary modernization and make effective use of the gains and capabilities achieved over the last few years.

Now, in my earlier questioning I got the view that it did not make any difference, the INF Treaty, if it were there or were not there, it would not have any effect. We need to modernize anyway.

But in reading this, with the emphasis on provided, it certainly sounds as though you are supporting the INF Treaty with the assumption that that is going to happen. There are very good indications that may not happen.

We have an enormous budgetary deficit. We have the Nunn amendment, which got 44 votes. We have an article here saying that we have notified our allies that we cannot pay for an F-16 move, because of our budgetary problems. And there is a growing cry that Europeans should pay more, and so forth.

I am trying to help out as much as I can, but I find it passing strange that you should have underlined that the Defense Department report says that we are going to support the INF Treaty and then stops with a dash and puts provided, and underlines it, that we vigorously pursue the necessary modernization.

Now, let me ask you this. If you were sure we were not going to pursue modernization, would you oppose the treaty?

Admiral CROWE. We were asked that question earlier today, Senator. And we said, no, we would not.

Senator PRESSLER. You would still support the treaty in the context of this?

Admiral CROWE. We were asked that question. Even if we did not modernize, we would not oppose the treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. But in the context of this introduction to the Congress of the United States, why did you underline, provided, that we vigorously pursue?

Indeed, if that is your answer, that makes my question even more pertinent. Why, in the report, do you say provided and underline it, that we vigorously pursue the necessary? That is a condition, is it not?

Admiral CROWE. That is just one way of reading it. I am not sure that is what the author of that sentence meant. I read it to mean that in order to maintain the deterrent capability of NATO's force structure we must vigorously pursue modernization. This is true with or without an INF Treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. You say you would support the treaty either way now. But when this was written, you said, provided.

Admiral CROWE. The answer is, and we did not write that, that "provided" refers to our ability to maintain deterrence; it does not condition support for the treaty.

Senator PRESSLER. OK, well, who wrote it? It is signed by Frank Carlucci. Maybe he wrote it. Did you have input into it?

Admiral CROWE. I think his people drafted the transmittal letter but the JCS did provide an input to the report.

Senator PRESSLER. So you disagree with the Secretary's report?

Admiral CROWE. No. I disagree with the interpretation that it means a condition on support for the treaty. And I think we stand by our answer to the question.

Senator PRESSLER. OK. But in the first page of it he says, before entering into our agreement with the Soviets, we made sure from the standpoint of the military implications of the INF Treaty, NATO's resulting force structure would be fully capable of supporting deterrence.

Then it stops, and there is a dash, and it says provided, and it is underlined, provided that we vigorously pursue the necessary modernization. That sounds to me like a condition. Does it not?

Admiral CROWE. You can certainly interpret it that way, Senator.

Senator PRESSLER. But you would be in disagreement with it? You would support the INF Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. What he is saying there is he wants modernization.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, he is saying he would support the INF Treaty, provided.

Admiral CROWE. And I think he would say he would support the treaty with or without modernization but modernization is necessary in order to maintain the deterrent capability of NATO's force structure.

Senator PRESSLER. But if I said I were going to do something, provided that something else happens, that would be a condition. Would it not?

Admiral CROWE. I understand what you are saying.

Senator PRESSLER. I am not playing games. I am just trying to learn the Defense Department's point of view.

But the Joint Chiefs would be in disagreement with Carlucci on that point.

General VUONO. But does he not say, following that, Senator, most of which were identified well before the INF Treaty became a reality?

Senator PRESSLER. Pardon?

General VUONO. Does he not make the point——

Senator PRESSLER. Where is that? Now, I have the whole thing right here.

Consistent with the President's guidance, this report outlines a framework for achieving what the national security strategy states must be accomplished to maintain the credibility and viability of NATO forces and strategy. That seems to reinforce what I am saying.

Then he goes through a whole series of things, this report has in it a whole series of things that must be done. And I have summarized them here somewhere if I can find my sheet of paper.

This report has all the things that need to be modernized if the INF Treaty is going to go into effect. So that means increased spending. There is no question about it, this report contradicts what I have been hearing here this morning from the Joint Chiefs.

And I am not putting you down about it. That is the way I interpret it.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I have just looked at the statement, and the full statement says, before entering into our agreement with the Soviets, we made sure that from the standpoint of the military implications of the INF Treaty, NATO's resulting force structure would be fully capable of supporting deterrence, provided, et cetera, et cetera.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, provided that we vigorously pursue the necessary modernization.

Admiral CROWE. But that does not necessarily refer to the INF Treaty. It is the same thing that the Chiefs have been saying this morning in their testimony.

And that is that we are not satisfied with the balance today. And we feel that we need modernization, we need improvement. And that if you want the level of deterrence high and where it should be, that is what we should have. And we will need that, and we will support that position after the INF Treaty.

Now, you can assume, you can strain that and say no, that is not what he is saying.

Senator **Pressler**. The report goes on to provide specific recommendations of proposed follow-on to the Lance missile, and expanded production of artillery-fired projectiles, in addition to the initiation of other weapons systems in Europe.

What would happen if Congress did not fund these programs? The treaty would not make any difference one way or another?

Admiral **Crowe**. Not to support for the treaty. But we would be making a big mistake.

General **Vuono**. Let me add, Senator, that those specific requirements for the follow-on to Lance and the restriction of the AFAPs have been a request from us before the INF Treaty.

Senator **Pressler**. That is correct, and I understand that. But I find it strange that this report has the word provided underlined, which sounds to me as though we are going to support the treaty, provided we get the modernization in Europe. I think a reasonable man could read it that way.

Admiral **Crowe**. I agree that is possible, Senator. But you would really have to ask Mr. Carlucci what he meant by that.

General **Gray**. Could I just add, though, that the conventional modernization is required to keep pace, and hopefully to improve our flexible response capability within NATO, which is the bottom line requirement for deterrence.

And it is independent of the INF Treaty, even though that sentence may sound different, or whatever. That certainly is not the way we looked at it. It is the crucial linchpin of flexible response.

Senator **Pressler**. I understand that.

General **Gray**. If we do not get that, and still have the INF Treaty, in my judgment, it does not make any difference. It just makes a lousy situation lousy.

And the INF Treaty, as we have tried to point out, helps us in many ways from the standpoint of the asymmetric reduction.

Senator **Pressler**. I understand that, and I am in agreement with that. But there is language on Roman number page XI which says:

> But this favorable judgment is conditional. It depends on NATO's ability to act decisively to sustain both nuclear and conventional modernization.

Just reading this report throughout, a layman, or this lay Senator, gets the clear impression that the Defense Department is supporting this treaty based on the condition that these modernizations are going to take place.

I rather doubt myself that they will actually take place. Maybe they will. And that is one of the reasons why I am so concerned for an amendment regarding conventional forces.

I know that nobody has twisted any of your arms, but all of the witnesses up here in favor of it are very careful to say that this is not going to cost any more money, we are not going to ask to spend any more money in Europe as a result of this.

But I have been through the cycle back in 1974, 1975, in the U.S. House, the Secretary of Defense saying to me, we are going to put these missiles in to protect the lives of servicemen.

So, I just wanted to make that point, and I guess we have ground through it several times. That is why I asked the question. I know you said, no, it would not make any difference if the INF Treaty is here or is not here, we would still be asking for these things.

But the report that is signed by Carlucci that came out on January 25 said, "provided that". And that to me sounds like a condition. If I say I am going to go to lunch, provided that you come with me, it sounds as though I will not go otherwise. But maybe I would anyway. But thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, could I just say one thing? I think the pattern of testimony is consistent throughout. We are not pretending the treaty saves money in the military area, because I do not believe it does.

Senator PRESSLER. It will not save money, but you are also saying it will not cost money.

Admiral CROWE. We still have a big threat and a big commitment in Europe.

Senator PRESSLER. And it will not cost money.

Admiral CROWE. Well, verification is going to cost some money. Now, Secretary Carlucci said he would take it out of what he presently had for 1988 and 1989.

But yes, verification will cost money, there is a commitment and investment involved in the verification process.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Adams?

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Crowe, I want to quote from another part of that report.

On page 10 of the same report Secretary Carlucci says and I have got it, here:

> Some force adjustments may need to be made, and are being considered as a result of the INF Treaty. However, the realities of the basic security situation in Europe exists with or without the INF Treaty.
>
> The predominant impact of the INF Treaty in this regard is not to exacerbate NATO's problems, but rather to highlight the risks in neglecting them.

So that your testimony and that of the other Chiefs, as I understand it, and as I have heard it, is that basically the INF Treaty with its asymmetrical reduction, the Soviets getting rid of far more than we are and getting those missiles out of Europe is a plus overall in the military, from the United States' point of view. And that we have got problems with NATO, regardless either way.

But that we are strong in NATO. Is that correct?

Admiral CROWE. Well, we are strong in NATO. We are not as strong as we would like to be, though.

Senator ADAMS. Of course, I understand that.

Admiral CROWE. Or as we need to be.

Senator ADAMS. I understand that. But, you know, to say that you have other problems which we know we have are exacerbated because of the INF Treaty is just not what this report is saying.

Admiral CROWE. And there will be some force adjustments made. Now, even in my own statement I said that we will be reviewing the disposition of our forces in the light of the new circumstances.

Senator ADAMS. Absolutely.

Admiral CROWE. We will rearrange the furniture as necessary to work with what we have and keep our defenses as high as we can with our resources.

Senator ADAMS. Now, I do not want classified information out of this. But I want to ask it now so that you can prepare, if you do not want to answer it now but answer it in classified version.

I am very interested in whether or not the Soviets, who I think are a very tough adversary for us throughout the world, are they upgrading those Pact divisions, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, East German, whatever else they have there, in the same fashion in which they are upgrading their own divisions in that area? I know maybe all of them are having reactive armor.

General VUONO. I think we need to provide some of that for the record, because it gets into classified. But the fact is that there are modernizations going on throughout the Warsaw Pact armies.

[The information referred to is classified.]

Senator ADAMS. There are modernizations. But I hope you will address the qualitative differences between those divisions.

General VUONO. I will. We will do that.

Senator ADAMS. Some of us have to focus on what is happening in the pact, and how much is in there for Soviet interests in the pact being together and how much is directed against us.

And I want to ask this question, whoever wants to answer it. My information from the early 1980's, and it was private information, but it was in the sense public that it came from a private citizen in China. Is there still a confrontation between the two nations of close to a million men at the Yalo River?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. They are deployed in a confrontational way. I am not sure the numbers are as great as a few years ago when the temperature was a little higher. But yes, they are.

Now, they have done some talking about that particular problem. I am talking about on the diplomatic front. And I think that the temperature has come down considerably on the river.

Senator ADAMS. The reason I ask this is because I heard the testimony of General Welch and your testimony, Admiral Crowe, and several others. And I accept this. We are dealing with significant force structures throughout the world.

And this idea of whether or not you can put a few clandestine missiles into a torpedo tube, or haul them out of a jungle in Cuba, in terms of the major strategic balance where we have got over 20,000 warheads on both sides, makes me concerned that we are defying the laws of military physics.

And I want to be certain that you are telling us and the American public where you want to concentrate your resources.

I do not want the testimony in front of this Committee, to make either the American public or yourselves, start chasing some missiles that are hidden in a submarine tube or in a jungle in Cuba, as opposed to a major military confrontation the Soviets may have, and be shifting missiles in their eastern portion, our western portion, or other places.

And that is why I asked you the earlier question. Do you feel your concentration needs to be in Europe? I think General Welch pointed out that that is a linchpin area. But I do not want us to be all things to all people and not get the significant and major job of facing the adversary done.

That is why I ask you, and I hope in classified hearing you will talk with us about qualitative analysis of how good the Pact divisions are, whether they are in there, and is there a lessening of threat to the Soviets in the eastern portion so there is a shifting of forces?

Because I hope that your testimony that comes out of here will be that the Joint Chiefs have focused on significant force changes in the world, and that you are well aware of any ability of the Soviets—to change their missile mix using SS-20's, whether you bolt them on or put them in a submarine tube, or wherever the hell you put them—that you are aware if it makes a significant change in the balance of the nuclear balance between the two of us.

General WELCH. I think that you make a good point regarding taking perfectly legal cruise missiles out of a submarine tube and stationing them in Cuba, where they would be illegal. That makes zero military sense.

So it is important to realize that SLCM's are not captured by this Treaty at our insistence. So the fact is that we cannot verify how many of these kinds of weapons they have running around the world on submarines, and the fact that we cannot verify that is one of the reasons they are not addressed by this treaty.

But if, for some reason, they should decide to take perfectly legal cruise missiles out of submarines and install them in places around the world in a land-based mode, if they were not in these regions you described, they would not be significant.

It does not matter to us, really, although we would find it and we would respond. It does not really matter to us whether they have 20 SSC-X-4's in Cuba, or 20 SS-N-21's in a submarine. It is the same threat to the United States.

We would find it, we would respond to it. But it would be absolutely not militarily significant, because they can do that legally, just by leaving them in the submarine.

So it is in these critical areas where they would have to concentrate them in significant numbers that we need to focus our verification efforts and that we need to be able to detect significant violations. And I believe we can do that.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, we have gone through a whole scenario of those things, a number of scenarios, and to talk in specifics, we would have to go classified, but just as General Welch described, we have tested every one of those scenarios, and we are comfortable with the risk of verification and over detection ability on each of those scenarios, that if cheating was to go on, on balance, in time, we would find it before it would be militarily significant, and we would find it wherever it is. And that is the judgment.

We are comfortable with the risk.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you, Admiral. That is what I want to be sure we come out of these hearings with. We must continue to focus on where our real military problems are, and we must meet those because it is very easy to drain resources away from points of great importance to others simply because in a democratic society they happen to be highlighted at the moment.

I appreciate your testimony this morning for standing firm, and I do not want to get into an argument with my colleague, a legal argument of who said what to whom. I just wanted to get to the specifics that you believe that we ought to ratify this treaty and we should not put anything else on it, and then move to the next problems.

Admiral CROWE. The implication that we will only be looking in one place is not right.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Adams.

I would like to revert for a moment to the position of the Secretary of Defense on the linkage, or relationship of this treaty to modernization, and in that connection, I asked him when he was before us a few days ago: In your recent report on NATO strategy in the 1990's, Mr. Secretary, you identified a number of nuclear and conventional weapon modernization programs.

Do you think the Senate should attach or should link its consent to the treaty to the moving ahead of those programs?

Secretary Carlucci replied to my question no, they are unrelated, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted the record to show that point.

Second, Senator Biden who is ill, asked that I leave with you gentlemen three questions which I hope would reply for the record.

One of them he asked me to ask verbally at this point, and that is addressed to Admiral Trost. I wonder if you and the other Chiefs could respond to the views expressed by the Secretary of the Navy that in the post-INF environment rather than increasing its conventional forces in Europe, NATO might decrease them rather than increase them.

How would you respond to that statement?

Admiral TROST. I would have to look at his statement and see in what context he has placed it. I do know that his feeling is, as expressed in a recent speech, that we should look at U.S. interests and commitments worldwide to see if there is a possibility of greater burdensharing by the NATO nations and thereby a lessening of the commitment required of us. I suspect that is the basis for the statement that you referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and I made an error there. The question was for me, one that I had prepared.

The one from Senator Biden concerns strategic defense, and he asks: Secretary Weinberger reportedly advised the President that:

> Even a probable Soviet territorial defense would require us to increase the number of our offensive forces and their ability to penetrate Soviet defenses to assure that our operational plans could be executed.

Could our operational plans be executed with our current forces if the Soviet Union were to prepare or build a territorial defense?

Would you have a response to that?

Admiral CROWE. Well, yes, we would.

The CHAIRMAN. You or any of your colleagues.

Admiral CROWE. I will ask the ex-Strategic Air Commander here, General Welch.

General WELCH. Well, certainly there is a great asymmetry in the job that has to be done, the deterrence task of strategic nuclear weapons, simply because the Soviet targets are much harder and are spread over a much larger area, and therefore we have to have more warheads than they do to do the same deterrence task.

And that makes us quite sensitive to Soviet ballistic missile defenses, so that if the Soviets were to be able to deploy a comprehensive kind of defense, it would have a significant impact on our ability to continue strategic nuclear deterrence.

The **Chairman**. Thank you.

Would the Joint Chiefs support a 50-percent reduction in our strategic forces at the START talks if the Soviet Union began engineering development of a national defense?

Admiral **Crowe**. Before I reply, would you read that again?

The **Chairman**. Certainly.

Would the Joint Chiefs support a 50-percent reduction in our strategic forces if the Soviet Union began engineering development of a nationwide defense? In other words, the INF, as we all, many of us believe, is the prelude to a START Treaty and moving into that area.

Admiral **Crowe**. Certainly that would come into our calculations, Senator. We make military sufficiency calculations on each one of these proposals by the United States, in any treaty or dialogue that we are engaged in, and that is the kind of input that goes into those military sufficiency calculations.

You are using, I assume, the term 50 percent because of the START——

The **Chairman**. The START talks, exactly.

Admiral **Crowe**. Again, I would re-emphasize that we feel each of those treaties or any such effort must rise or fall on its own merits.

The **Chairman**. Good. I thank you very much. And then I will leave these other questions with you to be answered for the record.

I have no further questions at this time.

Senator Cranston?

Senator **Cranston**. I do have a few more I would like to get into.

First I would like to read a bit more from Wayne Smith's article in the New York Times of October 1, 1984. He is I think generally viewed as our foremost American authority on Cuba. He stated in the article:

> Twenty-two years ago this month John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev reached an understanding that ended the Cuban missile crisis, and the world which had stood at the brink of war heaved a sigh of relief. Since then, every American President has taken that understanding as a deadly serious matter.
>
> Now, however, the Reagan administration seems intent on questioning its validity. The President and his associates apparently wish to free themselves of the restraints imposed by the accord——

Then it goes on and says

> On September 14, 1983 the President stated categorically that the understanding has been abrogated.

Later the article states:

> President Nixon was fully committed to the understanding. Noticing in 1970 that the Russians were constructing facilities in Cuba for the apparent purpose of servicing nuclear submarines, the Nixon administration insisted that this would be a violation of the accord and demanded that the facilities be dismantled. They were. Washington and Moscow agreed at that time that isolated port calls by Soviet submarines would not be considered a violation, but their servicing in or operation from Cuban ports would be.

> Apparently to assert their right to do so, the Russians sent a submarine into a Cuban port in 1972 and another in 1974. The United States was aware of those calls and did not consider them a violation of the agreement. Since 1974 there have been no Soviet nuclear missile submarines in Cuban ports except for one towed in briefly in distress.

That ends reading from that article.

Now, since the President has declared that the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement is abrogated, it would appear that Soviet actions inconsistent with it would not be what we normally call violations, since you cannot violate an agreement that is null and void, just as a list of alleged Soviet violations of SALT II set forth the other day by Senator Helms are not exactly violations since we never ratified the SALT II treaty.

I do want to stress that we would, of course, view Soviet basing of nuclear weapons or forces in Cuba as an unacceptable act just as we did in 1962. I think we should note that that rash act led to the downfall of Khrushchev as the Soviet leader. It seems pretty unlikely that Gorbachev would repeat that rash act, particularly when you predict, Admiral Crowe, that we would detect it now just as we did back in 1962.

Moving on to a few remaining questions I have, some critics of the INF treaty maintain that it reduces the options available to the President in time of crisis, that is, in the event tactical nuclear weapons fail to deter or defend Western Europe, the only next recourse would be strategic nuclear weapons.

What are your comments on that, and what is your view as to the effect of this treaty on the President's options in time of crisis?

Admiral CROWE. Number one, I do not believe that we are reducing our options, and I am a little confused by the statement because I think today, if we had a crisis or hostilities and theater nuclear weapons did not effectively deter or in the case of their use, did not prevent further attacks or did not contain the escalation, the next step is strategic weapons.

I do not understand the thrust of the comment.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, frankly, I do not either, but that is what some opponents of the treaty have been stating, and that is why I wanted to get your reaction to it.

General VUONO. I would only add to that, Senator, that the concept of flexible response remains valid after the INF treaty is signed because flexible response does not depend on any specific system. It depends on a series of capabilities which we have within the Alliance.

Senator CRANSTON. How do you envision——

Admiral CROWE. We are not going out of the theater nuclear business. I hope that it is well understood that the INF agreement does not do that.

Senator CRANSTON. On that point, how do you envision U.S. and NATO Ally nuclear forces covering the gap in the INF range left by the departure of Pershing II's and GLCM's? Are U.S. residual nuclear forces, including tactical and strategic forces, able to fulfill the missions previously assigned to INF forces?

Admiral CROWE. The answer is yes, but I would like both General Welch and Admiral Trost to comment.

General WELCH. That is the matter of the adjustments that were discussed earlier. It does not require new programs to do that, but it will require some adjustments in order for us to cover those deeper targets that were covered by the Pershing II. We can make those adjustments without new programs by the time that this treaty is consummated, which of course is three years after implementation.

Admiral TROST. All I could add is yes, those adjustments would be undertaken with existing forces, both land-based and sea-based, dual-capable aircraft as well as sea-launched Cruise missile capabilities which could be retargeted as required to meet the requirement that would be gapped as a result of the INF treaty.

Senator CRANSTON. We have heard charges by skeptics and doubters and opponents of the treaty regarding decoupling.

Do you believe this treaty decouples the United States from Europe in any military or strategic sense? Is the United States guarantee to our NATO allies just as solid after the treaty as before the treaty?

Admiral CROWE. I strongly do not believe it decouples. I believe that we are on the scene in some strength. The President has made clear we are going to remain that way, and we are determined and staunch, and that we are not going to see any diminution in that effort or in the linkage.

And I believe that those are false leads, Senator. I just do not believe that.

Now, I would have to admit, of course, there are some Europeans that are using that line of argument, but no, I do not believe that there is delinkage, nor will this diminish our commitment.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, some Europeans are raising that question or using that line of argument.

I assume you concur in the general view that European leaders for the most part publicly and privately do express support for this treaty.

Admiral CROWE. Well, I go to five NATO meetings a year, and I have been to two just recently where this was addressed correctly, and there was unanimity both on the political side of the house and on the military side of the house of NATO. I am talking about the Defense Planning Committee as well as the Military Committee.

And some of these implications I see or veiled references to how Europeans think I have not seen at a formal and official level in NATO. I just plain do not see it. And these discussions get pretty spirited and pretty involved, and the people are free to speak their minds, but they have been strong supporters of this agreement. So I have difficulty absorbing what I read sometimes in that regard.

General GRAY. I would like to reinforce that. Just last week I came back from a meeting with ten NATO nations, both military and political people, including ambassadors and the Secretary General of NATO, and I would echo what the Chairman has said. A lot of spirited discussion, a lot of concern, naturally, that is what we are all about, but no question that they are solidly behind the INF Treaty.

There is always going to be some Europessimism creeping in. That is cyclic, but I think they are behind the treaty.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Regarding the matter of early warning of mobilization by the Soviets, are the photo, infrared and radar reconnaissance capabilities of the United States capable of providing significantly greater and more precise coverage than several years ago?

If so, how does this improved reconnaissance capability affect the United States's ability to detect at an early stage any Warsaw Pact mobilization?

And finally, what difference does this make in terms of U.S. and NATO ability to counter potential Warsaw Pact aggression?

General WELCH. I think that in the unclassified context, I can say that a number of programs are now coming to fruition, and we are making deployments that significantly increase our capability, both with space-based systems and with aircraft, so that we will—we are steadily improving our capability to observe and detect such movements.

I would caution, though, that all the surveillance in the world does not do any good if we do not have the forces in place to react to that information.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

General WELCH. So I certainly see nothing about that improved surveillance capability that would modify in any way the requirements for weapons systems to respond to that information.

Senator CRANSTON. Finally, I would like to ask—I think it will just be one question—on the relationship of this treaty to the prospective START Treaty.

Do you believe that a treaty reducing by 50 percent our strategic forces on both sides should be linked to an improvement in the conventional balance, either by modernization or negotiation in the treaty itself? Do you believe that the emerging START Treaty can stand alone like the INF Treaty, assuming, of course, that you are satisfied with the specific terms that emerge in the START Treaty?

Admiral CROWE. I believe that what we have said earlier applies equally as well to the START Treaty, Senator, and that is that it must stand on its own merits and demerits, and it must improve our security as well as that of our allies, and otherwise we should not approve it. And I think linkage would be a mistake there as well as in this treaty.

I am not saying that we can work out a satisfactory START agreement. That remains to be seen. But I think that treaty should proceed on its own, separate and distinct from our other negotiations, and it should be judged on the specific provisions of that treaty, be they good or bad.

Senator CRANSTON. I want to thank the five of you very, very much. You have been patient, you have been responsive, and your great experience and expertise is a very great help to this committee and to the country, and we all thank you.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Cranston.

I concur with what you said. The Chiefs have been very lucid, very frank, and very helpful. Some of the replies I realize will be coming in in classified form at a later date for the record. Others that are being submitted for the record will come in unclassified form, including the answers to Senator Biden's questions here, and I think it was an excellent presentation.

I congratulate you Admirals and Generals. Thank you very much for being with us.

The hearing is recessed until 10 tomorrow morning.

I made a mistake. There is a subcommittee here tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. It will be chaired by Senator Biden, and it is the subcommittee on European Affairs.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene on Friday, February 5, 1988, at 10 a.m.]

THE INF TREATY

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul S. Sarbanes presiding.

Present: Senators Sarbanes, Adams, Lugar, and Pressler.

Senator SARBANES. The Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is very pleased to have with us today a distinguished panel of representatives from the North Atlantic Assembly.

Senator Biden, who is the chairman of the subcommittee, is, I think it is fair to say, most distressed that he is not able to be here today. He was very much looking forward to this hearing and was closely involved in planning and arranging it.

He was in Europe in January for an extended period of time, given the responsibility by Chairman Pell to sound out European opinion on the treaty. And he has worked very closely with the North Atlantic Assembly over the years.

Unfortunately, he has been diagnosed as having a very severe pinched nerve in his neck, and his doctor has ordered him to lie in bed. I know how much he wanted to be here and I am certain that he would want to express to the panel his very deep regrets at not being able to be present.

The North Atlantic Assembly is the interparliamentary arm of NATO. It consists of parliamentarians from all 16 NATO nations, who meet twice each year to address issues of common interest within the Atlantic alliance, and who meet more frequently in committees and subcommittees of the assembly for purposes of developing information and preparing reports.

Each year, on the basis of its work, the North Atlantic Assembly makes formal policy recommendations to the Secretary General of NATO.

The philosophical principle underlying the assembly's activities is that the common grounding of NATO is the shared democratic institutions of the alliance, that the alliance exists to defend, and that the basis of the alliance is public support for its strategy and purpose.

Parliamentarians who must stand for election, must command the support of their people, are the essential connection between the NATO publics and the structure of the alliance.

With us today are the President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Ton Frinking of the Netherlands; Francois Fillon of France; Karsten Voigt of West Germany; and John Cartwright of the United Kingdom. Each of these panelists is a distinguished parliamentarian in his own country, and each has played an active role in the North Atlantic Assembly.

The panel was chosen by President Frinking to represent a cross section of views within the Atlantic alliance. Senator Biden had written to him asking that he assemble such a panel, and we are pleased to have the four representatives he selected here before us today.

Mr. President, perhaps you would begin by introducing the panel and then proceeding to give your testimony in whatever order you believe best.

But let me defer first to Senator Lugar. Did you have any comments that you might want to make?

Senator LUGAR. Let me simply reiterate your word of welcome, Mr. Chairman, to these distinguished parliamentarians. We are indeed grateful that they have taken time to come and assist us in our deliberations.

We have had 2 weeks, I think, of very enlightening and exciting hearings. We have had an opportunity to go into this treaty in some depth with our own negotiators. Some of us have gone back and forth to Geneva for the last 2 years as a part of the Senate arms control observer group, trying to monitor the progress of the negotiations.

We visited with both the American negotiators and their Soviet counterparts to understand better the treaty. And we now move to our second obligation with respect to the advice and consent procedure to ratification of the treaty.

Your advice today will be most helpful to us, and we welcome you.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Did you have any comments, Senator Pressler?

Senator PRESSLER. No. I would just join in that welcome.

Most of the parliamentarians I have had the honor and the pleasure of meeting before. We do need to hear your views.

I would be remiss if I did not say there was some controversy on this side on recommendations of who to hear from. Everybody agreed on all of you. There were some additional suggestions, and some of their articles I would like to ask unanimous consent to place in the record. Someone is bringing them over.

But I look forward to hearing these witnesses.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator SARBANES. Gentlemen, why do you not proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. TON FRINKING, PRESIDENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, THE NETHERLANDS

Mr. FRINKING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to introduce the members of this panel, as you asked already. To my right, Mr. John Cartwright from the United Kingdom. He is the Social Democratic Party Whip in the House of Commons and SDP spokesman on defense and the environment.

To my immediate right, Mr. Karsten Voigt from the Federal Republic of Germany, member of the Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs.

And to my left, Mr. Francois Fillon from France, member of the Rally for the Republic Party and Chairman of the French National Assembly's Committee on National Defense and Armed Forces.

And I myself am Ton Frinking, the Assembly President and defense spokesman for the Netherlands Christian Democratic Appeal Party, that is heading this group.

I would like to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate having this opportunity to discuss the INF Treaty and the arms control challenges still ahead of NATO.

Although neither I nor my colleagues speak today on behalf of the entire North Atlantic Assembly, this delegation is, I believe, representative of the spectrum of views in the parliaments of the 16 nations.

Allow me also to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Senator Biden for assuming the chairmanship of the newly formed North Atlantic Assembly Special Committee on NATO Strategy and Arms Control. This special committee will surely form a critical feature of the work of the assembly, and we look forward to the Senator's active involvement.

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which I would like your permission to have printed in the record.

Senator SARBANES. Without objection, it will be included in full.

Mr. FRINKING. Thank you.

Also, with your permission, I submit for the record the text of the North Atlantic Assembly resolution, presented by Mr. Cartwright, on "The Arms Control Challenge For the Alliance," adopted at the 33d annual session last September in Oslo.

Senator SARBANES. Without objection, that resolution will also be included in the record.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FRINKING. Thank you.

The resolution expresses the unequivocal support for the INF Treaty of the parliamentary representatives of the 16 nations, and as such constitutes important evidence for your deliberations.

Senators, in September 1979 the then president of the assembly, Mr. Paul Thyness of Norway, testified on the SALT II Treaty before two subcommittees of the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committees. Referring to the Soviet Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, which the treaty did not limit, he stated that these Soviet deployments gave us "reasons to fear that the Soviet Union will develop more assertive policies, gradually eroding European self-confidence and its confidence in the American nuclear umbrella."

Three months later, the dual track decision was taken. Over 8 years later, some observers on both sides of the Atlantic have assigned, curiously enough, the same risk to the INF Treaty that my predecessor foresaw if these Soviet deployments had been allowed to continue.

Critics have denounced the agreement as an alleged victory for the Soviet grand design of divorcing United States security interests from NATO and of undermining allied cohesion. They would have us believe that the credibility of NATO's deterrence rests entirely on the deployment of a limited number of missiles begun only 4 years ago.

They also claim that the treaty will somehow leave NATO more vulnerable to Warsaw Pact conventional forces, as if the magnitude of the conventional threat was not every bit as disturbing as before the treaty was signed.

I do not have time today to explore all of these issues in detail, although hopefully we can explore them in the question period. For the moment, though, allow me to ask the committee to consider two simple questions:

First, would NATO be better off with nearly 1,800 treaty-prohibited Soviet missiles left in place, with their massive short warning threat to our ports, airfields, urban centers, and other targets?

And second, would retaining the nearly 900 U.S. missiles or, for that matter, some number between that and zero provide some clearly vital and irreplaceable contribution to the credibility of NATO's deterrent?

The answer to both questions, I firmly believe, is "No." This treaty, which NATO supports, ensures our security and sets a useful precedent for future arms control negotiations in the following ways:

It eliminates a substantial portion of the short-warning threat posed by Soviet ballistic missiles, thus enhancing crisis stability;

It establishes the principle that unequal reductions may be required to stabilize the balance of power;

It recognizes that security is a global matter, a point which the Soviets rejected up until this last summer by declining to negotiate a global zero solution;

It provides an important and positive first step on the road to a broader accommodation with the Soviet Union, an accommodation including, but not limited to, arms control;

It ensures that compliance will be checked by an unprecedented cooperative verification regime, and it applies glasnost to military data;

And it demonstrates that the Soviet Union can be brought to negotiate seriously if NATO demonstrates the will to respond to provocation.

In short, this treaty is important on three counts: By way of improving relations with the Soviet Union, by way of strengthening allied cohesion, and by way of contributing to the broader global search for greater security in all its aspects.

Therefore, insofar as I am concerned, the best way to think about this agreement is: Mission accomplished.

The treaty does not, of course, answer all of our security problems. That was not its mission. So, to link this agreement to matters not within its purview would risk not only jeopardizing the success we have achieved, but offering no promise of rectifying these other issues.

Nevertheless, the tasks still before us are formidable. This year we hope to see talks begin with the Warsaw Pact on negotiating conventional stability in the whole of Europe. I cannot overstress the importance of this task, for it is in conventional forces that the bulk of our defense spending is invested, and it is the large conventional imbalance that requires our reliance on the possible early first use of nuclear weapons. And it is this imbalance which most profoundly demonstrates the still wide gap today between professed Soviet intentions and a real world order of battle, the gap between what is said and what is done.

The most important test of new thinking in the U.S.S.R. will, therefore, be concrete Soviet steps to undertake the necessary asymmetric reductions in conventional forces to reach a stable East-West balance in Europe.

The question of eliminating disparities in short-range nuclear forces is also on our agenda. There are differences on this issue, but we should not confuse a triple zero option with reductions to balanced levels.

Short-range nuclear forces play an important role in deterrence and directly affect the battlefield by forcing the aggressor to disperse his forces. I do not believe, therefore, that zero is a universal model for an arms control.

But are we not better off by thinking now about how to reduce the 10-to-1 Soviet missile advantage in this category and about how to restructure, preferably in the context of negotiations, our own short range nuclear forces away from self-deterring systems?

Mr. Chairman, before closing allow me to say a few words about the argument that the INF Treaty and the arms control process in general will lull us into a false sense of security and detract from needed defense improvements. Far from it.

As Senator Biden and the members of this committee are fully aware, we are witnessing the unfolding of a new era in the Western European pillar of the alliance. Bilaterally and multilaterally, I think we are seeing some very encouraging and historic developments toward a stronger Western European defense and political identity. We must work hard to see this process gain further momentum.

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, the INF Treaty should be ratified. It is worthy on its own merits and codifies useful precedents for future negotiations. This treaty solves a specific problem relating to the missiles it eliminates, but it cannot be expected to solve all of our security problems, nor for that matter should we expect future arms control agreements alone to do so.

Nevertheless, we should exert our best efforts to ensure that the INF Treaty is but the first step in a longer and more encompassing process toward restructuring the military balance in Europe and laying the foundation for a more stable, secure, open, just, and normalized East-West relationship.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frinking may be found in the appendix.]

Senator **SARBANES**. Thank you very much.

Have you worked out amongst yourselves the order in which you will proceed?

Mr. **FRINKING**. Yes, alphabetical order. Next is Mr. Cartwright.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CARTWRIGHT, MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Chairman. Like all of my colleagues, I am obviously extremely grateful for the opportunity of discussing these important issues with you.

Between 1981 and 1987, I had the honor of being the rapporteur of the special committee established by the North Atlantic Assembly to monitor the progress of this very complex INF issue. And we tried over that period to produce reports as impartial as any politician's report can be, assessing the progress of the various issues.

I have to say to you, I came to that task as a very strong and committed supporter of the 1979 dual-track decision, recognizing that the zero option was inherent in that decision.

But I must also say that I was skeptical about the chances of achieving success in the zero option, and that skepticism is certainly reflected in the reports which I wrote over the years.

And I must confess that I have been surprised by the sheer pace of the developments since Reykjavik. I have been agreeably surprised that we have achieved a total zero, not only on the long-range INF systems, but on the shorter range systems as well, and particularly surprised that we have got such an effective verification regime, which I would argue would be a very important pattern for future arms control agreements.

I think by any test, this treaty is a very extraordinary achievement. I would accept that the rather greater flexibility we have seen in Soviet policy since the arrival of Mr. Gorbachev has certainly helped, but I would argue too that the achievement is mainly due to the determination of NATO, and particularly to the determination of the five basing nations.

There is no doubt that the treaty has very considerable support right across the political spectrum in Europe. There are some opponents. There are rather more people who are privately skeptical or indeed worried about the implications.

The arguments in favor of the treaty I am sure you are well acquainted with. I would mention three which I think are absolutely crucial.

First, the treaty does remove the threat of Soviet INF which has hung over Western Europe for something like 30 years;

Second, it does establish the principle of asymmetry, the concept that more Soviet missiles have to be destroyed than those of NATO, and that again is very important for future arms control possibilities, particularly in the conventional field;

And third, it does establish a very intrusive verification procedure, which does make cheating extremely difficult.

Those who are worried about the treaty in Europe suggest that it may mean creeping, or perhaps even galloping, denuclearization of Western Europe, leaving us vulnerable to Soviet conventional superiority.

I think those who argue that case do ignore the very substantial numbers of nuclear weapons which will either remain in Western Europe or which can be deployed in Western Europe very swifly in time of crisis, and they certainly overlook the fact that the systems now to be destroyed only began to arrive in Europe in November 1983.

Second, some people say the treaty will result in the decoupling of the United States from the defense of Europe, and I think the arguments that I just mentioned really demolish that. And in any case, the some 326,000 American ground troops and their families in Europe effectively couples the United States to the defense of Europe for as far ahead as we can see.

Third, the critics say that this treaty does not deal with the conventional imbalance. Well, that is hardly surprising since it was not intended to deal with the conventional imbalance.

But it is worth remarking that the destruction of this very substantial number of missiles does reduce the range of Soviet options. It does lead them to the necessity, for example, to switch aircraft into a nuclear role that might otherwise have a conventional role. And it certainly denies Soviet planners the possibility of using those missiles in a conventional or a chemical attack. So there are some benefits even in the conventional field.

Now, like all my colleagues, I am interested in where we go from here, and I think there is a widespread feeling now in NATO as a whole that we do need a clear, comprehensive approach—a conceptual framework is the current jargon phrase—covering all issues of East-West arms control.

I believe that we must start off in the search for that conceptual framework, recognizing that for as far ahead as we can see deterrence must rest on a mix of conventional and nuclear strength.

And we must also recognize that arms control and prudent modernization are not in conflict. They must go hand in hand in maintaining an effective deterrent.

As we approach this task of working out NATO's strategy, we must recognize two major changes in the recent past. First, we have to deal with our own publics, who are much better informed and much more interested in these issues than they have been in the past.

Second, we have to deal with a different style of Soviet leadership, one which is much faster on its feet and much more skillful and adept at exploiting differences within the alliance.

As we look forward to Europe after INF, I must tell you that I would be very strongly opposed to deliberately compensating for the loss of the Cruise and Pershing missiles. I can see no logic in this painful business of negotiating away these missiles, only to bring them back again in some different form.

That would simply look like circumvention as far as the U.S.S.R. was concerned, and indeed it would look like circumvention as far as our own publics are concerned.

But I would argue there is a very considerable difference between that sort of compensation and what I would call a prudent modernization and improvement of our existing assets.

One obvious example I would give of that process is the case for improving the effectiveness of our manned aircraft by providing them with a standoff capability, which could be either nuclear or conventional. I am very glad that the British and French Governments are now jointly beginning to investigate that possibility.

Second, I would say to you that the issue of battlefield nuclear weapons is going to be a very important one in the immediate future. My reports show and I have always argued that these are the most potentially dangerous of all the nuclear weapons and the ones which worry our publics most of all.

I believe that there is, therefore, a case for seeking to eliminate the short range nuclear missiles. But the issue of nuclear artillery I believe is one which ought to be addressed within the framework of conventional arms control, and I would very strongly resist any attempts to negotiate away nuclear capable aircraft.

In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that the 1979 dual track decision was at least in part an attempt on the part of Europeans to lock in the United States to the nuclear defense of Western Europe. It resulted from nagging doubts about the credibility of the U.S. strategic guarantee, and when the Cruise and Pershing missiles are destroyed those doubts may surface again.

That in my view underlines the case for a continued British and French nuclear role, not just a national nuclear role, but one which is seen as being in defense of Europe as a whole. It would not be something which would be there to try to replace the United States guarantee, simply to supplement it, to provide prudent insurance against an uncertain future, and of course to add to the problems of Soviet planners.

There is now general acceptance in Europe of the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. There is a general willingness and acceptance of the need for Europeans to be seen to be doing more in their own defense. And I do not accept that that enthusiasm, that drive, should stop at nuclear defense.

The British and the French are at least now beginning to start the process of examining the possibilities of cooperation in the nuclear field. I strongly welcome that. I hope the United States will encourage that development for the good of the alliance as a whole.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cartwright may be found in the appendix.]

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCOIS FILLON, PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FRANCE

Mr. **Fillon**. Mr. Chairman, I am going to try to speak to you in English, but it is not easy for me.

First, we must observe that the INF Treaty is a historic agreement, opening a new perspective in East-West relations. Officially, it is a good agreement. By that I mean that most political and military officials in the West feel it is positive in public, although many of them fear the consequences in private.

As an example of this attitude, I want to mention Richard Perle, who said to me 3 months ago: The most positive aspect of the treaty is still the criticisms it causes among European countries.

From a purely technical point of view, this agreement marks an important date in the history of arms control. In fact, for the first time an agreement does not only provide for the limitation of potential nuclear arms, but indeed for the destruction of existing nuclear weapons.

And, moreover, for the first time the verification procedures of a nuclear arms control agreement allow for onsite inspectors, which far exceeds anything we could have hitherto contemplated.

Also, it is the first time that the U.S.S.R. is agreeing to asymmetric arms reductions.

On the other hand, its contents render this agreement ambiguous, to say the least. The elimination of 1,052 Soviet missiles and 867 American missiles is in fact very little indeed when the enormous total potential of the two signatories is taken into account.

And especially, the limited geographical scope of this agreement, which at the outset only applied to Euromissiles, could be considered rather surprising in an era when weapons systems should be understood in broader, worldwide strategic terms.

It is understandable, under such circumstances, that the European states, and particularly France, while they approve the treaty in principle, have expressed a number of reservations and questions on the scope and outcome of this agreement. In fact, it must be scrutinized very closely indeed.

As far as France is concerned, the immediate consequences of the agreement are in no way significant. It must be recalled that, unlike her principal European partners—the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, and Italy—France was not directly concerned by these negotiations, as no Pershing II or Cruise missiles are deployed on her soil.

Having based her defense policy on an independent nuclear deterrent, our country finds itself in fact strengthened by the choices opted for 30 years ago and upheld by the recent military planning law.

Moreover, and this applies to all European states, the gravity of the imbalances which the agreement creates in the ratio of European forces must be seen in relative terms.

One can discuss endlessly the evenness of obligations to which the two parties have committed themselves. Some have pointed out that the negotiations—which were envisaged, it should be remembered, as early as the dual NATO decision of December 1979 and initially suggested by President Reagan—relate to a very special type of weapon.

The SS-20 and other intermediate-range Soviet missiles on one side and the Pershing II and Cruise missiles on the other are in fact the counterforce weapons to be used in a first strike and, if possible, by surprise. Their elimination to all intents and purposes brings us back to the original situation as it was 12 years ago.

It has also been emphasized that, on the contrary, this dual withdrawal has in fact created a new, asymmetrical situation. Soviet long-range strategic weapons, which are becoming more and more accurate, could be used against Western European countries under precisely the same conditions as the present SS-20's, while no American missile could any longer reach Soviet territory directly from Europe.

Moreover, some people regret that the negotiations did not concentrate on short-range "battlefield" weapons, with the INF being retained. Such an approach would have avoided the short-range asymmetry and would have reassured West German public opinion, which is very sensitive regarding this problem.

The vital question today is knowing if Europe will continue to have sufficient nuclear capability, in quantity and in quality, to dissuade a potential aggressor. It is, however, clear that the combined presence of the remaining American nuclear weapons and the French and British nuclear forces places us beyond the minimum threshold required of an effective deterrent.

The signing of the INF agreement does not, therefore, in itself constitute a serious problem for Europe. But it is absolutely essential that existing weapons will be constantly modernized, that we continue on our part in the future with the S-4 missile, with the new generation of nuclear submarines, and perhaps in the future with the weapons developed in cooperation with the British. Our allies should also modernize their defenses.

I am thinking particularly of the modernization of American short-range weapons and of the replacement or the backing up of the F-111 bombers by other more modern bombers.

But the real subject for concern is the possible extension of the agreement. In fact, it is in the endorsement of the zero-zero option in the Soviet-American agreement that our reservations and anxieties lie.

Three risks come to the fore, the first being that this agreement would only be the initial stage in the process of much more denuclearization in Europe. A third zero option, this time bearing on American and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons, has already been put forward by the Soviets, and there have already been sympathetic murmurings from certain of our partners.

It should be pointed out that negotiations on conventional forces could lead to identical risks if its implementation were conditional to a parallel agreement on tactical nuclear weapons, which Mr. Gorbachev has already proposed.

The second risk could be an aggravation in the delinking process between Europe and the United States. This of course has been rejected by American leaders, but the development of American public opinion with regards to nuclear forces and the reduction of the budget deficit, with its possible repercussions on troop levels stationed in Europe, could make this quite possible.

The third danger lies in the psychological and political offensive which the Soviets never hesitate to implement in Western Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany through the problem of German reunification.

This treaty is forcing Europe to rethink its defense requirements. France cannot remain indifferent to such developments. France remains solidly behind her allies and European partners, through affinity naturally, but also because in the eventuality of a conflict the outcome with regard to our country would be identical to that of our neighbors. The independence of our defense policy has never been synonymous with neutrality.

Therefore, it was indispensable to reinforce European solidarity with regard to the problems posed by their security and their defense, and to which the French Government is particularly attached.

The adoption by the foreign and defense ministers of the member countries of the Western European Union at The Hague on October 27, 1987, of a "Platform on European Security Interests" was from this point of view an important step.

Following up on the charter presented in December 1986 by Jacques Chirac, this platform stresses three essential principles:

First, the particular value of nuclear weapons in Europe. To remain credible and effective, the defense of Western Europe must continue to be based on an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces, "only the nuclear element of which can confront an aggressor with an unacceptable risk."

When we know the prejudices against, or the reticence with regard to, nuclear forces which exist in certain European countries, we can judge for ourselves the importance of this acknowledgment.

Second, the indispensable nature of the Atlantic alliance. Above and beyond the cultural and historic links which bind us together, we should always bear in mind that the alliance gives the European peoples a strategic depth which could not be found in their country alone.

And also, when faced with a totalitarian state which can concentrate a considerable part of its national product to strengthening its military means, Western democracies, which do not have the same facility at their disposal, will always have to combine their efforts.

Finally, I should like to stress the importance which we attach to the negotiations on arms control which will take place in 1988. Two points would appear to us to be of particular importance:

First—and here I repeat myself—all discussions leading to new reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe must be excluded. There are not in fact too many nuclear weapons in Europe. And I should hope, with this in mind, that the American Congress, if it ratifies the INF agreement, will be very clear on this point.

Second, it seems to me that the negotiations between the two great powers must from now onward focus on those areas where there is a real excess in arms, and by that I mean that priority should be given to their central nuclear arsenals, which today are abnormally overexpanded, followed by chemical weapons and conventional forces.

But arms reductions is not an end in itself. It has meaning only if it strengthens everyone's security. So, we should avoid imbalances, even temporary ones, that poorly devised arms control agreements may cause.

Let us not forget that credible defense effort, which certainly is not incompatible with lasting East-West relations, is one of the requirements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fillon may be found in the appendix.]

Senator **SARBANES**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Voigt.

STATEMENT OF HON. KARSTEN VOIGT, MEMBER OF THE BUNDESTAG, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Mr. Voigt. Thank you very much for the invitation to this hearing. I regard it as a token of the bonds of friendship that exist among parliamentarians in the North Atlantic Assembly.

These shared democratic values link both sides of the North Atlantic Alliance more effectively than any military strategy, however intelligent it might be, and more effectively than any weapon, be it ever so modern.

Despite the primary importance of trust in political relations between Western Europe and North America, the question keeps recurring as to whether the Soviet Union, by introducing new weapons systems, can undermine by military means our political trust in a system of joint trans-Atlantic liability.

When the Soviet Union began to deploy numerous SS-20's, the doubts of many security policymakers in Europe in the future credibility of the U.S. security guarantees started to grow. Then as now, I was not beset by any of such doubts.

Neither approximate strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, nor the speech delivered by a former United States Secretary of State in Brussels in 1979, were able to check my conviction that it was in the American interest, too, to defend Western Europe with all the resources at its disposal in the event, then as now unlikely, of a Soviet attack.

For security and disarmament reasons, revision of the Soviet SS-20 buildup was the most convincing goal of the NATO INF decision. This goal has been fully achieved in the present INF agreement.

That is reason enough for the INF agreement to enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany. So far, as seen in some opinion polls, the support is now beyond 90 percent.

The present INF agreement means that the Western alliance has succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to accept fully the western negotiating aims. The global abolition of intermediate- and shorter range nuclear weapons by means of a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is in line with our people's desire for disarmament and with the security interests of our countries. And honestly said, the image of the United States, and not only of the administration but also of the Congress, has improved in our public after the INF agreement.

Willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions represents a fundamental breakthrough. The application of this principle to future negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals could make it easier in that sphere, too, to encourage stability in the security field throughout Europe through the elimination of unilateral advantages.

The verification measures have already been mentioned. They are more comprehensive and effective than in all previous arms control agreements. The measures provided for in the agreement also include elements whose application to future agreements on nuclear, conventional, and chemical disarmament would seem to make good sense.

The Western European basing countries will commit themselves in an agreement with the United States to permit the implementation in their territories of those inspections which are provided for in the bilateral INF agreement. The agreement with the United States will be discussed expeditiously by the German Bundestag and will be ratified without reservations, additions, or amendments.

All parties represented in the German Bundestag support the INF agreement. I have not yet come across any member of parliament who intends to vote against any contractual provisions which are subject to ratification by the Bundestag. And, unlike France, we have to vote on it.

Even the decision, not expressly referred to in the agreement with the Soviet Union, to refrain from deploying Pershing Ia missiles, whose nuclear warheads are at the sole disposal of the United States now, not earlier but now, has the agreement of all parties represented in the Bundestag.

All parties in the Bundestag had, however, wished a double zero option to be extended to land-based short range missiles.

In view of the years of dispute over the NATO INF decision and its aims and consequences, this consensus, transcending party lines, is remarkable. It is in the nature of things that such consensus should be based in part on differing motives. In which democratic parliament would this not be the case?

Nevertheless, an opportunity exists to extend this consensus in the future to other areas of federal German security and disarmament policy. A sufficient number of bones of contention will remain. Nonetheless, this effort to reach consensus between the governing parties and the Social Democratic opposition on major security and disarmament issues can already be regarded as one of the beneficial byproducts of the INF agreement.

In newspapers in your country and ours, I have read that Western European politicians are expressing themselves more skeptically in private about the agreed double zero option than they will admit publicly. I know politicians of that type, too. They do not belong to my party. In the Christian Democratic Union, they constitute a minority.

Nevertheless, despite their reservations, these politicians too are advocating speedy ratification of the agreement. This is so not just because of public opinion or for reasons of party disciplines, but because these German politicians are also aware that rejection of the double zero option would inevitably impair the credibility of the western alliance, given that the zero option was originally tabled at the negotiations as a western demand upon the Soviet Union.

They also appreciate the value of the verification arrangements and the equally valuable impact of the INF agreement on political cohesion within the western alliance. These German politicians also fear that the rejection or postponement of the INF agreement would do more to alienate the two sides of the Atlantic from one another psychologically and to decouple their security than any deployment of intermediate range weapons could create in terms of joint military liability.

Just as in 1979 comments to that effect by Henry Kissinger gave rise to concern, an interview with Fred Iklé published by the newspaper Christ und Welt—Christ and World—on the January 29 under the heading "Who Will Commit Suicide To Defend the Germans?" presenting elements of a concept of discriminate regionalized nuclear deterrence has had a similar effect.

Criticism of the concept of discriminate deterrence comes from all parties represented in the Bundestag. This criticism is unequivocal and unanimous. The concept runs counter to the interests of Western Europeans in general and to those of the Federal Republic of Germany in particular.

Admittedly, the tendencies expressed in this concept are not new to the discussion on military strategy in the United States. The official NATO doctrine of flexible response can only smooth over this conflict between Western Europeans and the United States, but cannot resolve it.

Nevertheless, the advice I give to my parliamentary colleagues in the Federal Republic of Germany is to respond to statements and concepts of this sort from the United States with unequivocal criticism, but not with nervousness or angst.

The critical response in Western Europe to the concept of discriminate deterrence is an indication of how the consensus fostered within the western alliance by the INF agreement could once more be jeopardized by an argument over the security and disarmament policy steps to be taken in the wake of that agreement.

The Western Europeans agree with the United States on the priority that should now be allotted to a START agreement. In this context, we hope for an early agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the continuing validity and interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

It is to be hoped that we also agree on the aims and urgency of a worldwide ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Such a ban must be sufficiently verifiable.

However, once the relevant convention has entered into force, its effectiveness should not be restricted to continuing production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Once existing weapons stocks throughout the world have been destroyed within the shortest possible transitional period, there will be no need either for so-called security stocks.

If a worldwide ban on chemical weapons cannot be agreed upon during this year, I predict that supporters of regional solutions, of a chemical weapon-free zone, will again gain an influence in Western Europe.

All parties in the German Bundestag urge that the disarmament process be continued in respect of nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometers. In our view, negotiations with this aim should be commenced as soon as possible.

In the light of the INF agreement, all parties represented in the German Bundestag call for a review of the modernization of nuclear weapons agreed upon by NATO in Montebello.

None of the parties in the Bundestag currently supports the deployment of new short-range missiles. The publication of the concept of discriminate deterrence has led in the Federal Republic of Germany to a hardening of resistance against any modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. This concept is grist to the mill of those who believe in the military strategic legitimacy of the saying "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans."

There are only differences of details among the parties represented in the Bundestag. From my point of view, it is regrettable that this consensus in German politics has still to be met with a sufficient level of understanding and approval from our allies.

For decades there has been agreement within the western alliance on the need to seek greater conventional stability in Europe. Agreement will probably be reached before the end of this year on a mandate for a European disarmament conference, whose task will include steps toward the goal of reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This conference is a great challenge and opportunity for the western alliance. Governments, parliaments, and research institutes, as well as the general public, are beginning to make a host of diverse proposals for the substance of future negotiations.

In a report for the North Atlantic Assembly last September, I produced some ideas on this subject. You will find them in the written version of my testimony which I have delivered to you earlier.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Voigt may be found in the appendix.]

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your testimony. Let me again underscore our pleasure in welcoming this delegation from the North Atlantic Assembly and having this opportunity to hear their testimony.

This is a unique proceeding for the committee. We have done it once or twice in the past, and it is in part in recognition of our own membership in the North Atlantic Assembly and the fact that we are parliamentary colleagues. We therefore thought it appropriate to have such a forum, and we appreciate the President's efforts in putting together the panel that is here today.

I also might note that President Frinking was preceded in his post as president of the North Atlantic Assembly by a very distinguished former member of this committee and of the U.S. Senate. He is, of course, a very dear and close friend of mine, since he was for many years the senior Senator from Maryland; Senator Mac Mathias, who presided over the assembly with great distinction.

We will take 10-minute rounds of questioning. These lights [indicating] will go on, but they are to control us, not to control you.

Let me start with this question. Yesterday we heard testimony from our former Ambassador to France, Evan Galbraith, who said:

> The INF Treaty sets us on a slippery slope and we won't stop sliding until Germany is denuclearized, neutralized, and demilitarized. By ratifying this treaty you will destabilize Germany and Western Europe and threaten the existence of NATO.

Could you address those comments, please?

Mr. **Frinking**. Mr. Voigt.

Mr. **Voigt**. It is a good expression, not of German angst, but of American angst. But with thousands of warheads, nuclear warheads, being still on German territory, that means more nuclear warheads than on any other territory in any part of the world.

You cannot really think about denuclearization when you get rid of the INF missiles. But going beyond that, I think that even if you would get rid—and I do not see it happening for the foreseeable future, but even if you would get rid of all land-based nuclear missiles deployed in Germany, even then you would have sea-launched systems, air-launched systems, and many other nuclear systems.

So, in functional terms, even when you have no land-based nuclear systems left, Germany especially and the other Western European countries would not in functional and strategic terms be denuclearized.

Every conflict between East and West could escalate, whether we like it or not, into an all-out nuclear war. And this is a limitation of all these disarmament processes even if we go beyond that which we have to discuss now.

And I think very much that the support for NATO and for membership in the western alliance has increased after the INF agreement has been signed. And I think a NATO alliance which is capable of following an arms control strategy will always be more acceptable to Germany than a NATO alliance which will reject arms control agreements.

Mr. FRINKING. Mr. Cartwright would like to respond.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. If I could just respond as well, I think the quotation you have given us is obviously a fairly extreme version of an argument which we tend to hear in Europe. And I think there is a concern that the INF agreement will produce the sort of public mood in which people are more willing to be trustful of the Soviet Union, in which they are more willing to continue a process of nuclear disarmament, without necessarily thinking about where it is leading us.

I think to that extent I can understand the comment, exaggerated though it is. I think it is important for those of us who have some influence on public opinion in Western Europe to stand firm against that sort of public mood of euphoria, to demonstrate that we did not get this in my view extremely good outcome of the INF negotiations by caving in.

We did not get it by being euphoric about the Soviet Union. We got it by hanging tough and standing firm.

And though I recognize that there is a risk of an exaggerated public mood, I believe that it is up to those of us who influence public opinion to stand firm against that point of view and to demonstrate that we should stick to the attitudes and the policies that have produced this excellent agreement.

Mr. FRINKING. Francois.

Mr. FILLON. I will speak now in French and have a translation.

Mr. FILLON [through translator Sachs]. I feel that Mr. Galbraith was being rather excessive when he made this statement to your committee, even if such danger might even exist. In the INF agreement, in what was said in Reykjavik, in President Reagan's speech in 1983 on the strategic defense initiative, there is a logic to denuclearization.

I think it is quite obvious that this is what the U.S.S.R. is looking for. This is its goal—European denuclearization, because of its superiority in conventional arms. So, we the allies must change our logic, our opinion.

So, if there is this consensus in Europe on the need for a deterrence and if we can talk about conventional and nuclear arms, if we can also talk about chemical weapons and conventional weapons as far as the Soviets are concerned, we can stop the danger that Mr. Galbraith was talking about.

Mr. FRINKING. May I add a few sentences to my colleagues'. I remember that after the session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Oslo last September, there was one journalist who asked me the question: Is INF the end of NATO?

He asked the question because the public mood, of course, is very optimistic now. I think the same is happening in the United States. I think you might know better than I do, but people are very much aware that not just the INF Treaty, but also the developments in the U.S.S.R., are leading to a situation wherein we see a change of attitude and a change from inflexibility.

So, that means that this leads not to some new analysis of the INF Treaty; it leads to the NATO alliance itself. We should ask ourselves the question that if the relation between East and West is going to be really improved, and if that leads to new arms control agreements, what should we do to keep our strength and to keep our cohesion as good as it was?

I would say that the answer is not to stop negotiations, but to improve as much as possible our consultation process. And you demonstrate by inviting us that you anyway understand this line.

Senator SARBANES. Let me put this followup question to you very quickly, because I see my warning light is on. It is asserted by some—and the quote I read to you is part of that approach—that approval of the INF Treaty will weaken NATO cohesion.

But let me ask you this question. What would the rejection of the INF Treaty by the Senate do to NATO cohesion? And that is our choice. We have this treaty here. We can approve it or disapprove it. Some of its critics assert that if it is approved it will create an attitude of euphoria that will divert attention from other responsibilities and cause us to lower our guard as we deal with the situation.

But let me simply turn that around. What would be the impact on NATO and on the cohesion of the alliance and on the political situation within your own countries if the Senate were not to ratify this treaty?

Mr. FRINKING. Well, people have the events around SALT II in their minds. I think rejecting this treaty would be a disaster for the alliance. People would not understand it and would say this agreement was a first step in an ongoing improved relation between East and West and it is stopped now.

I would not be able to explain such an outcome really. Anybody else?

Mr. Voigt.

Mr. VOIGT. You see, we as Germans also need to ratify certain parts of the agreement, for there are bilateral agreements with the United States and only with their ratification in the German Bundestag can these parts be implemented.

And no one in the German Bundestag up to now intends to vote against these aspects, and this shows you, beyond all the other differing aspects of political life, how much and in which direction we develop our political thinking.

But let me put it in a more brutal way. The American Senate is free to vote against the ratification, and we are free as Germans to decide whether we allow continued deployment.

And already from these two conflicting elements, you see the difficulty we would run into if one side unilaterally would do something which in juridical terms they have the right to do, but which would have counterproductive effects on the other side inside the alliance.

And I respect your sovereignty as much as I respect German sovereignty, and we have to harmonize our equal rights in a way that is in the interests of our common alliance.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Just two sentences or so. Rejection by the Senate would undoubtedly be a tremendous boost to the so-called peace movements in Western Europe. Their argument has always been that we have to disarm unilaterally because multilateral negotiated disarmament simply does not work; we spend years and years and years negotiating and nothing comes out of the process at the end; therefore, we must make a great moral gesture and disarm ourselves.

Their impact has been very substantially undercut by the success of the INF negotiations. We have been able to show that negotiation works, it will deliver the goods. And if there were to be a rejection now, that would be a tremendous shot in the arm for all those who argued that you cannot trust the statesmen and the politicians, that you must do something on your own.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your last question and especially the responses, which I think are very important for our understanding.

During my questioning of Ambassador Galbraith earlier this week, I asked him the following: If we were to reject the treaty, could we guarantee that the GLCM's and Pershing II's currently deployed would remain in Europe, given European public opinion or that of European parliamentarians, and governments?

In due course, we are all elected. We are responsive to our electorates. Public opinion is a very important factor in democracies, and all of us have democracies.

His response, I think, was that if we ratified the treaty, the Pershing II's would be gone and therefore lost forever. Thus we should take our chances by retaining them for a while under the circumstances.

But our witnesses today bring to bear an important point, and that is that the alliance consists of sovereign countries. Public opinion is important, and INF deployments really depend upon a sense of alliance, cohesion, and shared risk.

I make these observations as a contribution to our dialog this morning. It appears to me in this country that support of the INF Treaty does not approach the 90 percent plus which you have suggested exists in the Federal Republic, but it may be verging above 60%, maybe even 70% if one excludes those who are undecided.

A very small percentage of Americans appear to oppose the treaty, while others express a degree of ambivalence toward it. These opinions are consistent on two other thoughts, one of which is that Americans distrust the Soviets. They distrust the Soviet leadership, their negotiators, their performance on past treaties.

Usually by 2-to-1 or 3-to-1, in most public opinion polls, this mistrust continues, despite any recent developments at the summit. But by the 2-to-1 or 3-to-1 majorities, Americans want their leaders to negotiate with the Soviets. They want to keep track of them and to have more contact back and forth.

Those two positions are not necessarily contradictory. Those who support ratification of the INF Treaty are not relying on trust to implement it. Whatever the level of trust of the Soviet Union, it is no substitute for the monitoring and verification of the terms of the treaty as well as the political willingness to take appropriate, proportionate measures in response to any Soviet cheating.

This is an important message to convey to our populations, even as we continue with other negotiations in the areas of strategic weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces.

But it is equally important that our populations understand this message as we pursue other means of shoring up the NATO deterrent against aggression. And it is the latter that we are attempting to cope with today in this hearing: how best to maintain and strengthen alliance cohesion in deterring Soviet and other aggression against the NATO countries?

Now, I believe that a part of that solution lies in the modernization of other remaining weapons that we have in NATO. This is why I direct my attention to you Mr. Voigt particularly, as you arrive in your testimony at this very important and interesting paragraph at the bottom of page 6 and onto page 7. You say that:

> All parties in the German Bundestag urge the disarmament process be continued in respect of nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometers.

And then you point out that:

> All parties represented call for a review of the modernization of nuclear weapons agreed upon by NATO in Montebello. None of the parties in the Bundestag currently supports the deployment of new short-range missiles.

That I suspect does get us into a disagreement. Clearly, if many Senators believed that we were not going to proceed in good faith with the Montebello decisions and then to thoroughly explore what INF Treaty ratification means without that modernization, then we would have much more of a debate here.

It seems to me that we are still attempting to deter aggression and that that entails some costs. Your view, at least I gather it, is that it is unthinkable for the moment politically that the NATO allies will begin spending more on their own defense. Yet the more testimony we hear, the more some of us come to a conclusion that in order to remain secure we may have to spend more, if only to carry out needed modernization programs.

There are downward pressures on the defense budget in this country, too, but we will have to recognize that reductions in nuclear weapons through this treaty and perhaps others may magnify challenges to our conventional forces as well as the cohesion of the alliance, challenges that will entail costs of one kind or another. By the same token, we must guard against the euphoric notion that reductions in nuclear weapons somehow automatically translate into lower defense budgets and greater resources for social programs in our countries. It may be a popular notion but it is illusory. National security cannot be cheap.

You have come here today as an honest reporter and friend of public opinion in your country. But can you give me some assurance that the INF Treaty will not be used in the Federal Republic as an excuse or opportunity to renege on the Montebello decisions and the modernization commitments undertaken by the Alliance long before the INF Treaty became a reality? I ask this question, having recently talked with Foreign Minister Genscher here in Washington about the recent visit to your country of the Soviet Foreign Minister. Certainly Mr. Schevardnadze expressed critical views about NATO's modernization programs and even suggested that such programs would constitute a circumvention of the INF Treaty.

Can you give me any reassurance about your country's views on the Montebello modernization program that is somewhat brighter than that contained in your testimony?

Mr. VOIGT. The statement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that it was circumvention has to be rejected, for this is not true. This is one element.

The other element is that all German parties want to review the Montebello decision. But we are not unilateralists. I also reject people who support a global unilateralism. Some of them can be found in the United States.

I also reject those who are in favor of a European unilateralism or even a regional one or a national one. We are in an alliance, and this means if one partner wants modernization then we have to consult about it. And on the other hand, it is also true if one partner, especially the partner in whose territory these weapons need to be deployed, wants a review, we need the review, too.

I think that we have to take into consideration in the German debate the importance especially of the American troops being present in Western Germany, and so far we need to think about their strategy. But on the other hand, I think you also need to take into consideration our regional specific interests.

And especially the publication of this concept of discriminate deterrence has again provoked a very loud discussion in Germany, and especially among strong supporters of the NATO dual track and of the deployment even, who reject this concept.

And there are anxieties growing that you are thinking after modernization of shorter range weapons about regional, limited nuclear war options, and the Germans cannot accept that. It is understandable.

Senator LUGAR. That is important, and that is one of the great values of this dialog today.

You have asked that we consider more carefully our words and our testimony. As all of you as students of American politics are well aware, each of us is free to make all sorts of statements, and you have to weigh them in each of your countries as to their source and the degree of currency they have.

But it is important to air these concerns, to get them out on the table, because very clearly one of the fears in the Senate is that this treaty could commence a process of denuclearization of the European continent. While such concerns do not constitute sufficient reason for rejecting this treaty, they do provide us with an opportunity to analyze the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression against Western Europe and in maintaining a level of cohesion and confidence among the allies.

And yet, in the Federal Republic, there is very clearly under way a debate on denuclearization. Your testimony indicates much sentiment in Germany favoring a third zero with respect to tactical nuclear weapon systems, a sentiment not shared in Britain, France, or the United States.

And I thank you for drawing our attention historically to these prospects, which I think are very important.

My time is up on this round.

Senator **Adams**. Senator Lugar, if you wish to proceed with your second round, please go ahead. Senator Sarbanes and I would be happy to have you do that. If not, I am sure Senator Sarbanes may wish to have some questions.

Senator **Lugar**. I will yield to Senator Sarbanes.

Senator **Sarbanes**. I want to follow on something that was just brought up in response to a question from Senator Lugar. I am concerned by the extent to which doubts voiced by Americans about the American commitment to defending Western Europe become the origin of, or certainly add fuel to, any such doubts which may exist in Europe.

In other words, this concern may always be there, but it seems to me it gains impetus when, for instance, a former Secretary of State makes a speech expressing such doubts, or if a leading official, as happened recently, starts talking about "discriminate deterrence" and so forth.

To what extent do you perceive that European doubts about the American commitment to defend Western Europe come from doubts expressed by Americans?

Mr. **Voigt**. That is obviously so. I think you are right, it is an ever-going discussion, I would say. And it will last in the future again, because you can never prove that our common security will be guaranteed by the efforts of all the 16 nations.

The best thing the United States is going to do is to reaffirm it as many times as they can express it. A new government starting its new administration might start by doing so.

It has no direct relation, I would say, with INF. We in the assembly are now, under the chairmanship of Senator Roth and with the assistance of Senator Nunn as well and two Members of the House and a few Europeans, in the process of producing a study on NATO in the nineties that will deal with all the subjects you just mentioned, because we have to deal not just with the public mood after INF, we have to see what is going on with the process of openness in the Soviet Union, where is it leading to.

And on the other hand, we have a big deficit problem in the United States, leading to the question to Europeans, what are you going to do in the future. And we have to answer that question, and we are trying to do so in that report.

It is an absolutely legitimate question of how we are going to come to a European pillar in a situation where the Europeans are having big problems in increasing their defense efforts. They might increase their defense cooperation, but I can imagine that then the Americans will look to the Europeans and say: "Hey, where is our part of the deal?"

So, this is a problem that is far-reaching. It is far more than just the INF Treaty, and that is one of the reasons why I said earlier we have to improve our consultation process. We will have to encourage each other to come to better cooperation, and we will have to make clear what the burden is and how we are going to distribute the burden in the alliance.

But to repeat, it is not just the INF Treaty that brings up this problem. We will have to rely on the Americans. They are in Europe and you cannot deny that 300,000 American people in Europe are an essential part of the decisionmaking in the United States as well.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. I think it would be too easy for Europeans to put blame for what I call nagging doubt in my testimony, to put the blame for that on individual comments by American politicians or leaders. I think European doubts are inherent in the situation.

All the time that there was nuclear supremacy on the part of the United States, clearly that strategic nuclear guarantee was quite clear and quite credible, and there was no doubt about it. Once the threat by the United States to use strategic nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe ran the risk of a response from the Soviet Union, in other words American cities were being put at risk to defend European cities, there is an inevitable doubt about the credibility of any such guarantee.

Now, none of us are doubting the fact that the guarantee is there. But I think it is very difficult to remove the worry in the back of many of our minds of, will this really happen if we ever get to that situation.

I agree very much that the presence of American ground troops is an important factor in underlining the fact that the United States is coupled with the defense of Europe. But nevertheless, I think the position of the British and French nuclear deterrent is very important here, not, as I said, in any way to supplement or replace the United States, but simply as a prudent insurance against an uncertain future.

Mr. FILLON [through translator Sachs]. I also believe that the European perception of the United States defense policy for Europe's security depends upon the opinions of the American people themselves.

In Europe there seems to be this fear that there is a new weakness in American leadership and it is all very much related to the buildup that is going on in the Soviet Union, and all of that seems to be related as well to the new style that the Soviet leaders have of communicating.

In other words, if the Senate were not to ratify this treaty, I think that there would be grave political consequences in Europe, because there is this feeling already that there is not a great deal of cohesion. And all of this when you look at it contrasted to the monolith that we all know is the U.S.S.R.

In other words, the Europeans want to be able to count on a durable U.S. policy, whereas there is a fear right now that it is being challenged occasionally.

There is another concern in Europe as well, and that is related to our own schizophrenia in Europe, but that is a totally different story.

Mr. Voigt. If I may, I would add that all these examples show that the primary coupling element between the two sides of the Atlantic are dominated by political and psychological factors, and we have to consider them primarily, especially being on both sides of the Atlantic in the parliaments, and I think they are of primary importance.

And to a certain degree I never have been quite sure whether some European security specialists, not so much public opinion, were more interested in the INF deployment not to counter Soviet SS-20's but to counter perceived American lack of credibility.

So far, some were directed more against the United States than against the Soviet Union. And I think we should concentrate more on the political elements, and every time when we only concentrate on military components we will frustrate one another time and again.

Senator Sarbanes. I would just make this observation. For deterrent purposes, what is important is what the Soviet Union perceives. If, instead of reinforcing doubts within Europe, an effort is made to diminish them and present a more credible posture, it would serve as a more effective deterrent to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets make their calculations based on what they expect the nature of the response to be. And as long as they believe there's a strong probability of a response and therefore a very high risk for them, it would serve as a deterrent.

So, it is their perception of what we would do that is relevant in terms of determining the effectiveness of the deterrent.

Senator Adams.

Senator Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We want to welcome you here. I have had the opportunity to read your statements and have had reported to me that all of you are in support of ratification by the U.S. Senate of the INF Treaty.

I am in support of that and I am in support of the proposition that we should not add reservations or other conditions or linkages that would require resubmission to the Soviet Union.

What I wish to address, President Frinking, I will simply address to you, sir, since you are the President of the alliance, but any of the others can comment. We have a new generation of leadership in the Soviet Union. I am not talking about ideology or anything else, but just simply as a matter of age.

Similarly, new leadership will appear in the United States either in this Presidential election or the next, again as a matter of age. This new leadership did not grow up, as we did, with the Depression, World War II, and so on. We are trying to determine as these come into power how we produce, as Senator Sarbanes just commented, a stability of crisis management, an ability—as Mr. Voigt said, to ensure—that neither a political nor a military figure makes the mistake of starting a war or military action.

We talk around the edges of this in terms of specifics, such as modernization of NATO forces to match pact forces and nuclear deterrent and potential of what size strategic forces we use.

I would like to ask the question that any of you can comment on: First, would you give us your recommendation as to what in your opinion is the type of modernization in the conventional area we need. Second, coupled with that, what would be the reaction in Europe if we were to have a significant reduction in the total number of some 12,000 warheads we have pointed at one another?

We want to approve INF, but we want to have discussions on these other two points. And the important thing that you can give to us and the American people is a European perspective of the potential for both modernization and reorganization, if it is necessary, of NATO forces to create this uncertainty in the mind of pact forces and the Soviets that they should not start a war; and second, if we can discuss significantly reducing this 12,000 warheads on each side.

I will state to you, in case you have not read the testimony or followed it, that we have had all the Secretaries of Defense in, we have had the Joint Chiefs of Staff in, and there is certainly some number of nuclear missiles considerably less than what we have now that is significant enough to destroy the world.

So, I would like your comments—given the fact that you are in support of the INF Treaty—of these next two matters.

Mr. Frinking.

Mr. FRINKING. Well, I am in fact in favor of the ratification, a speedy and quick ratification if possible, of the INF Treaty. I think that means as well that any amendment would mean that this ratification would be at stake probably. So, in my opinion there should be no amendments in order to have this settled as soon as possible.

That leads me to the remark of Chairman Sarbanes, who said deterrence is something that should be looked at from the Soviet perspective. I would say that there are always four actors in our security policy. That is Moscow, that is the alliance as a whole, that is your own population, and it is the military, who have to be confident in their own efforts.

So, deterrence in the eyes of our own population is accepted, but not in the amount of systems now deployed in Germany and in The Netherlands and in Belgium. It is the central region.

So, looking at your question, should we after an INF agreement and after a START agreement not look at modernization of our remaining forces, that can be addressed in two ways.

First of all, the general opinion I think is—and we will have to look to the money as well and to the preparedness of the governments to spend more money. Can we afford to spend more money in our defense? I would say we have to increase defense cooperation, so that we get more defense for the money we now spend.

There is no question we should not modernize our forces, because if you have a high-technology army, navy, and air force, then you will have to renew things that are outdated, deleted, have no use any more. So, to have things modernized is not a question.

The question is should we modernize because of INF and should we look at improving our conventional forces? In this respect, the mood in Western Europe, and I think in the whole of NATO, is that we should start trying to negotiate the imbalances between East and West with an asymmetric number of conventional forces taken out by the Soviets first.

So, the priority is to come to lower levels in conventional forces and renew what is necessary.

Senator ADAMS. But you are satisfied that there need not be a linkage of the modernization or the negotiation of reduction of forces to INF?

Mr. FRINKING. Oh, no, I would not make any linkage.

Senator ADAMS. And I want to be certain that the other members of the panel agree with that position, because it may be an issue and you are speaking for the political forces of Europe as far as I am concerned.

Mr. VOIGT. We want many things, but we cannot link everything with everything. I want to enhance conventional stability in Europe, but this is an issue and an objective independent, of the INF agreement.

I especially share your view that we should primarily be concerned about crisis stability in Europe. This is a primary task of our own defense programs and of our arms control concept concerning the conventional field in Europe. Looking at crisis stability, I think we should first look at elements which are not so fancy. This means sustainability, readiness, and making better use of our reserves.

And second, we as Germans especially should also think about reviewing our position about barriers, antitank barriers, and reviewing certain positions concerning other elements of antitank and air defense measures. I think this is an element which should be discussed inside the alliance, but we needed to discuss it before the INF agreement, we need to discuss it independently of the INF agreement.

And we should concentrate now on this issue, especially while we are preparing the conventional arms control talks from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Senator ADAMS. Thank you.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. On the specific point you put to us about the linkage of INF with progress in conventional modernization or progress in conventional arms control, I would be very strongly against linkage. There is a tendency to give the impression that the Cruise and Pershings have been with us a long time and we have become very dependent on them.

It is worth remembering that they did not start to arrive until November 1983. The deployments are not yet even complete on the basis of the original 572 systems planned. We have only got one Cruise base, for example, operational in Britain. The second one is not yet in operation.

So, we have not become so totally dependent on these weapons that the world has to change out of all recognition once they disappear.

And on the business of conventional modernization and improvement, I think I would argue there, as I was trying to argue in my original testimony, that we should not fall into this trap of seeing arms control on the one hand and sensible ongoing modernization on the other as being somehow in competition.

They should not be in competition. They go hand in hand. They are the opposite sides of the same coin. If we are trying to maintain an effective deterrent, if we are trying to maintain stability and security, particularly at lower levels, then we should see the two as contributing together to the achievement of that objective.

There is no point in having weapons, whether they are conventional or nuclear, if they are becoming obsolescent. And sensible modernization at lower levels is really what we are trying to get at, surely, both in the nuclear and in the conventional field.

Senator **Adams**. Mr. Fillon, I do not know whether you would wish to comment, but I would be most happy.

Mr. Chairman, if I could have an additional 2 minutes for them to complete their answers, I will ask no more questions.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Yes, just for the purpose of hearing the response.

Mr. **Fillon** [through translator Sachs]. Just as my colleagues, I am very much against any sort of linkage. Deterrence is quite simple. The U.S.S.R. is afraid of our nuclear weapons and there is no need to increase the risk of conflict by linking.

So, we need to decrease the danger of triggering a conflict, especially a surprise conflict. And for that we have to be concerned about the denuclearization of Europe. And we should not be including dual-capable weapons and we should be talking in negotiations concerning chemical weapons, without creating temporary imbalances in that field.

Senator **Adams**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Thank you.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you.

I think that this treaty is going to be overwhelmingly approved in the U.S. Senate. But I do think there will be very serious efforts to amend it, which is fairly common in our treatymaking processes. The Panama Canal Treaty was so amended. We have amended aviation treaties. It is a unique thing, the way our system works, where the Senate has a constitutional responsibility to look closely at these treaties.

There has been much concern expressed in a couple of areas. One is attaching an amendment regarding moving closer to a 1-to-1 ratio on conventional forces in Europe. The MBFR talks have gone on for a number of years and many of the terms are defined. It could be done within a matter of weeks.

Would you support this concept? I have always supported the concept of arms control, but in some ways we are giving up our trump card and the Russians are keeping their's with conventional forces.

If this could be done in the Senate and if the Russians were agreeable, would you like to see this treaty include moving toward a 1-to-1 ratio of conventional forces?

Mr. **Cartwright**. Could I perhaps start off? I would be very strongly opposed to trying to link INF in that way. Obviously, if we could get to a 1-to-1 ratio on conventional forces, we would all be extremely happy. But again, with respect, I think we are falling into the trap of believing that somehow Cruise and Pershings were deployed originally in response to the conventional imbalance.

They were not. The decision to deploy them related to the very worrying threat of this whole new type and class of weapon, the SS-20, which was threatening Western Europe in a whole new way.

The argument ran that we had to deploy something which would at least give us some counter to the SS-20. Now we are in this treaty removing the threat of the Soviet INF systems that have threatened Western Europe for 30 years, but particularly removing this extremely accurate and mobile and sophisticated system, the SS-20.

I think that is the scope that we should limit our operations within this treaty to. That is what the object of the negotiation was. We have, I think, succeeded in that objective.

We ought to have a separate negotiation about conventional systems, difficult though that will be. So, I would be very strongly opposed to that sort of linkage.

Mr. VOIGT. May I add that I am also strongly opposed to that, and for two reasons. First, it would practically mean that we support those who say that the INF Treaty in itself is not a good treaty, and I think it is in itself a good treaty which needs to be ratified on its own substance.

Second, while we are in favor of arms control in the conventional field, equal ceilings are only one goal of our arms control priorities. We also want to diminish the capacity of surprise attack and of terrain-seizing offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.

This has to do in one way or the other with equal ceilings, but it is not identical with them. So to link, before we have reached a consensus about our own goals in arms control, a treaty which we have reached now with goals where we have not found a consensus yet inside the alliance would not be credible for anybody in our public, and not even credible in arms control and security terms.

Mr. FRINKING. I would say that this suggestion is the same as killing the INF Treaty. Why? Because I do not see that the alliance, that NATO itself, could come up with any proposal that is leading to a 1-to-1 situation in conventional arms, because we do not even know what one to one is.

We have considered after the Reykjavik meeting in NATO the conceptual framework of the future, the need to harmonize force planning and arms control. We need an arms control policy. We need a force planning policy coordinated as such.

We could easily start a process of how we think or what we think about conventional forces 1-to-1 in that framework. But linking it to INF is in my opinion the same as being very much against INF and trying to achieve that via this amendment.

Francois.

Mr. FILLON [through translator Sachs]. I think that there would be a great danger in linkage. I just got back from the U.S.S.R. a few days ago, where I had discussions with arms control officials, and they are not in favor of linkage at all either.

I believe that, at least at the current time, the genuine objective of the Soviet Union is to force us to negotiate on nuclear arms that still remain in Europe. I believe at this point the Soviets do not really see any great imbalance in Europe.

They might tell you or we might feel that they have superiority when it comes to armored vehicles and weapons. But as far as we, the allies, are concerned, we are superior in the air. I do not have to tell you that it is not at all the same thing.

So, I think it is fair to say that at this point we are very far away from a good conventional arms agreement. Therefore, to link the two together would be very bad.

Senator **Pressler**. Let me say that there has been some discussion, mainly in the Armed Services Committee, about article 14. If this has been covered, I apologize for being out of the room. I was with Secretary of the Navy Webb talking about the Naval Reserve unit in South Dakota, my home State.

But in any event, if this has been covered, article 14 of the treaty, I think the Armed Services Committee is going to adopt some kind of recommendation. The article reads as follows:

> The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

The concerns that have been expressed revolve around whether this article might be interpreted as prohibiting the United States from assisting our NATO allies in the development of their own missile systems. And the Soviets have already begun to claim that the treaty prohibits this and other forms of modernization within NATO.

So, there is some concern here of how this article 14 will affect our relationship with our NATO allies. Do you have any of those concerns?

Mr. **Voigt**. This issue has been debated in Germany and we discussed it inside of our subcommittee on arms control and disarmament, and this concern has not been raised. It is not a noncircumvention clause insofar as we do not perceive such a risk, and we think it is clear that it is only a binding obligation insofar that other treaties and commitments are not undermined.

But this does not by itself exclude any necessities which we think are necessary inside the alliance.

Mr. **Cartwright**. The comment of Mr. Shevardnadze 10 days or 2 weeks ago certainly elicited a very robust response in London.

We are not in favor of circumventing the treaty, that is for sure. But that does not rule out sensible modernization of existing nuclear assets. I think the response of Great Britain is that we are not going to be told by the Soviet Union of our own defense priorities.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions. Would you like me to wait for the next round or finish up now?

Senator **Sarbanes**. Why do you not go ahead.

Senator **Pressler**. Do any of the rest of you want to respond on that point?

Mr. **Frinking**. My only response would be, I do not know of any plans or policy that might in the future be the subject of this article.

Senator **Pressler**. Let me ask about this. There was an article in the Wall Street Journal entitled "Europe's INF Message to President Reagan." This article was by some Europeans who were opposed to adoption of the INF Treaty. Mr. Benoist is a senior fellow of the College de France. Mr. Huyn is a former member of the Bundestag and a diplomat. Mr. Frost is—Hans Huyn, I must not have said it right, H-u-y-n, and Gerald Frost.

Are these people part of study groups, or are these names that you recognize? Are you familiar with them?

Mr. VOIGT. I think it would be very surprising if you do not find, if you would not find these voices in our debate. They exist and they are one of the reasons that we have only 90 percent support for the INF Treaty and not 100 percent in our public opinion.

Senator PRESSLER. Good.

Mr. Chairman, I must ask to insert into the record a letter from the ranking minority member and the chairman's response. He had wished to invite some other people. He very much agreed with everybody who was invited here today, and I am hosting this group at lunch and we are glad you are here.

Our ranking minority member had hoped to invite some other guests also. And I ask unanimous consent to place his letter and the chairman's response in the record.

Senator SARBANES. Without objection, that will be so included.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

Senator SARBANES. I think to make that record complete, we would include Senator Biden's letter of invitation to the North Atlantic Assembly requesting their appearance here and the ground rules under which it would take place.

[The material referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FRINKING. Mr. Chairman, may I ask you a question?

Senator SARBANES. Certainly.

Mr. FRINKING. Is this letter related to members of parliament or members of the North Atlantic Assembly, the question that Mr. Pressler is putting forward?

Senator SARBANES. Not exactly, no.

Without objection, these letters will be included in the record.

Are you finished?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Senator Adams.

Senator ADAMS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SARBANES. Gentlemen, we very much appreciate your testimony. We welcome this effort to extend the working relationship between the Senate and the North Atlantic Assembly. And we know that it took a great deal of time and effort on your part to appear here today, and we are most appreciative to you.

The meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10:02 a.m., February 16, 1988.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify on the INF Treaty. My statement in support of the Treaty is similar to one presented last week to the Senate Armed Services Committee, that is, an overview of NATO, military objectives and strategy of the Alliance, main provisions of the INF Treaty including verification, and efforts to prepare NATO for the Future.

NATO OVERVIEW

Clearly the North Atlantic Alliance has evolved dramatically since WWII. In particular, the predominant position of the U.S. gradually changed as the European nations recovered economically, assumed a larger role in NATO, and reached out to the world in general. Today, the European and American pillars are genuine partners with much in common--politically, economically and above all integrated military policies within the NATO framework.

Insofar as the American pillar is concerned, economic support for the industrial allies no longer is necessary or desirable. Yet, our political and military participation in NATO still makes a crucial difference.

Certainly, the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella is vital to NATO, especially for allies possessing no nuclear arsenals of their own. Part and parcel of European expectations is a viable linkage between continental based conventional forces, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic systems.

Similarly, the allies are deeply interested in preserving the trans-Atlantic coupling. Our military presence of 300,000 troops in Europe and our maritime strength is a central part of this process. Moreover, I would argue strongly that the U.S. role in shoring up international peace and security outside the Treaty area contributes heavily to NATO's well-being and that members willing to put their forces on the line in this fashion should receive credit in the realm of burden sharing.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

NATO's general military objectives have remained constant and consistent from the outset:

- Deter a Pact assault;
- Defend forward if attacked; and
- Restore the territorial integrity of NATO.

The strategy for achieving these objectives is set forth in MC 14/3, a NATO document, which was adopted in 1967 to provide a more credible replacement for the earlier doctrine of "massive retaliation." Under the new "flexible response," no one proposed to fold the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but much more emphasis was placed on direct defense by conventional forces and the selective and discriminant use of theater nuclear weapons.

Such a strategy to be successful depended on constant and adequate investments across the spectrum of weaponry from conventional to strategic. It is a lesson NATO has had difficulty absorbing. On the other hand, the Kremlin has continued its policy of steady improvements at all levels and, over time, has confronted NATO with not only strategic parity but an adverse balance in theater nuclear and conventional forces.

As a consequence, the JCS have for a number of years been disturbed about the military balance and the level of risk in Western Europe. The U.S. has since 1981 been effectively modernizing and upgrading its conventional forces in Europe which has benefited all of NATO. Still, we and the Allies have some way to go before we can face the future with confidence.

Of special concern to the JCS is the low level of sustainability items and munitions supporting non-U.S. formations as well as shortcomings in infrastructure and C3. Despite NATO's progress in other areas, these deficiencies lower the nuclear threshold and increase the risk of general escalation. Suffice it to say, this state of affairs hardly accords with a strategy designed to allow deliberation and discrimination in the process of "flexible response."

To help relieve these problems, the U.S. and NATO have for some years been engaged in a serious arms reduction dialogue with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The result has been two SALT agreements and, in the case of conventional weapons, 14 years of frustration, i.e., MBFR talks. Unfortunately, these efforts did not prevent the Kremlin from deploying intermediate range missiles capable of striking every nation on and around the Eurasian Continent. Consequently, by the late 1970s, NATO moved to the "dual track" decision followed ultimately by INF negotiations, a "global solution," and the Treaty we address today.

THE INF TREATY

This brings me to the Treaty itself.

Each Party to the INF accord (US and USSR) has agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and related support structures and equipment. That includes ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles within the range of 500 to 5500 kilometers. Existing classes of missiles to be eliminated by the Parties are specified by type in the Treaty text.

Military Impact

Overall, nothing about this document makes Europe "safe" for another conventional war. Nor does it eliminate the risk of a nuclear war. Yet, implementation of this agreement will:

- Reverse a 40 year build-up during which Western Europe has become the most militarized region in the world; and

- Eliminate completely two classes of very destructive short-warning nuclear weapons systems.

The INF Treaty clearly validates the proposition that the U.S. and its allies must negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. In this regard, deployment of U.S. Pershing missiles and GLCMs to Europe made the crucial difference. Had we not done so, the Soviets would have retained a decisive advantage in intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Instead, they have agreed to give them up altogether.

Obviously, Moscow would not have signed a Treaty conferring enormous military advantages on the West. Nonetheless, there are substantial benefits for the U.S. and its allies.

The Soviets have agreed to an asymmetric reduction in military capabilities, favoring the U.S. by a ratio of four-to-one. This asymmetrical reduction is politically significant--a very valuable precedent for future arms negotiations. Equally important to consider, of course, is the military impact on both sides.

SACEUR surrenders the ability to hit some important targets with ground-launched missiles, in particular aim points deep inside the Warsaw Pact and in the Soviet Union itself. There is little doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing the Pershings because of their rapid, accurate, deep-strike capability. That was an influential element in moving them toward a double-zero approach.

On the other hand, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters. They no longer will have the capacity to:

- Hit with ground-launched theater ballistic missiles Great Britain, Spain, France, Italy, and a large part of Turkey; or

- Strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites and debarkation sea and air ports in Western Europe.

Incidentally, we have always been extremely concerned about the Soviet's ability to cover our shallow support area in Europe. To threaten these targets in the future, the Soviets will have to use their dual-capable aircraft or their strategic weapons.

Next, this agreement excludes all strategic and theater nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France while eliminating the ground-launched intermediate and shorter-range missile threat to these same systems.

Additionally, we have long been worried about the Soviets attacking NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter range delivery systems with CW capabilities (i.e. SS-12s and SS-23s) will fall out of the Soviet order of battle as a result of the INF accord.

Finally, a key factor is the global reach of this Treaty. With the SS-20s, the Soviets have a capability to hold at risk nearly 500 targets in the Asia-Pacific theater. The SS-20 can range virtually all of mainland Asia plus Japan, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and a portion of Alaska. The Soviets also have nearly 300 shorter-range missiles in the Far East. Our Asian friends and allies are greatly relieved that the INF Treaty will eliminate these threats.

Overall, the U.S. and its allies will be much better off with the INF Treaty than without it.

Verification

With respect to verification of compliance, this agreement relies on two basic methods. National Technical Means (NTM) will be the principal method of regularly monitoring Soviet compliance with the Treaty. In this regard, the parties have agreed not to interfere with each other's NTMs.

To buttress these systems, the Treaty includes the unprecedented right of on-site inspections (OSI), set forth in the Inspection Protocol, i.e.: baseline; close-out; elimination; short-notice; and portal monitoring of selected facilities. Of particular U.S. interest is the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk where SS-20 missiles formerly were assembled.

Under this Treaty, we will witness the actual destruction of over 1700 deployed and non-deployed missiles of the USSR. Additionally, the total web of all intelligence resources--plus organizational and equipment improvements already in train--provide high confidence that we can effectively assess and verify Soviet compliance with the Treaty as a whole.

In this regard, General Welch's statement contains an excellent commentary on the difficulties of maintaining a viable force of missiles from initial production through years of operational deployment--even when allowed to do so in an open fashion. In the case at hand, the INF Treaty breaks a critical link in this cycle by banning all flight-testing of ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Detecting such tests happens to be one of our strengths--but not the only one.

Additionally, the total ban on ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles simplifies the process of verification. All we have to do is detect one illegal missile or launcher after all are supposed to be destroyed. Suffice it to say, our discovery of cheating would run counter to everything General Secretary Gorbachev is trying to do in his public diplomacy, e.g, improve the Soviet image; revitalize the Soviet economy in cooperation with the West; and achieve more openness and candor in Soviet society. In this broader political context, cheating on the INF Treaty would be very risky business and involve extremely high stakes.

Still, I would argue that the United States needs insurances against Soviet cheating. More than anything else, we must maintain a strong resolve to "blow the whistle" on Soviet non-compliance and to deploy such forces as may be necessary to offset any military advantage they might seek to gain by breaking out of the INF Treaty. Concurrently, the JCS believe that we must ensure that hedges and safeguards related to the INF Treaty are preserved as we move forward with the START process.

Further Implications for NATO

Equally important is an understanding of what the INF Treaty does not do in terms of NATO defense.

- As to arms control, it is only a first step if we are to reduce the worrisome imbalances between East and West.

- The Treaty has little impact on NATO's fundamental strategy. The United States will retain a spectrum of capabilities to selectively execute NATO's strategy of "flexible response."

- The Treaty addresses only one of the several areas of concern which plague the Alliance today--especially the short-range nuclear, conventional and chemical imbalances. Without further efforts by NATO, the adverse conventional balance will continue to force excessive dependency on nuclear arms should deterrence fail.

- The agreement does not alter, in any way, NATO's longstanding reliance upon qualitative advantages to deter and, if necessary, defend against a still numerically superior adversary.

Further, no arms control agreement has ever prevented the Soviets from shifting resources from one military pocket into another. Undoubtedly, this aspect of the arms control process is frustrating to parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic. It would be a grave mistake, however, for the U.S. and its NATO allies to cut back on force improvement programs allowed by the INF Treaty while leaving the Soviets with a free hand to pursue their own military agenda.

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

More to the point, it is imperative for the Alliance to take stock of its military posture and to examine preparations for the long-haul.

Progress in NATO Councils

Even before the INF Treaty, NATO was severely challenged to keep pace with Soviet building programs and improvements in their theater nuclear and conventional postures. Within NATO Councils, this challenge has provoked a number of steps:

- 1983 - the Montebello decision to reduce and modernize NATO nuclear forces in Europe.

- 1984 - Conventional Force Improvements.

- 1986 - the Conceptual Military Framework designed to give the Alliance a fully integrated concept for defense; and

- 1987 - Force goals supporting the Conventional Defense Improvements program.

Another bridge to the future is some impressive work by the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, encouraged by the Nunn-Warner Amendment: i.e.

- Enhanced anti-armor and anti-tank weapons, e.g., the Multiple Launch Rocket System, Advanced Precision Guided Missiles, and Infrared MAVERICK;

- Area and local air defense systems such as combined purchases of AWACs, an interoperable IFF system, and a family of surface-to-air missiles (for instance PATRIOT, ROLAND, and RAPIER);

- The Anti-Tactical Missile System now being pursued by the U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany; and

- The NATO Frigate replacement program.

Overall, programs of this type are strongly supportive of NATO's need to improve its force posture. The traditional and lingering question remains however: whether NATO Europe is collectively prepared to move from common R&D to the more expensive business of acquiring and deploying weapon systems required by the common defense.

U.S. Contributions

As a leader of the Alliance, the U.S. likewise must seriously address the crucial issues confronting NATO, and there is no better time than now as we implement the INF Treaty.

As I pointed out earlier, the JCS have been dissatisfied with the NATO force balance for several years. Admittedly, we have made considerable improvement in our posture since the late 1970's, and we know that these steps have reinforced uncertainties in the minds of Kremlin planners. But the Soviets continue to run fast and to attempt to match our efforts. While the Chiefs strongly endorse the INF Treaty, you should not conclude that they will be satisfied after that accord is implemented--it speaks only to a slice of their overall concerns.

What the Chiefs prefer, of course, is to develop an integrated concept for the future that strengthens all of NATO, lays out a course for our representatives to pursue in Alliance councils, guides U.S. investment strategy, and receives the strong support of the Congress. We are working hard to bring together such a concept in the Pentagon now.

That is the central thrust of recent work by OSD on "Long-Term Competitive Strategies," a concept designed to get the most out of our acquisition process.

Secretary Carlucci's report to Congress on Support for NATO Strategy in the 1990's clearly notes that Competitive Strategies is not a substitute for NATO Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI). The allies must move forward to correct critical deficiencies in infrastructure, munitions, C3, sustainability, and a number of other areas. We intend to continue to press our NATO friends to see the CDI through to completion. Still, the two efforts have one thing in common. Both call for the exploitation of new technologies to blunt the initial attack and counter follow-on forces of the Pact.

Conceptually, the "Competitive Strategies" effort first addresses Soviet plans for overrunning NATO--the initial air offensive, the rapid penetration of our forward defenses, and the central coordination of forces massed for the seizure of large chunks of allied territory. These concepts are the heart of current Soviet military strategy. They also point to endemic weaknesses on the Soviet side and to new technologies which can be used effectively to exploit these weaknesses and disrupt the Soviet timetable of attack.

Overall, the proposed solution relies heavily on conventional high-accuracy stand-off missiles and supporting battlefield and rear area surveillance capabilities (great similarity to FOFA). Many of the proposed missile systems can be found in present cooperative research programs of NATO, and a number of the battlefield surveillance systems are well along in the U.S. development program.

Concurrently, the JCS believe it is essential to press forward with nuclear modernization efforts launched by the 1983 Montebello decisions and currently in progress. For the most part, the Chiefs have been focusing on dual-capable systems permitted by the Treaty, for example:

- A tactical missile system (follow-on to LANCE), with possible adaptation of the Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles; plus

- A tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) to enhance the effectiveness of dual-capable aircraft and provide greater survivability.

Again, many of these systems build upon common R&D efforts, examples of which were cited earlier in my statement. Depending upon warhead selection, these weapons can be used as theater nuclear forces, or to strengthen conventional units, or both.

Likewise, the JCS are examining in conjunction with their NATO counterparts the in-theater disposition of our European-based forces, which are not covered by the INF Treaty, to see if these force dispositions make sense in the light of new circumstances.

Overall, we are trying to get as much deterrence and defense as possible for NATO out of technologies embedded in the coalition's ongoing programs--essentially mature technologies which can be fielded over the next few years.

Everyone must understand, however, that given the dynamic and fragile nature of deterrence, military risks are related more directly than ever to time in the acquisition process. We cannot afford business as usual.

CONCLUSIONS

To put all of this into perspective:

- The JCS have unanimously concluded that, on balance, this Treaty is militarily sufficient and effectively verifiable. In turn, they believe that this accord is in the best interests of the United States and its allies and strongly recommend its ratification by the U.S. Senate.

- At the same time, it is important to underscore the consequences of not ratifying this Treaty. As Secretary Carlucci observes in his statement, we could expect to see a continued build-up of Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and Asia, deployment of the already-tested SS-20 follow-on missile and the SS-X-4 ground-launched cruise missile, and further momentum in fielding the recently-introduced SS-23. Certainly, that would be a step backwards in the arms control process and in trying to reach asymmetrical reduction agreements which will enhance rather than degrade U.S. and allied security.

- While beneficial to the Alliance, the INF Treaty will not correct other imbalances confronting NATO, particularly in the case of short-range missiles, conventional forces, and chemical warfare. The U.S. and its allies must move forward in a timely fashion to complete yesterday's work and prepare for the future. If precious time is allowed to slip away, NATO could end up with neither a credible deterrent nor a viable defense. Conversely, if this time is used wisely and productively, I am confident that the U.S. and its allies can achieve four objectives stressed in the President's Report on National Security Strategy: narrow the gap in conventional capabilities, enhance deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and reduce the risk of Soviet miscalculations.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD R. BURT

The INF Treaty which now lies before you is the culmination of more than a decade of American and European effort. The process began with what was then called the TNF or theater nuclear force debate of the late 1970's, which was triggered by the unwarranted, unilateral Soviet buildup of its nuclear forces directed against Western Europe. The debate led to the joint meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers in December 1979, at which the decision was taken to deploy American

Pershing II and cruise missiles while opening negotiations with the Soviets. The process continued through eight more years of intense East-West and transatlantic diplomacy, punctuated by the arrival of the first American missiles in 1983, the Soviet walk-out from the negotiating table, their return in March 1985, and finally, the signing of an agreement in Washington some eight weeks ago. The resultant Treaty is perhaps the NATO Alliance's most significant political achievement in its nearly forty-year history.

Clearly, the INF Treaty has not solved all the problems of European security. At the same time, the Treaty does resolve one major problem confronting the NATO Alliance--the SS-20. Soviet deployment of this missile, beginning in the late 1970's, represented not simply a new military challenge to the Alliance, but also a broader strategic threat. Against the background of Soviet conventional superiority, and in an era of strategic parity, deployment of the SS-20 was the culmination of a set of Soviet steps designed to decouple the United States from Europe, to destroy the credibility of the American strategic deterrent, and to expose Western Europe to Soviet coercion.

Beginning in 1979, the Alliance addressed the SS-20 challenge in a unique way. Rather than simply building up a counterforce, NATO found it necessary to proceed along a dual path of deployments accompanied by an arms control offer. This double-track approach, which linked a military program to East-West and Alliance diplomacy, has been subjected to no little criticism. The complex linkages involved have been difficult to manage, even within the U.S. Government, let alone within the Alliance. But the the double-track approach has succeeded. In doing so it has conclusively demonstrated Winston Churchill's dictum that we must be prepared to arm if we wish to disarm.

I would like to emphasize this point, for it is perhaps one of the most important results of the INF process. During the early 1980's unilateralism was a strong force in both the United States and particularly Europe. The unilateralist thesis was that a freeze on Western nuclear forces--and specifically renunciation of INF deployment--would prompt the Soviets to exercise parallel restraint and even to reduce their own deployments. The INF experience has convincingly shown that real arms reductions can be achieved only through negotiation backed by strength. The arguments of the peace movement, so appealing to European public opinion a few short years ago, have thus been discredited.

As for the agreement itself, it is possible, of course, to dream up a better accord than the one we have. It would be nice, for example, to have the Soviets dismantle their SS-20's while we retain some of our PII's and GLCM's. But a negotiated agreement must represent a balance of interests and concessions. The issue before you is not whether this is the best imaginable agreement, but whether our negotiations have achieved an outcome that clearly and significantly serves U.S. and Allied interests. My answer is yes.

If there are risks associated with this Treaty, they do not flow from its provisions. What risks there are flow from the wrong lessons that people, especially in Europe and in West

Germany, in particular, might draw from the INF experience. One such wrong lesson is that, having achieved this accord, NATO can now cut back on its defense effort. This is incorrect: public opinion in Western Europe must understand that we cannot afford to reduce defense spending in the face of what is still a very real and potent Soviet threat.

A similar wrong lesson is that in solving the problem of the SS-20, NATO has solved all of the problems of European security. But problems remain, most notably the root problem of European security -- Soviet superiority in conventional forces and consequent offensive capability.

A third wrong lesson from the INF experience, which many on the West German left are drawing, is that this treaty represents the first step towards the denuclearization of Europe and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence. But nuclear deterrence will remain an essential component of Alliance strategy for the foreseeable future. As Secretary Shultz testified here last week, NATO will need to proceed with the modernization of its nuclear forces, as agreed in Montebello in 1983, so that they maintain their capability to fulfill their mission of deterrence.

A denuclearized Europe would represent the height of Western strategic folly. By stripping away NATO's nuclear deterrent, Western Europe would be exposed to the full brunt of the Soviet Union's conventional offensive capability. The INF Treaty, by removing some 400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe, does not alter the Alliance's strategy of flexible response. Nor was it meant to. The United States, after the Treaty is fully implemented, will continue to deploy some 4,000 nuclear weapons throughout Europe.

If the left has some mistaken ideas about what the treaty means, so do many on the conservative side of the European political spectrum. It has become popular for West German conservatives, for example, to argue that the treaty strategically "singularizes" their country by virtue of the fact that after INF reductions, short-range Soviet missiles in East Germany will still be able to strike targets in West Germany. It is also noted that under the accord, many of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany will be nuclear artillery shells that could, in a conflict, be used on German soil.

But West German "singularization" is a myth. Prior to SS-20 deployment, nobody argued that West Germany had been singled out as a nuclear target, and we are now getting rid of the SS-20s. In fact, the "singularization" argument vastly exaggerates the impact of the INF accord. While West Germany, after INF elimination, will still be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, so will the rest of Western Europe and, indeed, the United States. The idea that the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could be used only on German soil is also wrong. After INF withdrawals, we will still possess a considerable number of nuclear munitions based in Europe, at sea and in the United States that can threaten targets throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet homeland.

It is true that West Germany, because of its "front-line" geographic position and its non-nuclear status, finds itself uniquely exposed in Central Europe. The presence of U.S. nuclear forces has been an important means of reducing this exposure. If NATO starts down the road to eliminating this presence, West Germany could find itself genuinely "singularized."

I am confident that in the end that Europeans and Americans alike will draw the correct lessons from the INF experience. The Senate deliberations can make a decisive and positive contribution to this process of opinion-molding. European leaders such as Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Thatcher have expounded the right lessons. They have defended the continued validity of the strategy of flexible response and have expressed confidence in the solidity of the U.S.-European security partnership. It is precisely the closeness of European-American cooperation and our strong dedication to the principles of the Alliance that have made possible the achievement of the successful implementation of NATO's double-track INF decision.

Finally, in assessing the treaty, we must address the consequences of failure of ratification. The INF treaty is unique in many respects, but most importantly because it flows out of a collective commitment that the NATO governments made to their people. That commitment, made by President Reagan in 1981 on behalf of the entire Alliance, was clear and simple: If the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate its unwarranted SS-20 threat against Europe, NATO would forego the deployment of INF missiles. Throughout the entire course of the INF negotiations -- and especially during those difficult days of late 1983 when American Pershing II and cruise missiles actually arrived in Europe -- the United States and its key allies reaffirmed this commitment. In other words, we were able to deploy because European publics had faith in NATO's pledge to seek the removal of all INF missiles. If, in having achieved our goal, we were to now repudiate NATO's long-standing commitment by repudiating this Treaty, the consequences would be extremely serious. Not only would it be highly unlikely that we could maintain public support for keeping U.S. missiles in Europe, but over the longer term, the credibility of the NATO Alliance would more broadly be called into question. If I were Mikhail Gorbachev, I doubt I could think of a more welcome development.

In the years ahead we will continue to need a solid framework within which to undertake our common defense and arms control efforts, both in the conventional and nuclear fields. In my judgment, the following principles can provide us such a framework:

. First, the engagement of American power on the European continent, in terms of both troops and nuclear weapons, is and will continue to be essential. For the credibility of Alliance strategy this engagement must be substantial, not token.

. Second, nuclear deterrence will remain an irreducible component of Alliance strategy. This implies that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil as well as the retention by the United States of viable central strategic forces will remain an essential element of Western security.

. Third, the Alliance must have sufficient conventional forces to sustain a strategy of flexible response. In the current context, a concerted effort to rectify the existing conventional imbalance--whether through force improvements or a combination of force improvements and arms control--is indispensable.

. Fourth, there needs to be equitable burden-sharing within the Alliance, to be measured not simply in economic terms. Non-financial burdens, such as the density of stationed military forces and the frequency and scope of training activities, should also be taken into account. There must be burden-sharing within the Alliance with respect to out-of-area responsibilities as well.

. Fifth and finally, the principle of equitable risk-sharing within the Alliance must be preserved. No one member of the Alliance, or group of Allies, can be asked to assume risks substantially greater than the other Allies are expected to bear. The territory of the European Allies cannot be conceived of as the exclusive battlefield for nuclear or conventional conflict; nor can there be a trip-wire strategy that would lead to swift and inevitable escalation to a central strategic war.

Adherence to these five principles I have outlined helped bring us the INF Treaty. If we are to build upon our success in the INF arena, we will need to maintain and modernize our remaining nuclear forces in Europe. There is nothing in the INF treaty which will interfere with our ability to do so.

The debate on which the Senate is now embarked is not simply about the INF Treaty but also about the overall U.S. commitment to Europe. I personally welcome such a debate, because I believe it will reinforce a fundamental strategic truth, namely that the American commitment to Europe is indispensable to our role as a world power.

Over a period of several hundred years, British policy was governed by the maxim that the nation could not be secure if a hostile power were to control the continent of Europe. This same principle holds true for the United States as we move into the twenty-first century. Twice in the past seventy years we have learned to our regret that ignoring Europe in time of peace obliges us to come belatedly to Europe's rescue in time of war. The U.S. commitment to and presence in Europe is not a favor to the Europeans, but rather an essential pillar of American security.

The INF treaty is the product of our commitment to Europe, and of Europe's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Pride in this common achievement will further reinforce our solidarity and help secure further common achievements--in arms control, in overcoming the division of Europe, and above all in assuring peace with freedom.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN CARTWRIGHT

It is a great pleasure and a considerable privilege, to be invited by the US Senate to offer my thoughts on the recently signed INF Treaty. I appreciate that it is not customary for non-Americans to be asked to testify in front of Senate Committees and this, therefore, makes me all the more proud to be here, especially at such an important juncture in East-West relations.

Mr. Chairman, for seven years between 1981 and 1987 I served as co-rapporteur, and later sole rapporteur, of a Special Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly set up to study and monitor the political and military aspects of INF modernization and arms control. From the start its guiding premise was that a diverse group of NATO parliamentarians, representing a cross section of views from the member nations, might conceivably contribute in some way to both governmental as well as public understanding of the complexities surrounding the INF issue. In time, the mandate for the Committee was broadened to take in other important aspects of NATO security. But at the heart of our work throughout this period remained the Euromissile conundrum. I hope in some modest way our reports and our work made a constructive contribution to the debate within the Alliance.

For these seven years, Mr. Chairman, it was my responsibility to track closely developments in these areas and to produce annual reports for my Assembly colleagues to consider. During the course of this work I, and the other Committee members, travelled widely and frequently to elicit official opinion as well as private and expert views in the key NATO countries.* You will appreciate, I am sure, that in so doing we built up a fund of knowledge and an historical perspective on the issues involved.

Mr. Chairman, you will recall that some three years ago a composite volume consisting of the first four such Special Committee reports was reproduced by this Committee.** This was after the INF negotiations had broken down as a result of the Soviet decision to walk out of the talks in retaliation to the initial deployment of the NATO Cruise and Pershing II missiles. At that time the prospects for an agreement seemed poor. As I reflected in that Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of the time:

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* The Committee visited the United States 7 times, the United Kingdom 3 times, France, the Federal Republic, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands twice and Geneva once during this period.

** Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, January 1 1985.

> Arms Control negotiations remain at an impasse. In effect both sides miscalculated the others determination. The Soviet Union's hope that dissent within the Alliance would yield for them what they could not achieve at the negotiating table was proved wrong.
>
> Similarly the Alliance calculation that the Soviet Union would begin negotiating seriously only when convinced at Western determination to deploy has also proved wrong, at least in the short term. The question now is whether there is room for compromise. The Alliance has stressed its willingness to "reverse, halt or modify deployment if and when an equitable and verifiable agreement is achieved in Geneva". Yet Soviet insistence on the removal of INF as a precondition for recommencing negotiations has made compromise impossible in the year following initial NATO deployments.

In retrospect, I still believe this analysis to have been basically accurate. The critical words are these: "at least in the short term". As we know, for a year or more the Soviet Union exhibited an intransigent and unconstructive attitude to the possibility of negotiating an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles separately from other nuclear arms control issues. In the face of a carefully orchestrated attempt on the part of the Soviets to impede the NATO deployment schedule, the Allies demonstrated a resolute approach by implementing this difficult and politically sensitive decision, although at some continuing cost to the consensus on defence issues in key European countries. The successful deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles, despite a divisive and highly emotional internal debate, was correctly regarded at the time as a victory for the Alliance. Deterrence was strengthened as was our perception, at that time, of the coupling of the US strategic nuclear guarantee to Western Europe.

However, we know that the management of security issues in the Alliance is more than merely a question of bolstering deterrence with the acquisition of new and more sophisticated nuclear systems. Indeed, the acceptability of a strategy of deterrence depends not only on the perceived effect this will have on an adversary but also on the effect it will have on the people it is meant to defend. It was this realization — and a recognition that the relationship between deterrence and reassurance is an indispensible factor in the contemporary debate about nuclear strategy — which served as the basis for President Reagan's original zero-option proposal of 18 November 1981, and which was always at the heart of the original dual-track decision.

When the zero option was first advanced, and for some years after, I was sceptical about its chances of success. This feeling is clearly reflected in the reports I produced. However, it is a fact that President Reagan's original zero-option was enthusiastically welcomed by Allied governments, was lauded in NATO communiqués and was championed by those on the right of the political spectrum as a demonstration of what "real arms control" was all about.

That the Soviets eventually agreed, not only to Mr. Reagan's original proposal on longer-range missiles, but also to the inclusion of shorter-range weapons; that they also agreed to the establishment of an "effective" verification regime, as defined by the Reagan Administration, to ensure compliance with the agreement; and that they made these about-turns within three years of returning to the negotiating table, is remarkable when one considers both the atmosphere and polemics of the preceding 5-6 years.

This change in Soviet policy owes most to the steadfastness of NATO, but can also be traced to the new flexibility in Soviet thinking associated with the ascendancy of Mr. Gorbachev. I was certainly surprised both by the speed and the content of the Soviet concessions which have made this agreement possible. Just over a year ago I wrote that the Reagan Administration had "laid out a series of very stringent (verification) conditions which appear to have little hope of being accepted by the Soviet Union." Nevertheless I totally support this agreement and hope very much that it will receive ratification in the US Senate, without amendment.

Although I cannot of course speak for Europe, nor indeed, for that matter, for the United Kingdom, I can state with absolute confidence that the members of this Committee should have no illusions about the measure and depth of support which this INF Treaty commands across the continent of Europe and across the political spectrum. In fact, support for the Treaty transcends political parties and groupings. In the basing countries the agreement is overwhelmingly endorsed by the public at large, as proved by several opinion polls.

There are, of course, some on the fringes in Europe, as here in the United States, who oppose the Treaty. Others are sceptical about its long-term effect. But they are a distinct minority which has had little obvious impact either on official policy or on public opinion.

Mr. Chairman, I am conscious that there are some prominent American analysts — as well as some respected colleagues of your own in this House — who contend that the INF Treaty is not in the long-term interests of the Atlantic Alliance and that it receives only luke-warm support in Europe. As a European broadly in the centre of the political spectrum, I would like to make a few points in defence of this Treaty. I would then like to discuss the post-INF agenda for the Alliance, give a brief assessment of NATO's future nuclear requirements and add a word or two on measures to enhance the role of Europe in NATO's defence.

The Compelling Case for the INF Treaty

(i) First let me say that, although the arrival on the scene of the SS-20 was not the only reason for NATO's decision to modernize its Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force capability in the late 1970s, there is no doubt that NATO planners were concerned about the expanding nuclear options this weapon system gave the Soviets against European targets. Moreover we were led to believe by some strategists that the Soviet Union was in the process of developing a specific theatre doctrine to match its theatre nuclear arsenal.

The European feeling that the United States seemed indifferent to constraining development of the SS-20 in the context of the SALT II negotiations, while being willing to talk about limitations on cruise missiles, certainly added to Allied discomfort. This concern was reflected in Helmut Schmidt's famous IISS speech in London in 1977. It did not take long before the publics in Western Europe (and, for that matter, in the United States) came to see the NATO LRINF missiles as a direct response to the production and deployment of the Soviet SS-20. For years NATO governments (and NATO communiqués) did little to dispell this notion. In fact, it soon became official US policy that the elimination of the SS-20 would undermine whatever other case there was for modernizing US LRINF. As Secretary of State George Shultz remarked in May 1987 "The intent of the US LRINF deployment was to offset the SS-20."[1]

The deal on offer in the INF Treaty would eliminate more than 1700 Soviet missiles, thus ridding the continent of an entire class of missiles which have been there since 1957, in exchange for some 859 missiles on the NATO side. If the US Senate should now decide that it is not in the interests of the Western Alliance to conclude such a deal, I believe that such a decision would simply not be understood in Western Europe. This could have serious consequences.

(ii) Second, despite what some over-anxious critics fear and some over-optimistic sections of the peace movement hope the INF Treaty, if ratified, would by no means result in the continent of Europe being denuclearized. As has been pointed out, none of the NATO LRINF systems were deployed before 1983, nor were any other systems of comparable range removed to facilitate the introduction of these systems.

As 4,600 US nuclear warheads, the long-range theatre systems and operational arrangements such as the F1 11, and the 400 SLBM warheads would remain assigned to SACEUR it cannot seriously be argued that NATO's nuclear deterrent will be significantly undermined by a deal in which the Soviet Union will scrap many more warheads than will NATO. Nor can the INF Agreement be said to risk "decoupling" the continent of Europe from the United States. As the former Director of ACDA recently remarked: "it is a little ridiculous to talk in 1987 as if the US guarantee of Western Europe's security depends entirely on deployments begun only in December 1983."[2]

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[1] Time, 18 May 1987

(iii) Third, it has been said that the INF Treaty will do nothing to reduce the substantial Soviet conventional superiority. This is true. But it was never intended that the INF negotiations would provide a panacea for all NATO's security problems. In this respect I agree with Richard Perle's remark that "it is foolish to believe that the dangerous conventional imbalance can be made safe by an ever larger imbalance favouring the Soviets in medium-range missiles."[3]

(iv) That said, the INF Treaty could modestly assist NATO military planners in other ways. According to NATO SACEUR General John Galvin, the destruction of nearly 1600 Soviet missiles "will by no means eliminate the nuclear threat to NATO Europe, but it will reduce seriously Soviet flexibility in planning for the employment of nuclear weapons systems."[4] For instance, it is possible to argue that some portion of Soviet aircraft assigned to the conventional mission would have to be held in reserve for the nuclear role, thus somewhat reducing the immediate Warsaw Pact air threat.

Similarly, the INF agreement could also significantly reduce the threat identified by some analysts of a potential Soviet conventionally-armed short-range-tactical missile capability by and against key NATO targets such as airfields and command and control centres. It was this perceived threat which gave rise to the recent debate about ATBMs within the Alliance. The need to develop an expensive and possibly destabilizing defensive system will be removed as a result of the limitations which the INF Treaty will put on the Soviet shorter-range missile strike force.

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2. Kenneth Adelman, Address to Mid-Atlantic Club, Harriman, New York, 1 May 1987

3. US News and World Report, 25 May 1987

4. Presentation to Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 30 July 1987

(v) However, in responding to what I believe to be exaggerated and extravagant worries about the INF Treaty, it is important that those of us who believe that, on balance, this Treaty favours NATO, do not ourselves exaggerate its virtues and the impact it might have. It is important to look at the agreement in context.

In the totality of nuclear arms control, the INF Treaty would pale in comparison to agreements limiting strategic arms and defence and space systems. In terms of the volume of weapons, as well as strategic and political relevance, a START agreement which drastically reduced the arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons of both Superpowers would be far more significant than any INF Treaty. In fact, if accompanied by an agreement on ABM/SDI, such a treaty would be an historical and sensational breakthrough in the history of nuclear arms control. This is fully appreciated in Europe, which is why the NATO governments now place the issue of strategic arms at the top of their arms control list.

In the larger equation, too, the issue of conventional arms control and conventional stabilization measures is starting to figure much more prominently and is now taxing the best minds we have in our government ministries, research establishments and various think-tanks.

With respect to both of those challenges — and in the latter case I am fully aware of the dilemmas associated with battlefield nuclear weapons, a point to which I will return a little later — we would do well not to understate the importance of two additional and positive elements relating to the INF Treaty. The first is the Soviet acceptance, for the first time, of the principle of asymmetrical reductions in forces. It is essential that this principle, now established in the INF Treaty, should have wider currency in the context of conventional arms control.

The second element concerns the extraordinary concessions which the Soviet Union has made in recent months in agreeing to a most intrusive (and "effective") verification regime for the INF Treaty. I believe — and I know that I am not alone — these to be of major significance in terms of the establishment of certain principles and practices which could be used to positive effect in any future agreement.

If we are indeed at the beginning of a new, exciting and constructive phase in East-West arms control, then I believe that there are many positive attributes associated with the INF Treaty — above and beyond the "intrinsic" merits of the treaty I have mentioned — which should not be underestimated as we become more comprehensively engaged in this arms control process.

The Post-INF Alliance Agenda

This brings me to the post-INF agenda for the Atlantic Alliance. As someone who believes both in the maintenance of the nuclear component in NATO's defence and the continued viability of the NATO strategy of Flexible Response, I naturally applaud and support the call by NATO Foreign Ministers last year in Reykjavik for a comprehensive and conceptual approach to the whole question of the future of East-West arms control. Indeed, I introduced a resolution to the last Plenary Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Oslo in September 1987, which suggested elements that might go into this comprehensive approach. Since this resolution - The Arms Control Challenge for the Alliance - was adopted with minor amendments by the North Atlantic Assembly, I thought it might be useful for your Committee if it was read into the record. It is attached as an annexe to this statement.

It is my belief that Flexible Response will remain valid only if NATO maintains an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. I further contend that, if properly integrated with force planning ("harmonization" seems to be the current vogue term), arms control can make a substantial contribution to preserving and strengthening deterrence in the decades to come.

There has been a good amount of discussion in recent months in the Atlantic community on the need for "conceptual clarity" in NATO's future arms control and force planning policies. I, too, believe in the need for a measure of conceptual clarity. It is now a policy imperative for the Alliance as important for its own sake as it is to show to our publics that we have some idea where we are going or would like to go with our security and arms control policies. This was not always the case. For many years it was sufficient for our government establishments to raise the spectre of Soviet power and domination, mouth a few platitudes about nuclear deterrence, and proceed to fashion defence policy accordingly.

All this has now changed. One of the enduring legacies of the INF chapter has been the growth of public interest in nuclear weapons and defence issues generally. This is, whether we like it or not, obliging NATO governments to explain and to justify the ambiguities of NATO nuclear strategy.

Moreover, we are now faced with a Soviet Union extraordinarily adept at identifying and exploiting the ambiguities of our nuclear strategy. Gone are the days when the NATO establishment could rely upon uninformed and disinterested publics, and cumbersome and inept Soviet diplomacy. It is an entirely new environment we are living in, and we had better get our conceptual clarity right.

What principles do I see as the most important in the short and medium term which might help us as we move into what will clearly be a more challenging environment? I would identify six:-

- sensible, stabilizing and politically sustainable force modernization; the two corollaries to this:
  - no compensation for compensation's sake in nuclear modernization; and
  - arms control policies which focus on the most destabilizing elements of our force structures;
- increased sensitivity to the particular security concerns of certain allies;

- improved integration of force requirements and arms control, both in nuclear and conventional matters;
- more balanced co-operation among the European members of NATO, in both nuclear and conventional fields.

NATO's Future Requirements, and the Question of Compensation

I would like to pick up one or two of these above points since I think they are of critical importance in terms of where we go with our force modernization and arms control policies in the wake of the INF agreement.

1. The first point I would make concerns battlefield nuclear weapons. I have long believed that the potentially destabilizing roles these systems might play in a conflict or crisis situation in Europe, earmark them as natural candidates for inclusion in an arms control framework. I am aware that in recent years, as a result of the Montobello agreement, NATO has reduced the stockpile of battlefield nuclear weapons considerably, to a level of about 4600. I supported this rationalization, much of which, of course, involved obsolete systems.

   I am also aware that the future role for nuclear artillery and short-range missiles in NATO planning is likely to provoke a heated debate among planners and experts alike. There will be great pressure from without and within the Alliance to negotiate these systems downward. We must remain pragmatic, and not theological, as we consider this difficult and complex problem. It touches on several sensitive issues.

   NATO has for many years found it difficult to set out sensible tactics and doctrine for the use of nuclear artillery and there have been, and will likely continue to be, pressures from some NATO countries to switch artillery pieces to conventional tasks.

I agree very much with my colleague, Ton Frinking, when he says that there is no logical reason why negotiated reductions in the most destablizing of these systems need await progress in conventional and chemical arms control. To be sure, there will be manifold practical problems associated with any negotiations along these lines, not the least of which is the dual capability issue and the question of verification. However, the INF Treaty regime may make this now less of a problem than it once was.

We should remain open-minded as an Alliance on this issue, pragmatic in terms of identifying potentially unstable systems, conscious of the need to defend our positions publicly, sensitive to the special security concerns of specific allies, and aware that the Soviet Union stands ready and willing to exploit division and prevarication.

2. As to the question of compensation, I would argue that it is very important to distinguish between sensible modernization of our most stabilizing nuclear assets, which I support, and the acquisition of new nuclear systems as compensation for the "loss" of the INF systems, which I very much oppose - and not just on the grounds of non-circumvention.

It has been suggested that extra F-1 11s or the basing of B52s should be considered in this connection. However, as Professor Lawrence Freedman has pointed out:

> "In order for these new deployments to have a reassuring effect on Europeans concerned about de-coupling, these new deployments would need to be given a high profile. However, such a profile would create considerable problems for the host country and would carry the risk of increasing the pressure for aircraft to be included in an arms control regime."[5]

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[5] In an unpublished paper submitted to the North Atlantic Assembly, as part of the NATO in the 1990s project, entitled "The Future of NATO's Deterrent Posture".

A prime example of what I would consider to be sensible modernization of existing NATO nuclear assets would be the development of new stand-off missiles to improve the effective range of aircraft. It is likely that in the post-INF era the primary responsibility for nuclear missions will pass to aircraft. Tactical aircraft — notably the F-15 and Tornado — have been strengthened in recent years to enhance penetrability.

The development of stand-off missiles such as the American short-range attack missile (SRAM 2), or an extension of the range of current French ASMP missile to enable it to target Soviet territory, would seem to me both stabilizing and sensible. The opportunities for co-development and co-production among Allies should certainly be explored.

Conclusion

The original 1979 NATO decision to base the Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe was, at least in part, the result of a deliberate attempt to lock the United States into the nuclear defence of Europe. It sprang from nagging doubts about the credibility of the US guarantee to threaten the use of strategic nuclear weapons in defence of its European Allies.

With the departure of Cruise and Pershing, those nagging doubts remain. They reinforce the case for a continued British and French nuclear capability supplementing the US guarantee whilst simultaneously providing an insurance against any abrupt change in US policy.

There is now a general acceptance of the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Indeed it is argued frequently that the best way of ensuring a continued US commitment is for Europeans to be seen to be doing more to defend themselves.

Why should that concept be abandoned when it comes to the critical issue of nuclear weapons? The British and French governments are now starting to explore the possibilities of cooperation in the nuclear field. I wholeheartedly welcome that approach and I hope that the United States will also encourage such collaboration for the good of the Alliance as a whole.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANCOIS FILLON

Following many long months of negotiations, the US Soviet double "zero option" agreement was finally signed on 7 December last year.

From a purely technical point of view this agreement marked an important date in the history of arms control. In fact, for the first time an agreement does not only provide for the limitation of potential nuclear arms, but indeed for the destruction of existing nuclear weapons. And moreover, for the first time, the verification procedures of a nuclear arms control agreement allow for on-site inspectors, which far exceeds anything we could have hitherto contemplated.

On the other hand, its contents render this agreement ambiguous, to say the least. The elimination of 700-800 Soviet missiles and 300-400 American missiles is, in fact, very little indeed when the enormous potential of the two signatories is taken into account--with almost 12,000 nuclear warheads on each side.

And especially, the limited geographical character of this agreement--which at the outset only applied to "euromissiles"--could be considered rather surprising in an era when weapons systems fall into strategic categories on a planetary scale.

It is understandable, under such circumstances, that the European States, and particularly France, while manifesting their approval in principle, have expressed a number of reservations and questions on the scope and outcome of this agreement.

In fact, it must be scrutinized very closely indeed.

Which aspects should be scrutinized: As far as France is concerned the immediate consequences of the agreement are in no way significant.

It must be recalled that unlike her principal European partners--the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and Italy--France was not directly implicated in these negotiations, as no Pershing II or cruise missiles are deployed on her soil. Having based her defense policy on an independent nuclear deterrent, our country finds itself, in fact, strengthened by the choices opted for 30 years ago, and confirmed by the recent military planning law.

Moreover, and this applies to all European States, the gravity of the imbalances which this agreement creates in the ratio of European forces has to be seen in relative terms.

One can discuss endlessly the balance of obligations to which the two parties have committed themselves.

It has been pointed out that the negotiations--first evisaged, it should be remembered, as early as the dual-track decision of December 1979, and initially suggested by President Reagan--relate to a very special type of weapon. The SS-20 and other intermediate-range Soviet missiles on the one side, and Pershing II and cruise missiles on the other, constitute, in fact, the counterforce weapons to be used in a first strike and, if possible, by surprise. Their elimination--to all intents and purposes--brings us back to the original situation as it was twelve years ago.

It has also been emphasized that this double withdrawal has brought about a new asymmetrical situation. Soviet long range strategic weapons, which are becoming more and more accurate, could be used against Western European countries under precisely the same conditions as the present SS-20s, but no American ground-launched missile could any longer reach Soviet territory directly from Europe.

Moreover, certain people regret that the negotiations did not bear more on short range weapons with the INF being retained, which would have avoided this asymmetry and would have reassured West German public opinion, which is very sensitive regarding this problem.

In actual fact, the vital question today is whether Europe will continue to have sufficient nuclear capability--in quantity and in quality--to dissuade a potential aggressor. It is clear that the combined presence of the remaining American nuclear weapons and the French and British nuclear forces places us beyond the minimum threshold required of an effective deterrent. The signing of the INF agreement does not therefore, in itself, constitute a serious problem for Europe.

But is is absolutely essential that existing weapons are constantly modernized, that we continue on our part with the S-4 missile, with the new generation of nuclear submarines, and perhaps with the weapons developed in cooperation with the British. Our allies should also modernize their defenses. I am thinking particularly of the modernization of the American short range weapons and of the replacement, or the backing-up, of the F-111 bombers by other, more modern bombers.

The real subject for concern: Possible extension of the agreement

In fact, it is in the endorsment of the "double zero" option in the U.S. Soviet agreement that our reservations and anxieties lie.

Three risks come to the fore. First, this agreement could only be the initial stage in the process of much more denuclearization in Europe. A third zero option, this time bearing on American and Soviet short range nuclear weapons, has already been put forward by the Soviets, and there have already been sympathetic murmurings from certain of our partners. It should be pointed out that negotiations on conventional forces could lead to identical risks if their implementation were conditioned on a parallel agreement on tactical nuclear weapons, which Mr. Gorbachev has already proposed.

The second risk could be an aggravation in the "delinking" process between Europe and the United States. This, of course, has been rejected by American leaders, but the evolution of American public opinion with regard to nuclear forces, and the reduction of the budget defecit with its possible repercussions on troop levels stationed in Europe, could make this quite possible.

The third danger lies in the psychological and political offensive which the Soviets never hesitate to implement in Western Europe and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany through the problem of German reunification.

New requirements necessary for the defense of Europe

France cannot remain indifferent to such developments. She remains solidly behind her allies and European partners--through affinity, naturally, but also because, in the event of a conflict, the outcome with regard to our country would be identical to that of our neighbours. The independence of our defense policy has never been synonymous with neutrality.

Therefore, it was indispensible to re-enforce European solidarity with regard to the problems posed by their security and their defense, and to which the French government is particularly attached.

The adoption by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member countries of the Western European Union, at the Hague on 27 October 1987, of a "Platform on European Security Interests" was, from this point of view, an important step. Following up on the charter presented in December 1986 by Jacques Chirac, this "platform" stresses three essential principles:

- The particular value of nuclear weapons in Europe. To remain credible and effective, the defense of Western Europe must continue to be based on an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces, "only the nuclear element of which can confront an aggressor with an unacceptable risk." When we know the prejudices against, or the reticence with regard to, nuclear forces which exists in certain Euroepan countries, we can judge for ourselves the importance of this acknowledgement.

- The indispensible nature of the Atlantic Alliance. Above and beyond the cultural and historic links which bind us together, we should always bear in mind that the Alliance gives the European peoples a strategic depth which could not be found in their individual countries alone. And, furthermore, when faced with a totalitarian State which can consecrate a considerable part of its national product to the reinforcing of its military means, Western democracies, who do not have the same facilities at their disposal, will always have to combine their efforts.

- The necessity and will to make a "European Pillar" out of the Alliance: the Western European Union, from this point of view, offers the most appropriate setting.

The development of efforts in military cooperation between European countries is clearly moving in this direction.

First, there is Franco-German cooperation, which concerns mainly armaments--combat helicopters, for instance--or the creation of joint structures which facilitate the identification of a certain harmony with regard to defense concepts. But there is also cooperation with Great Britain--to which I shall return--with Italy and Spain, for example, in observation satellites, and the cooperation already operating within the framework of the alliance. Such cooperation must include the nuclear weapons field.

Of course, there are certain limits.

Particularly, uncertainty remains the major element of dissuasion. It would therefore be dangerous to wish to systematically codify the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be used. It would be equally dangerous to wish to set up a single decision-making center on a European scale, while the coexistence of several decision centers--particularly the French and British--combine to increase the element of uncertainty confronting a potential aggressor.

But, between the two European states which have developed nuclear forces--France and Great Britain, increased exchanges could facilitate the perfectioning of nuclear submarines and missiles and better cooperation between the two missions.

Regarding the Federal Republic of Germany, it is essential that we arrive at better mutual understanding. From our standpoint, we must increase our efforts with German leaders from an information point of view. But it would be dangerous to maintain a vague, undefined situation between the idea of providing information and that concerning decisions on the use of weapons.

Finally, I should like to stress the importance which we attach to the new negotiations on arms control which will take place in 1988.

Two points would appear to us to be of particular importance. Firstly, and here I repeat myself, all discussions leading to new reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe must be excluded. There are not, in fact, "too many" nuclear weapons in Europe. And I should hope, with this in mind, that the American Congress, if it ratifies the INF agreement, will be very clear on this point.

Secondly, it seems to me that the negotiations between the two Great Powers must, from now onwards, focus on those areas where there is a real excess in arms, and by that I mean that priority should be given to their central nuclear arsenals, which today are abnormally overexpanded, followed by chemical weapons and conventional forces.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TON FRINKING

It is a privilege for this delegation of the North Atlantic Assembly to have the opportunity to share its views on the Washington INF Treaty and on the post-treaty security universe. Although neither I nor my colleagues speak today for the Assembly as a whole, this delegation is, I think, broadly representative of the spectrum of views evidenced in the parliaments of the sixteen nations.

Before turning to the subject at hand, allow me to pay tribute to Senator Biden for assuming the chairmanship of the newly formed NAA Special Committee on NATO Strategy and Arms Control. The Special Committee will surely form a critical feature of the work of the Assembly, and we look forward to the Senator's active involvement.

Mr. Chairman, in September 1979 the then President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Mr. Paul Thyness of Norway, testified on the SALT II treaty before two subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Referring to the Soviet Backfire bomber and the SS-20, he stated that these deployments:

> ...give the Soviet Union a capability to attack Western Europe which has no counterpart on NATO's side. There is now a missing step in the escalatory ladder. Arguments that this doesn't matter have considerable force, since the scenarios which we are presented with appear much more to be products of theoretical analysis than of a forecast of what could actually happen. But in a situation where the Soviet Union has this added nuclear capability in addition to a significant conventional superiority in Europe, there are reasons to fear that the Soviet Union will develop more assertive policies, gradually eroding European self-confidence and its confidence in the American nuclear umbrella.

Over eight years later, some observers on both sides of the Atlantic have, curiously enough, assigned to the INF treaty the very same risks my predecessor foresaw--even though this agreement was concluded very largely on U.S. terms, and even though this is a treaty all NATO governments support.

They denounce the treaty as an alleged victory for the Soviet scheme to divorce U.S. security from that of NATO Europe. They point to Mr. Gorbachev's statement at the White House on December 8: "This will of course be the first step down the road leading to a nuclear-free world, the building of which you, Mr. President, and I discussed at Reykjavik." Either out of ignorance or by design, they would have us believe that the credibility of NATO's deterrent spectrum rests entirely on deployments begun only in 1983, and that the removal of the missiles will rob NATO of any options to strike Soviet territory from Europe. They also claim that the treaty somehow "leaves" NATO Europe more vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact conventional threat, as if the magnitude of this threat was not just as great before as after the conclusion of this agreement, or as if the Pershing IIs and GLCMs were intended to destroy Soviet tank formations crossing the inner-German border.

But the agreement has also troubled men whose counsel merits our close attention. Among them certainly is the former SACEUR, General

Bernard W. Rogers. In the Winter 1988 issue of Global Affairs, he describes two "key tools" required for deterrence set out in NATO's "General Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons." The first, he writes, is "the ability with land-based, theater nuclear weapons to hold at risk--with certainty--militarily significant targets deep in the Soviet homeland," "the initial use of a limited number" of which would signal NATO's determination to respond to Warsaw Pact aggression. The second is "to have a number of escalatory options between NATO's disadvantaged conventional forces at one end of the force spectrum and U.S./U.K. strategic nuclear forces at the other end." He argues that the INF treaty damages both of these two "key tools."

The principal difficulty I have with these alleged pitfalls, however, is that they assume that we would be better off either with a different treaty or no treaty at all. That is, that NATO would be a lot safer with the 1,752 Soviet SS-4, SSCX-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-20, and SS-23 missiles left in place, and that retaining the 859--or even, for that matter, 100--U.S intermediate-and shorter-range missiles would answer all our problems. Nor do these arguments address the likelihood that in the absence of a treaty, we would be confronting a far larger number of Soviet missiles than those that will be destroyed by virtue of this treaty.

But I do not believe, nor do the Soviets believe, that the commitment of the United States to the defense of NATO rests on whether or not we add 572 warheads to the existing long-range theater capability in Europe, which counting the 160 F-111s based in Britain alone amounts to a potential for delivering 480 1-megaton bombs. U.S. and NATO security interests are inextricable; Western European and Canadian security is U.S. security.

Nor do I believe that either of the two key tools General Rogers describes depends on the Pershing II or GLCM. General Rogers speaks of land-based means to fulfill this mission, but there is no apparent reason--nor does he provide one--why this is in any way the case. Could it possibly matter one iota to the Soviet leadership whether the signalling function, for instance, was executed by SLCMs or SLBMs stationed on relatively invulnerable platforms rather than by the treaty-limited systems, which are far more vulnerable to preemption by conventional and nuclear means? We must resist the apparent tendency to ascribe undue operational significance to the artificial compartmentalizations of arms control.

Abstract nuclear targeting is not the issue. The function of nuclear weapons is a political one--to deter all wars--and our deterrent remains intact.

Nor do I believe that the imbalance in conventional forces is made safer by preserving an imbalance in intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces. It is simply incorrect to argue that the INF treaty "leaves" NATO more vulnerable to Warsaw Pact conventional strength. The conventional threat was just as great before the treaty's signature. We must strive, of course, to eliminate the conventional imbalance, but that task was never an INF mission.

True, the Soviets may believe that the INF treaty can start a dynamic for denuclearization, as Mr. Gorbachev's statement denotes. But that is a gloss that the Soviets are likely to place on any nuclear arms control agreement, such as the START agreement the sides are still negotiating. And, parenthetically, for those concerned about flexible response theology the START agreement, which continues the SALT pattern of codifying strategic parity when central strategic exchange, as General Rogers put it, "in the final analysis, is the guarantor of NATO's deterrence," would seem to cause far more trouble than the INF treaty. Yet we all welcome the prospect of 50 percent reductions in strategic weapons, coupled with strict observance of the ABM treaty, because stability cannot be preserved if either side seeks to acquire unilateral advantage in offensive or defensive systems, and because we believe that essential equivalence promotes deterrence.

But denuclearization is a result which we are quite prepared to avoid. I think Ken Adelman had it right when he stated on May 1, 1987, that the denuclearization argument "assumes that upon signing one agreement we will be powerless to stop the train and get off" when our security interests demand it. And as the security platform of the Western European Union, adopted on October 27, 1987, clearly declares:

> In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the Western strategy for the prevention of war. which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defense must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.

The question is also posed as to why, if the INF treaty is such a good deal for NATO, did the Soviets agree to it? Have we not been duped?

The answers, as I see them, is that resisting agreement was unduly harming the Soviets politically in Western Europe. But a new Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, could hardly have convinced his general staff that doing away with over 1,700 missiles was acceptable simply because it was good politics. The Soviet Union wanted to remove the Pershing II for the same reasons NATO decided to deploy it. So, yes, we are giving up a significant military capability. But in exchange the Soviet Union is giving up a far larger capability. And in the far more important area of the political function of nuclear weapons, and of allied cohesion, NATO remains on solid ground.

Mr. Chairman, in the December 10th joint communiqué, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev stated that the INF treaty "is historic both for its objective--the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms--and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability."

The treaty is, indeed, historic on these two counts. But verification and reductions are not ends in themselves. True, Article VI of the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, to which the INF treaty preamble refers, commits the Parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." But the real test for an arms control agreement is whether it reduces the risks of war and increases stability.

I believe the INF treaty meets this test. It ensures our security on its own merits and sets useful precedents for future arms control negotiations. At least six points should be stressed:

- it eliminates a substantial portion of the short-warning threat posed by Soviet ballistic missiles, thus enhancing crisis stability;
- it establishes the principle that unequal reductions may be required to stabilize the balance of power;
- it recognizes that security is a global matter, a point which the Soviets rejected up until this past summer by declining to negotiate a global zero solution;
- it provides an important and positive first step on the road to a

broader accommodation with the Soviet Union--an accommodation including, but not limited to, arms control;

- it ensures that compliance will be checked by an unprecedented cooperative verification regime*, and it applies glasnost to military data; and
- it demonstrates that the Soviet Union can be brought to negotiate seriously if NATO demonstrates the will to respond unilaterally to provocation.

The principal new nuclear threat NATO faced in the latter 1970s in Europe has been eliminated: the SS-20, whose deployment was interpreted as a Soviet attempt to sanctuarize Soviet territory from a war in Europe. At the same time, the treaty does not prevent NATO from continuing to deploy means apart from the treaty-limited systems to deny sanctuary to Soviet territory. So eight years after the dual-track decision, the most appropriate way for NATO countries to characterize this treaty is: mission accomplished.

But we should not rest on our laurels indefinitely. The INF treaty must be viewed as only the first step toward a broader accommodation. On June 12, 1987, the North Atlantic Council set out the broad guidelines, to which the North Atlantic Assembly gave elaboration (see accompanying resolution), for the work left before us, namely:

- 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive armaments;
- a global ban on chemical weapons;
- elimination of conventional force disparities from the Atlantic to the Urals; and
- reductions to equal ceilings in U.S. and Soviet land-based

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* Although I understand Senator Pressler's concerns about the verification regime, Congressional Record, December 9, 1987, S17461-17463, I find Ambassador Nitze's remarks, ibid., S17461, persuasive.

short-range nuclear missiles in conjunction with the elimination of chemical weapons and conventional force disparities.

All of these goals are equally important. But of special interest in the current debate in Europe are the third and fourth points--conventional and short-range nuclear arms control.

The ultimate test of Soviet intentions will be how the new negotiations on conventional stability fare. It is possible that they may do no better than the now 14-year old MBFR negotiations, particularly since the geographic scope of the new talks covers the whole of Europe and because NATO will be demanding more far-reaching results than common manpower ceilings in Central Europe. Some will no doubt argue that NATO proposals for deep and unequal reductions in major combat weapons are unrealistic and should be scaled back, much as with the debate surrounding the zero option when it was first proposed in 1983.

But over four decades after the end of World War II, and twelve years after the Helsinki Final Act, it is more than high time that we posed the question squarely to the Warsaw Pact of whether it is prepared to eliminate its preponderance in conventional forces--a posture far beyond what could be described as purely defensive. So long as that imbalance persists, the meaning of "common security" is empty.

Another contemporary issue is whether negotiations on short-range nuclear forces, that is, of under 500 km range, should await results in the chemical and conventional force areas. President Reagan has stated that there should be no further nuclear reductions in Europe until conventional disparities in Europe and chemical weapons have been eliminated. In West Germany, however, officials of the political parties have argued for immediate negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons, not necessarily linked to other arms control fora. Some of these officials have even called for a "third zero option" on missiles between 500 km and an unspecified lower boundary as well as nuclear free zones, which has given ammunition to those who feel the INF treaty has opened the floodgates for the denuclearization of Europe. On January 18 this year, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed, as had long been expected, "the full elimination of tactical nuclear means."

The presence of short-range nuclear forces compels the potential aggressor to disperse his conventional forces, and they are an important element in the flexible response spectrum. Therefore, I do not believe that zero is a universal model for arms control.

But is should be pointed out that in the short-range ground-launched category the Warsaw Pact fields some 1,400 missile launchers against 88 NATO Lance launchers, and 6,260 artillery pieces vs. 2,700 for NATO. I do not understand why Soviet reductions to NATO levels, and even to lower common ceilings, in this class would harm deterrence, or why such reductions should necessarily await progress in conventional and chemical arms control. Indeed, such talks could hold out the possibility of restructuring on a mutual basis these forces to eliminate potentially destabilizing aspects, such as by reducing what could be described as "self-deterring" very short-range nuclear artillery and freeing up the launchers for the conventional mission. NATO had already decided to eliminate 2,400 warheads in the U.S. stockpile in Europe--why not try to further incorporate these decisions into mutual dialogue with the USSR?

To freeze out further nuclear arms control in Europe for the indefinite future would, perhaps, perpetuate the myth of NATO superiority in short-range nuclear systems, complicate modernization decisions such as regarding the Lance II, and encourage those who appear to seek disarmament for disarmament's sake alone. And it would serve no NATO interest to discover in a few months that the Soviet Union was increasing the rate of deployment in their short-range forces as a means of compensating for INF reductions, and that NATO had no recourse to reverse such a development through negotiation. In addition, whatever is achieved in conventional and chemical arms control, or, for that matter, in our own defense efforts, will not diminish the necessity of nuclear deterrence; to make further nuclear cuts contingent upon prior agreement on a conventional balance and a chemical zero option could wrongly imply just the opposite. But I would stress again that it is in the area of conventional arms control--and conventional forces--that our arms control and defense efforts should be primarily devoted in the coming years.

We cannot solve our conventional force posture deficiencies with arms control alone. Nor can we expect to remedy them with nuclear panaceas in an era of strategic parity and Soviet theater nuclear advantages, which the INF treaty diminishes. But it is at the conventional stability talks that the real answers will be revealed to whether the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon its threatening posture directed against NATO--especially the short-warning threat--and to work toward laying down a concrete basis for fundamentally restructuring East-West relations.

In addition to the major structural changes in the Warsaw Pact military posture we will be seeking in the conventional stability negotiations, much remains to be accomplished in the area of confidence- and security-building measures affecting the activities of military forces in Europe. At the next Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), NATO should move boldly beyond the necessary improvements to the notification, observation, and inspection measures already in place to propose constraints on military activities. Both negotiations should aim at reducing the potential for both sudden and large-scale aggression and affording concrete basis to the obligation against the threat or use of force. In this context, I would note that the execution of the INF verification regime itself will prove a very positive confidence-building measure.

There is a final aspect that I would like to stress, which is the forging of the Western European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. One effect of the INF debate has been the strengthening of a Western European identity in security policy, which is very welcome indeed. The reactivation of the Western European Union, Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, efforts to rationalize armaments production, greater attention to strengthening conventional defense, and Franco-German defense cooperation are all invigorating the NATO train, with the United States as its indispensable locomotive. The multinational naval deployments to the Persian Gulf, and the recent reported decision by Britain, France, and Italy to coordinate minesweeping operations, must also be noted as tangible evidence of the European commitment to security out-of-area. Western Europe must continue to develop solutions to its particular security challenges in defense cooperation and armaments inter-operability, as well as coordination of policy toward the Soviet Union.

We in NATO must increasingly work together through meaningful consultation to agree on the track we want to follow. In this context, the substantial presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable role in European security, just as does the commitment of all the NATO nations to the principles of risk- and burden-sharing so fundamental to Allied cohesion. And I would note in this regard that despite the very difficult debate that took place in my own country regarding the INF deployments, the Dutch government restored two nuclear missions--maintaining F-16s and Orion ASW aircraft--that it had planned to cancel upon the commencement of INF GLCM deployments in 1988.

Mr. Chairman, in the final analysis, it is well worth recalling what the Alliance is all about. As stated in the 1967 Harmel Report on The Future Tasks of the Alliance, NATO has two main functions. The first is "to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to *deter* aggression and other forms of pressure and to *defend* the territory of member countries if aggression should occur," based on the doctrine of flexible response. In this climate, the second function can be executed: "to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved." And the "ultimate political purpose" of the Alliance "is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."

Over two decades later, the Harmel Report remains remarkable for its resilience and vitality. But some observers have called for a second Harmel Report to guide NATO for the next twenty years, particularly in light of the uncertainties that the INF controversy, the 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit, and the perpetual debate about burdensharing and out-of-area activities have brought increasingly to the fore.

I think we would all agree that the two functions of the Alliance remain the same. But there is confusion of thought, on both sides of the Atlantic, about their implications. Tactical prescriptions cannot substitute for coherent policy and Allied cohesion. What is required, therefore, is an effort to work toward the adoption of a strategic framework for integrating arms control, defense and foreign policy. This superstructure--call it Harmel II--should address key questions such as:

- What is sufficiency in our conventional and nuclear posture?
- What should be the characteristics of that posture, taking into account the possibilities of reductions?

- What is the future of the European and North American pillars of the Alliance? and
- How can we best ensure that the principles of the Helsinki Final Act are pursued with persistence and imagination?

In a few months, the work of the North Atlantic Assembly's study committee on "NATO in the 1990s," chaired by Senator Roth, will be completed and the results published. We hope that this timely survey of a wide range of security questions confronting NATO will make a valuable contribution to planning for the years ahead.

To summarize, the INF treaty should be ratified. It is worthy on its own merits, and codifies useful precedents for future negotiations. It is my strong opinion that the INF treaty is a major step forward in at least three ways: by way of improving relations with the Soviet Union, improving relations within NATO, and contributing to the broader, global peace process. This treaty solves a specific problem relating to the missiles it eliminates, but it cannot be expected to solve all of our security problems, and nor, for that matter, should we expect future arms control agreements alone to do so. Nevertheless, we should exert our best efforts to ensure that the INF treaty is but the first step in a longer and more encompassing process toward restructuring the military balance in Europe and laying the foundations for a more stable, secure, open, just, and normalized East-West relationship.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, IT IS A PLEASURE TO JOIN YOU TODAY.

AT THE OUTSET I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT I THINK THE INF TREATY STANDS ON ITS OWN AS A SOUND AGREEMENT, AND IS ONE THAT THIS COMMITTEE AND THE SENATE AS A WHOLE SHOULD SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS, AS WITH ANY IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY ONE THAT CONCERNS NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS, WE MUST ASK THE BASIC QUESTION, WHICH IS: WHAT IS LEFT, AND IS IT ENOUGH TO CONTINUE TO DETER THE SOVIETS? WE SHOULD ALSO ASK:

What actions will be required of us if the Treaty receives your advice and consent?

I would like to begin by making three specific comments about NATO and the INF Treaty, and then conclude my statement with some remarks on what the Atlantic Alliance can do in the future to insure that the promise of the INF Treaty is realized.

The first and I think most obvious point to make about the INF Treaty is that it confirms the basic truth of international politics that one must negotiate from strength. This Treaty bears out that truth, not only for the obvious reason that the Alliance remained united and successfully began its deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles. This was, of course, a prerequisite to our success, for it demonstrated our ability to ignore Soviet intimidation and blandishments aimed at preventing our deployment in NATO countries. If that Soviet propaganda had succeeded, it would have insured Soviet global dominance in intermediate range nuclear forces. Had we or our NATO allies submitted to such tactics, or indeed had we listened to calls within our own countries for "unilateral restraint," or a freeze, we would now likely face the wholly unstable and dangerous situation of overwhelming and worldwide Soviet superiority in intermediate range nuclear missiles. In short, if NATO had not displayed the unity and courage it did, and if NATO had not been encouraged by our own resolution and resources, Soviet military and political dominance of Europe would be insured.

There is another dimension to this point about negotiating from strength, and it concerns the global nature of our competition with the Soviet Union. While it was surely a necessary condition of accomplishing a zero-zero outcome on INF for the Alliance first to deploy its own INF force, I doubt

THAT ON ITS OWN THAT WAS SUFFICIENT TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO GIVE UP ALL OF THEIR PREVIOUSLY STATED "NON NEGOTIABLE DEMANDS."

WHEN WE SPEAK OF NEGOTIATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS LOOK TO THE ENTIRE "CORRELATION OF FORCES." IN OTHER WORDS, THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ABLE TO REBUILD AND MODERNIZE THE ENTIRE RANGE OF OUR MILITARY FORCE AFTER SOME TEN YEARS OF DAMAGING CUTS WAS ALSO INFLUENTIAL IN THE SUCCESS OF OUR INF NEGOTIATIONS, AND SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED AS BACKGROUND TO OUR SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMACY. CLEARLY, IF WE CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN THE KIND OF DEFENSE CUTS WE HAVE SEEN OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, MIRRORING THE WORST DAYS OF THE DECADE OF NEGLECT--CUTS THAT DO, IN MY OPINION, SERIOUSLY ENDANGER OUR OWN SECURITY--WE CANNOT EXPECT THE KIND OF DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS WE HAVE SEEN IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. WE GIVE THE SOVIETS LITTLE INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS WITH US IF THE CONGRESS INSISTS ON CUTS OF THE MAGNITUDE REQUIRED IN THE BUDGET RESOLUTION IN 1988 AND 1989. THIS SIMPLY TELLS THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE BACK TO THE DAYS OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN OUR TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH. IN SHORT, WE ARE TELLING THE SOVIETS WE WILL REDUCE ON OUR OWN.

THE SECOND POINT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THE INF TREATY IS THAT IT CLEARLY ENHANCES NATO SECURITY. THE TREATY DOES THIS FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT UNDER ITS PROVISIONS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL ELIMINATE FORCES CAPABLE OF CARRYING OVER 1600 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHILE THE U.S. WOULD ELIMINATE FORCES CAPABLE OF DELIVERING SOME 400 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE INITIAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE ALLIANCE IS THAT THIS TREATY REDUCES SIGNIFICANTLY THE SOVIETS' ABILITY TO STRIKE NATO TARGETS WITHOUT RESORT TO THEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES. WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT MUCH OF THE SOVIET INF FORCE THAT WILL BE DESTROYED UNDER THE TREATY (THE SS-12'S AND 23'S) HAS CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES, BOTH AREAS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS POSSESS A CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE. SO THE

INF AGREEMENT REDUCES THOSE THREATS AS WELL. THESE ARE TARGETED PRIMARILY AGAINST PORTS AND AIRFIELDS, AND LARGER SITES-- IN SHORT, THEY ARE TARGETED AGAINST OUR REINFORCING CAPABILITIES.

ANOTHER ADVANTAGE IN THIS TREATY LIES IN THE ASYMMETRICAL NATURE OF THESE REDUCTIONS. GIVEN THE ENORMOUS SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMS, THIS PRINCIPLE OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION IS AN EXCELLENT AND NECESSARY PATTERN FOR THE FUTURE.

FINALLY, THERE IS THE ASSURANCE GIVEN US THROUGH THE VERIFICATION MEASURES. WE HAVE ACHIEVED IN THE INF TREATY MANY OF THE KIND OF VERIFICATION MEASURES WE HAVE WANTED, AND THAT WE BELIEVE WILL GIVE US SOME DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL COMPLY AND THAT WE HAVE A MUCH BETTER CHANCE OF DISCOVERING SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS.

IN A SOCIETY AS LARGE AND CLOSED AS THE USSR, AND GIVEN THEIR PAST RECORD ON CHEATING, WE CAN NEVER BE 100% SURE WE WILL DETECT ANY CHEATING. I HAVE NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES ARE BETTER THAN WE HAVE EVER OBTAINED BEFORE. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN GOOD VERIFICATION PROCEDURES ARE OF LITTLE USE IF WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO REACT TO VIOLATIONS. OUR RESPONSE TO NONCOMPLIANCE, SHOULD IT OCCUR, IS AS IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE IMPORTANT, THAN OUR TECHNICAL ABILITY TO DETECT VIOLATIONS. WE MUST BE RESOLVED, WELL IN ADVANCE, WHAT SHOULD BE OUR REACTION AND RESPONSE TO SOVIET CHEATING. THIS REQUIRES SUPPORT BY THE CONGRESS.

CLEARLY, I THINK THE INF TREATY LEAVES NATO IN A STRONG MILITARY POSITION. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE ALLIANCE COMES OUT OF THIS LONG PROCESS OF DEPLOYMENT AND NEGOTIATION STRONGER THAN EVER. I AM AMAZED, FRANKLY, THAT IN THE FACE OF REALLY QUITE EXTRAORDINARY ALLIANCE UNITY--UNITY THAT WE WORKED MOST DILIGENTLY TO MAINTAIN FOR THE LAST SEVEN YEARS, AND THAT SAW

US THROUGH WRENCHING DOMESTIC DEBATES, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE, AND UNITY AND COURAGE BY THE NATO NATIONS DESPITE THE MOST INTENSIVE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS--SO MANY PEOPLE EXHIBIT FEARS THAT NATO IS ABOUT TO CRUMBLE.

THE CLEAR POLITICAL MESSAGE THAT CAN BE DERIVED FROM THIS ENTIRE PROCESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS FAILED TO CRACK THE ALLIANCE. THAT WE CONTINUE TO HAVE DISPUTES WITHIN NATO IS NOTHING NEW. THAT IS BECAUSE THE 16 NATO NATIONS ARE SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT, UNLIKE THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS, MANY OF WHICH ARE ACTUALLY OCCUPIED BY SOVIET TROOPS. BUT OF COURSE TO KEEP NATO STRONG AND UNITED, WE MUST MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE OUR MILITARY. THESE ARE SIMPLY NATO'S NEXT CHALLENGE.

IN CONCLUSION, LET ME MAKE A FEW REMARKS ABOUT THE FUTURE. ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREEMENTS COMPEL US TO ASK A SIMPLE QUESTION: WHEN THE MISSILES GO, WHAT'S LEFT? IS ENOUGH LEFT TO CONSTITUTE A PROPER AND ADEQUATE DETERRENT? THE INF TREATY DOES NOT ALTER NATO'S FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY; THAT STRATEGY REMAINS INTACT AND STRONG. BUT SUCH STRATEGIES ARE NOT SELF-SUSTAINING. SINCE THE BIRTH OF NATO IN 1949, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING THE PROPER MIX OF FORCES--BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR--THAT MAKE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE STRATEGY. THOSE CONCERNS ARE WITH US TODAY AND ARE WITH US WHETHER WE HAVE AN INF TREATY OR NOT.

THE KEY IS THAT WE CANNOT ALLOW OUR FORCE STRUCTURE TO STAGNATE, THINKING THAT ALL OUR PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED WITH THIS TREATY OR WITH THE GREAT STRENGTH WE ADDED IN THE PAST SIX YEARS. WE MUST, FOR EXAMPLE, GO FORWARD WITH THE 1983 MONTEBELLO DECISION, WHICH CALLED FOR MODERNIZATION OF NATO NUCLEAR AND DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS.

NOTHING IN THE INF TREATY PREVENTS US FROM FULFILLING THE MONTEBELLO DECISION, NOR INDEED DOES IT LIMIT US FROM TAKING A

HOST OF NECESSARY MEASURES TO INSURE OUR SECURITY SUCH AS STRENGTHENING OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. IN THIS REGARD IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO SPEAK OUT FIRMLY AGAINST FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S RECENT THREATS. ACCORDING TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE, ANY ATTEMPT BY THE ALLIANCE TO MODERNIZE ITS TACTICAL OR BATTLEFIELD-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD "SCUTTLE" THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN REDUCTIONS MADE THUS FAR. HE GOES FURTHER THAN THIS, OF COURSE, AND STATES THAT THESE MODERNIZATIONS "MUST NOT BE PERMITTED." NOT PERMITTED BY WHOM? NATO SECURITY IS NOT IN MR. SHEVARDNADZE'S HANDS, NOR IS IT WITHIN HIS PURVIEW TO DICTATE TO US HOW WE SHALL SEE TO THAT SECURITY. THE TREATY DOES NOT PREVENT MODERNIZATION. QUITE THE CONTRARY, THE TREATY COMPELS MODERNIZATION, AND I HOPE THE CONGRESS WILL VOTE THE NECESSARY FUNDS SOON.

THESE SOVIET THREATS ARE NOTHING NEW, BUT NATO MUST REJECT THEM AS IT HAS REJECTED IN THE PAST SUCH BULLYING AND CRUDE THREATS. I WOULD MERELY RECOMMEND THAT THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER BORROW A COPY OF THE TREATY AND REFRESH HIS MEMORY OF ITS PROVISIONS.

CLEARLY, IT REMAINS THE ALLIANCE'S OWN DECISION WHETHER IT WILL, OR WILL NOT, MAINTAIN DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. AT MY LAST MEETING WITH THE NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS IN MONTEREY, IN NOVEMBER 1987, THEIR DETERMINATION IN THIS REGARD WAS AS STRONG AS EVER. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT GIVEN CONTINUED STRONG LEADERSHIP AND ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES, AND ADEQUATE FUNDING BY THE CONGRESS, THE MILITARY MODERNIZATION CALLED FOR IN MONTEBELLO WILL BE CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFULLY AND ON TIME. THAT IS URGENTLY REQUIRED.

ONE OTHER POINT, IF I MAY, BEFORE I CLOSE. ALL OF THE WORRIES AND UNCERTAINTIES AS TO SOVIET CHEATING, AND WHETHER THE VERIFICATION IS ADEQUATE, CAN BE DISPELLED IF WE FUND, COMPLETE AND DEPLOY THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE

INITIATIVE PROGRAM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I HOPE THAT NOTHING WILL INTERFERE WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF S.D.I. AS SOON AS WE CAN.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT TO THANK THE COMMITTEE FOR ITS TIME TODAY AND I WOULD NOW BE PLEASED TO TRY TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

It is a special pleasure for me to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations as it proceeds with its evaluation of the INF Treaty for ratification. This assessment is preparatory to the Senate's fulfillment of its constitutional responsibility of "advise and consent." Needless to say, I am happy to be of assistance in this historic process.

This Treaty has been interpreted by some as the successful culmination of a long and arduous process; by others as a potential cataclysm for Alliance relations that will start a process, perhaps now unavoidable, of the unraveling of the NATO Alliance. I believe that the first interpretation is closer to the truth. However, I would also state that there does exist in the Treaty a potential for further developments that is worrisome. Consequently such possibilities must be carefully monitored. Under the proper conditions, if all of us take care not to be swept away by euphoria or by panicky reactions, this Treaty can be of unquestionable net benefit to the United States and to the Alliance. I shall address these matters by presenting a series of observations.

1. Since I shall be later pointing to some possible dangers and suggesting some admonitions, I should state unequivocally at the outset that the Senate should proceed with the ratification of the proposed Treaty. The Administration may justifiably take pride in the negotiation of this Treaty. As I have just mentioned, there should be no great apprehension regarding

proceeding with ratification. There should be somewhat more, though not significantly more, apprehension regarding the impact of the proposed reductions, even if successfully verified, on the relationship of Warsaw Pact to Alliance forces. Yet on balance, the Treaty, when its terms are finally carried out, should have a favorable impact on the military security of the western world.

Let me stress this most important point: arms control agreements can only be assessed on balance. If one were to weigh any arms control agreement, as is so frequently done, exclusively in terms of its impact on U.S (or Alliance) forces, one must inevitably conclude that the pact is not in the national interest. Any military advantage that comes from an arms control agreement stems, not from its impact on U.S forces, but rather on the reductions or the restraints it imposes upon the forces of a potential opponent. To elicit such restraint, presumably enforceable, the price we must pay is restraint on our own forces. Consequently, I urge the Committee not to be too beguiled by observations to the effect that when viewed unilaterally, this Treaty imposes some sacrifice of U.S. capabilities. That is inevitable. It is inherent in the arms control process. In military terms, the only question is whether the overall impact of the restraints on both sides are favorable to our interests. Note also that I have said military terms. Of course, there is in addition a political dimension, which in this case is less clearcut in terms of its effects--and to which I will turn later.

2. When the agreed terms are ultimately fulfilled the Soviet Union would then have sacrificed a ballistic missile force capable of delivering more than 1600 warheads--in exchange for a mixed American force capable of delivering some 400 warheads. This 4:1 exchange ratio is a remarkable achievement--quite astonishing in light of prior Soviet behavior in negotiations and probably quite implausible to those American officials who proposed the zero option in 1981. At that time the proposal was

viewed as so much in the American interest that the Soviets could never accept it. Perhaps we might ponder the advice: never to look a gift horse in the mouth. But more appropriately, we should recognize that the Soviets have accepted a specific exchange lopsidedly in the Western interest for motives that, as yet, are not entirely clear to us.

But we should also recognize that insofar as the arrangement goes, it is to our advantage. Any time one can reduce the number of warheads targeted exclusively on so densely populated an area as Western Europe, one should acknowledge the benefit. In the past, and particularly when the Europeans both urged us to press on with arms control and more specifically to do something about the SS-20, the European attitude would have been wholeheartedly in favor of such an outcome. Unhappily our European partners tend to be rather mercurial, thus, as the earlier hopes have been transformed into emerging reality, they have tended to develop doubts--which they are more inclined to express privately than publicly.

3. Since the deployment of the SS-3s, SS-4s, and SS-5s in the late 1950s the Soviet Union has had, what we have lately advertised as a monopoly of intermediate range weapons directed against Europe, while, until the past 4 years there have been no American European-based missiles that could reach the Soviet Union. For most of that period we were unconcerned about this "monopoly" believing, quite correctly, that American strategic forces provided a more than sufficient counterweight to these regional Soviet advantages. The 1979 NATO decision to deploy Euromissiles was a dual-track decision: the intent was to use the prospective deployment as a way to persuade the Soviets to constrain, if not terminate, the deployment of the SS-20, a matter of great concern in Europe.

The strategy worked. The main task originally assigned in Europe to Pershing 2 and cruise missile deployment has been accomplished--even beyond the expectation of the time. But in the course of achieving deployment of the missile force in Europe in the period since 1982, we developed a rationale, as a way of facilitating deployment, which we now find hard to abandon.

This is the illusion of concreteness. As weapon systems are deployed they take on presumed virtues and an apparent indispensibility that did not exist prior to such deployment. Nonetheless, we must cling to that original vision: a Soviet "monopoly" which has existed for some thirty years and (though it has only bothered us in quite recent years) is about to be removed. All and all that is a substantial accomplishment.

4. The Administration has made a great point of the fact that "for the first time in history we are eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons". I can well understand why the Administration chooses to do so. In PR terms it is a powerful point. Nonetheless, with all due respect, I would hope that the members of the Committee would not be particularly swayed by such an argument.

Eliminating entire classes of weapons is not, in general, a good thing. In general a mix of weapon systems tend to complicate a hypothetical attack plan by one's potential opponent and thereby adds to deterrence. This was a point reiterated in recent years by the Scowcroft Commission--which pointed to the increased stability in deterrence provided by a mixed force of bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. I would hope that the Committee bears this in mind as it examines this and prospective future agreements. One should not want to generalize, from this specific agreement,to the hypothetical virtues of eliminating entire classes of weapon systems.

In this particular case the balance of advantages is quite clearly to the West in light of the fact the the Soviets have accepted the principle of asymetrical reductions, an exchange ratio significantly favoring the West, and the reduced weight of a prospective attack against Western Europe. Because of the vulnerabilities and the short flight times, in this particular case the agreement also probably adds to overall arms stability. But one must not generalize from this that there are advantages in removing classes of nuclear weapons. That is the path to increased vulnerability, reduced flexibility of forces, and in most cases reduced crisis stability.

5. Nuclear deterrence for Europe will be altered but ought not be significantly reduced by this agreement. Altogether too much alarm, based upon faulty premises, has been expressed on this point. It has served to concentrate attention on the conventional imbalances in Europe, which need to be corrected, but on the faulty premise that the role of nuclear deterrence in the protection of Western Europe will have been fatally weakened. Deterrence depends upon Soviet perceptions of the strength and will of the United States reflected in its declared intent and its capabilites.

While there are those in certain military headquarters and in some European capitals who suggest that the nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union is provided only by forces assigned to Allied Command Europe, this has not been the case in the past and should not be the case in the future. The Soviet Union is deterred by the overall power of the United States, whether or not forces are specifically assigned to NATO. It is a form of parochialism in Europe to suggest that the Soviets have basically been deterred by a relative handful of warheads in Europe, none of which were deployed before 1983. It is the overall strength of America's strategic forces that has been the principle element in Europe's nuclear deterrent in the past and will remain so in the future. If the Soviet Union is not deterred by the 12,000 warheads in America's strategic forces that can reach Soviet soil, then the Soviet Union will not be deterred by the 12,400 warheads that could reach Soviet soil when we throw in that handful of weapons presently based in Europe that will be withdrawn under this Treaty.

Nuclear deterrence need not be weakened, and should in certain respects be strengthened, by the Treaty. To achieve this is primarily a matter of getting the perceptions right, especially through our declaratory policy. We should be endeavoring to make this clear both to our allies, and to the extent necessary, to the Soviets. Regrettably the Administration has been all too reticent on this issue.

6. There is no question that the INF Treaty has imposed serious strains on the Alliance. Perhaps it should not have done so considering the strong military posture of the Alliance. Perhaps it would not have done so, had the Treaty had not come in the wake of Reykjavik, which badly shook allied confidence in the steadiness of American policy and even in American understanding of the time-honored Alliance strategy. However, coming as it did in the wake of Reykjavik, the INF Treaty seemed to suggest that the Americans might agree to or even seek "the denuclearization of Europe", a view unfortunately reinforced by some high-level American statements. Since "the denuclearization of Europe" has been stated by Mr. Gorbachev to be a near term Soviet objective and since it has been a Soviet continuing objective since the inception of NATO, it would seem ill advised for the United States to seem to confirm such a goal as valid. Not only has the security of Europe rested on the threat of nuclear deterrence in the past, it is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

It is vital for the United States, in my judgment, both to recognize the present fragility of the Alliance and to rebuild its cohesion. The United States should begin to rebuild European confidence by stating certain things quite clearly. First, it should point out that, irrespective of what Mr. Gorbachev may say or hope, there will be no "denuclearization of Europe". Second, the American nuclear deterrent will be available to sustain the security of Europe as long as it is required--and the United States does not see any end to that necessity for the foreseeable future. Third, all targets that it is necessary to cover to provide nuclear deterrence can be either better covered or adequately covered by U.S. strategic forces. Fourth, we need to remind Europeans that the chief beneficary of the elimination of 1,600 warheads targeted against European targets are the Europeans themselves. That is why the Europeans earlier demanded these negotiations.

While it is true that what ails the Alliance in the wake of the INF Treaty is psychological rather than military, those psychological issues require careful handling by the American government.

7. Much emphasis has been placed in the wake of the INF Treaty on the long standing defects in NATO's conventional posture. Those deficiencies deserved to be corrected in the past--and they deserve to be corrected in the future. By itself, however, the INF agreement does not significantly change the situation that has prevailed in the past. In light of those deficiences Allied conventional forces required back-stopping by nuclear deterrence in the past and will require such back-stopping in the future.

Yet, over the years the change has generally been favorable. The conventional deterrent, while still needing significant improvement, is far more robust than it was thirty years ago, when the Alliance relied overwhelmingly on the nuclear threat. The INF Treaty needs to be explained against its historical background--and not, as if it removed the prinicpal element of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, the handful of weapons scheduled to be removed from Europe are, so to speak, the tail of the dog of nuclear deterrence--and not the dog itself.

8. The most important immediate tasks regarding NATO security are to remind the Allies that nuclear deterrence remains in place for Europe and that Europe will continue to need and to have such a deterrent. Still there is more to be done with respect to correcting the deficiencies in the Allied conventional posture. About this, however, one should be realistic. First,

there is not likely to be substantial volume of additional resources available either here or in Europe. Second, the degree of confidence that one may repose in the conventional deterrent is unlikely to be sufficiently high that one can dispose of the backing by the nuclear deterrent.

However, improvements can and should be made. Many of these are well known, indeed have been preached over the last quarter of a century. More equipment and appropriate training, particularly for reserve forces is one important item. (it would be highly desirable, for example for German reservists to be effectively equippd and organized into truly effective combat units) Improved deployments are another item; the layer cake deployment of the Allies along the Central Front represents a long standing problem. Other known items include matters on which this Committee has already done substantial work: aircraft shelters and adequate stockpiles of munitions and other supplies. The point is that much of an improved conventional capability comes not from miraculous new insights, but simply doing better what we have known all along we should do.

It would also help, to the extent that the Germans have doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, for them to accept the desirablity of new defensive barriers in Germany. That the Germans, because of the political implications, have never been prepared to construct barriers against a Warsaw Pact attack reveals, in my judgment, that they have considered the risk of such an attack as quite low. If there are serious doubts about the continued efficacy of nuclear deterrence it would seem appropriate to improve conventional deterrecne through barrier creation. Who knows but that the new European anxieties might actually permit the Alliance to accomplish something more.

I should note, however, that I would be careful about regarding either new doctrines or new technologies as panaceas. While much is heard about emerging technologies, one must be aware that they are, in reality, slow to emerge. Such discussion is particularly seductive since it appeals to an American belief in substituting technology for force structure and substituting equipment for manpower. That can only be carried so far. We must remain aware that the Soviets (and their allies) still have immense, if cumbersome forces--and immensely more numerous reserves.

One should be careful also not to be too much reliance on new doctrine, such as certain aspect of the Air-Land Battle, useful as that excercise may be. Generally speaking NATO will, of necessity, generally remain confined to defense; our Allies are notably defensive-minded. The numerical limitations of forces and serious logistical problems will make it difficult for the West to rely on major offensive action.

The main point, however, to bear in mind is that we do not seek perfection. Conventional forces can be so improved and made sufficiently robust that the Warsaw Pact will lose much of whatever temptation it may have to test them.

9. IF the chief item that must be tended to in the wake of the Treaty is to shore up Alliance cohesion, morale, and forces, there are other vulnerabilites that we must be aware of. Notable among such vulnerabilities is the rigorousness of the system of verification. The Administration quite properly takes great credit in the breakthrough with the Soviets in allowing on-site inspection, which is unprecented. Welcome as such a development is, the Committee must remain aware that it does not ensure compliance. Inspectors will be permanently stationed at Votkinsk, but this is only the assembly point; inspectors will not be stationed at production facilities. Other areas subject to inspection include the designated deployment areas, but this represents only a minute fraction of Soviet territory. In other words, if the Soviets were to cheat (which I do not think likely) we would have to rely on other means to detect such cheating.

I believe that the likelihood of cheating is low because the incentives to do so in this case are low. One is here dealing with only a very small part of the Soviet forces. Consequently cheating, which might seriously damage Soviet political objectives, does not hold out the prospect of significantly altering the overall military balance. What is more, the elimination of various categories of weapons means that any detected system in these categories would represent a violation. Since there is a ban on flight testing, the value of a hypothetical covert force is further reduced.

But pointing to the weakness of Soviet incentives to cheat in this case is rather different from having confidence in our capacity to ensure compliance. While I believe that verification measures are adequate for the INF Treaty and that the Treaty on balance conveys benefits to western security, one should not be deceived about the rigorousness of the verification regime or the capacity readily to transfer it to future agreements. To put it briefly, the greatest danger would be to accept that this verification regime provides an adequate precedent for a prospective START agreement.

10. All that remains for me to do now is to indicate what these observations regarding the INF Treaty may imply about the future--particularly the future of arms control. The clearest inference to be drawn is that of a yellow traffic signal. While we should proceed, it is indispensible that we proceed with great caution. This is mandated by three crucial considerations--two relating to the arms balance and one relating to verification.

In the first place, it must be strongly emphasized that the INF agreement removing from Europe missiles that have served, however temporarily, to help deter a Warsaw Pact attack expands the role in overall nuclear deterrence that must be played by U.S. strategic forces. The role of these forces in providing extended deterrence is therefore an increasingly proponderant one. That implies that there is a smaller tolerance for error in any adjustments of the strategic forces than there was previously. It therefore implies that any downward adjustments made under START must be even more carefully scrutinized.

Second, it is essential to examine the character of any strategic arms agreement. In 1982 the Administration established as prerequsite for arms control negotiations that "A START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces". Thus, reductions, however popular, are not enough. A prospective arms agreement must be judged by this criterion--especially in light of the enhanced importance of strategic forces for extended deterrence.

The present direction of the negotiations is, at best, ambiguous; consequently the content of those negotiations must be carefully monitored. In particular, what is presently on the table is that the SS-18 force, the Soviet Union's most notable counterforce weapon, would be reduced by fifty percent. But the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads suggests that the number of aim points in the United States could shrink by more than fifty percent. In other words, the ratio of Soviet RVs with counterforce capability to U.S aim points might actually increase. Such a possibility must be carefully watched. For if were to occur, it would not "promote strategic stability." Avoiding increased vulnerability is a more important criterion for any strategic arms agreement than simple reductions.

Third, we must fully understand that the verification regime for the INF Treaty would be quite inadequate for a prospective START agreement. The chief risk in the INF verification regime is that it might be taken as an acceptable precedent for verification in START. The reasons that we can have measured confidence in Soviet compliance in INF are three. First, by reducing intermediate range missiles to zero, the task of detecting violations is made comparatively simple. An observation of any missile, in the procribed category, would mean a violation. Second, the elimination of the entire class of weapons permits a ban on flight testing. The utility of a covert force would be substantially reduced, if one is unable to test the vehicles. Third, the INF agreement applies to a very small fraction of Soviet capabilities, none of which could be targeted against the territory of their principal opponent, the United States of America. Since detection is easier and since a relative handful of covert weapons would not upset the strategic balance, the Soviet incentive to cheat is quite weak.

But bear in mind that none of these considerations would apply in a prospective START agreement.

First, the number of strategic delivery vehicles that would have to be monitored in such a regime would run into the many hundreds. Detection of violations would be much harder, since the conditions would be inherently more ambiguous. Second, unlike the INF case there could be no total ban on flight testing. Since flight testing would continue, any covert force would have greater strategic value. Third, unlike the INF agreement, which applies to a small portion of total Soviet capability, the START agreement would apply to the bulk of Soviet forces (and all those forces could reach North America). As the number of vehicles falls for the two sides, the premium on cheating would grow. Consequently, in the START case one cannot rely on the weakness of the incentive to cheat.

The conclusion is clear. Caution must be the watchword. The details of and the prospects for verification are immensly more important in START than in INF. We must bear in mind that in the new world of mobile missiles, the problems of verification are inherently more difficult than when we were simply monitoring silos as under Salt I. In this emerging world, never again shall we have a treaty as easy as the INF agreement to have measured confidence in Soviet compliance.

Mr. Chairman and other members of the Committee, I thank you for your attention. Let me conclude with the following observation. It has frequently been observed both by those who are cautiously sympathetic to arms control and those who are hostile to arms control that the greatest danger in an arms control agreement, even one as attractive as the INF agreemnt, is that it will create euphoria and cause us to let down our guard. The fear is that the a well-founded agreement will sweep us along in a torrent of good feeling and cause us to embrace other agreements that are ill advised. Regrettably I must conclude on this somber note: such apprehension is amply justified. As we proceed with further arms control discussions, we must be cold-eyed if not cold-blooded, regarding the terms of any prospective agreements.

Mr. Chairman I shall be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EVAN G. GALBRAITH

Thank you very much for allowing me to appear today. My background includes having lived twenty years in Europe, doing business in every Western European country. In addition to serving as the United States Ambassador to France from 1981 to 1985, I served on two other occasions in the government - over three years in the Central Intelligence Agency and later as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce. I am a graduate of Yale and Harvard Law School and currently am an international investment banker.

I would like to address first the question of verification under the INF Treaty and to state categorically that verification is impossible - not just difficult - it is impossible. This must be so because the Soviet SS-20's are mobile and we do not know how many SS-20's the Soviets have produced. Think about it - how can you verify the absence of the SS-20 unless you know how many to look for. Our intelligence community has produced a wide range of estimates. It is important to understand that the estimates are based only in part on hard intelligence and are largely based on assumptions. The fact is we simply do not know. There could be several hundred SS-20's stored in sites we cannot inspect. Our right of inspection covers only a small fraction of the Soviet Union and it is unlikely the Soviets would convenience us by storing SS-20's in the areas we can inspect.

When confronted with this unassailable logic Administration officials say in effect - "Yes, but...", These "buts" include:

(a) The number of concealed SS-20's would have no military significance. Two or three hundred SS-20's have no military significance? Then why are we paying so dearly - by giving up our key deterrent, the Pershing II? The Administration cannot have it both ways - the SS-20's cannot be significant for purposes of the Treaty but insignificant when violating it.

(b) The SS-20, if stored clandestinely, will not be properly tested and its crews will not be properly trained. This lame rejoinder barely merits comment, but for the record let it be noted that other missile crews, those operating the SS-25's for example, can also be proficient in launching the SS-20. The SS-20 needs no further flight testing and can be properly maintained for years. Even into obsolescence they will remain lethal.

(c) We are also told that cheating will be too costly. Why? The SS-20's can be stored in banal containers or in SS-25 canisters at existing military bases not subject to our inspection. The cost is infinitesimal in comparison with constructing new missiles and will be lost in the Soviet defense budget. This is another red herring.

The Administration has certified that this Treaty is verifiable. In fact it is not. The Senate should not be a party to what amounts to a deception of the American people.

Turning to the substance of the Treaty, in my opinion the loss of the Pershing II is even more devastating than the impossibility of verification. The Pershing II is regarded by most Europeans as a key deterrent to Soviet aggression and its deployment reinforced the will of the Europeans to maintain an effective military force against the Soviet Union.

The underlying problem in Europe is the fact that almost no one believes the United States would use its strategic nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of defending Europe. To do so would cause a Soviet nuclear attack on the American people. Consequently most Europeans think the Soviets are not deterred in Europe by American strategic weapons. Therefore Europe is wide open to a Soviet nuclear, conventional, and chemical attack, unless there are U.S. nuclear weapons on the ground in Germany. Most people think the Soviets must assume that in the event of a convential Soviet break-through the U.S. would use its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe if only to prevent U.S. troops from being slaughtered. Moreover, the use of tactical nuclear weapons need not necessarily escalate into a strategic exchange.

The loss of belief in the American nuclear umbrella in Europe has given rise to defeatism, appeasement and a longing to opt out. This is manifested in Germany by the Greens, the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and much of European youth. The Germans in particular have been assaulted by Soviet propaganda about a nuclear holocaust, Germany burning, Germany as a nuclear battlefield, etc. and all with an adverse effect on Germany's will to resist. However, the Pershing II helped restore European faith in the West's ability to stand firm. The American nuclear umbrella was restored. Now with this Treaty we are on our way to withdrawing it. The ink was barely dry on the INF Treaty before Gennscher, Shevarnadze, Honnecker et al began discussing the elimination of the remaining nuclear weapons in Germany. The INF Treaty sets us on a slippery slope and we won't stop sliding until Germany is denuclearized, neutralized and demilitarized. By ratifying this Treaty you will destabilize Germany and Western Europe and threaten the existence of NATO.

And to what end? The purpose of the SS-20 is not to fire them. They were deployed to intimidate, to terrorize and ultimately to force the Europeans to opt out of any effort to resist the Soviet domination of Western Europe. Soviet terror is not going to be diminished by the elimination of the SS-20. The SS-24 and SS-25 can also be targeted on Europe. The grizzly Soviet propaganda war will continue. The erosion of Western resolve will continue.

We are asked, if this fatal scenario is possible, why is it that European leaders favor the Treaty? The answer lies in the confluence of favorable public opinion in Europe and the disarmament policy of the Reagan Administration. Government leaders have concluded they cannot resist politically the combination of these two forces. As Professor Jeffery Hart points out in his recent book From this Moment On - Chamberlain was, after his agreement with Hitler in Munich, a national hero and Churchill could do nothing. A New York Times editorial , even in the dark days of 1940, persisted, "After all, Neville Chamberlin tried to bring peace to Europe. He tried boldly and bravely when other men had shrugged their shoulders. Was it not better to have tried and failed than never to have tried at all?" The answer is not by relying on the word of tyrants. Only through strength can they be kept at bay.

I would also like to speak to those like Henry Kissinger who have said the Treaty is a major mistake, but think it is too late; the damage is done and not to ratify would not stop the withdrawal of the Pershing II's. We might as well go ahead and insure that the SS-20's are also withdrawn. Other opponents of the Treaty fear that rejection could lead to the election of the SPD in Germany. But is it wise to suppress the truth? Is it not better to speak out as Churchill did after Munich even if into the teeth of public opinion. Maybe with the truth we can salvage the Pershing II's. The loss of Germany through neutralization would be a disaster. We must do everything possible to prevent it. This Treaty will aid and abet those forces who would have it come about. I urge that the Senate either reject the Treaty or postpone it until the American people can be given a chance to appreciate its adverse consequences. Perhaps, it will become an issue in this election year and the next Administration will be better placed to judge it objectively.

Lastly, can France replace the United States as the nuclear guarantor of Europe? Perhaps. France will soon have the necessary military hardware. But the question is whether or not Germany will accept France as its nuclear guarantor and if so will French nuclear weapons be sufficiently credible to stop the erosion in Germany of the will to resist. On this latter point I have grave doubts.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ALTON G. KEEL

Mr. Chairman: I want to thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to participate in these important hearings on the INF Treaty, and to review the role of the Treaty in the NATO Alliance context.

Others have addressed the Treaty's provisions, its security benefits, and the background of the neogtiations. General Galvin will give you his appreciation of the security implications of the Treaty, and the effect of the Treaty on his ability to implement NATO strategy. As General Galvin will confirm, the Treaty has the support of NATO's military leadership, and -- as you've already heard -- of our own.

The most useful contribution I can make to these hearings is to convey to you my first hand knowledge of what the Allied governments think about the INF Treaty; what the Alliance sees as some of the challenges ahead in a post-INF era; and what is now ongoing within the Alliance to begin to address some of these challenges.

Mr. Chairman, there have been a number of prominent American opinion-makers -- former government officials -- willing to speak out against this INF Treaty; expressing concern about where it leaves us and where it leads us; charging that it has weakened the Alliance and raising doubts about the Alliance's future. These critics have often claimed to be speaking in the name of Europeans. I don't know what Europeans they believe they are speaking for, but I'm here to tell you today that they are not -- are not -- speaking for the Allied governments or for Europeans who represent those governments. I don't have the luxury to speculate about what the Allied governments think. As the U.S. government representative to the NAC at NATO headquarters in Brussels, I deal with my European counterparts on a daily basis: privately and publicly; formally and informally, officially and unofficially. Moreover, I deal with them in the Councils where Alliance consensus is formed -- including the consensus for INF.

What do the Allies think? First, they believe the INF Treaty is an Alliance success story. It vindicates our approach to east-west relations: strength, realism and dialogue. And the INF debate -- far from calling into question our strategy and doctrine -- has reaffirmed the validity of our policy of flexible response, with the critical role of nuclear deterrence, and the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Political courage has been rewarded and the benefits of political solidarity and cohesion have been demonstrated.

Second, the Allies believe the INF Treaty is in the security interest of the Alliance -- both militarily and politically. It achieves the Alliance military objective of eliminating the SS-20 threat to Europe and it politically strengthens the Alliance's hand in applying its proven approach to the challenges ahead: military strength and political solidarity.

Third, while the Allies are conscious of and sensitive to the Senate's perogatives, the Allies believe that not only should the INF Treaty be ratified, but that it must be ratified. Failure to ratify the Treaty -- and ratify it in a way that does not cause reinterpretation or renegotiation -- would be a major blow to the Alliance. The INF process has promoted political unity within the Alliance; rejection would provoke disunity and discord. The INF result has vindicated the Alliance approach to east-west relations, and discredited the so-called "peace movements"; rejection would discredit the Alliance and revive the unilateral disarmament movements. Ratification of the INF Treaty would demonstrate to European publics that the U.S. government -- both the executive and legislative branches -- can successfully negotiate and put into force an agreement with the Soviet Union judged to be in our security interest; failure to ratify would undermine all confidence in U.S. leadership and do so for the foreseeable future.

That's what the Allies believe. Perhaps equally important is what they do not believe. The Allies do not believe that the INF Treaty, in and of itself, undermines our deterrence or invalidates our policy of flexible response. The Allies do not believe the INF Treaty is the first step on a "slippery slope" leading to the denuclearization of Europe -- or, more precisely put, forcing U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. And, the Allies do not believe that the INF Treaty necessitates radical revamping of Alliance strategy.

All this does not mean, Mr. Chairman, that the Alliance has no concerns as it looks ahead -- nor does it mean that the Alliance is somehow oblivious to the challenges ahead. Pas du tout, not at all. To assume this, or conclude this, or assert this would be an extraordinary disservice to the Alliance and to the talented people -- both military and civilian -- who serve it. No, the Alliance recognizes the challenges ahead and has numerous efforts underway intended to meet those challenges -- efforts which some treaty critics are either oblivious to or choose to ignore. But the INF Treaty or the INF process did not create these challenges -- nor do they diminish the Alliance's ability to respond to them. To the contrary, the lessons of the INF Treaty and process strengthen the Alliance's ability to respond to the challenges ahead: both militarily and politically.

So, I will focus on the political and strategic policy context for the Treaty, from the perspective of what it means for NATO. What are its implications for our ability, through the NATO alliance, to meet the challenges confronting us into the 1990's?

In a fundamental sense, the INF agreement is an Alliance Treaty. Therefore, I commend the Committee's approach as it examines this Treaty, of not just looking at it in the U.S.-Soviet context, but at its implications and lessons for the Alliance as a whole.

The Treaty benefits the Alliance, both militarily and politically. It is the accomplishment of the long-standing Alliance objective to reduce one important element of the Soviet military threat to our Allies. It is a heartening demonstration of what Western solidarity can achieve. Not the least, it offers important lessons and opportunities for the future.

The Alliance, as a dynamic and flexible entity, has already begun the process of looking ahead. It is working in a step-by-step fashion to build on what works, and to remain steady on course -- following a proven strategy of strength and realism. In sum, while much still remains to be done, our policies for enhancing collective security -- the NATO approach -- are working.

There is no need, in the aftermath of the Treaty, either to fear the future or to search for radical new approaches to Alliance strategy. Instead, an evolutionary approach, through equal partnership, building on the agreed body of principles and policies which underlie the Alliance, is the way ahead. The Alliance is moving ahead. Early ratification and implementation of the Treaty will help us to get on with our agenda.

AN ALLIANCE TREATY

As Secretary Shultz noted in his testimony, the dual-track approach to the INF problem was a joint NATO effort from the beginning, in the late '70's. The successful implementation of that approach has demanded cohesion, unprecedented consultation and extraordinary political courage and determination from the members of the Alliance.

We and our Allies defined our goals, together; we decided on our course of action, both in terms of deployments and arms control, together; we faced up to intense Soviet pressure, together. And, in the end, the strength of the leadership of the Basing Countries and the United States -- bolstered by support from the other Allies -- brought the Soviets to accept our proposals. After years of stalling and failed efforts to split us from our European partners, the Soviets were forced to negotiate seriously at Geneva. This is a crucial lesson. Simply put, strength and unity -- and patience -- paid off, and in a tangible way not often apparent in contemporary diplomacy.

Thus, our Allies rightly see the Treaty as a historic triumph of NATO partnership. It vindicates the fundamental Alliance strategy set forth in the Harmel Report: We pursue more constructive relations with the East on the basis of military strength and political cohesion. Had we wavered, had we listened to the critics of the 1979 decision and the loud opposition to GLCM and Pershing II deployments, we'd now have an entirely different "double zero solution": Zero INF for NATO, and zero Soviet reductions, leaving the Soviets with an INF monopoly.

There can be no doubt that the members of the Alliance support this Treaty and want it ratified. This support is demonstrated in Alliance communiques, national statements at the highest levels, and in private contacts. When European leaders speak for themselves, their support is crystal clear. I know a number of you recently have been in European capitals and heard these leadership views first-hand.

One sometimes hears the charge that the Treaty was concluded "above the heads" of our Allies. I can only term this absurd. First, the Treaty meets all of the goals we collectively set for ourselves. Second, the consultations on both tracks of the 1979 decision were unprecedented in scope and depth. To give you an idea of the depth of consultation, let's look at just the past two years of this more than eight-year process.

From November 1985, when President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva, to December, 1987, when the Treaty was signed, within NATO there were some 60 high-level consultations with our Allies at which the Geneva NST negotations and INF were the sole or major topic. This averages to well over two consultations per month. The record includes meetings with the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and with our NST negotiators, who consulted with the Allies on a regular basis. It includes numerous special consultations by Paul Nitze, Max Kampelman, Mike Glitman and other senior officials at key intervals. These consultations took place at NATO headquarters, where the Alliance consensus was formed and evolved. In addition, regular expert level meetings of the NATO Special Consultative Group on the INF negotiations and the High Level Group on NATO nuclear forces were held throughout the process. This critical activity is still ongoing. Of course, aside from these Alliance consultations, there were numerous additional exchanges and policy-level bilateral contacts in capitals, especially with the basing countries.

THE TREATY'S IMPACT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The INF Treaty -- like any major new step forward -- has generated questions about its implications. These questions are not new -- and have been largely answered -- but, not unexpectedly they continue to be raised. Change does cause uncertainties, with uncertainty comes anxiety -- and questions should be raised. These questions fall into two categories. One concerns the impact of the Treaty on NATO security and the Alliance's ability to deter the Warsaw Pact. The other is concern about the Treaty's implications for the future, such as whether we are headed toward the denucleari.ation of Europe.

I believe strongly, and I believe our Allies do as well, that it is important to distinguish between the two. We have it in our power to shape the future. The INF Treaty stands on its own as an Alliance accomplishment. The U.S. and its Allies will need to deal with future issues on their own merits. The INF Treaty, the INF process, the INF debate enhances our ability to do so; it does not lessen it.

As Secretary Carlucci cogently pointed out in these hearings, the fundamental question is whether rejection of this Treaty would contribute to NATO's political and military objectives. Would rejection make us and our allies safer, and assist us in meeting the challenges ahead? The answer is an emphatic "no."

I would like to look quickly at the immediate effects of the Treaty, and some of those concerns about the future I mentioned.

Let's keep in mind what the Treaty, in and of itself, does not do.

As mentioned previously, it does not pave the way to a de-nuclearized Europe -- or, better put, to forcing U.S. nuclear forces from Europe. Whatever the issues regarding specifics, there is solid agreement in the Alliance that deterrence is a function of both conventional and nuclear forces. There is no support in Allied governments for a de-nuclearized Europe. Nuclear weapons -- let's be clear on this, and say so -- are essential to the deterrence of any war in Europe, nuclear or conventional.

The Treaty does not de-couple the U.S. from its Allies, nor does it foreshadow a waning U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Beyond our vital ideological, political and economic national interests in and links to Europe, the more than 300,000 U.S. troops and about 4,000 nuclear weapons remaining in-theater constitute the visible expression of our Atlantic commitment.

The Treaty does not solve all of our security problems, nor was it ever meant to. It does remove a considerable threat. We did not get it for nothing, and we had to give up some systems -- some military capability. So did the Soviets and more so. Now, in light of sober and prudent assessment of our security requirements and deterrent posture, we need to make sure that we carry out the conventional and nuclear defense improvements which the Alliance had concluded were necessary with or without an INF agreement. The INF Treaty does not make these any less necessary. Also, we have for some time been looking at how the theater nuclear force posture might be adjusted in light of the security situation after implementation of the INF Agreement. Or, how best to use remaining resources. That work is ongoing with the HLG and at SHAPE and will continue.

As we look to the question of where the Alliance is going from here, we need to keep in mind the need for mutual reassurance on both sides of the Atlantic, reassurance that both America and its Allies remain commited to the fundamental principles of our partnership. We must reassure our publics that our strategy is sound and to remind them of our basic principles. It is important to put the current debate in the perspective of the constant political, economic and geo-strategic imperatives which guide us. We must also avoid slipping into a logic which feeds unhelpful impulses in Europe and North America toward the disengagement of the United States and Europe. The NATO summit in March will demonstrate the determination of the Alliance partners to ensure our cohesion, security and the peace.

The basic principles underlying this Alliance provide firm bedrock. It is worth repeating a few:

-- Our strategy for peace in freedom is based on the maintenance of NATO's strength and political cohesion as the prerequisite for addressing the most fundamental sources of difference between East and West. The underlying tensions re brought about by the unnatural division between east and west and the failure of the east to recognize that most cherished right -- individual freedom.

-- Our Alliance is a partnership of free nations for the pursuit of collective self-defense and common values. Through leadership, we build consensus.

-- The freedom and well-being of Western Europe and North America are inextricably linked. The continued presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe gives expression to our commitment.

-- We can best preserve peace by maintaining credible deterrence, which requires for the foreseeable future an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons, -- and the presence of a mix of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

OUR ALLIANCE AGENDA

On the basis of these principles the Alliance can continue to meet the military and political challenges confronting it, and to build on the impetus and lessons of the INF Treaty. We already have in place, or are developing, the building blocks for elaborating an Alliance program which will carry through the end of this Administration and into the next.

Both the INF Treaty and developments in the Soviet Union have raised the possibility of permanent, positive changes in the East-West relationship. Conclusions are premature, but we can all hope this is so. We should take advantage of every opportunity to advance agreements that are in our interest. We can't accept "good intentions" on faith; we must test them. There must be realism, coupled with a willingness to confidently exploit each opportunity to advance our interests. Certainly President Reagan's efforts with Mr. Gorbachev have been crucial in this regard. So as we are prudent and cautious, demanding Soviet positive actions instead of promises, so must we also move ahead into the post-INF era with confidence and certainty. Indeed, these very hearings and Senate ratification of the Treaty will speak volumes about the wisdom of our approach.

The Alliance faces a difficult and inter-related set of political and security issues, virtually all of which confront us independently of INF. But the Treaty is now an integral part of the framework for dealing with them. Let me mention some of the key tasks to which NATO is responding in the near term:

-- The Alliance needs to capitalize on the INF experience to put NATO's principles and objectives forward more clearly, and to build on the lessons learned. More plain speaking on the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, in preserving the peace, is called for.

-- Nuclear and conventional defense issues confront us with difficult and costly political decisions. It is hard for our publics to understand that Western security requires us to build weapons which we want never to use. The Alliance must support the modernization of its nuclear deterrent called for -- prior to the INF Treaty -- by Defense Ministers in the 1983 Montebello decision. In addition, we need to ensure that steps are taken to keep its deterrent effective and up to date. Prudent defense planning requires that we must thus examine what force adjustments should be made as a consequence of the INF Treaty to make the most effective use of our remaining nuclear arsenal. The Soviets are doing this; so must we.

Work here is underway under the aegis of Defense Ministers in NATO's High Level Group, and with the participation and input of NATO's military authorities, including General Galvin.

-- NATO needs to keep up momentum on strengthening its conventional defenses. In this connection innovative thinking and commitment from the U.S. Congress has been particularly important. NATO's Conventional Defense Improvements effort (CDI) is playing a key role in directing NATO planning machinery towards addressing the key deficiencies in NATO's conventional posture. From Congress and the Executive Branch, as well as from respected individuals like my predecessor, David Abshire, we see attempts to ensure that the Alliance makes better use of its defense resources. This is an immense, urgent and at times thankless task. It is important that as we refine thinking on how to strengthen defense and better exploit resources, we integrate this thinking into Alliance mechanisms. This requires coherent leadership and persistence.

-- The U.S. and most of its Allies will have to cope with constrained defense budgets. The issue of equitable burden sharing is always with us, and requires careful management. Our Allies are coming to look more realistically at the problems inherent in the concept of strengthening the "European Pillar" of the Alliance. A new round of consultations on better use of defense resources in ways that improve the equity of our burdens is about to begin. We all need to do more.

-- We will be seeking to maintain a consensus on Alliance and U.S. approaches to arms control that are consistent with U.S. and Alliance security interests, and politically viable among Allied publics. As a fundamental proposition, we seek only arms control agreements which further our security interests. Our priorities are 50% reductions in START, to address the conventional imbalance (through both negotiation and modernization), and a global, verifiable world-wide ban on CW. The Alliance is exploring how better to articulate the fundamentals of its overall concept of arms control, as mandated by NATO foreign Ministers at the June, 1987 Reykjavik ministerial.

-- The Allies have for some time been hard at work on developing and articulating a political definition of our conventional stability objectives. We are putting together the specifics of a Western conventional arms control proposal aimed at blunting the Warsaw Pact's threatening and destabilizing offensive capabilities through large, asymmetrical Soviet reductions, coupled with a stringent verification regime and increased transparency. In anticipation of these prospective negotiations on enhancing Europe, we are refining and elaborating our political vision of the fundamental requirements for stability and enhanced security: articulating the root causes of instability in Europe. Our purpose in the conventional stability negotiations is not to seek reductions as an end in themselves, but to address the fundamental causes of instability. This activity is a central part of our effort to fill out the post-INF agenda, by addressing the critical aspect of the Soviet military posture which is at the heart of our security concerns in the Alliance. Of course, the imperative to address the Soviet conventional preponderance in Europe exists independently of the INF Treaty. And this preponderance, Alliance publics must be told, cannot be rectified primarily through arms control. They must be reminded of the lessons of the INF negotiation: military strength and political solidarity achieve results. Arms control is a derivative of defense, and not vice versa. Our publics must also be told that progress -- or even parity in conventional forces -- will not invalidate the continuing need for nuclear deterence.

-- While seeking to engage the Soviets in negotiations on conventional stability at lower levels of Soviet forces, the Alliance is also engaged in developing its approach to a resumption of the CDE negotiations on confidence building measures. This must take into account and assess both the benefits and new problems that greater transparency can pose for the West.

-- The Vienna CSCE review meeting is a particularly important element in our efforts to break down the division of Europe and to address the fundamental issues which divide East from West. It is here, and in the forthcoming conventional stability talks, that we will test the Soviet approach to Europe, on the basis of our values and objectives. Promises or signals from the East must not be allowed to substitute for concrete steps in the CSCE process -- especially in the area of human rights.

LONGER TERM CHALLENGES

So, the Alliance is actively engaged in dealing with the issues which we see abroad in the near term. The complexity of bringing together Alliance efforts to meet these tasks is daunting enough, but in a longer-term optic, we also see in the issues before us part of the larger, systemic challenges facing the U.S. and NATO in the decades ahead.

-- How should the economic dimension of our security be defined? How can we maximize the returns from our defense expenditures?

-- How do we justify nuclear deterrence to our publics, and respond to Soviet overtures seeking to test our determination to keep the world safe from any warfare, nuclear or conventional?

-- What will be the balance between offense and defense in our approach to security?

-- How can conventional arms control and force improvements be coordinated? What do we mean by "stability"?

-- What do we seek by way of "improved" relations with the Soviet Union? Can we influence the course of events in the USSR?

-- What is the desirable balance in the Atlantic partnership between the U.S. and its Allies?

OUR STRATEGY

Answers neither to these questions, nor to the shorter term issues, will be revealed overnight. They will be found, incrementally and by hard work, by the development of agreed objectives and processes within the Alliance. This is under way. By focusing on the values and principles of our free and open societies, and by recalling the underpinnings of the Transatlantic Partnership, we stand the best chance of preserving our concept of security.

Our strategy is working. Its development and implementation, not to mention articulation, may not be perfect -- or even tidy at times. But it is flexible and dynamic. Every once in a while we should look at what we have achieved over the longer term. Our gains, and ability to react to changing circumstances, are considerable. We should avoid the temptation to press for quick or dramatic fixes because of frustration that all is not perfect.

NATO's political and military strategy cannot be dictated by particular governments, editorialists, respected analysts or wise men. It is not handed down; free societies don't work that way. Rather it is developed by informed debate, by hearings such as these, by leadership, and by the determination of sovereign allies to unite in pursuit of common objectives.

Within the Alliance we are are engaged in reviewing our options and defining practical ways to address our requirements. In the North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee, in our discussions of NATO's arms control concept, in NATO's High Level Group and Special Consultative Group, in the High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control, in the Defense planning process and in countless other fora we are refining the implementation of our strategy. Again, work is on-going.

In 1989 we will observe the 40th anniversary of NATO. We will enter the fifth decade of the most successful and free Alliance in modern times, if not in history. Our partnership was devised by far-sighted individuals to restore order and secure the peace in a world torn by warfare and dictatorship. In the past, history's answer to the breakdown of order has been to turn to authoritarianism, control, and more strife. In the late forties, America and its Allies had the vision to ensure that this time, our answer would be democracy and freedom. Our task is to pursue this legacy into the coming decades.

Sadly, much remains to be done. While we have secured the blessings of several generations of peace for our peoples, a third of Europe is still denied self-determination and freedom of expression. In the rest of the world, the challenges to the democratic order are as important as those which faced us in 1945. As it was then, the answer today is our vision, based on the strategy and principles and values which have served us so well.

The INF Treaty is part of that vision of a more stable world, with fewer weapons and greater freedom. It is a limited and partial step, to be sure. But as this nation's representative to NATO, I can assure you it is an important step in helping to spur our sense of vision forward into the 21st century.

In this spirit, I want to return to the central premise of our discussions, in light of the look ahead we've just taken. Does the INF Treaty before you serve the interests of the U.S. and the Alliance in meeting these challenges? The answer is a resounding "yes." Would rejection or amendment serve U.S. and Alliance interests even better? The answer, unequivocally, is "no".

I hope this Committee and the full Senate will pronounce favorably on this Treaty and soon. Your advice and consent, as well as your observations and reactions, will be important in shaping the way ahead. Your demonstration of commitment to the Transatlantic Partnership and our political and military unity will play an important role in proving, as we must, to our publics and the East, that the Alliance is firm and united, and that the United States is fully commited to our Allies and European security -- not just for the moment -- but over the long haul. Aside from the common bond of common values and common beliefs, there is the most rudimentary reason to do so: it is in our own security interest.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate, I am delighted to be with you today to present my views -- those of a military commander in Europe -- on the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

These hearings come at an important time for the Alliance, a time when many challenges are looming on the horizon. To be sure, few of NATO's nearly forty years have been tranquil. The Alliance has endured a variety of challenges since it was created in 1949. It resisted Soviet efforts to intimidate the West on a number of occasions, most notably those involving Berlin in 1949 (the Berlin blockade was lifted a month after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty) and again in 1961. More recently, NATO members refused to be intimidated by Soviet efforts to prevent deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

There has also been no shortage of intra-Alliance crises: Suez in 1956, the French withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1966, and the continuing dispute over Cyprus are but three of these. In addition, the member nations have wrestled over virtually every issue central to the trans-Atlantic partnership, including questions of Alliance strategy, the proper course of relations with the East, the amount that member-nations should contribute to the collective defense, Alliance involvement in out-of-area issues, and the magnitude of the Soviet challenge.

Through all of this, however, NATO has endured, defying those who have prophesied its impending doom. Indeed, NATO has not only survived, it has now outlasted all multilateral peacetime Alliances in modern history. For almost four decades, the sense of common purpose, the perceived benefits of collective security, and the ominous Soviet presence in Eastern Europe have kept NATO intact.

Now the Alliance is being confronted by new challenges, and many of them seem to be converging simultaneously:

* Historically unprecedented U.S. fiscal and trade deficits, which are prompting America to reexamine its role in the world and in the trans-Atlantic partnership.

* Adverse demographic trends in many NATO nations that will result in a 12.4 percent decrease in the number of draft-age males in NATO's sixteen nations by the year 2000 -- by which time the Warsaw Pact is expected to have registered a 15.2 percent gain -- with the hardest hit being the Federal Republic of Germany, whose draft-age population will fall by 42% between 1987 and 2000, Italy, which will experience a 30% decline, and the United Kingdom, which will suffer a 25% drop.

* The emergence of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, whose introduction of domestic reform in the USSR and reassuring foreign policy rhetoric have prompted some Western leaders to call for reassessment of the Soviet challenge.

* Ever increasing weapons system costs and slow economic growth in many NATO nations, which have led to relatively contentious guns versus butter debates.

However, the most immediate challenge ahead will be that of adapting to the changes brought about by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This agreement is viewed favorably by the nations of the Alliance, and it should, in my view, be ratified; it has many features that will be beneficial to the West. But it also poses some risks. Those risks are worth taking, but the United States and the other members of NATO will have to take steps to deal with them to ensure that the security of the West is maintained.

The INF Treaty

The INF Treaty has a number of positive points. It will eliminate the Soviet SS-20 missile -- with its triple warhead capability -- as well as the SS-4 and SS-5, and will prevent deployment of the new Soviet ground-launched cruise missile altogether. The destruction of the SS-12s and SS-23s -- capable of carrying conventional and chemical as well as nuclear warheads -- will mean that wartime reinforcement of my command from North America will be less threatened. And although the Treaty will by no means eliminate the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, Soviet flexibility will be reduced. Another positive aspect of the Treaty is its precedent-setting principle of asymmetric reductions -- the Soviet Union will destroy deployed missiles capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as could be carried by the deployed American systems. Additionally, the agreement includes the most extensive verification measures ever accepted by the USSR. The provision for on-site inspection will not only provide means to detect Soviet Treaty violations, it will also serve as a useful model for future negotiations and complement the on-site inspection provisions of the confidence-building measures negotiated in 1986 at Stockholm.

Most important, however, the INF Treaty represents the first negotiated reversal of the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons, and thus offers grounds for hope that we can achieve greater security and a more stable relationship at a lower level of armaments. But in our pursuit of arms reductions, our objective must be greater security, not merely reductions for their own sake.

There are some risks if the Soviets succeed in generating a euphoria that stops NATO's ongoing process of modernization of weapons and equipment, or if the Treaty leads to a withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Europe, or if the Soviets come to believe that NATO is somehow less cohesive and less committed to making the sacrifices necessary for defense. However, I believe we can and will avoid these disadvantages, and I am convinced that the Treaty should be ratified. To put it another way, if military modernization proceeds as currently planned, NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defense will remain viable and I will still be able to carry out my mission of deterrence and defense.

The Soviet Challenge

But whom are we seeking to deter and what are we preparing to defend against? A number of observers have contended that the USSR is no longer a threat to the security of the West, or that even if the Soviets have not give up their geopolitical ambitions, that their forces and those of our Allies are not substantially larger than those of NATO. I do not subscribe to that school of thought. Despite the conciliatory rhetoric of the Kremlin, there has been no decrease in the conventional forces facing Europe, nor has there been any slowdown in the rate of Soviet military modernization. To the contrary, in the last five years the Soviet Union has outproduced the United States more than 2 to 1 in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, 4 to 1 in artillery, and 1.3 to 1 in fighter aircraft. Indeed, the USSR alone has outproduced all the NATO nations together in every major category of ground weapons system over the past three years. The reality is that if we look at the conventional face-off in Europe, NATO is currently outnumbered roughly 3 to 1 in tanks and artillery, and 2 to 1 in combat aircraft. Warsaw Pact force levels far exceed reasonable requirements for defense, yet there is no sign of slackening in the Pact's efforts to build its military power: perestroika and glasnost do not seem to apply to the Soviet military.

The Soviets have done more than merely stress quantity; they have also made great strides in improving the quality of their equipment, thereby eroding the traditional advantages the West previously has enjoyed in these areas. In the air, new Soviet fighters (the MIG-29 and SU-27) are equipped with look-down shoot-down radars and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. They are controlled by a newly deployed airborne early warning aircraft. On the ground, NATO's qualitative advantages in anti-armor systems have been virtually eliminated in some areas. Well over 1800 of the new T-80 tank have been deployed in Eastern Europe. These tanks have a 125mm main gun, a laser range-finder, and special armor that reduces the effectiveness of NATO's anti-tank weapons. And recently, there have been reports that a successor to the T-80, with improved armor and other advances, is being fielded. Older Soviet tanks and armored fighting vehicles are being fitted with reactive armor, providing increased protection against chemical energy warheads. This is of particular concern because of our heavy reliance on anti-tank guided missiles to offset Soviet tank superiority. New Soviet submarines are putting to sea -- submarines that are quieter and faster than before and thus more difficult to locate and counter. And the fitting out of the 65,000 ton aircraft carrier **Leonid Brezhnev** continues, as does construction of the second carrier of this class.

Perhaps most disturbing of all, the Soviets have continued to build their capability to conduct offensive operations. In the past decade we have seen the development of doctrine, organizations, and equipment designed to enhance the USSR's ability to conduct rapid, sustained attacks over long distances with large units. The formation of new high-level forward headquarters, creation of Operational Maneuver Groups (large, highly mobile, self-contained armor units designed for deep penetrations), the stockpiling of 60-90 days of fuel and ammunition, the continuing high density of Warsaw Pact tank deployments near the inter-German border, and the forward basing in Eastern Europe of a new air-superiority fighter (Fulcrum), a new long-range attack aircraft (Fencer), and a new close air support aircraft (Frogfoot) have all contributed to the Soviet capability to conduct massive offensive operations on short notice.

In sum, in light of the prevailing military imbalance, particularly in conventional forces, we should be careful not to equate the rather delphic indications of greater Soviet domestic reorganization and openness with a true and lasting diminution of

Moscow's geopolitical aggressiveness or with a change in the Soviet military. Until we see a shift from the offensive orientation of Soviet Warsaw Pact doctrine and organization, we must question the overall aims of our adversaries.

The Need for Continued Modernization

The North Atlantic Alliance must meet the Soviet military challenge with modernization of NATO's military forces; in a world in which rapid technological changes can make a big difference in capabilites, there is no alternative. This updating of our weapons systems is fully consistent with the Treaty and is permitted by the INF accord. It is the completion of our long-standing NATO plans to keep our forces current -- plans that, in their details, stem from the modernization study of 1978 and the meeting of NATO's defense ministers at Montebello in 1983, which mandated the subsequent SHAPE nuclear weapons requirements study of 1985. Given the fact that Soviet modernization has shown no sign of slackening, there is no choice in this technological age when it comes to keeping up with the latest developments -- we have to run fast just to stay even.

NATO Strategy

NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defense seeks to dissuade aggression by posing three general types of response: direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response. Direct defense seeks to defeat aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight, using the means chosen by the aggressor to place the burden of escalation on him. Deliberate escalation strives to defeat aggression by deliberately raising, in a controlled manner, the scope and intensity of combat, making the cost and risk disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives, and the threat of nuclear response progressively more imminent. Deliberate escalation is aimed at weakening the enemy's will to continue the conflict and includes the possibility of Alliance first use of nuclear weapons. General nuclear response remains the ultimate deterrent and includes strategic nuclear strikes designed to destroy an enemy's capacity and will to continue the war.

Flexible response and forward defense is the correct strategy for NATO; it is the approach that most appropriately takes into account the mix of Alliance political and military realities. One of those realities is that NATO must defend well forward. In addition to the obvious political considerations, there are sound military grounds for starting our defense as close to the border as possible. Principal among them is the fact that we lack the depth to carry out a more traditional strategy, in which a defender facing a numerically superior force trades space for the time needed to ascertain the nature of the attack, wear down the attacker, and organize a counterattack. Forward defense means to the Soviets that any aggression will be met immediately by NATO forces defending every inch of Western soil, and seeks to minimize the burden of war on the populations of NATO's front line states.

Since its adoption in 1967, flexible response has accommodated numerous changes in our equipment and force structure -- and in those of our adversary. For flexible response to remain viable, however, it must be supported by a balanced triad of conventional, theater-based nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. In other words, to deter war -- and deterrence of war is my overriding objective -- NATO must possess a credible capability for effective military response across the full spectrum of conflict.

Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic nuclear forces are the cornerstone of NATO's strategy of flexible response and the basis of our capability at the ultimate level of combat power. Over the course of the past decade the United States and the United Kingdom have pursued vigorous programs of strategic nuclear modernization designed to maintain a secure and effective strategic deterrent. The continuation of these programs is essential to maintaining the vitality of the strategic leg of the NATO triad. Even if we are able to obtain an agreement for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, essential updating of our force should continue as required.

Theater-based Nuclear Forces: For flexible response to be viable, NATO must be able to implement controlled escalation through the selective employment of theater-based nuclear weapons. For the nuclear option to be credible, these forces must present a wide range of options and be broadly based throughout Allied Command Europe in order to show the unity of our collective effort, to cover any eventuality, and to deny scope for preemptive strike calculations by our adversary. We must also possess sufficient capabilities to make the Soviets uncertain as to the precise nature of NATO's response to aggression.

Chemical Defenses: To deter Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons, NATO needs to have a modern retaliatory capability and effective defenses against their use by our opponent -- areas in which the Alliance has been deficient. The Alliance has, however, made progress toward reaching an acceptable defensive posture, and recently the United States embarked on a program to modernize NATO's retaliatory stockpile.

The United States is the only NATO country that maintains chemical weapons for employment by Allied Command Europe. The U.S. unilaterally halted its chemical weapons production in 1969. Our usable stocks of chemical munitions are not only relatively small compared to the size of the Soviet stockpile, they are also becoming increasingly obsolete and limited in application, particularly with regard to a survivable deep-strike capability.

This situation and the lack of progress in chemical arms control prompted the United States, with NATO's support, to begin manufacturing modern binary chemical weapons. Production commenced in December 1987 with assembly of artillery shells, and will subsequently extend to the BIGEYE bomb, a chemical round for the multiple launch rocket system, and a new deep-strike standoff system. To ensure that the chemical stockpile does not exceed the minimum essential level, the modernization plans include provisions for the destruction of the unitary stockpile in conjunction with the production of binary weapons.

Just as NATO's demonstration of determination in deploying P-IIs and GLCMs led to an agreement eliminating SS-20s, we hope that through our deployment of binary chemical weapons we can stimulate progress in negotiations for a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. In lieu of such an agreement, NATO must maintain a modern retaliatory capability.

Conventional Forces: NATO has never had sufficient conventional military capabilities for stand alone deterrence; instead the Alliance has tended to rely heavily on nuclear weapons, even though the Soviets achieved parity with the West in nuclear weapons and continued to build ever-stronger conventional forces.

We do not need to match the Warsaw Pact man for man or tank for tank. What we do need is a conventional capability strong enough to frustrate aggression and increase the time before nuclear weapons would have to be used. Such a capability would preclude hasty decisions to use nuclear weapons and enhance the flexibility of NATO's strategy of flexible response. Deterrence would be more credible because Soviet planners could not be sure of gaining their attack objectives so swiftly that NATO would be unable to consider the use of nuclear weapons. Conventional improvements would also demonstrate the collective will of Alliance members to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure Western security, thereby adding to the credibility of NATO's overall deterrent posture. Finally, conventional enhancements would bolster the self-confidence of NATO nations and ensure that the Soviet Union remains unable to intimidate or coerce Western Europe in order to obtain political, economic, or military concessions.

The Continuing Importance of Europe

Some Americans have maintained that we should not be as concerned with the security of Europe as we have in the past. They have contended that the magnitude of the United States military commitment to Europe should be reduced, that a free and prosperous Western Europe is becoming less important to the United States than it used to be.

Most of us, however, know that the United States' contribution to the defense of NATO Europe is not an act of charity, nor is it a luxury. Aside from the direct defense of the United States and the North American land mass, the stability of Western Europe remains America's highest priority. In this group of powerful, industrial, highly developed democratic nations lies the future security and prosperity of the West -- and the support for democracy worldwide. It is for this reason that we Americans sacrificed so much to support the postwar recovery of Western Europe.

That geo-strategic imperative which has guided America's foreign policy since WWII -- a policy of containment -- remains valid: we must continue to ensure that a hostile state is never able to dominate the Eurasian landmass and capture the military and industrial potential of Western Europe. Were a government antithetical to U.S. interests to do so, the global balance of power would shift unfavorably and our security would be jeopardized. Twice this century the United States went to war to prevent this from happening. We should be careful not to undermine the arrangements that have made such actions unnecessary since 1945. In an era of enormously powerful conventional and nuclear weapons, the potential costs of conflict in Europe are unimaginable.

In terms of global economic importance, NATO Europe today ranks just behind the United States, accounting for 22% of the gross world product in 1986, while the U.S. economy equated to 25%, the Soviet Union 14%, and Japan 9%. Of great significance also is that 46% of America's overseas investment -- over $105 billion -- is in Western Europe. Additionally, European members of the Alliance continue to give more official assistance to developing countries than does the U.S.

Beyond its tremendous economic importance, Europe also occupies a critical geostrategic location, controlling three key maritime choke points that would be crucial in the event of war: the Turkish straits, that control passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean; the Danish straits, through which shipping from the Baltic must pass to reach the North Sea; and Norway's North Cape, past which ships of the Soviet Union's large northern fleet have to sail enroute to the North Atlantic. Loss of friendly control of these vital points would be a serious reverse for American security policy.

Strong historic and cultural ties continue to bind Europe and the United States together as well. Furthermore, many of the world's most advanced democracies fly their flag at NATO headquarters outside Brussels. These Allies believe in the same principles that we hold dear: pluralism, free enterprise, rule of law, minority rights, market economics, self-determination, and freedom. Their survival is important to America; our way of life could not flourish in a world that did not contain such nations.

In short, Europe remains of singular importance in the United States' security calculations, and preserving the NATO Alliance should remain the cornerstone of American foreign policy. We should continue to link free Europe's security to that of the United States; we are part of the same past and our future is a shared destiny.

Burdensharing

But are our European Allies doing their fair share in helping provide for the defense of NATO? No single set of indicators can tell the whole story. It is true that the European members of NATO as a whole do not spend as large a percentage of their gross national product on defense as the U.S. does. I believe they should spend more, and I have made this clear with all the allied nations in formal discussions on force goals, as well as at other times. But, while defense spending statistics can provide an indication of national contributions, they are not adequate alone to determine whether a nation is doing its fair share. We should look not just at how much a nation spends, but at what it gets for its money and at the non-quantifiable burdens it bears for the Alliance as well.

Even spending figures contain some surprises, however. If one looks at defense expenditures since 1971, one finds that, contrary to the perception of Europe as free-rider, only three countries -- Denmark, Portugal, and the United Kingdom -- did not exceed the United States in average annual defense budget growth. To be sure, American defense budgets grew very substantially from 1979 through 1986, far more so than did European budgets. If we take a longer view, however, we find that overall U.S. defense budget growth from 1971 to 1985 was only about one percent in real terms. During the same period, NATO budgets on average increased nearly two percent. At present the United States may be embarking on another period of defense budget cuts.

In 1987, five Allies surpassed the 3% real growth in defense spending goal -- Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey; the U.S. increase was only .03%. And for the period 1988-1992, several nations predict growth rates much higher than those anticipated by the United States.

Other figures also indicate a level of European burdensharing that is different from the stereotypical view held by many Americans. Today, of the 2.6 million men on active duty in Europe, the Europeans contribute 2.3 million. In terms of equipment, the Europeans provide 80% of the combat aircraft, 80% of the tanks, and 70% of the fighting ships. Of the 14 million men in the Alliance who could be mobilized for war, the Europeans would provide 10 million. Even after 30 days of mobilization, 75% of the ground forces, 50% of the air forces, and 30% of the naval forces would be European.

Of great importance to any discussion of burdensharing are those national contributions that are not quantifiable yet are still vitally important to the Alliance. We should not forget, for example, the political and economic costs involved in the stationing of large numbers of allied troops in one's country. The cost of providing military bases and training areas also is not reflected in defense spending statistics, nor is the conduct of military exercises in densely populated European nations, which, beyond maneuver damage, impose many costs on the countries involved.

Germany provides a striking example of a country which makes significant contributions to the collective defense that are not reflected in many burdensharing statistics. The Federal Republic, a country the size of Oregon, with a population of 61 million (imagine about 1/4 of the American population, all living in Oregon), has 400,000 allied military personnel -- who are accompanied by 325,000 dependents -- stationed on its soil. This is in addition, of course, to Germany's own nearly 500,000 active duty service members. To support the Allied contingents, the Federal Republic places at their disposal numerous military installations, training areas, and housing units -- all free of charge. The real estate provided alone is worth over 30 billion dollars. Germany also hosts a great number of military maneuvers designed to improve the readiness of NATO forces. Well over 5,000 exercises take place annually, with some 70 of them involving more than 2,000 soldiers. Additionally, each year 580,000 military aircraft flights are conducted, 110,000 of which include low-level flying.

Another item that is not reflected in defense expenditures is the provision by our European Allies of both peacetime and wartime host nation support that reduces the cost to the U.S. in terms of money, manpower, and materiel. Besides the rent-free bases already mentioned, other peacetime arrangements include: use of joint installations where infrastructure is provided by the host nation; provision of storage sites for ammunition, fuel, and prepositioned equipment; and domestic infrastructure improvements such as roads, ports, and airfields in anticipation of requirements during an emergency. Wartime host nation support would be even more substantial. The European Allies would operate co-located bases for reinforcing aircraft and would provide naval facilities. Host nations would provide organized military and civilian units for combat service support. Germany, for example, has plans to employ 93,000 military personnel in wartime logistics functions to support U.S. forces.

There are other contributions to the common defense that are often overlooked. German economic assistance and payments for the support of the garrison in Berlin are not considered defense expenditures and thus are not reflected in NATO statistics although they do contribute to Alliance defense efforts. Eleven Allied nations provide economic and military assistance to Turkey, Greece, and Portugal. And many Allies have provided assistance to Western defense outside the NATO area. This support has been more substantial than is frequently recognized. Five NATO nations (Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) have joined the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, and Germany moved ships to the Mediterranean to assume some of the NATO missions there during the operations in the Gulf. In 1984, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands responded to a request by the Red Sea littoral states to clear the Gulf of Suez of terrorist mines. In 1983, the same nations, less the Netherlands, joined the U.S. in sending contingents to Beirut at the request of the Lebanese government. And on other occasions, several European nations have made contributions, not only to the Multinational Force and Observers patrolling the Sinai, but to United Nations peacekeeping forces throughout the world.

In sum, the European Allies make a substantial contribution to the collective defense, more than they are often given credit for. They do need to do more, and not just in terms of spending. We will all have to strive for a more coherent approach to virtually all aspects of the common defense -- especially in our conduct of research and development and armaments production. But, given the global interests of the United States, it is likely that our defense spending levels will always exceed those of our more regionally-oriented Allies. Over and above the recognition that the defense of Western Europe is in fact the defense of the United States, there is another point I believe we all understand: the U.S. is the acknowledged leader of the Western world; there are costs associated with that leadership.

The U.S. Action Agenda

In my view, the United States should take a number of actions in the years ahead. First, I believe the Senate should ratify the INF Treaty. There are, as I noted earlier, risks involved with the agreement, as there are any time military capabilities are altered. I am confident that the Alliance can deal with those risks. I am less confident that NATO could adjust to non-ratification of the Treaty. The agreement has undeniable public support throughout the Alliance; any U.S. steps at this stage that threatened to imperil it could gravely undermine backing for NATO and damage Alliance solidarity. That is an important concern to me as a commander, since it would harm the cohesion of NATO and the fighting will of my command. Morale and collective will are vital elements of our ability to fight, and indeed of NATO's ability to deter war as well. As Napoleon observed, in battle the moral is to the material as three is to one.

Second, America should maintain its present level of forward deployed forces in Europe. Sizable U.S. withdrawals might be taken by our European Allies as indicating a reduction in the U.S. commitment to NATO, or as reflecting an American conviction that the Soviet challenge to Western Europe was diminished. Neither perception would be accurate and, again, Alliance cohesion would suffer as a result.

U.S. forward deployments are also very important given the prospect of conventional arms talks. Unilateral reductions of American troops would indicate to the Soviet Union that there will be little need for conventional negotiations to achieve reductions in the U.S. forces forward deployed in the theater. If we are serious about achieving cuts in the Soviet forces facing NATO -- and I believe we should be -- we will need the bargaining leverage that comes from continuing our current deployments in Western Europe.

Third, the United States needs to follow through with the modernization of its theater-based nuclear forces to ensure that NATO continues to have a credible, varied, and European-based mix of both short and long-range nuclear forces. These forces must be capable of holding at risk massed troops on the battlefield and able to strike militarily significant targets throughout the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. To meet this requirement the United States should press forward with several already planned initiatives during the period that the Pershing and cruise missiles are withdrawn. Of primary importance will be the need to make the improvements, in accordance with earlier agreements, to enhance America's nuclear-capable aircraft. We should develop a standoff air-to-ground nuclear missile for these aircraft. We should increase aircraft survivability through the construction of more aircraft shelters and though other active and passive defensive measures at our air bases. And we should improve aircraft penetrability through the upgrading of avionics and electronic warfare equipment.

It would be unwise, however, to rely completely on our nuclear capable aircraft. Were we to do so, our adversary would be able to concentrate more exclusively than before on stopping these aircraft. Thus the Warsaw Pact should also be confronted with other types of delivery systems. In particular, we should replace the Lance ballistic missile and improve the capabilities of our nuclear artillery. For the United States to pursue these programs, Congress should lift the restrictions on the overall number of modernized artillery munitions and on the use of the Army tactical missile system as a dual-capable follow-on to Lance.

In addition to the development of these systems, some restructuring of the stockpile in Europe may be necessary. With the removal of the Pershing and cruise missiles, we will be taking some stones out of the defensive wall. As they are removed, we may need to rearrange the stones that will be left. The Soviets will certainly be doing the same thing. In fact, a military leader would be derelict in his duty if he did not seek to do the best possible with the military assets that are provided to him.

A nuclear force containing the modern systems I have described, systems that have been long been recognized as needed by the Alliance, would maintain target coverage for selective use while continuing to provide widespread NATO nation participation and the sharing of burdens and risks. Their presence would also help prevent any perception that the linkage between NATO's nuclear forces in Europe and the strategic nuclear forces of the United States has been altered.

Fourth, the United States should maintain the momentum of its conventional force modernization and continue development of its chemical warfare retaliatory capability. In the conventional field, it is particularly important that we make the Follow-on Forces Attack concept an operational reality. The United States has an advantage over the Soviet Union in the technologies needed for FOFA, and we should seek to exploit them. Priority should be given to developing an accurate, responsive surveillance and targeting system, to a command, control, communications, and intelligence system capable of collecting, fusing, and disseminating intelligence and targeting information in a rapid and secure manner, and to improvements in both air and ground delivered systems.

Of course, new hardware is not enough. We must also work to be able to meet the U.S. commitment to reinforce NATO. We cannot currently do so because of continuing shortages in a number of interrelated areas: readiness and availability of support units; POMCUS fill; strategic lift; theater war reserve stocks of preferred munitions, equipment, spare parts, and medical supplies; availability of warehousing to support prepositioning and other theater storage programs; and host nation support. Each of these items must be addressed. Because they are so closely related, efforts to make improvements in one area often yield true dividends only if accompanied by progress in others. Increases in our POMCUS stocks, for example, must be accompanied by increases in warehouse space necessary to store those stocks. On the other hand, greater POMCUS fill can decrease our need for strategic lift that would otherwise be needed to carry equipment from the United States. In short, it is not efficient to concentrate on capabilities in one or two areas while neglecting the others.

Fifth, we should pursue conventional and chemical arms control. We could, for example, redress the conventional imbalance without spending great sums if the Soviets would agree to verifiable conventional force reductions to parity. Conventional arms control may hold promise if Mr. Gorbachev means what he has said about being willing to accept deep asymmetrical cuts in conventional forces to reach equality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And equality -- that takes into account the asymmetries of the two alliances -- should be our goal. We should be wary of proposals that do not achieve that objective: small reductions, for example, would be largely symbolic and would have little effect on the military imbalance in Europe. Their pursuit would merely divert our negotiators from what we should seek: common ceilings in the weapons systems that cause us the most concern -- tanks, artillery, and possibly, infantry fighting vehicles. Now is the time to find out whether Mr. Gorbachev is serious or not. An agreement that achieves conventional parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be a major step forward in achieving greater security for the West and making the world a safer place in which to live.

As we seek progress in conventional arms control, we should remember the lesson of the INF negotiations. As the members of this committee know, the Soviets returned to the negotiating table only when they became convinced that the NATO nations were unified in their decision to deploy the PIIs and GLCMs, and determined to carry it out. The Soviets have only recently voiced an interest in negotiations on chemical weapons. This seems to have been more the result of recent American steps to produce a binary chemical round than of changes in Soviet intentions. We will need to display similar determination and unity in the conventional field if we are to achieve meaningful arms control in that area as well.

From the perspective of the European theater, conventional arms control should be the top priority. But even if conventional parity is achieved -- an accomplishment that will require difficult negotiating, if it proves possible at all -- it is likely that we will still need to maintain an Alliance nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons have preserved peace in Europe for more than four decades, whereas conventional defenses prior to the nuclear age were often unable to dissuade would-be aggressors. Conventional deterrence failed in 1939, in 1914, in 1870, and on many earlier occasions as well. History seems to indicate that desires for a nuclear-free Europe are incompatible with the goal of a war-free Europe.

In the area of short range nuclear weapons; that is, in the ranges under the Treaty's lower limit of 500 kilometers, we should maintain our current capabilities and continue with earlier plans for modernization. Withdrawal of either the Lance missile or nuclear artillery rounds, for example, might be misperceived by the USSR as a weakening of the American commitment to use nuclear weapons in situations where U.S. territory is not threatened. Such a perception would undermine deterrence. Furthermore, loss of Lance -- currently deployed by six NATO nations -- would mean removal of another element of nuclear burden-sharing and would allow the Soviets to focus largely on stopping our nuclear capable aircraft, rather than having to worry about theater-based missiles as well. And elimination of nuclear artillery warheads would mean that the adversary could mass with less trepidation as he approaches the battle area.

Conclusion

Deterrence is more than just a product of tangible military assets. In a larger sense it stems from the collective willingness to make the sacrifices necessary to preserve Western security and freedom. This formula has been successful throughout the 39 years of NATO's existence -- an unprecedented period of peace in Europe.

The burdens of alliance have not always been easy to bear. The costs of maintaining our capabilities for deterrence and defense have been heavy; that NATO's nations continue to shoulder them is a tribute to our shared appreciation of democracy and freedom. This common bond distinguishes NATO -- a voluntary partnership of 16 sovereign nations -- from the Warsaw Pact, where the only vote that counts is cast by the Soviet Union, and where those who have deviated from the Kremlin line have in the past been reined in by Soviet military action.

Just as we share basic values, all NATO nations share a fundamental stake in the security of an independent and prosperous Atlantic community. We demonstrate recognition of this fact in a military sense when we develop a broad multinational capacity to act -- through, for example, the basing of nuclear-capable missiles, aircraft, and artillery in many different nations of the Alliance. Such manifestations of Alliance unity are crucial to the continuing success of NATO, for by sharing together the burdens and risks we display a strong, credible deterrent of war. And that is our overriding objective.

We cannot hope that the competition between East and West will go away; what we need to do is ensure it does not become war. If Allied Command Europe ever has to fight in defense of the West it will be ready, but my primary mission is deterrence. The strength of NATO's military forces and the unity of the Alliance will remain the basic and indispensable ingredients in the accomplishment of that mission. In being militarily prepared -- well-armed and vigilant -- we preserve that which is of the very highest value to us: peace with freedom.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. CARL E. VUONO

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TODAY TO EXPRESS MY SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE MILITARY STRATEGIES. I WILL ALSO ADDRESS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY FOR THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO INSURE THAT THE ALLIANCE CAN CONTINUE TO EXECUTE ITS STRATEGY AND ACHIEVE ITS SECURITY OBJECTIVES.

THE ARMY AND THE OTHER SERVICES HAVE THE MISSION OF MAINTAINING THE COMBAT READY FORCES NECESSARY TO FULFILL OUR SECURITY OBJECTIVES. IN ACCOMPLISHING THAT MISSION IN THE CASE OF NATO, THE ARMY'S PROGRAMS AND FORCES AIM TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, GENERAL GALVIN. AS THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE AND COMMANDER OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, HE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS, HAS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXECUTING OUR ALLIANCE MILITARY STRATEGY.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES ARE ULTIMATELY DERIVED FROM NATIONAL INTERESTS, NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE SECURITY OBJECTIVES, AND THE THREAT TO THOSE INTERESTS.

FOR OVER FOUR DECADES, THE MOST DANGEROUS CHALLENGE TO THOSE INTERESTS HAS BEEN THE MILITARY POWER OF THE SOVIET UNION. ALTHOUGH THE USSR HAS BECOME A GLOBAL POWER SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, IT CONTINUES TO ACCORD ITS HIGHEST EXTERNAL MILITARY PRIORITY TO CENTRAL EUROPE.

A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF U.S. SECURITY POLICY THROUGHOUT THIS CENTURY REMAINS THE CONVICTION THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS DEMAND THAT NO HOSTILE STATE DOMINATE REGIONS OR GROUPS OF STATES VITAL TO OUR INTERESTS. THIS CONVICTION WAS CEMENTED BY THE EXPERIENCES OF TWO WORLD WARS, THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, AND THE COMMITMENT TO PROTECT COLLECTIVE SECURITY WITH CONVENTIONAL, NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCES.

ALSO ENDURING IS NATO'S STRATEGY, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN. DETERRENCE DEMANDS ROBUST ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, WITH THE NUCLEAR LEGS OF THE TRIAD BEING THE ULTIMATE GUARANTEE OF NATO SECURITY. WHILE A CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE IS THE PREFERRED OPTION IN THE EVENT THAT DETERRENCE FAILS, NATO'S STRATEGY ALSO REQUIRES THE MAINTENANCE OF CAPABILITIES TO EXECUTE A RANGE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS TO DEFEAT AN ATTACK OR CAUSE AN ENEMY TO CEASE HIS AGGRESSION.

DETERRENCE DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON FORCE CAPABILITIES, BUT ALSO ON WARSAW PACT PERCEPTIONS OF NATO'S WILL TO EXECUTE THE STRATEGY, WHICH IN TURN REQUIRES MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG AND HEALTHY TRANSATLANTIC BOND. ALLIANCE COHESION IS SUSTAINED BY MANY

FACTORS, BUT THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL U.S. COMBAT FORCES ON THE CONTINENT IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR. WE SHOULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE BURDEN WE BEAR RELATIVE TO OUR ALLIES IN TERMS OF OUR IN-THEATER FORWARD DEFENSE FORCES, NOR SHOULD WE UNDERESTIMATE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THOSE U.S. FORCES. THE DETERRENT VALUE OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS, TACTICAL AIR WINGS, AND NATO-COMMITTED MARITIME FORCES IS A PRODUCT NOT ONLY OF THEIR VERY SUBSTANTIAL WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES, BUT IS MULTIPLIED MANY FOLD BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE AMERICAN. ALTHOUGH OUR REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY IS VITAL, FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES PROVIDE A DISPROPORTIONATE RETURN ON INVESTMENT BY LINKING U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A WAY OTHER FORCES CAN NEVER DUPLICATE. THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES CANNOT BE CAPTURED BY NUMERICAL ASSESSMENTS ALONE. IN BOTH FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS, WE MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT; CERTAINLY, THE SOVIETS DO.

THE INF TREATY

THE INF TREATY DOES NOT CHANGE THE STRATEGY OF THE ALLIANCE. WHILE I REMAIN UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE RELATIVE NATO AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES, EVEN WITH THE ADVANTAGES THE TREATY BRINGS, THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE CAN STILL BE MET. THEREFORE, I SUPPORT THE RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY. THE TREATY HAS THREE SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT:

FIRST, IT ENHANCES WESTERN SECURITY BY REDUCING THE THREAT TO NATO FORCES, TERRITORY, AND INSTALLATIONS, WHILE ALSO REDUCING THE LONG-RANGE THREAT TO U.S. FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA. THE TREATY ELIMINATES, IN PARTICULAR, A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO MANY NATO AIRFIELDS, PORTS, POMCUS SITES, AND LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES. THE TREATY DOES, OF COURSE, REQUIRE THE U.S. TO YIELD THE MILITARY CAPABILITY FO THE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE AND THE PERSHING II, THE LATTER OF

WHICH HAS A CAPABILITY TO STRIKE QUICKLY INTO THE SOVIET UNION. ON BALANCE, I BELIEVE THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO FIGHT AND SUSTAIN THE FIGHT IS ENHANCED.

SECOND, THE TREATY ESTABLISHES A PRECEDENT FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS THAT CAN BE APPLIED IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE UPCOMING ATLANTIC-TO-THE URALS CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. UNDER THE INF TREATY, THE SOVIET UNION WILL GIVE UP THE DEPLOYED CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH FOUR TIMES THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENTS OF OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES. WE, OF COURSE, WILL CONTINUE TO SHARE THE DETERRENT BENEFITS WHICH THOSE SYSTEMS BRING TO THE WEST.

THIRD, THE TREATY INCLUDES THE STRICTEST VERIFICATION REGIME IN THE HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE INCLUSION OF AN ON-SITE VERIFICATION PROGRAM IS AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT PRECEDENT, IF CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL OUTCOMES.

OVERALL, THE INF TREATY IS A VICTORY FOR ALLIANCE RESOLVE AND SOLIDARITY. WE MET THE THREAT OF THE SS-20 AND CARRIED OUT THE DIFFICULT "DUAL TRACK" DECISION, WHICH REQUIRED US TO MODERNIZE AND NEGOTIATE SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE WERE FIRST SUCCESSFUL AT IMPROVING OUR SECURITY THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF INF MISSILE SYSTEMS. THEN BY SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETING NEGOTIATIONS, OUR ADVERSARY HAS BEEN LED TO MAKE DISPROPORTIONATE SACRIFICES TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES. IT IS NO WONDER THAT EVERY NATO GOVERNMENT HAS COME OUT IN FAVOR OF THIS TREATY, WHICH IS A MONUMENT TO THE HEALTH AND VITALITY OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE TREATY IS AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE. IT SHOULD BE RATIFIED, BUT WE SHOULD DO THIS WITH AN EYE TO THE FUTURE. THE UTILITY OF THIS TREATY IN OUR CONTINUING SEARCH FOR SECURITY WILL BE DETERMINED BY

WHAT WE DO IN ITS WAKE, MORE THAN IT WILL BE BY THE TREATY'S OWN CONSIDERABLE MERITS.

THE POST-INF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

NATO CAN AND WILL MAINTAIN ITS STRATEGY WITHOUT INF MISSILES, BUT IT WILL ALSO HAVE TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE AND ADAPT ITS OTHER FORCES. MORE OF THE BURDEN OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE WILL FALL ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND THE REMAINING NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THE TREATY WILL NOT SAVE MONEY, NOR WILL IT SOLVE OR DIMINISH NATO'S OTHER DEFENSE PROBLEMS. INDEED, WHILE THE TREATY STANDS ON ITS OWN MERITS, IT REMINDS US OF THE ALREADY EXISTING NEED TO MODERNIZE NATO'S CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL, AND REMAINING NUCLEAR FORCES.

WE MUST INSURE THAT THE MILITARY FORCES REQUIRED TO EXECUTE OUR STRATEGY CONTINUE TO BE ADEQUATE WHEN COMPARED TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE WARSAW PACT. IN THE EARLY 1970s THE USSR GAINED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY. THE USSR ALSO BEGAN TO PLACE MORE EMPHASIS IN ITS DOCTRINE ON CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS. THIS DOCTRINE, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE THEATER STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE, GUIDED THE CONVENTIONAL BUILDUP WHICH CONTINUES UP TO THE PRESENT, EVEN AS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PROFESSES THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND A NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY." STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF NATO COUNTRIES ARE THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT. HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF DETERRING WARS OF ALL TYPES IS AND HAS BEEN SHIFTING MORE TOWARD CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

WHILE THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN CHEMICAL AND SOME SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, IT IS IN THE REALM OF CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES THAT THE DISPARITIES ARE MOST EVIDENT. THE MILITARY NET ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED LAST SPRING POINTED OUT THE FOLLOWING ALLIANCE-WIDE FORCE RATIOS, ASSUMING FULL REINFORCEMENT: NEARLY A 3:1 PACT ADVANTAGE IN TANKS, MORE THAN A 3:1 PACT

ADVANTAGE IN ARTILLERY, AND NEARLY A 2:1 ADVANTAGE IN DIVISION EQUIVALENTS. EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION TRENDS SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN THESE ADVANTAGES. THE PACT, IN GENERAL, AND SOVIET FORCES IN PARTICULAR, HAVE MATCHED THESE EQUIPMENT GAINS WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN FORCE STRUCTURE, OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES, AND SUSTAINMENT THAT FURTHER SUPPORT THEIR DOCTRINE.

OMINOUSLY, RECENT STUDIES ALSO INDICATE THAT THE USSR HAS IMPROVED THE QUALITY OF ITS GROUND SYSTEMS AND THAT THEY ARE MATCHING US IN MANY QUALITATIVE ASPECTS. OUR ALLIANCE'S BASIC TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN TURNED INTO A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE IN DEPLOYED GROUND SYSTEMS.

ALL IS NOT BLEAK, HOWEVER. NATO HAS A MORE COHESIVE ALLIANCE; HIGHER QUALITY, BETTER TRAINED UNITS AND SOLDIERS; AND, GIVEN ENOUGH TIME, THE ADVANTAGES INHERENT TO DEFENSE. AFTER YEARS OF BUILDING UP, IF PLANNED MODERNIZATIONS TAKE PLACE, WE CAN BEGIN TO MATCH THE PACT'S MODERNIZATION RATE AND ULTIMATELY CLOSE THE GAP CAUSED BY TWO DECADES OF INTENSIVE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES MODERNIZATION.

WITH OR WITHOUT THE INF TREATY, THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE MODERNIZATION OF BOTH ITS CONVENTIONAL AND NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. IN AN ERA OF SCARCE RESOURCES, THIS MUST BE DONE WITH CARE, CHOOSING THE APPROACHES AND SYSTEMS THAT WILL GIVE US THE MAXIMUM WARFIGHTING "VALUE ADDED."

ON THE NUCLEAR SIDE, NATO WILL RETAIN AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INF TREATY. HOWEVER, THAT ADEQUACY PRESUPPOSES CONTINUING THE NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION EFFORTS INITIATED IN 1983 BY THE MONTEBELLO DECISION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. BRIEFLY, THE ARMY'S PART IN THIS MODERNIZATION CENTERS ON A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE MISSILE AND ARTILLERY-FIRED ATOMIC PROJECTILES. LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS THAT CURRENTLY HAMSTRING THESE TWO PROGRAMS MUST BE LIFTED IN LIGHT OF NATO'S ENDURING NEED

FOR VIABLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT SYSTEMS TO IMPLEMENT THE MONTEBELLO DECISION.

A FAILURE TO MODERNIZE WILL EVENTUALLY REDUCE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF OUR FORCES AND INCREASE THE RISK THAT THE FORCE STRUCTURE BACKING OUR STRATEGY ALREADY ENTAILS. SACEUR HAS DESCRIBED THE NEED, AND IT HAS BEEN REAFFIRMED ANNUALLY BY THE ALLIANCE'S DEFENSE MINISTERS SINCE MONTEBELLO. IT IS NOW TIME TO MOVE FORWARD, SHOW OUR RESOLVE, AND FIELD THE MODERN CAPABILITIES.

THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY NATO HAS NEVER HAD CONVENTIONAL FORCES SUFFICIENT FOR STAND-ALONE DETERRENCE OR DEFENSE. INSTEAD, THE ALLIANCE HAS RELIED UPON THE COMBINED CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF ITS MEMBERS TO ENSURE ITS SECURITY. THE RECOGNITION OF ROUGH STRATEGIC PARITY AND THE ALL-TOO-EVIDENT GROWTH IN WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES HAVE DRIVEN NATO TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS EFFORT IS DESIGNED TO REDRESS SOME TROUBLING DISPARITIES IN THE NON-NUCLEAR EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS THAT SUPPORT SACEUR --SUCH AS, IMPROVEMENTS IN CLOSE COMBAT CAPABILITIES, FOLLOW-ON FORCES ATTACK (FOFA) SYSTEMS, IMPROVED AIR DEFENSE, ENHANCED SUSTAINING CAPABILITIES, IMPROVED COMMAND AND CONTROL SUITES, AND IMPROVED THEATER REINFORCEMENT -- HAVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY WITHIN THE ARMY'S PROGRAM. MODERNIZATION PRIORITIES IDENTIFIED BY THE ON-GOING DOD COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES STUDY REINFORCE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED BY NATO, INCLUDING DEEP ATTACK AND AIR DEFENSE. OUR AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE CAPITALIZES ON OUR TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTHS TO EXPLOIT KEY PACT VULNERABILITIES AND NEGATE PACT STRENGTHS.

THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SACEUR TEN MODERN U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS IN EUROPE WITHIN TEN DAYS OF MOBILIZATION IS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE ARMY'S NATO-ORIENTED PRIORITIES AND THE CORNERSTONE OF THE U.S. CONVENTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. MOBILITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMS, SUCH AS POMCUS, INCREASES IN INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT, AND THE FAST SEALIFT INITIATIVE, ARE VITAL TO THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR NATIONAL PROMISE TO HAVE TEN DIVISIONS IN EUROPE WITHIN TEN DAYS.

LASTLY, AS OUR NATO ALLIES AND OUR NATION PLACE A GREATER RELIANCE ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF THAT DECISION. VISIBLE, EFFECTIVE, CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL BUT EXPENSIVE INVESTMENTS, AS THIS CONGRESS WELL KNOWS. THE NATO ALLIANCE CANNOT AFFORD TO SPEND LESS ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE UNTIL THERE IS A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THE THREAT THAT MUST BE DETERRED.

SECURITY IN EUROPE CAN THEORETICALLY BE ENHANCED BY NEGOTIATED REDUCTIONS IN THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT. IF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MEANS WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT ACCEPTING DEEP ASYMMETRICAL CUTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO REACH EQUALITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT, THEN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MAY BECOME AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT PARALLEL PATH TO ENHANCING SECURITY. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MUST BE VIEWED AS A COMPLEMENT TO, BUT NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR, OUR COMMITMENT TO MODERNIZE OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

OUR ALLIANCE'S KEY MILITARY OBJECTIVE IN ANY CONVENTIONAL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES TO DEFEND ITSELF AND DETER WAR. SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR THEATER-WIDE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND IN SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE; PROVISIONS TO INCREASE WARNING TIME; AND VARIOUS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES MAY ALL BE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE. IN JUDGING ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS, WE MUST APPLY

CRITERIA SIMILAR TO THOSE WE USE IN DECIDING ON THE FORCES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WE SHOULD KEEP OUR ATTENTION NOT ON THOSE FORCES WHICH MIGHT BE REDUCED, REDEPLOYED, OR CONSTRAINED, BUT RATHER ON OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND AND DETER WITH WHAT IS LEFT AFTER AN AGREEMENT.

THE ISSUES ARE MUCH MORE COMPLEX THAN SOME NOW REALIZE. MOREOVER, THE PROSPECTS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL DO NOT DETRACT FROM THE IMPORTANCE OF MODERNIZATION; RATHER THEY ADD TO IT. UNLESS NATO CONTINUES TO MODERNIZE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE NO MILITARY INCENTIVE TO SURRENDER ITS ADVANTAGES.

WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO DEMAND MAJOR CHANGES IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES. NATO IS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE, AND ITS FORCES ARE STRUCTURED TO MEET ITS OBJECTIVES. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS BUILD THEIR FORCES TO FULFILL THEIR DOCTRINE AND TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THOSE FORCES HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY SIZED, STRUCTURED, AND DEPLOYED FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT CHANGE THEIR OBJECTIVES, THE LIKELIHOOD OF SATISFACTORY COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL OUTCOMES IS SMALL. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PROSPECTS FOR ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY AS A GREAT AND PROSPEROUS NATION WILL INCREASE BY REDUCING THE THREAT THEY POSE TO THEIR NEIGHBORS, THEY WILL HAVE TO RECONSTRUCT THEIR MILITARY FORCES. UNTIL THAT TIME WE MUST BE CONFIDENT, STRONG, AND PATIENT. WE CAN AND SHOULD ADJUST TO A CHANGING THREAT, BUT TO CHANGING CAPABILITIES NOT MERELY TO STATED INTENTIONS.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

THE INF TREATY, IN AND OF ITSELF, IS A GOOD TREATY. BUT TREATIES ARE NOT ENDS IN THEMSELVES. THE INF TREATY IS BUT ONE STEP IN THE

PROCESS OF SECURING PEACE WITH FREEDOM. SUBSEQUENT STEPS MUST MAKE SENSE IN LIGHT OF OUR SECURITY NEEDS.

I INTEND, WITH YOUR HELP, TO CONTINUE TO BASE ARMY DECISIONS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, REGIONAL PRIORITIES, CINC NEEDS, AND U.S. AND ALLIANCE STRATEGIES WHICH HAVE PROVEN SUCCESSFUL THROUGH SOME DANGEROUS TIMES.

I HOPE MY TESTIMONY MAKES CLEAR MY SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY, AS WELL AS THE RATIONALE FOR ESSENTIAL FORCE MODERNIZATION AND THE NEED TO APPROACH FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH PATIENCE, UNITY, AND SELF-CONFIDENCE.

THERE ARE MANY REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE, BUT WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE PATHWAY TO MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE SECURITY WILL ALWAYS BE MARKED WITH CHALLENGES. AS A NATION AND AN ALLIANCE, WE MUST BUILD ON WHAT HAS WORKED, CORRECT KNOWN DEFICIENCIES, AND BE WARY OF RADICAL PROPOSALS. WHAT WE NEED MOST AT THIS POINT IN HISTORY TO INSURE OUR FUTURE SECURITY IS A STEADFAST RESOLVE, FOCUSED ON THE OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS OF OUR NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE STRATEGIES.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE: I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE INF TREATY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO U.S. AND NATO MILITARY STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES.

ALTHOUGH THE FOCUS OF THIS COMMITTEE IS ON THE INF TREATY, THAT TREATY CANNOT BE ASSESSED WITHOUT A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC PURPOSES FILLED BY THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND SO I WOULD LIKE TO OPEN MY REMARKS WITH A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE OVERALL NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE, AND THE

MILITARY CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO UNDERWRITE THAT OVERALL STRATEGY.

WHATEVER WE MAY ACHIEVE IN ARMS REDUCTIONS AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL, THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEVEL OR IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS, DETERRENCE WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND, AS IT HAS FOR OVER 40 YEARS, ON A BALANCE OF CAPABILITIES AT EACH OF THOSE LEVELS AND ON THE LINKAGES AMONG THOSE CAPABILITIES.

THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF THE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE REQUIRES THAT WE ENSURE THE SOVIETS COULD NOT BELIEVE THEY COULD ACHIEVE THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH ANY COMBINATION OF SURPRISE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ATTACK, CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, OR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK FOLLOWED BY ESCALATION TO THEATER OR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OUR APPROACHES TO ARMS REDUCTIONS AND OUR PROGRAMS TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN MILITARY FORCES MUST BE CAREFULLY STRUCTURED TO ENSURE THE BALANCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND TO REINFORCE SOVIET PERCEPTIONS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE. ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERALL IMPACT OF THE INF AGREEMENT MUST NECESSARILY CONSIDER THE BALANCE OF FORCES AT EACH LEVEL -- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, THEATER NUCLEAR, AND CONVENTIONAL -- AND THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE COST VERSUS GAIN FROM AGGRESSION AT ANY OF THOSE LEVELS.

AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL, WE ARE BUILDING THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO; MAINTAIN HIGH CONFIDENCE DETERRENCE OF A SURPRISE NUCLEAR ATTACK; TO CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN CRISIS; AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT.

CONCERNING THAT LAST POINT -- THAT IS, THE LINKAGE BETWEEN FORCES AT EACH LEVEL OF CONFLICT -- NUCLEAR FORCES CAN COMPENSATE TO SOME DEGREE FOR NATO'S CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESS. BUT, THE REVERSE HAS NEVER BEEN POSSIBLE. THAT IS, CONVENTIONAL FORCES CANNOT COMPENSATE FOR INADEQUATE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES NOR COULD THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES COMPENSATE IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL WAY FOR AN INADEQUATE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. HOWEVER, ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES DETER CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN CRISIS, AND PROVIDE VITAL WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES. THEY ARE THEREFORE VITAL TO AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. FURTHER, THE JOINT CHIEFS HAVE LONG BEEN CONCERNED WITH BOTH THE CONVENTIONAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT.

IF DETERRENCE FAILS AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL THERE WILL BE GREAT PRESSURES FOR RAPID ESCALATION TO THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MORE ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES WOULD RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, BUT THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES REMAINS. THE WARSAW PACT MUST CLEARLY PERCEIVE A SUCCESSFUL CONVENTIONAL ATTACK COULD FORCE NATO TO ESCALATE AND THE COST, TO THE WARSAW PACT, OF THAT ESCALATION MUST BE TOO HIGH FOR THE POSSIBLE GAINS FROM THE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. AT THE SAME TIME, IF A CONVENTIONAL WARSAW PACT ATTACK FAILS TO PRODUCE A QUICK VICTORY, THERE WILL BE PRESSURES FOR THE SOVIETS TO ESCALATE TO THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE POINT IS THAT WHILE THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE IS IMPORTANT, IN FACT, VITAL TO DETERRENCE AND STABILITY, THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES MUST BE EVALUATED ON THEIR OWN MERITS AND THAT HAS BEEN THE APPROACH IN ASSESSING THE MILITARY SUFFICIENCY OF

POST-INF AGREEMENT THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES.

U.S. AND NATO CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN SYSTEMS ADDRESSED BY THE INF TREATY IS LONG STANDING. THE TREATY HAD ITS BEGINNINGS IN NATO'S 1979 DUAL-TRACK DECISION ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY OBJECTIVE OF THAT DECISION WAS TO COUNTERBALANCE THE DISTURBING EFFECT OF SOVIET SS-20 MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS ON WESTERN SECURITY. THE DUAL TRACK WAS TO DEPLOY U.S. INF IN EUROPE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT REDUCED INF MISSILE SYSTEMS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. WE HAVE TRAVELED DOWN BOTH TRACKS OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS. THAT IS, WE HAVE COUNTERBALANCED, TO SOME DEGREE, SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AND HAVE NEGOTIATED THE ELIMINATION OF THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE THREAT. HOWEVER, THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID OF THE OTHER CLASS OF FORCES ADDRESSED BY THE TREATY. WE DID NOT COUNTERBALANCE SOVIET SHORTER RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH NATO DEPLOYMENTS, BUT THIS TREATY WOULD ALSO ELIMINATE THAT CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY ON THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BALANCE IS A STRAIGHTFORWARD MATTER. THE TREATY WOULD CLEARLY IMPROVE THE NATO/WARSAW PACT BALANCE WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE IN VERIFYING THE CHANGE. THE SOVIETS WILL DESTROY DEPLOYED SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF DELIVERING JUST OVER 1600 WARHEADS COMPARED TO ABOUT 400 FOR THE U.S. HOWEVER, ASSESSMENT OF THE TREATY IMPACTS ADDRESSES MORE THAN SIMPLE CHANGES IN THE BALANCE.

THE MORE COMPLEX QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE REMAINING NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES COULD ENSURE:

1) THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PERCEIVE THAT THE THREAT OF NATO ESCALATION AND THE COST TO THE WARSAW PACT OF SUCH AN ESCALATION MAKES THE POSSIBLE GAINS FROM A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK NOT WORTH THE RISK AND, 2) IF DETERRENCE FAILS AT THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL, THE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS BALANCE CAN SERVE SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

IN MY OPINION, THERE ARE AFFORDABLE IMPROVEMENTS AVAILABLE, MANY ALREADY UNDERWAY, UNQUESTIONABLY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE TREATY, FOR NATO TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE THEATER NUCLEAR DETERRENT. THOSE IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED WITH OR WITHOUT THE TREATY. FURTHER, THOSE IMPROVEMENTS CAN PROVIDE A POST-TREATY BALANCE SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN THE CURRENT BALANCE. HENCE, I BELIEVE THE TREATY PROVIDES FOR AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN DETERRENCE.

HOWEVER, THE TREATY ALONE CANNOT ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES. ADEQUATE FORCES ARE NOT THE AUTOMATIC PRODUCT OF ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES. THERE MUST BE A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO BUILDING AND SUSTAINING FORCES WITHIN THE LIMITS OF SUCH TREATIES. HENCE, MY CONCERN IS NOT WHETHER THE INF TREATY ALLOWS FOR ADEQUATE FORCES. IT CLEARLY DOES. MY CONCERN IS FOR ADEQUATE ONGOING SUPPORT TO PROVIDE THOSE FORCES. THE BUDGET REDUCTIONS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS AND THE DRASTIC REDUCTIONS WE FACE IN 1989 AND PROBABLY BEYOND DO NOT PROVIDE FOR FORCES THAT WARRANT HIGH CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ADEQUACY.

HOWEVER, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THAT BUDGET, WE ARE FOCUSING ON FORCES THAT ARE CAREFULLY STRUCTURED TO UNDERWRITE THE MOST VITAL NEEDS OF THE STRATEGY. AT

THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEVEL, THE AIR FORCE PROGRAMS REQUIRED ARE FUNDED AND WERE UNDERWAY WELL BEFORE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY. THE F-15E, UPGRADING THE F-111 FORCE, NIGHT AND ADVERSE WEATHER CAPABILITY FOR THE F-16 FLEET, AND A STANDOFF NUCLEAR WEAPON FOR OUR DUAL CAPABLE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ARE SOME EXAMPLES.

AS FOR IMPROVING CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OUR CHOICES WITHIN BUDGET LIMITATIONS ARE, AGAIN, CAREFULLY AIMED AT UNDERWRITING THE STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENSE, RAPID REINFORCEMENT AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. HOWEVER, ANY DISCUSSION OF PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE THOSE CAPABILITIES IS CLEARLY OUTSIDE THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THIS HEARING, SO LET ME CLOSE WITH SOME COMMENTS ON VERIFICATION.

I WOULD AGREE WITH THOSE WHO POINT TO THE LONG HISTORY OF SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENT VIOLATIONS. THOSE VIOLATIONS ARE WELL DOCUMENTED. OUR APPROACH HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE TO INSIST ON A VERIFICATION REGIME THAT WILL REVEAL CHEATING THAT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT OUR DETERRENT POSTURE AND THAT LEAVES US WITH OPTIONS TO RESPOND TO SUCH CHEATING. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE SECOND POINT IS AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT AS THE FIRST. THERE IS NO VALUE TO VERIFICATION IF THE SOVIETS BELIEVE WE WOULD FOLLOW A "NO RESPONSE" POLICY.

TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT INF VERIFICATION, WE KNOW WE CAN VERIFY THAT THE SOVIETS DESTROY OVER 1800 DELIVERY SYSTEMS IDENTIFIED BY THE SOVIETS. AS SUGGESTED EARLIER, THAT ALONE BRINGS ABOUT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. WE WILL ALSO WITNESS AND CAN VERIFY THE ELIMINATION OF THE EXISTING COMPLEXES OF EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURES AND FACILITIES THAT SUPPORT THOSE SYSTEMS. FURTHER, FLIGHT TESTING OF THOSE SYSTEMS WILL BE PROHIBITED AND WE HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE OF MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THAT PROVISION THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY AREAS OF SOME UNCERTAINTY. WE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT SMALL NUMBERS OF MISSILES WILL NOT BE CONCEALED. WE CAN OVER TIME MONITOR DEPLOYED SYSTEMS MAINTAINED IN ANY MILITARILY USEFUL POSTURE, AND THE SOVIET DECLARATION OF NUMBERS OF DEPLOYED SYSTEMS FALLS WITHIN THE RANGE OF U.S. ESTIMATES BUILT UP OVER YEARS OF SUCH MONITORING.

IN ANY CASE, FOR THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN A MILITARILY USEFUL FORCE OF COVERT MISSILES, THEY WOULD NEED AN ELABORATE HIDDEN INFRASTRUCTURE TO HIDE THE MISSILES, PERIODICALLY TEST THEM AND PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF EMPLOYING THEM IN A CRISIS. THEY WOULD RUN A HIGH RISK OF DETECTION OVER TIME.

APART FROM THESE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE MILITARY UTILITY OF SUCH A CHEATER FORCE WOULD BE LOW COMPARED TO THE RISK.

AND SO IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE INF TREATY AND ITS VERIFICATION PROTOCOL ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN, AND, IN FACT, TO ENHANCE, U.S. AND NATO STRATEGIES SUPPORTING DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. BUT THE RESOLVE WE DEMONSTRATED IN THIS SUCCESSFUL DUAL TRACK STRATEGY MUST NOW BE APPLIED TO MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF FORCES REQUIRED TO DETER AT THE CONVENTIONAL, THEATER NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC LEVELS OF CONFLICT.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS, AND TO THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN MORE DETAIL.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. CARLISLE ALBERT HERMAN TROST

Let me state at the onset that I support the INF Treaty now before the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. I am satisfied that, on balance, the Treaty is militarily sound, and I believe that its ratification is in the best interests of the United States. Most importantly, with entry into force of the INF Treaty, NATO will still retain reliable nuclear and conventional forces that possess capabilities to effectively deter or, if required, to respond to Soviet aggression.

The role of NATO's maritime forces and the contributions of those forces to NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent posture will be critical in a post-INF threat environment. Carrier based dual-capable tactical aircraft, ballistic missile submarines, and sea-launched cruise missile capable surface combatants and submarines, all unaffected by the Treaty, remain available for employment in NATO's Strategy of "flexible response."

As Admiral Crowe noted in his earlier testimony, the Soviets have demonstrated an emerging concern about NATO maritime strength. That concern is reflected in a growing number of Soviet proposals to curtail naval activity, under the guise of "military detente," in northern European waters. General Secretary Gorbachev's call for an Arctic zone of peace encompassing the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas, and Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov's call for a ban on anti-submarine activities in areas of the North and West Atlantic are specifically directed at NATO naval forces. Similarly, the General Secretary's "warning" that U.S. deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles jeopardizes negotiations between superpowers on a 50 percent cut in strategic nuclear weapons is directed at Soviet concern over U.S. sea power.

NATO's wartime success is critically dependent upon sea lines of communication in the Atlantic for rapid reinforcement and resupply, as well as those in the Pacific for sustained support. The Soviets know that and understand that western maritime strength is the guarantor of those sea lines and thus is the principal barrier to the global strategic objectives essential to their preferred strategy.

In a post-INF era, naval forces will also retain their inherent mobility and flexibility and their ability to apply discriminate force where necessary. Essentially remaining under national control, not tied to garrison ashore or subject to host government approval to operate from overseas bases, naval forces are highly leveraged for alliance support while remaining free to respond quickly and unilaterally to crises that threaten U.S. national interests.

There will still be major imbalances between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional and nuclear forces after the provisions of an INF Treaty are effected. Those imbalances should be redressed, in my view, primarily by deep and asymmetrical cuts through the demobilization of preponderant Soviet forces that can be brought to bear on the Central Front -- or elsewhere on the Soviet periphery -- within militarily significant timelines. In that regard, one of the most salient aspects of the INF Treaty for the future is its affirmation of the principle of asymmetrical reductions reflected in the treaty requirement for the Soviet Union to eliminate a greater number of weapon systems to achieve parity with the United States.

Thank you for the opportunity to briefly share my views on this important Treaty and the increasing value of NATO maritime power to the Alliance.

NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194

The Assembly,

Convinced that balanced and effectively verifiable arms control agreements are a fundamental component of Western security;

Conscious that public support for the Alliance is essential to maintain the validity of NATO's deterrent strategy, and convinced that reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons contribute to an improvement in public support for this strategy;

Welcoming the statement at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Reykjavik on 12 June 1987;

Welcoming the US-Soviet joint statement of 18 September announcing agreement in principle on the conclusion of a treaty on intermediate range forces, to intensify efforts to achieve a treaty on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms, and to begin full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing;

Encouraged by the conclusion on 16 September 1987 of the agreement on US-Soviet nuclear risk reduction centres;

Noting developments in the Conference on Disarmament regarding verification of a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons;

Concerned that the absence of a predictable environment surrounding strategic offensive nuclear weapons and defense and space armsjeopardizes prospects for strengthening strategic stability;

Aware that such a predictable strategic environment implies a strengthening of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty regime;

Stressing the important and complementary role of conventional arms control negotiations in maintaining deterrence against all forms of aggression;

Aware of the need to improve the harmonization of NATO's force planning and arms control policies;

Expressing its conviction that, for East-West stability to be genuinely strengthened, professed non-offensive Warsaw Pact intent must be tangibly demonstrated by appropriate restructuring of its offensively oriented force posture;

URGES the United States and the Soviet Union:

1. to move speedily to overcome the remaining technical obstacles and conclude an agreement banning their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles on the basis of equality of rights and limits;

2. to convene, at the earliest possible opportunity, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty review conference in an attempt to achieve mutual understandings on those articles of the ABM Treaty which are

ambiguous and open to subjective interpretation, particularly those defining "research", "development and testing", "components", and "other physical principles", in the expectation that such mutual understandings will provide a foundation for an early agreement on deep reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms to balanced and stable levels;

3. to continue efforts to build upon the 1974 Threshold Test an Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty by limiting the yield and frequency of their nuclear tests, as a step toward the ultimate objective of achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; and

4. to resume negotiations on confidence-building measures all ballistic missile launches and major military exercises, to reduce the risks of surprise attack and confrontation triggered by miscalculation, accident, or failure of communication;

URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to continue to exercise their best efforts with a view to achieving an early agreement on a comprehensive, global ban on chemical weapons;

b. to explore, as part of a comprehensive approach to arms control and disarmament, appropriate limitations, consistent with NATO's 1983 Montebello decision, on those US and Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe of under 500 kilometers range, which may pose special problems for crisis stability;

c. to commence, without delay, negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic to the Urals between NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, aimed at establishing a stable, secure, and effectively verifiable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, removing disparities, and eliminating the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action, with primary emphasis placed on stability measures applicable to main ground combat weapons in the Central Region; and

d. to negotiate and adopt, in the next phase of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, mutually complementary and effectively verifiable confidence- and security-building measures to further reduce the risks of military confrontation in Europe, with special attention devoted to operational constraints on military activities, exchange of views among commanders, greater information exchange about military forces, and enhanced cooperative means and modalities of verification, including mandatory on-site inspection.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KARSTEN D. VOIGT

Thank you very much for the invitation to this hearing. I regard it as a token of the bonds of friendship that exist among parliamentarians in the North Atlantic Alliance.

We parliamentarians are elected to represent the interests, the concerns and the hopes of our peoples and States. That our opinions can differ, even on issues of foreign and security policy, is legitimate in a democracy. The democratic process is often complex and arduous. But common commitment to the values of democracy make our Alliance strong. It is the most important link between our countries and peoples. These shared democratic values link both sides of the North Atlantic Alliance more effectively than any military strategy, however intelligent it may be, more effectively than any weapon, be it ever so modern.

Despite the primary importance of trust in political relations between Western Europe and North America, the question keeps recurring as to whether the Soviet Union, by introducing new weapon systems, can undermine by military means our political trust in a system of joint transatlantic liability.

When the Soviet Union began to deploy numerous SS 20s, the doubts of many security policymakers in Europe in the future credibility of the United States' security guarantees started to grow. Then, as now, I was not beset by such doubts. Neither approximate strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union nor the speech delivered by a former US Secretary of State in Brussels in 1979 were able to shake my conviction that it was in the American interest, too, to defend Western Europe with all the resources at its disposal in the event - then as now unlikely - of a Soviet attack.

Nevertheless, I voted for the NATO "two-track" INF decision in the spring of 1979. My motive, however, was less distrust in the security guarantee of the United States than criticism of the Soviet disregard for legitimate Western European security interests. This disregard was expressed in the continued deployment of SS 20s under the Brezhnev regime despite the public and internal criticism from Western Europe. This Soviet behaviour was intolerable, more for reasons of security policy than for reasons of military strategy.

For security and disarmament reasons, revision of the Soviet SS 20 build-up was the most convincing goal of the NATO INF decision. This goal has been fully achieved in the present INF Agreement. That is reason enough for the INF Agreement to enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I should also have been able to accept a negotiated result which followed the guidelines drawn up by Paul Nitze and Yuri Kvitsinskiy during their walk in the woods. But I consider the implementation of the double-zero option for land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces, as has now been agreed upon, to be an ever better outcome. In 1979 I hoped for such a result, but after 1980 I often doubted that it could ever be achieved.

The present INF Agreement means that the Western Alliance has succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to accept fully the Western negotiating aims. The global abolition of intermediate- and short-range nuclear weapons by means of a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is in line with our people's desire for disarmament and with the security interests of our countries. Although the agreement defines equal rights and responsibilities for the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet Union has to destroy a considerably greater number of missiles and warheads than the United States. This is confirmation by the Soviet Union of the NATO view that the Soviet Union hitherto possessed advantages in this category of weapons.

Willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions represents a fundamental breakthrough. The application of this principle to future negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals could make it easier in that sphere, too, to encourage stability in the security field throughout Europe through the elimination of unilateral advantages.

The verification measures jointly laid down in the INF Agreement are more comprehensive and effective than in all previous arms-control agreements. The measures provided for in the Agreement also include elements whose application to future agreements on nuclear, conventional and chemical disarmament would seem to make good sense.

The INF Agreement, with all its rights and responsibilities, is a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. This bilateral agreement, however, affects the interests of all European States. That is why it is good that during both the Carter and Reagan Administrations the United States has endeavoured to maintain constant consultation with its Western European allies. In the Federal Republic of Germany during this same period, irrespective of all differences of opinion regarding negotiating strategy, not only the the various Federal Governments but also members of the Bundestag from the Government and Opposition sides informed themselves on the state of the negotiations. These consultations and the information obtained were, apart from a few exceptions, completely satisfactory. The major exception I remember was the lack of information and consultation in connection with the walk in the woods.

The Western European stationing countries will commit themselves in an agreement with the United States to permit the implementation in their territories of those inspections which are provided for in the bilateral INF Agreement. The Government of the Soviet Union will be formally notified by the States concerned that consent is given to the implementation in their respective territories of inspections as provided for in the INF Agreement and its accompanying Protocol. The agreement with the United States will be discussed expeditiously by the German Bundestag and will be ratified without reservations or additions.

All parties represented in the German Bundestag support the INF Agreement. I have not yet come across any member of parliament who intends to vote against any contractual provisions which are subject to ratification by the Bundestag. Even the decision, not expressly referred to in the Agreement with the Soviet Union, to refrain from deploying Pershing Ia missiles, whose nuclear warheads are at the sole disposal of the US, now has the agreement of all parties represented in the Bundestag. All parties in the Bundestag had wished a double-zero option to be extended to land-based shorter-range missiles. The unilateral renunciation of the Pershing Ia missiles is regarded by us as a contribution aimed at facilitating politically and accelerating agreement on the implementation of such a double-zero solution.

In view of the years of dispute over the NATO INF decision and its aims and consequences, this consensus, transcending party lines, is remarkable. It is in the nature of things that such consensus should be based in part on differing motives. In which democratic parliament would this not be the case? Nevertheless, an opportunity exists to extend this consensus in future to other areas of Federal German security and disarmament policy. A sufficient number of bones of contention will remain. None the less, this effort to reach consensus between the governing parties and the Social Democratic Opposition on major security and disarmament issues can already be regarded as one of the beneficial by-products of the INF Agreement.

In newspapers in your country and ours I have read that Western European politicians are expressing themselves more sceptically in private about the agreed double-zero option than they will admit publicly. I know politicians of that type, too. They do not belong to my party. In the CDU/CSU they constitute a minority. Nevertheless, despite their reservations these politicians, too, are advocating speedy ratification of the Agreement - and not just because of public opinion or for reasons of party discipline, but because these German politicians, too, are aware that rejection of the double-zero option would inevitably impair the credibility of the Western Alliance, given that the zero option was originally tabled at the negotiations as a Western demand upon the Soviet Union. They also appreciate the value of the verification arrangements and the equally valuable impact of the INF Agreement on political cohesion within the Western Alliance. These German politicians also fear that a rejection or postponement of the INF Agreement would do more to alienate the two sides of the Atlantic from one another psychologically and to decouple their security than any deployment of intermediate-range weapons could create in terms of joint military liability.

Although I do not share their critical objections, I should like to attempt, for the sake of fairness, to outline the main motives of these German politicians. They fear above all that the implementation of the double-zero option is the United States' first step towards withdrawal from its joint nuclear liability with Western Europe. Just as in 1979 comments to that effect by Henry Kissinger gave rise to concern, an interview with Fred Iklé published by the newspaper Christ und Welt on 29 January under the heading "Who will commit suicide to defend the Germans?" and presenting elements of a concept of "discriminate" regionalized nuclear deterrence has had a similar effect.

Criticism of the concept of discriminate deterrence comes from all parties represented in the Bundestag. This criticism is unequivocal and unanimous. The concept runs counter to the interests of Western Europeans in general and to those of the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. Admittedly, the tendencies expressed in this concept are not new to the discussion on military strategy in the United States. The official NATO doctrine of flexible response can only smooth over this conflict between Western Europeans and the United States but cannot resolve it. Nevertheless, I advise my parliamentary colleagues in the Federal Republic of Germany to respond to statements and concepts of this sort from the United States with unequivocal criticism but not with nervousness. I have three reasons for giving this advice:

1. Decades of experience have taught that in the United States, as elsewhere, the publication of a strategic concept and its realization are two entirely different matters. In addition, the United States would not be able to translate parts of this concept of discriminate deterrence into practice if the Western Europeans maintained their resistance.

2. Although Western Europeans can never be quite sure whether the United States' security guarantee includes readiness to sacrifice Boston for Bonn, the Soviet Union itself cannot, of course, be quite sure either whether this pledge would be redeemed in the event of an attack, so that aggression by the Soviet Union would continue to entail unwarrantable risks to its own territory. The main military instrument of joint transatlantic liability remains the presence of numerous US servicemen and their families in Western Europe.

3. Strategically intelligent and technically perfect though strategies may be for controlling the escalation of a nuclear war that begins on a

> regional scale in Europe, no US politician will ultimately want simply to test the practicability of such a strategy in the event of war. The risks of its failure and of the destruction of human civilization remain far too great.

The critical response in Western Europe to the concept of "discriminate deterrence" is an indication of how the consensus fostered within the Western Alliance by the INF Agreement could once more be jeopardized by an argument over the security and disarmament steps to be taken in the wake of that Agreement.

The Western Europeans agree with the United States on the priority that should now be allotted to a START agreement. In this context, we hope for an early agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the continuing validity and the interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

It is to be hoped that we also agree on the aim and urgency of a worldwide ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Such a ban must be sufficiently verifiable. However, once the relevant convention has entered into force its effectiveness should not be restricted through continuing production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Once existing weapon stocks throughout the world have been destroyed within the shortest possible transitional period, there will be no need either for so-called security stocks".

All parties in the German Bundestag urge that the disarmament process be continued in respect of nuclear weapons with a range below 500 km. In our view, negotiations with this aim should be commenced as soon as possible. In the light of the INF Agreement, all parties represented in the German Bundestag call for a review of the modernization of nuclear weapons agreed upon by NATO in Montebello. None of the parties in the Bundestag currently supports the deployment of new short-range missiles. The publication of the concept of discriminate deterrence has led in the Federal Republic of Germany to a hardening of resistance against any modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. This concept is grist to the mill of those who believe in the military strategic legitimacy of the saying "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans".

There are only differences of detail among the parties represented in the Bundestag. The Christian Democrats, for example, believe that a drastic reduction of the short-range nuclear weapons with a range below 500 km should be followed by a modernization of the Western systems, whereas Social Democrats are more disposed to seek the implementation of a third zero option for land-based short-range missiles. There are also, however, Christian Democrats who want agreement on ceilings for short-range nuclear systems below the numbers presently deployed in the West. Spokesmen of the CDU/CSU have also pointed out repeatedly that they can only conceive of a modernization of the Lance missiles in the context of a Western negotiating strategy.

From my point of view, it is regrettable that this consensus in German politics has still to meet with a sufficient level of understanding and approval from numerous several of our allies.

For decades there has been agreement within the Western Alliance on the need to seek greater conventional stability in Europe. Unilateral defence measures have enabled the Western Alliance to achieve only limited success in this direction. To the extent that this requires higher defence expenditure, complete success will not be achieved during the coming years either. Irrespective of all rhetoric, I see no scope for increasing against a background of general economic stringency the percentage of national budgets which are devoted to defence; this applies to most countries on both sides of the Atlantic.

The approach to arms control pursued at the Vienna MBFR negotiations has not brought success. Agreement will probably be reached before the end of this year on a mandate for a European disarmament conference whose tasks will include steps towards the goal of conventional reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This conference is a great challenge and opportunity for the Western Alliance. Governments, parliaments and research institutes, as well as the general public, are beginning to make a host of diverse proposals for the substance of future negotiations. In a report for the North Atlantic Assembly last September I produced some ideas on this subject, which I should like to repeat here:

> Arms control will be given a chance only when the extent of conventional arms, on the basis of a changed political analysis of the threat, is perceived by both sides as disproportionate; disproportionate in relation to the low political probability of aggressive intent by either of the two sides and disfunctional in relation to their own political intentions. If the Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev is, in contrast to its stated aims, convinced of the political usefulness of conventional superiority in Europe, then really substantive arms control in the conventional sphere is doomed to failure. But if the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to conventional stability, this would be proof of a substantively new West European policy on the part of the USSR.

A. The Asymmetrical Conventional Arms Race in Europe

The arms dynamic in conventional weapons in Europe is characterised by a number of asymmetries. These asymmetries are the chief source of instability. They are at the same time the major reason why conventional arms control in Europe is faced with obstacles which can be surmounted only with difficulty. The thus far unsuccessful MBFR attempt is one example.

Firstly there is the geographical asymmetry of the Alliance systems. The Warsaw Pact has cohesive Alliance area with adequate territorial depth. It can deploy its troops in deep formation. To move units from the western Soviet Union to the East-West border requires a land or air journey of not even 1000 km. On the other hand, the access routes of the Soviet Union to the oceans are extremely unfavourable. In addition, in winter most of them are usable only with difficulty or not at all. By contrast, NATO has the advantage in this respect and can also control the eastern approaches to the oceans with relative ease. Its major handicap, however, is the lack of depth in Alliance territory. The West European countries are also separated by the Atlantic from the major alliance power, the USA. American and Canadian reinforcement units have to be transported more than 6000 km to Europe by air and sea.

Added to this geographical asymmetry is the asymmetry of military doctrines and military strategies. In the event of a crisis, the Warsaw Pact wishes to defend itself on the territory of its opponent. Its military strategy is therefore geared toward a territorial counter-offensive capacity, i.e. to forward defence. The development of Soviet strategy is aimed at the comprehensive conventionalism of counter-offensive capacities. NATO fears not so much the famous Blitzkrieg option by the Warsaw Pact as it does an offensive following a brief period of military preparation. And even if no agressive strike intention is attributed to the Soviet Union, from the Western viewpoint, its military strategy still constitutes the greatest source of military instability in Europe.

The NATO strategy of flexible response is admittedly more defensively structured by comparison, inasmuch as NATO is not in a position to mount a territorial offensive with land units. That said, NATO does not renounce tactical-offensive options by bomber and rocket deep into enemy territory. Interventions against military targets in Eastern Europe have always been one of the tasks of NATO air strike units. As has been described this tactical-offensive capability is in future to be reinforced under the planning directive Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) and above all to be conventionalized. The object is to counter the second Soviet detachment in its approach areas. In addition, NATO reserves the possibility in its doctrine of the nuclear first strike. This so called premeditated escalation is being implemented through appropriate weapons systems and operational planning.

Socio-political asymmetry also influences the military situation in Europe. While the world-power status of the Soviet Union has hitherto been based on military might - the Gorbachev reform programme suggests it intends to change this in the medium and long term - the West has far greater economic potential and the more attractive social system. It should be borne in mind in this connection that the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe also discharge functions in guaranteeing the influence of security and social policy. Their job is to provide military compensation for the hitherto missing acceptance of the political system. The difference between the systems is also reflected in the differing degree of openness and availability to the public of military planning on the two sides.

These asymmetries undoubtedly influence the trends in the armaments dynamic in the conventional sphere. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states are gradually stepping up and conventionalizing their potential, which is suited to the territorial offensive. Conversely, there are in the West also tendancies towards what might be referred to as "sovietization" of military doctrine in the sense of conventionalization and shift of emphasis towards tactical-offensive capacity (FOFA and Air Land Battle). Arms technology trends match these plans for the further consolidation of offensive options on both sides. The long-range potential of conventional munitions is being increasingly extended. Both sides are acquiring ever greater capacities for the rapid deployment of military resources on enemy territory (conventional stand-off weapons, cruise missiles and even to some extent ballistic missiles).

Certainly, the technical and financial problems which these new technologies raise – some of which have been outlined – should not be underestimated. It should nonetheless be understood that the dynamics of conventional arms in Europe, because of tendencies both in arms technology and in military strategy on both sides, will in future further magnify existing instabilities unless limitations are agreed.

B. *Criteria for the Stabilization of Conventional Arms*

the stabilization of the military situation in Europe must from the outset be incorporated in an overall peace and security policy concept embracing political, economic, social and military elements. The goal is *the demilitarization of the East-West*. It postulates not so much the removal of antagonism between the systems as its gradual transformation towards less violent forms of *conducting* the power and system conflict. An increasingly violence-free form of conducting the power and system conflict between East and West could also, within the meaning of the objectives of the CSCE Final Acts, have a humanizing effect on the systems and thus on the substance of the conflict. There is little evidence to suggest that the West has an overall peace and security policy concept, a failing which becomes increasingly obvious with each new Soviet disarmament proposal.

In the suggested framework of conventional stabilization, emphasis needs to be placed on creating a *structural non-aggressive capacity* on both sides. For the Warsaw Pact that means permitting its military strategy of the territory-taking counter-offensive to be called into question and ultimately abandoning this provocative concept. The counter-move on the NATO side is to reverse the trend towards the conventional consolidation of airborne capacity to strike at follow-up Soviet forces. Put simply, if the Warsaw Pact were to abandon its strategy of the territorial counter-offensive, the NATO threat of a nuclear first strike would lose any military justification.

There is no question that structural non-aggressive capacity is a considerably more demanding goal than mere parity. Under the traditional ideas of balance, a contribution will already have been made to the goal of conventional stabilization if the military power ratio is compensated for by arms control policy. On the other hand, structural non-aggressive capacity requires both sides *not only to disarm* but above all to rearm into its force structure in such a way that it is credible and clearly recognizable to the opponent as renouncing offensive options. In this sense the goal of parity is to be qualified in the direction of defensive capacities on both sides.

Conventional stabilization measures aimed at structural non-aggressive capacity should be based on the following criteria:

(i) Strategic stability

In the conventional sphere, this means force structures on both sides which facilitate defence but make attack more difficult. Confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in this context serve the purpose of reducing capacity for the surprise attack and attack following a short period of military preparation. In order to decrease offensive options on both sides, these potentials must, in addition, be directly limited and/or converted, and military doctrines and military strategies included in the East-West dialogue and eventually changed.

(ii) Stabilization of Arms Dynamics

This concerns restrictions which affect military power relationships. The goal must be to create defence structures on both sides which generate no further incitement to the arms race.

(iii) Crisis Stability

Force structures are crisis-proof if in a crisis they produce no pressure for the rapid deployment of military resources, make the race to mobilize unnecessary and place a premium on winning time. CSBMs which lengthen periods of military preparation, such as disengagement measures, can be cited in this context. But in the final analysis only direct limitation and alteration of potentials can create true crisis-proof structures.

(iv) Restraint Capacity

Even after adjustments are made toward structural non-aggressive capacity, any military aggression must continue to be calculatedly untenable. In terms of the conventional offensive potential, restraint capacity must be geared to denying the chances of success of an attack (criterion: denial concept of deterrence). On the other hand, nuclear weapons in their military role are to be reduced to weapons of last resort (criterion: guaranteed response capability).

(v) Damage Limitation

Because of the primacy of the prevention of war, the above four criteria need to take precedence over that of damage limitation. But as a failure to prevent war cannot be completely ruled out, the structures of armed forces must provide no compulsion towards rapid escalation in the event of war. Damage limitation also entails protecting that which is to be defended - no easy task in densely populated central Europe. Even a long drawn-out conventional war of attrition would lead to the destruction of central Europe.

(vi) Alliance Acceptability

For NATO, this means retaining the multinational structure of forward units. This applies both on grounds of restraint capacity (an aggressor would *a priori* have to contend with the entire Alliance) and on grounds of stability policy considerations (no NATO state can go on the offensive on its own). Conversely, for the Warsaw Pact, Alliance acceptability means the creation of forces structures which facilitate a more organic and less hegemonic relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European states.

(vii) Social Acceptability

The defence instrument must be capable of being brought into conformity with the standards of democracy, i.e. it may not lead to the militarization of society. Neither may the financial and human resources of society be excessively strained, so that other state tasks (such as in social, environmental and education policy) can continue to be carried out.

C. Unilateral or Co-operative Stabilization Measures?

Advocates of an attempt to stabilise the conventional situation in Europe by means of a unilateral change in Western military strategy and the rearming of forces structures in the sense of the various "defensive concepts", base their demand first and foremost on a criticism of arms control practice hitherto. It is maintained that conventional arms control has failed and this is illustrated, above all, in the MBFR Troop reduction negotiations in Vienna. In this connection, it is asserted that the predilection for negotiated arms control means that what could be done unilaterally for stabilization remains undone because no one wants any "trump cards" for the discussions removed from his hand. In addition, the MBFR example reveals that arms control negotiations are occasionally even used to hinder arms limitation. The objection is generally raised that co-operative arms regulation is completely unrealizable if, in addition to purely quantitative limitations, it must alter qualitative structures and options.

At the same time, it is argued that unilateral stabilization measures independent of the outcome of negotiations would be possible and therefore advisable if they were to promote the mutual security of both sides. The argument goes that a Western change of strategy to unambiguous defensiveness would reduce possible Eastern perceptions of being under threat and thereby create incentives for the conversion of the forces of the Warsaw Pact as a reaction to Western initiatives. Some proponents of the defensive concepts go so far as to argue that unilateral conversion by the West would remain arms-race proof even if the Eastern side did not react similarly but built up its offensive potential. It is maintained that at least it would be more cost-effective to react to offensive options with unambiguous defensive measures than to extend one's own offensive capabilities.

Against this argument it has to be contended that a unilateral attempt at stabilization can end the reciprocal arms dynamic only if the other side arms exclusively on grounds of uncertainty about the political intentions and motives of its opponent. *If the Soviet Union is keeping its military potential at the ready purely because it fears an act of aggression by the West, then it can in fact abandon its offensive* doctrine if it regards NATO as structurally incapable of attack. However, should the USSR and the Warsaw Pact be arming for other reasons - and these need not necessarily be aggressive, they could, for example, also have to do with the political function of the military in the world power role of the Soviet Union or its political influence within the Warsaw Pact - then it will not react symmetrically to the introduction of defensive concepts in the West. If under these circumstances it were to assume that such a Western change denied its military strategy success in the event of war, then an offensive-defensive arms dynamic in Europe could come about. Whether the defensive would have the advantage over the offensive in such a situation is just as speculative a question as the corresponding arguments in the SDI debate.

Furthermore it is not, in the final analysis, to be determined unilaterally what is perceived as defensive and non-threatening or as offensive and aggressive. Military structures which appear equally defensive to East and West are the only genuinely defensive ones. In this connection it is necessary for East and West to develop joint yardsticks and criteria for assessing military potential and options, particularly in the conventional sphere.

There are admittedly border-line cases such as a territorial counter-offensive strategy, which can scarcely be perceived as particularly defensive. But conversely, a concept of static territorial defence which even renounces the regaining of lost territory must surely be described as clearly structurally incapable of attack. Most "defensive concepts", however, contain elements of mobility. Some of them moreover do not renounce firing on enemy territory and even go as far as wide-ranging interdiction in order to increase the restraint capacity of the relevant concept.

This last point foreshadows a further problem. Conflicts of aim among the above-mentioned criteria can scarcely be avoided in the event of unilateral arms conversion. Thus the criterion of unambiguous defensiveness can conflict with the requirement of restraint capacity where, for instance, mobility and the tactical counter-offensive to regain lost territory are renounced. A reduction in the size of units would indeed meet the criterion of strategic stability because surprise attacks would be made more difficult. But if this were to happen on one side only, crisis stability might conceivably be impaired because there would have to be early mobilization in a serious crisis. These and other conflicts of aims can be removed only by conversion to structural non-aggressive capacity.

The conclusion is that co-operative arms guidance towards conventional stabilization should not be renounced. Negotiated arms control can encourage, supplement and cushion arms conversion measures. It must nonetheless be borne in mind that arms control processes can produce results only if both sides are interested in substantive agreements.

This has hitherto been in doubt in the MBFR negotiations. That is one of the reasons why the Vienna negotiations constantly concentrated on procedural questions which bore no relation to the merely minimal reduction aims. Occasionally the MBFR negotiations served as an instrument to prevent the unilateral withdrawal of American troops.

The, as yet, unsucessful MBFR attempt demonstrates that a future European disarmament conference can also produce substantive results only if both Alliance systems are interested in the stabilization of conventional capability. Each side must, in addition, enter into negotiations with security policy and military strategy goals which enable even its own side to undertake conventional disarmament if the other side is prepared for appropriate - possibly asymmetrical - counter-concessions.

Co-operative arms regulation may not, however, lead to the blocking of unilateral stabilization measures. The latter are not to be confused with unilateral disarmament, but are always advisable when they underpin mutual security without endangering one's own defense capability. It is thus a matter of balancing co-operative and unilateral stabilization within an overall concept. In this context arms control would not so much have the task of bringing about conventional parity as the much more demanding function of facilitating the arms conversion of both sides towards greater defensiveness.

There are increasing signs that the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev is also ready for cautious questioning of its military doctrine and military strategy hitherto. There is no apparent reason why NATO should not take Gorbachev at his word and use the chance for an inter-Alliance dialogue about military doctrines, strategies, operational capabilities and forces structures. The dispute between an optimistic and a pessimistic analysis of Soviet intentions is idle as long as the West is incapable of testing the Soviet Union under the leadership of Gorbachev by its own constructive proposals.

LETTER FROM SENATOR BIDEN

February 3, 1988

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members, Committee on Foreign Relations

FROM: Joe Biden

SUBJECT: Appearance of North Atlantic Assembly Panel

On Friday, February 5, the European Affairs Subcommittee will conduct a hearing to receive testimony from a panel of four European parliamentarians representing NATO's inter-parliamentary adjunct, the North Atlantic Assembly.

Chairman Pell asked that the Subcommittee hold this hearing in order (a) to provide a significant courtesy to the Assembly, in which the Senate is a regular participant; and (b) to afford Senators the opportunity to hear a cross-section of informed European opinion, but without creating an untoward precedent for the Committee. An identical procedure was followed in 1979, during the SALT II hearings.

The panel was selected by the Assembly's President, Ton Frinking of Holland, a centrist very active in defense affairs. In addition to Mr. Frinking, the panel consists of:

> John Cartwright, a member of Britain's SDP, who has been active in the North Atlantic Assembly for years as rapporteur of the Special Committee on Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control, which I have chaired.

Francois Fillon, a member of France's RPR, who is chairman of the Defense Committee of the French Assembly.

Karsten Voigt, a member of West Germany's SPD, who has been foreign policy spokesman for his party for a number of years.

I personally very much appreciate the willingness of these four gentlemen to travel to the United States to make this appearance, and I welcome all members of the full Committee both to the hearing and to the lunch which follows.

LETTER FROM SENATOR HELMS

February 2, 1988

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Claiborne:

I respectfully protest, but in the strongest terms, the procedures followed in choosing the witnesses for the hearing in the European Subcommittee on Friday. The settled procedure in the Committee with regard to witnesses is that the Minority is allowed to select, at a minimum, one witness for every two witnesses selected by the Majority. I have been trying to negotiate an equitable basis with the distinguished Chairman of the European Subcommittee for over a month now to have him adopt balanced procedures. I have even proposed a number of distinguished Europeans as alternatives. I am sorry to say I have met no success whatever.

This is unfair and unrepresentative. I recognize that there is a problem in that the goal is to receive a cross-section of opinion from our NATO allies--a goal that conflicts with the tradition that our Committee does not hear non-U.S. citizens. The Subcommittee Chairman's assertion appears to be that by turning the choice of witnesses over to the NATO Assembly itself there is no need to recognize an equitable ratio of selection. I believe that an equitable ratio must be the paramount rule, to which the desire to hear NATO opinion must be subordinated.

In addition to all that, it is important to bear in mind that the NATO Assembly does not represent the official opinion of NATO. It is a parliamentarians' group, whose work is valuable to the members, but which has no direct mandate from NATO, and has no authority to represent NATO opinion. No matter what the ultimate composition of the group of witnesses--all of whom are doubtless distinguished gentlemen--their opinion is merely opinion. Not one of them meet the criterion of having been selected by the Minority. It is the process which is totally unacceptable.

Such a situation will ultimately prove extremely embarrassing to the Committee, and thoroughly discredit the testimony of the witnesses. I urge that the Subcommittee meeting be postponed until a process acceptable to the Minority can be agreed upon.

Sincerely,

Claiborne - You may not consider it relevant
but, when I was chairman of a FRC
subcommittee, the minority was given
an equal number of witnesses at
every hearing. I never regretted that
policy.

LETTER FROM SENATOR PELL

February 3, 1988

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Jesse:

Thank you for your letter of February 2, concerning the European Affairs Subcommittee hearing scheduled for this Friday. I appreciate your concern about maintaining a balance of witnesses in Committee proceedings. It is a concern I share, and I shall continue to do my best to uphold the principle and practice of balance.

It is necessary to emphasize, however, that the European Affairs Subcommittee hearing on Friday is a special case. I specifically asked Senator Biden to conduct such a hearing -- not to hear European witnesses per se but to hear a diverse panel of representatives from the North Atlantic Assembly.

The purpose was two-fold:

-- to afford a significant courtesy to the Assembly, which is NATO's inter-parliamentary adjunct, a body of which the Senate is a member, and in which many Senators have been active for years. I felt that for the Committee to offer such a forum to the Assembly, as it did during the SALT II hearings, was more than proper.

-- to afford Senators the opportunity to hear a cross-section of informed allied opinion -- without establishing a precedent that the Committee would find it difficult to live with. By asking the President of the Assembly to select a panel of four defense-minded members of the NAA seems to me now, as it did in 1979, an effective resolution of a dilemma.

Allow me to reiterate that the hearing's very purpose was to do what is being done: to provide a forum for the North Atlantic Assembly. It was because I wished this to occur without burdening the Committee with any great problems of precedent or witness-selection that I determined to have the Assembly witnesses appear before the European Affairs Subcommittee.

I suggest that we let this matter be worked out to the satisfaction of Senators at the Subcommittee level.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

Claiborne Pell

LETTER FROM SENATOR BIDEN

January 19, 1988

Hon. Ton Frinking, President
The North Atlantic Assembly
3, Place du Petit Sablon
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Dear Ton:

This is to formalize the invitation to you from the Subcommittee on European Affairs to testify on February 5 concerning the INF Treaty. The hearing will be conducted at 10:00 a.m. in room SH-216 in the Hart Office Building of the Senate.

The Foreign Relations Committee begins its hearings on the INF Treaty on January 25, and hearings will continue on an intensive schedule for approximately one month. According to present plans, all hearings will be held at the full Committee level, with one exception: On February 5, the European Affairs Subcommittee will hear from a group of four parliamentarians -- yourself and three others chosen by you to represent a full range of views within the Atlantic Alliance.

From the perspective of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, this procedure is designed to reconcile two imperatives: (a) that the full Committee avoid violating its tradition of not receiving testimony from foreign citizens (a violation would open a Pandora's box of difficulties for the future); and (b) that on this crucially important issue the Committee somehow have the benefit of the views of our NATO allies.

In all of these hearings, we are asking that witnesses ensure that the Committee receive copies of written testimony at least 48 hours in advance of actual presentation. Such written testimony may be of any length you find suitable. However, your oral presentation should be shortened to about 10 minutes to allow time for a good period of give and take with members of the Subcommittee (as well as any members of the full Committee who may also attend).

I look forward to seeing you on February 5th. In the meantime, John Ritch, Deputy Staff Director of the Foreign Relations Committee (202/224-3953), can handle any questions you might have. Martin McCusker of the Assembly staff can coordinate reimbursement of travel expenses through Barbara Allem of the Foreign Relations Committee staff (202/224-3916).

I wish to express in advance my deep appreciation for your willingness to make a contribution to the Senate's deliberative process.

Sincerely,

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman, Subcommittee on
European Affairs

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FRANK D. CARLUCCI

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee to testify on behalf of the INF Treaty. The Treaty is a major achievement in arms control; more importantly, it supports our overall security policy, in which arms control is but one component.

AN ARMS CONTROL SUCCESS

The INF Treaty is a direct result of the strength and solidarity of the United States and its Allies. In his testimony last week, Secretary Shultz has described how these qualities, sustained through the sometimes turbulent years of INF deployments and negotiations, resulted in an agreement which meets our stringent standards.

The INF Treaty reflects the Reagan Administration's philosophy that arms control agreements should reduce numbers of weapons, rather than merely limit their growth. In doing so, the Treaty codifies important U.S. negotiating principles. It makes reductions in the most destabilizing Soviet systems. It makes asymmetric reductions to equal levels. Third-country systems are excluded. And on-site inspections are a key means of verification. All of these principles set important precedents on which to build in other arms control negotiations.

The verification regime established by the Treaty is particularly significant. Its objectives are threefold: first, to provide confidence in our ability to monitor Soviet compliance; second, to help deter Soviet violations by enhancing the likelihood of detection and making it more difficult for the Soviets to commit an undetected violation; and third, to permit timely detection of any Soviet violations, so that we -- the executive and legislative branches in concert -- can take appropriate and proportional steps to protect U.S. and Allied security.

National technical means comprise our principal capability for monitoring Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty. However, these means will be supplemented by an unprecedented set of cooperative verification measures. These measures include comprehensive exchanges of data, restrictions on the location of systems during the three-year elimination period, displays at certain SS-25 ICBM bases to enhance national technical means, and a variety of on-site inspections that extend well beyond the elimination period. The Treaty's verification provisions are designed to maintain a proper balance between protecting U.S. security interests and maintaining an effective capability to detect Soviet cheating.

The verification provisions are complemented and reinforced by other provisions of the Treaty. The prohibition of flight testing, the production ban, and geographic constraints will make it difficult for the Soviet Union to deploy a militarily-significant covert force of INF missiles. Should the Soviets still elect to violate the Treaty, this will prove costly, complicated, and -- we believe -- detectable before any significant military threat to U.S. interests would arise.

The verification provisions for future arms control agreements will need to be tailored to meet the specific requirements of each. START, for example, involves reductions to agreed levels across several classes of weapons, rather than elimination of an entire category. Thus an even more comprehensive verification regime will be necessary. Nevertheless, the basic principles contained in the INF Treaty, such as on-site inspection, form an important precedent.

SECURITY BENEFITS OF THE INF TREATY

While the success in meeting our arms control standards and in establishing precedents for future agreements is important, what matters most from my perspective as Secretary of Defense is whether the INF Treaty contributes to the security of the United States and its Allies. The Treaty clearly does, in two important ways.

First, elimination of current and future Soviet INF missiles will reduce the military threat to NATO. Under the provisions of the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union will eliminate forces with deployed missiles capable of delivering over 1,600 nuclear warheads. This includes shorter-range Soviet systems which also have conventional or chemical warfare capabilities. This will reduce the Soviet Union's ability to execute rapid strikes throughout Western Europe without resort to its strategic weapons. In addition to relieving pressures on our own nuclear forces and elements of their command and control, this should increase the survivability of the airbases, ports, depots, and other facilities vital to NATO's conventional defenses.

Because many of the Soviet INF missiles can reach a large portion of Asia, the INF Treaty will also enhance the security of our friends and allies in that part of the world.

In exchange for the elimination of Soviet INF missiles, the United States will give up PERSHING II and GLCM forces with deployed missiles capable of delivering about 400 nuclear warheads. This will remove a part of our capability to hold at risk targets in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union with European-based systems. Nevertheless, NATO's agreed strategy of flexible response will remain valid and credible. A variety of nuclear systems will remain committed to NATO, including dual-capable aircraft, LANCE short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery, as well as U.S. and U.K. strategic forces. With these forces, modernized as necessary, NATO will retain a wide spectrum of retaliatory options to maintain deterrence. The U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe will not be decreased.

A second major way in which the INF Treaty promises to bolster NATO security is by enhancing the political credibility of NATO as a whole. Deterrence is based not only on NATO's military capability, but also on its collective political will. The INF experience demonstrated to the Soviets that our nations have the political resolve to make -- and stand by -- the tough decisions necessary to ensure our security. In short, in the face of Moscow's protracted intransigence, NATO held together in implementing both tracks of its 1979 decision by deploying our INF missiles and steadfastly supporting the zero-zero proposal. Having seen the strength and solidarity of the Alliance in peacetime, Moscow is less likely to reach the mistaken conclusion that it could divide the Alliance in a crisis or war.

THE FUTURE OF NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE

The INF Treaty should not be considered, or become, a step toward the denuclearization of Europe. NATO's Defense Ministers have agreed that the Alliance must retain a balanced mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities to provide for deterrence. Nuclear weapons must continue to provide a counter to the Warsaw Pact's numerically-superior conventional forces, to offset the Soviet Union's remaining theater nuclear capabilities, and to hold Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory at risk, thus deterring war. The United States and other NATO governments have agreed that negotiations to reduce NATO's remaining nuclear forces in Europe should await establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces there.

NATO has already made sizable unilateral nuclear reductions prior to signature of the INF Treaty. In 1980, 1,000 warheads were withdrawn without replacement. As a result of NATO's 1983 Montebello Decision, an additional 1,400 warheads were withdrawn and one additional warhead was withdrawn for each PERSHING II and GLCM warhead introduced. As a result, the number of NATO nuclear warheads in Europe has declined by 2,400 since 1979. The INF Treaty will lead to even further reductions.

In making the Montebello Decision, NATO's Defense Ministers agreed that NATO must take steps to ensure the responsiveness, survivability, and effectiveness of the forces that would remain after NATO's unilateral reductions. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was asked to develop recommendations on how best to structure these forces to maintain deterrence with a minimum number of nuclear weapons. His recommendations involved modernization of existing systems, improved deployment of nuclear forces within Europe, and enhanced survivability of these forces and their command, control, and communications.

The improvement measures stemming from the Montebello Decision, which preceded the INF Treaty, are required independent of the agreement, and NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed their continued importance. Some of our weapons, such as the LANCE missile and nuclear artillery rounds, are fifteen to thirty years old. A number of improvement measures have been or are currently being implemented by the United States and other nations concerned. Improvement measures which still require implementation include developing a follow-on to LANCE, replacing a portion of our nuclear free-fall bombs with a tactical air-to-surface missile, and production of sufficent modern artillery rounds to allow retirement of older rounds. None of these programs are constrained by the INF Treaty, because the agreement does not limit dual-capable aircraft or nuclear forces with ranges below 500 kilometers.

With respect to conventional forces, the need to redress critical deficiencies was well established long before the Soviets began negotiating the INF Treaty in earnest. The ongoing Conventional Defense Improvements effort is intended to reduce NATO's reliance on the threat of early nuclear use to deter conventional aggression by the Warsaw Pact. It is designed to bolster NATO's capabilities in such areas as reinforcement, follow-on forces attack, sustainability, and air defense. This effort must also continue in the post-INF environment.

While the INF Treaty will provide important security benefits to NATO, some adjustments might be necessary to ensure that NATO's remaining forces provide the full range of deterrent capabilities required by Alliance strategy. Such adjustments are under consideration by NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, of which I am a member. They involve possible reallocation of existing assets and changes in planning and procedures. Like the programs that the Alliance is pursuing independent of the INF Treaty, any adjustments would be fully consistent with the agreement, and not undercut the real reductions in nuclear forces that will result from it.

The INF Treaty does not exacerbate NATO's defense needs. Rather, it heightens awareness of the risks of persisting deficiencies. The Alliance will face two major challenges in pursuing those programs necessary to ensure the deterrent capability of its remaining forces. The first challenge is to make the most efficient use of limited resources and to share the burden equitably. Even though defense budgets are likely to be constrained, I intend to ensure -- and will so encourage my fellow Defense Ministers -- that the nuclear and conventional programs I have discussed are given special focus as they compete with other priorities.

The second challenge is to avoid being lulled into a false sense of security by the INF Treaty. We have already witnessed Soviet efforts to use the Treaty to undermine support for necessary modernization efforts outside its scope, even though we can fully expect the Soviet Union to continue upgrading its own remaining forces. This is a standard Soviet tactic, which reflects one of Moscow's primary strategic goals: to convince Western European nations to distance themselves from the United States and to neglect their military preparations. The task for NATO leaders is to convince their publics that they must not rest their security on Soviet pledges. The Soviet Union respects strength, and scorns and exploits weakness. If NATO citizens resist vital defense modernization efforts for fear of upsetting Moscow, they invite eventual Soviet dominance.

THE ROLE OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

While the INF Treaty stands on its own merits, other arms control agreements could complement and reinforce the INF Treaty and the benefits it provides. Our top priority is a START agreement involving fifty percent reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Such deep and comprehensive reductions could limit Moscow's ability to offset the INF Treaty's elimination of the SS-20 with increases in its ICBM and SLBM forces. At the same time, continued modernization of remaining U.S. strategic forces would ensure their continued credibility as the ultimate guarantor of Alliance security.

Another high U.S. priority is to negotiate an agreement on conventional forces in Europe. While Soviet intransigence has stalemated the MBFR talks, NATO has called for new negotiations for an agreement covering forces "from the Atlantic to the Urals" to deal with the threat arising from Warsaw Pact advantages in Europe. Such an agreement should establish a more stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, eliminating the Warsaw Pact's capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. This will require deep, asymmetric reductions, for which the INF Treaty provides an important precedent.

In conducting these other negotiations, we must remember a key lesson of the INF negotiations: Without sustained efforts to improve U.S. and NATO capabilities, the Soviet Union will have little incentive to negotiate away its advantages. The INF outcome proves unilateral disarmers wrong. Had INF opponents succeeded in blocking our deployments, we would now be faced with a Soviet monopoly in INF missiles, rather than have before us a treaty eliminating them on both sides. Arms control can complement efforts to maintain an effective military posture, but cannot substitute for them.

We must also avoid the false hope that a fundamental change in Soviet aims was responsible for the INF Treaty and will now ease the way for future agreements. Credit for the INF Treaty should go where credit is due: to the resolve and solidarity of the Western Alliance.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The Senate now has the important task of providing its advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty.

Ratification would provide NATO significant security benefits, as I have indicated. An entire category of nuclear missiles would be eliminated permanently, reducing the Soviet threat to our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. NATO's deterrent strategy would remain intact, and the solidarity of the Alliance would be strengthened. The elimination of INF missiles, in conjunction with continued efforts to maintain an effective nuclear and conventional force posture, would contribute to Alliance security by allowing for credible deterrence at a lower level of forces.

If the Treaty were not ratified, or were otherwise crippled, the threat posed by Soviet INF missiles would remain. In fact, the Soviets would likely continue to build up these forces, deploying the already-tested SS-20 follow-on and SSC-X-4 ground-launched cruise missile and continuing deployments of the recently-introduced SS-23. The solidarity of the NATO Alliance, and the bilateral security relationships between the United States and its Allies, would be weakened. This could undermine the ability of the Alliance to sustain the determination and resolve to counter Soviet INF capabilities, as well as to move forward in other vital areas of NATO defense.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD BROWN

I. The Context

The U.S.-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, future arms control and reduction agreements, for short and long range nuclear forces and for conventional forces as well, force structure planning and burdensharing all need to be seen as part of a wider picture. The relevant context comprises the nature and needs of U.S. security and our alliance relationships both in NATO and elsewhere in the world. These subjects are covered, briefly and I fear sketchily, in my written submission. I will be dealing with only some of them in my oral presentation today.

U.S. objectives in NATO, and in our political and military relationships elsewhere in the world, are not substantially different from what they have been over the past 40 years. That this would be the case is a tribute to the vision of those who, in the aftermath of World War II, displayed the wisdom, political skill -- and in the United States, the required bipartisan will -- to devise an alliance that has faced successfully the challenge of time. Yet, because these objectives must now be sought in a world that is clearly different and significantly more complex than it was 40 years ago, it is appropriate to revisit them. And given such changes and complexities, the methods that we should pursue to achieve those goals need adjustment at the least, and even, conceivably, some revision.

These changes from 40 years ago condition the ways in which the U.S. and its allies should seek to preserve and promote stable international security, democratic political institutions, world economic growth, and access to markets in and to raw materials and product from the rest of the world. Such changes involve both sides of the Atlantic -- and the Pacific -- as well as the Soviet Bloc and the Third World.

The postwar American political objective of promoting European unity as a way to increase the coherence of the alliance members, has met with considerable success over the past 40 years. The further pursuit of that unity is likely to be of great significance during the next 40 years. Today's alphabet of European integration -- ECSC, WEU, EEC, EMS, to cite but a few -- is also an important tribute to the vision of the policymakers of yesteryear. Simultaneously, political change has occurred in Europe. There used to be sharp divisions within many of our European allies, including strong Communist and extreme right-wing parties. Some of them had authoritarian governments. Divisions remain, but there is now a clearer coherence, defined in terms of democratic institutions, market economies (which include various mixtures of government and private sectors, of capitalistic and social-democratic approaches), and a loosely but recognizably shared set of attitudes toward the ordering of the international community and its security.

The United States no longer has the economic dominance or the military predominance we enjoyed after World War II. The U.S. share of industrial production and services that was in the neighborhood of 50 percent then stands now at less than 25 percent. Though U.S. GNP is four times what it was then in real terms, the rest of the world's has increased from its war-destroyed level by a much larger factor. And though the U.S. nuclear capability equals and deters that of the Soviet Union, and U.S. force projection abilities into distant areas exceed that of the U.S.S.R., Soviet conventional military capability gives it a distinct edge on its own periphery, including key areas of Eurasia.

Compared to these developments in the West, what was once thought to be a monolithic Soviet Bloc has lost its most populous member, with China adopting an independent approach in foreign policy, recently very anti-Soviet and even now on better terms with the U.S. than with the Soviet Union. China's revisionist approach to its economic system could threaten to erode the Communist Party's political control. Such an economic policy, even in milder form, both tempts and frightens Soviet leaders, who have recognized the stagnation of their own economy and the corresponding threat to future Soviet political and even military strength. They are casting about for radical new approaches in economic terms and in political processes, while determined at the same time to preserve full political control by the Communist Party. Eastern Europe has experienced comparable economic failure, and is ruled by communist regimes that with few exceptions lack even as much legitimacy as the Soviet regime has in the eyes of its people. That region, likely to experience both less detailed control by and less economic help from the Soviet Union, is a potential source of significant instability.

Given these changes and complexities, it should not be surprising that, now as before, there are disparities of views and of attitudes on many matters among the various members of the NATO alliance, or between Japan and the U.S., and that individual members of the alliance should differ with the United States about policies within the alliance or in parts of the world far from themselves or their perceived interests.

To be sure, such differences are not new. But the boundaries of cooperation and competition between the U.S. and Europe (as well as Japan) have become over time increasingly blurred. Today for example, the principal economic rivals and partners of the U.S. are at present its industrialized allies in Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, the Third World has become a highly disparate and contentious arena for economic competition and political conflicts. We now experience economic competition from newly industrializing countries either allied with or reasonably friendly to the United States in political and military terms. Political conflicts involve the U.S. and its allies (formerly the Colonial Powers in those regions), the Soviet Bloc, and numerous indigenous and usually nondemocratic regimes and world views including Islamic fundamentalism, left and right wing military dictatorships, both disillusioned and unrepentent Marxism-Leninism, other forms of authoritarianism, and some incipient democracies.

But NATO comprises two of the three industralized democratic regions (North America, Western Europe, and Japan) that together produce 60 percent of the world's product, and lead in technology and in living standard. The combined economic, political, and military weights of its North American and European partners should make feasible the achievement of allied economic, political and military goals, providing those are reasonably defined.

That the allies should often aim for concerted military and diplomatic policies even outside their own immediate region has been shown in recent months in the Persian Gulf. There, the common goals of assuring access to Persian Gulf oil on commercial terms, avoiding domination of the region by an Islamic fundamentalist Iran, and limiting Soviet influence there made it possible for American policy, skillfully applied after a stumbling start, to encourage concerted policies on a behind-the-scene bilateral, or even a unilateral and parallel, basis. We should seek similar approaches in policies toward the Middle East and toward the Third World countries of the southern part of the globe, but should recognize that agreement is likely to be more difficult to achieve there. Specifically, we should not expect others to help us on Central America, although it is not unreasonable to expect them to refrain from opposing U.S. policies.

In military terms the objectives of the U.S. and its allies should continue to be to deter Soviet nuclear attack through appropriate nuclear doctrine and adequate nuclear forces at various levels; the alliance does not need to match Soviet forces precisely at every imaginable level in order to achieve adequate nuclear deterrence. Soviet achievement of nuclear parity in the early 1970s made the threat of the use of U.S. nuclear forces, tactical or strategic, in response to a conventional attack less of a deterrent than it once was. But other factors continue to provide a deterrent to conventional war in Europe. These include the likelihood of nuclear escalation inherent in the political commitment of the United States, the disposition of allied conventional forces including over three hundred thousand U.S. troops in Europe, and the possession and presence of the alliance's nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. A robust deterrent requires NATO conventional forces that give high confidence of being able to deny the Soviets the quick victory they might hope to gain by rapidly overrunning most of Western Europe in a blitzkrieg launched either without warning or after a rapid mobilization.

In the Third World, allied military capabilities need to take into consideration that advanced military technology has been spread rather widely to developing countries, through sales of advanced military equipment by the developed countries and through the creation of indigenous arms industries with substantial technical capabilities. The U.S. would have to expect to carry the bulk of allied efforts in military actions in Third World areas. As events in the Persian Gulf have shown, however, British and French forces -- especially naval forces -- can also contribute. For either U.S. or other allied forces, their structure, equipment, and especially their ability to be moved in quickly and on short notice will be extremely important, whether the forces they face are indigenous or Soviet in nature.

II. The INF Treaty

I would like to turn now to the INF Treaty itself. I plan to concentrate on three sorts of issues: the effect on the military balance; the impact on and interaction with alliance relations; and U.S.-Soviet relations. These subjects overlap, as do their political and military aspects. Let me begin by saying that I judge the treaty to be in the interest of U.S. security and that I urge its ratification without actions that would open it to reinterpretation or renegotiation from either side. It is possible unilaterally to write a treaty unilaterally that would be better, if we were beginning from scratch. At some point in the real negotiation, it might actually have been possible to negotiate a better one. I myself would probably have preferred non-zero equal numbers (or at least the right to non-zero equal numbers) on the two sides in both the 500-1000 kilometer and 1000-5500 kilometer ranges. But there are good arguments on the other side; verification is easier at the zero level and is easier also if the agreement covers both range categories. Certain political problems also flow from the agreement: there will be pressures for a rush to denuclearization at the battlefield level; there are European concerns about a perceived decoupling of the U.S. nuclear deterrent from the defense of Europe; and there is also a need to reexamine targeting so that the targets that would have been covered by U.S. INF forces are covered by other systems. But these are manageable. The political disadvantages of not having a treaty or of not ratifying the treaty that has been signed are very much greater. The negotiation and ratification of the treaty and its provisions also produce significant political advantages. The course of events has shown that alliance unity in responding to Soviet military deployments with deployments of our own can encourage, and in this case produced, a fair arms reduction agreement. The elimination of a category of nuclear weapons (land-based ballistic and cruise missiles of range 500-5500 kilometers), and the evidence that the alliance is prepared to negotiate nuclear arms reductions, encourages public support of allied military efforts, by convincing allied publics that their governments have a believable arms control policy. That in turn helps to legitimize their defense policies and programs.

The December 1979 decision to develop and deploy U.S. INF forces in Europe, made with our NATO partners, was in part a response to the Soviet buildup of intermediate range missiles, especially the SS-20. It also was in part a response to European concerns about the need for additional coupling of the U.S. nuclear capability to the defense of Europe, by strengthening the INF rung of the escalation ladder. These objectives were pushed largely by European allies, but as usual it fell to the U.S. to orchestrate the complex political arrangements that went with the decision, both then and in the 1980s. Those arrangements and the 1979 decision included the dual track approach, combining a program for development and deployment with an intention to negotiate limitations and reductions of the Soviet INF force level and to adjust the level of U.S. deployments correspondingly. The political arrangements included decisions on how many systems were to be deployed in which countries, the timing of the deployments, and the U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

If we look at the outcome of this process, we see that in military terms the Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, SS-5s, and (undeployed) SSC-X-4s will be eliminated. That means about four times as many deployed Soviet warheads in the INF category will be eliminated as on the U.S. side -- the Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. Comparing the situation to that of 1979, when we had zero in this category and the Soviets had a couple of hundred SS-20s, we will be where we were then and they will have removed all of their missiles in that category. With respect to the shorter range INF forces, of 500-1000 kilometer range, the Pershings Is of the Federal Republic of Germany will be removed, along with a substantially larger number of Soviet SRINF systems, the SS-12s and SS-23s. The INF and SRINF elimination will be extended to Asia, an arrangement that affects Soviet but no U.S. systems.

It remains true that the Soviets can still attack all the targets that had been targeted by the eliminated missiles with other forces of their own. The targets that would have been hit by SS-20s can clearly be hit by Soviet ICBMs, for example. Similarly, targets in Eastern Europe or the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union that could have been hit by the Pershing IIs or the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles can now be hit by U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, SLCMs, or weapons carried in tactical aircraft. The targets of the U.S. systems would be, for example, airfields, conventional forces, and forward military command posts. In each case these could be covered, or threatened in order to deter Soviet actions, or attacked as part of a program of escalation. For us, as for the Soviets, that particular rung of the escalation ladder will not be covered quite as well by other existing delivery systems, though additional substitute systems are possible within the terms of the treaty to meet those concerns, if they should be considered to be a military necessity. What will be missing is the ability to hit those targets in Eastern Europe and the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union with U.S. ballistic and cruise missiles based on the ground in Western Europe.

In fact U.S. strategic forces have adequate precision, and can arrive almost as fast -- 25 minutes for ICBMs, which is about twice as long as the fastest INF forces would take. One concern sometimes expressed is that a President of the United States would be less likely to use those forces than he would be to use theater forces. That is an arguable issue. It would depend very much on the circumstances under which the crisis had arisen, the detailed military situation that prevailed, and the degree of cohesion between the U.S. and its allies at the time. My personal view is that a President would probably not be much more willing to use land-based theater forces than he would to use either the submarine launched ballistic missiles committed to SACEUR or to use U.S. based ICBMs. But there are arguments for covering those targets from the theater. There are alternatives that would allow this: submarine launched cruise missiles that would take 60 to 90 minutes to get to their targets; submarine launched ballistic missiles assigned to SACEUR -- these can be considered theater based, are less accurate now than the INF systems would have been, but will be replaced by highly accurate D-5s; tactical aircraft which could be equipped with cruise missiles of range under 600 kilometers without coming under the definition of strategic weapons embodied in the SALT II agreement. Thus the concern can be managed, though it may not be possible to provide replacements for the INF forces that would have precisely the same characteristics. Indeed that is why I would have preferred a non-zero solution, but I do not consider this a crucial concern.

Does this INF treaty decouple the U.S. from the defense of Europe? Will it lead to denuclearization, and heighten the danger from what almost everyone agrees to be a significant conventional imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, though there is some disagreement on the degree of imbalance? These questions are political issues, and go to the heart of the alliance relationship. My own answer is that the U.S. is and will remain tightly coupled to the defense of Europe after the ratification of the INF Treaty. It will continue to be coupled in terms of battlefield and other tactical and theater nuclear weapons in Europe. There are 4500 of these including, in addition battlefield nuclear weapons in the form of artillery and Lance missiles, longer range systems in the form of submarine-launched cruise missiles and land-based aircraft whose range and refueled radius, respectively, exceeds 1000 kilometers. It is coupled even more in my judgment by the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe; these would be immediately involved in combat by a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack; to think that the American nuclear capability would not be invoked to defend them is to suggest that the U.S. is not coupled to its own military forces. Finally, and not by any means least, the U.S. nuclear and other military capability is coupled to the defense of Europe by its alliance with and commitment to the security of its NATO allies, underlined by the U.S.'s own self interest.

Why, if all this is so, have there been so many expressions of concern about the INF Treaty by pro-American European conservatives, and indications by American opponents of the treaty of private objections by European military and political leaders? The answer, I think, lies in a series of other events. The Reykjavik Summit meeting in October 1986, in which President Reagan enthusiastically agreed to the elimination of all ballistic missiles and perhaps (stories vary) to the elimination of all nuclear weapons, an alteration which would clearly make the shaky (and I think unfavorable) conventional balance the decisive military-political element in the European balance. An event of a completely different kind, but one which must equally have affected European attitudes, was the Stock Market collapse in October of 1987. That strongly suggested chickens coming home to roost after a spree involving hundreds of billions of dollars of consumption, with the money borrowed mostly from outside the United States, and resulting in a potential world-wide financial and economic crisis. When the fundamental basis of both their military security and their economic well-being is called into question by the policies and actions of a U.S. administration, and related events in the U.S., the stage is set for substantial allied concerns about other individual actions by that administration. It is only fair to add that this is not the first U.S. administration to raise such concerns among our allies. But it is also fair to note that the scope of the negotiations at the Reykjavik Summit, as well as the magnitude of the October 19 stock market collapse, were unprecedented. And in any case confidence is further eroded when the very administration whose actions concerns our allies becomes weaker in its domestic political grip, as happened both in 1986 and in 1987: the Iran-Contra Scandal; the 1986 elections; various legal problems of administration figures; and domestic economic concerns.

Political problems for European leaders result from the INF Treaty through increased pressure to denuclearize Europe entirely, which would be a dangerous mistake militarily and politically. Such pressures are especially visible in the Federal Republic of Germany. Arguments are made by pro-American conservatives to the effect that remaining short range nuclear weapons are useable only against East or West Germany. This ignores the many aircraft-carried weapons, SLCMs, and French and British systems, not to mention U.S. SLBMs committed to SACEUR and U.S. stratetgic systems. Those concerns have nevertheless already led to closer Franco-German cooperation, and thus have not been all bad. The French worry about German resolve, and the loss of value of their own nuclear forces through denuclearization. They also worry about U.S. resolve. But the leaders of European governments, of whatever political stripe, have embraced the INF Treaty. They know that it is popular with their own publics, and indeed an important element in sustaining what consensus remains in favor of a continued strong European military capability. They also have concluded that it is in the best interest of their own countries, and of the alliance, in military and political terms. What European political leaders need to do, and few of them have done it (American political leaders have with some exceptions been rather more realistic in this regard) is to face up to nuclear weapons as a fact of life, and as a necessary part of the deterrence of war even as the alliance works both to stabilize the nuclear balance, by modernization and reduction, and to build up its conventional capability to raise the nuclear threshold. Reykjavik was no help in this regard, nor is SDI. The modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons (of ranges less than 300 miles) would be an effective way of demonstrating an appreciation of this fact of life. Such a move would be politically difficult for some European governments. If, however, it were combined with the reduction in the numbers of battlefield weapons, that would be sensible militarily if the ranges of those battlefield weapons were increased from their present value of a few tens of miles to a couple of hundred miles, it could be done as an alliance initiative and would be an effective move both militarily and politically. It would be one way of preempting a likely Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the two Germanies, or in all of continental Europe except France and the Soviet Union.

Where does INF fit in U.S.-Soviet relations? Militarily, it is a side show to the issues of strategic weapons -- START, SDI, and the ABM Treaty. But it is significant in political terms, reintroducing arms control as an accepted element in the relationship, and abolishing a category of weapons. Some of the verification arrangements, including cooperative activities and on-site inspections, could be helpful precedents in START and strategic defense agreements. We should not overestimate this advantage. INF arrangements are a great deal simpler than those for strategic weapons would have to be for equivalent confidence in compliance. We can afford to have them simpler in the case of INF, because there is so little incentive to cheat on INF. The missions of those forces can be carried out by other forces. Because the U.S. has declared the SALT II agreement that limits the number of Soviet ICBMs no longer operative, the Soviets can build as many SS-25s as they wish to carry out the role of the dismantled SS-20s. Why should they instead choose to cheat on INF?

As to political effects, the Soviets do want to encourage differences between the U.S. and its European partners -- in strategy, in political views, and in military planning. They probably see some chances to do these things as a result of the INF agreement. I have already referred to some allied concerns and divisions on these matters. But on the whole, I do not think that the Soviets have so far gained in these terms. The unity of the alliance during the execution of the dual track strategy, both in accepting the deployments of Pershing IIs and Cruise Missiles and in the details of the negotiations, including allied support for the U.S. proposal of the zero option (whether that was the best option or not) was a big political plus. Going ahead with the deployments was another example of alliance unity under U.S. leadership, as was agreeing to the INF Treaty as finally negotiated. The failure of the Soviet walkout from the INF talks in 1983, and the failure of their attempt to influence Western European elections through the INF issue are further examples. How the situation plays out from now on depends on U.S.-allied coherence on battlefield nuclear weapons, on conventional forces, and related issues -- including U.S. Senate ratification of the INF Treaty without reservations or amendments that would require renegotiation or an elaborate round of comparative reinterpretations on the part of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the gamut of allied political-military relations -- which includes the issues of burdensharing, of the modernization of nuclear and conventional forces, the reliability of U.S. political commitments and the quality of the U.S. decision making process, and last but not least the whole range of economic relations and trade -- INF has come to play a significant, though largely symbolic, role.

In terms of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, the INF agreement has relatively little effect, as I have already described. In political terms, it is more significant, being the first arms control agreement negotiated since 1979, and if ratified the first significant one to be ratified since 1972. It has clearly had a positive effect on making the discussion of other issues between the superpowers more feasible, as in turn the ability to reach an INF agreement profited from the easing of U.S.-Soviet relations after their nadir in 1982-83. If the INF Treaty's ratification were to be derailed, despite the modest nature of the agreement and despite its negotiation and support by a President with unimpeachable anti-Soviet credentials, it is hard to see how the Soviets could expect any significant arms control agreements with the United States in the foreseeable future. Some members of the foreign policy community, and some members of Congress, may think that would be a good outcome. I think it would be a very bad one and a dangerous one.

To conclude on the INF Treaty: I consider it a modest but useful step. Future alliance military strategy and force structure decisions, nuclear and conventional, need careful political handling. A possible modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons and -- if necessary -- of permitted mid-range systems, continuance of U.S. military deployments in Europe, improvement of the capabilities of alliance conventional forces, and consultations with allies on these matters and on future arms control and arms reduction negotiations will all need to be pursued. In this context, both the ratification of the INF Treaty and the statements of policy by the administration, by the Congress, and even by outside witnesses who presume to speak with authority as past policy makers or opinion leaders in influencing the future will have considerable importance.

III. The Future Military Balance

Let me turn now to the issue of the future military balance, specifically the conventional force balance in Europe, and the corresponding issues of force structure and of arms control and reduction.

To begin with, I recognize that Soviet attacks across the NATO-Warsaw Pact boundary, especially on the Central front, have never been likely since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and that they are increasingly unlikely, especially in the present political condition of the Soviet Union. Surely a rational Soviet leadership will consider the potential gain from such an attack and weigh it against the potential loss, which is unlimited. In that sense the detailed military configuration of the NATO alliance has always been an insurance policy against an unlikely event. But we must always think of future possibilities, likely and unlikely. A failure of reform in the Soviet Union and a continued economic and technological decline might lead to a situation of desperation. One or more East European countries might try to break away from the Soviet Union. Western unity might decay and create tempting targets for individual territorial grabs with the bonus of disintegration of the alliance. In a tense military-political confrontation, the balance of military forces could matter a great deal. Political cohesion on the Western side could matter at least as much, so we must be careful in structuring alliance military forces and their command arrangements not to undermine that political cohesion. Even in comparatively relaxed situations, such as now prevail, a degree of political intimidation can be and is exercised implicitly or explicitly by a sufficient imbalance in conventional forces. This is probably even more true on the NATO flanks where the balance is worse and there may be less sense of assurance that political cohesion would immediately bring the force of the entire alliance to bear. The alliance thus needs a balance of military forces, their proper geographical distribution, and expectations of behavior and of outcome that would lead the Soviets, their allies and ours, and other nations all to believe that the Soviets could not overrun the central front in a short time, say less than a month. Such calculation and planning must include the effects of various amounts of warning, of delays in western political decisions, of possible mobilization on each side, of reinforcement of the allied forces from the U.S. and from the U.K., of French behavior, of air power and sea power, etc.

Allied planners of force structure and of operations must also think about the possibility that the Soviets could outlast the NATO alliance in a long conventional war. The political cohesion of the Warsaw Pact and even of the Soviet Union could, however, come into question in a lengthy stalemated struggle. One must balance the deficiencies of our forces and capabilities for a short as opposed to a long war. But, given my estimate of Soviet thinking and motivation, my own judgment is that incremental capabilities should be put preferentially into assuring the alliance's ability to contain a Warsaw Pact attack during the first month rather than into improving the chances of lasting from the third month into the fourth, for example.

With respect to out of area abilities, what is most important to the U.S. is the political cooperation of its NATO allies in such regions as the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The forces used there would have to be largely American, but French and British forces can contribute significantly in military terms and those of other allies slightly. The presence of other allies has political importance beyond their military contributions, as is shown by the present situation in the Persian Gulf. Some parts of the U.S. force structure need to be configured for distant Third World operations, especially but not only for Southwest Asia. This is true whether the attack being resisted, preempted, or deterred is by Soviet forces or by the forces of regional powers or elements.

How should the alliance go about improving the balance of conventional forces in Europe? The answer depends on what the Soviets do as well, both unilaterally in their own force structure and dispositions and in arms control negotiations with the U.S. and its allies. Both unilateral efforts and cooperative efforts (in arms control) can change the balance, perhaps stabilize it and thus reduce the risk of war. The goal should be to give each side assurance that it could not be successfully invaded, that is to make defensive conventional forces dominant over offensive ones. Soviet officials occasionally express concern that under certain circumstances they might be attacked from the West, against the evidence of the force structure and disposition of Western forces. I believe, to the contrary, that a situation in which neither side had any prospect of successful conventional military action against the other would lessen or remove a present Soviet lever in East-West relations. Why, then, should they be willing to see such a change? We don't know that they are or will be. But such a Soviet willingness could arise from what seems to be a present trend in Soviet politics to seek an easing of its international relations for the next few years. The Soviet leadership may have concluded that military capability has carried Soviet power and the Communist party as the vanguard of progress as far as it can, and it is time to turn to other methods. They may wish to concentrate resources on internal development, without abandoning political, propaganda, and diplomatic moves abroad. Another possibility is that they may plan to anesthetize the West in anticipation of some future military buildup and confrontation. They may hope to make such an arms control agreement part of a larger package that would include economic benefits for the Soviet Union in the form of the availability of Western technology and capital. Or they may be motivated by a combination of these and other factors.

In unilateral terms, NATO options for improving the conventional military balance include the following:

a. Introduction of additional advanced technology into allied forces: precision guided munitions and delivery systems of short and long range; improved target acquisition capabilities including space based and air based sensors of all sorts; tactical intelligence and data fusion; command-control and communications systems; remotely piloted vehicles.

b. Force size. The alliance could increase its reserve or active forces to improve the balance. Estimates suggest that six or eight more divisions would substantially reduce the Warsaw Pact ability to advance rapidly into Western Europe.

c. Changes in strategy. The limitations of no early use of nuclear weapons, no fixed defenses along the inner German border, a doctrine of not retreating from any territory on the allied side of the line even if doing so would improve the ability to stabilize a line farther forward than would otherwise be the case, and a prohibition of plans for ground counterattacks across the border even after a Warsaw Pact attack across that border combine to make a successful defense considerably more difficult. A relaxation of the last three inhibitions could make a substantial difference.

d. Better integration of national forces and a common command-control and communications system would make it less rewarding for Warsaw Pact forces to concentrate their attacks at the boundaries between Army corps of different nations. The present situation constitutes a significant NATO weakness.

It should be noted that these suggested improvements face substantial practical (including political) obstacles. Many Europeans regard the proposal for greater use of technology as motivated by a U.S. attempt to restore its dominance in NATO armaments production. Both introduction of more technology and increased force size are inhibited by their implied costs; they would probably require a growth of about ten percent in NATO defense budgets over the next four years. Moreover, the growth would have to be devoted to the right uses. Both are unlikely. Force growth is inhibited also by demographic limitations, which are even more severe in Europe than in the United States, and especially so in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose population is actually shrinking. Changes in strategy are inhibited by differing views of the Soviet Union and the nature of the Soviet threat. These are accompanied by different views about East-West relations, and about relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the DDR. A better integration of the command structure and a smoother transition from peacetime to wartime command arrangements flies in the face of the understandable desire of national governments to command their own forces.

What about conventional arms reduction as a way of improving stability, and reducing the ability of the Soviets to attack successfully by rapidly advancing the front through Western Europe? A good many simulations of such a conflict have been carried out, involving varying assumptions about mobilization, political decisions with respect to reinforcement, and capabilities of the forces and equipment on the two sides. As usual, such simulations are probably more reliable in telling us how the results change with changes in these factors than they are in foretelling the outcome of a particular actual attack, which would depend on such things as leadership, morale, training, surprise, and the fog of war -- all of which are difficult to evaluate and predict, much less include in the simulation. However, these studies do suggest that the outcome does depend on the size of the forces, on their armaments, especially tanks and artillery, on their location, and on their degree of readiness. In addition, air power, resupply, intelligence and the technology of sensors and of weapons all matter. A recent RAND Corporation study based on such simulations concludes that in order to reduce the ability of the Warsaw Pact forces to penetrate deep into NATO territory quickly by means of arms reductions, unequal and rather deep reductions would be required in the key firepower elements -- tanks and artillery. This is because the NATO forces can now barely cover the line from the Baltic to the Alps, while the Soviets have large forces and reserves -- more in fact than they can funnel at one time through the relatively few corridors that geography allows for an attack. Therefore, unless the Warsaw Pact forces are reduced below the number that they can bring to bear in a first echelon assault through those corridors, reductions on the NATO side merely make the force ratios at the critical points -- and the outcome -- worse for NATO. The reductions should be made in equipment rather than in units or in personnel. The issue of whether air power should be included is an arguable one; the Soviet position would probably be that it should. They would tend to count only attack aircraft where they are at a disadvantage, while having many more air defense aircraft than the NATO forces. In fact all aircraft are in principle dual-capable. Moreover, aircraft without ground forces can't mount an invasion. Sea power, which is rather less relevant over the first few weeks, would also be a likely Soviet candidate for inclusion. Verification of removal or destruction of tanks and artillery is probably feasible, but will prove complex.

All of these factors suggest that conventional arms reductions would involve complex and lengthy negotiations, which would affect and be affected by political relations between the West and the Soviets during and after the negotiations. This raises some of the usual questions. Would strengthening alliance conventional military capabilities, or at least convincing the Soviets that the alliance will strengthen capabilities absent an arms control agreement, act as a positive lever in such negotiations? (And how do we do that with shrinking defense budgets?) Or would such a course make the Soviets less willing to negotiate reductions in their own capabilities? Or are the Soviet decisions on these matters in fact driven by internal Soviet political, economic, bureaucratic forces and personal ambitions? My own judgment is that they are largely so driven, but that a believable allied intention to strengthen its capabilities unless the Soviets agree to a reasonable and verifiable reduction in conventional forces would be a useful lever. My view, therefore, is that conventional arms reduction should be pursued actively, and that we face a Soviet leadership that is willing to enter such negotiations seriously but will prove to be tenacious in safeguarding what they regard as their own security and their own advantages. We should thus be prepared for protracted and difficult negotiations. In the meantime it is important for the U.S. and the other allies to bring under a common umbrella our military strategy, our own force planning and structure, and our proposals for arms control and reduction so that each is consistent with the other, a condition that has seldom prevailed, and does not now.

IV. Burdensharing

Let me now turn to the issue of burdensharing. To begin with, I would like to note that the alliance is a political arrangement even more than it is a military structure; indeed, different allies participate to different degrees in the military structure. Thus the political cohesion of the alliance, which is in danger of and has already experienced some erosion, needs to be preserved. These fissiparous trends are not surprising. Has the Cold War ended? Did we win it? It is winding down? Whatever the answers to these questions, and whatever form the alliance takes, whether the changes be large or small, it will help the transition if the burdensharing issue is well handled. This in turn raises other questions. How should the burden of each member be measured? What is fair? Who is to decide what is fair? And how should we proceed?

In this connection, it should be noted that the Japanese and European situations are rather different. Japan is a special case. East Asia is more complex in terms of geography, the variety of national entities, and differing states of economic and political development. It is important that Japanese military capability not be such as to frighten other Asians. And the U.S. and Japan, allies though we are, are engaged in an especially severe economic competition with each other. In Europe, the lines are more clearly drawn, there is a long and relatively stable history of sharing of the burden, and that burden -- at least with respect to forces defending Western Europe itself -- is more evenly shared than is the case vis a vis Japan. Europeans do, as they often say, provide over 80 percent of the ground forces (counting the French) and 75 percent of the tactical air forces deployed in peacetime on the Central Front.

The U.S. spends about 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense. The average European contribution is about half that percentage of GNP. The Japanese contribution is just over 1 percent by its own measure, probably more like 1 1/2 percent by standard NATO definitions. The principal competitor in all of these nations for government expenditures both in economic and political terms, is income transfer programs. They are somewhat more difficult to measure. But they probably amount to an average of about 25 percent of GNP among our European allies (with considerable variation among them), 14 percent or so in the United States, and about 10 percent in Japan. The disparity in percentage of GNP devoted to defense is less justified now that the United States has a per capita GNP not much higher than that of its allies. On the other hand, the U.S. is and inevitably will remain the leader of the alliance. As such it has more responsibility than the others. In particular it has more out of area responsibilities than its allies. Those extra responsibilities, as much as its greater size, gives the U.S. extra weight in the political decisions of the alliance. There is no replacement for that weight, or for the U.S. Correspondingly, although if we were starting the world all over again the division in resource contributions between the U.S. and its allies probably would be different from what it now is, I do not think it either realistic or desirable to seek an abrupt and major relative change. Allied leaders will often make other arguments, particularly that the U.S. along with Britain (whose percentage of GNP devoted to defense is not much less than ours) and Canada (whose percentage of GNP is much less) do not have conscription, whereas the European allies on the Central Front, including France, do. If the difference in cost between conscripts and volunteers is counted in, the disparity in defense percentages of GNP drop. On the other hand, the effectiveness of a conscript force of short termers is somewhat less -- you get what you pay for, and it is questionable to charge yourself for a conscript but credit yourself with a veteran.

In any event, changes in the nature of the U.S. contribution to European defense had already begun in the late 1970s, when we informed our allies that in case of a crisis outside of NATO the reinforcements on which SACEUR had been counting from the United States might go to that other area of conflict rather than to Europe, where NATO planners would otherwise have been expecting them. The swing strategy, of moving U.S. naval forces from the

Pacific to the Atlantic in case of a NATO crisis, was altered. Those moves, and their elaborations during the Reagan administration, seem to me a sensible modification of plans. Proposals to remove large numbers of U.S. ground forces in Europe to the United States for possible use elsewhere are in my judgment unrealistic. They would instead be demobilized and thus not useable anywhere. An exception would be a change of that sort made as part of a conventional arms reduction agreement with the Soviets.

We should, instead of relocating large numbers of U.S. troops from Europe, insist on arrangements with our European allies for the freer use of U.S. forces in Western Europe for out of area crises. Europe is closer to many of those areas than the U.S., so this makes military as well as political sense. It would help, however, to make those arrangements with relatively little publicity so as to avoid political complications in Europe. Unfortunately, to counter calls in the U.S. for reduction of American forces in Europe, a high profile for those same arrangements would help. We should also continue the trend toward increased host country support, through supply of indigenous transport, etc. In so doing we can't logically insist that the Federal Republic of Germany buy General Motors rather than Mercedes trucks to support U.S. forces.

Turning to Japan, we should urge Japan to provide the great bulk of the forces necessary for its own self defense against a conventional attack. The Japanese have already been contributing over a billion dollars annually to the support cost for U.S. forces in Japan. The appreciation of the yen and the indication that they will assume more of the costs for Japanese support personnel should boost this to two billion dollars a year. But we should press the Japanese to assume a still larger share. Japan should also be asked to assume a large fraction of the burden of economic assistance for the developing world. Its large trade surplus should be recycled at Japanese risk, not at the risk of U.S. banks.

What is the likelihood of change in the share of the defense burden among the U.S. and its allies? As to reallocation of U.S. and allied shares of a constant total, my judgment is that it will not happen, at least not by agreement. If we can get the total to grow, even very moderately, I think that our allies can probably be persuaded to pick up most of that growth. Europeans are clearly unwilling to shift expenditures from entitlements to defense, or to raise taxes to pay for more defense. It is hard to criticize them for that when the U.S. displayed an identical attitude even while it was increasing the military's share of the GNP. The U.S. borrowed the money, especially from the Europeans and the Japanese, whose savings rate is much higher than our own. Europeans would have a much harder time following the course of borrowing from abroad.

How then should we proceed? My answer is that we need to proceed by political negotiation and compromise, an approach not foreign to this body, nor to the other either, in this kind of difficult situation. I suggest that we begin from where we are and try to improve the military capabilities of the alliance. We shouldn't force burdensharing decisions into a zero sum game. We should adopt the approach that all should do more, and negotiate the ratio of increased contributions. I am not saying that I think the U.S. defense budget can as a practical matter rise in real terms next year or the year after. I am speaking of a program for the next five years. I think that political compromise among allies in those terms is feasible.

To conclude, a few words about defense production as it affects alliance relations. There is no doubt that Europeans, and in a more limited way even the Japanese, want a larger share of defense production of major combat equipment. As a political matter, the two way street and offsets are and will remain a fact of life. Economies of scale and avoidance of duplication of research and development costs argue that the largest producer and purchaser of such equipment within the alliance -- the United States -- can produce the equipment less expensively. This is probably the case, abstractly considered, despite $100 hammers, $600 toilet seats. But again as a practical matter, we need to find some other way to achieve those efficiencies. Such a program was initiated in the late 1970s. The approach was to have only one development in a particular defense area, such as short range air-to-air missiles or long range air-to-air missiles. One industry team from North America and Europe would carry out the research and development on each program, with U.S. firms taking the lead on some and Europeans on others. Production lines would be set up for each system on each side of the Atlantic to provide some competition, at the cost of some efficiency. R&D duplication would be avoided, and some production savings could also result. The program languished during the early 1980s, along with some other alliance issues and multilateral approaches. In recent years, however, it has been revived and I think it ought to continue to be pushed. We should accept the existence of political constraints on achieving the optimally efficient arrangements but that should not prevent us from seeking arrangements that are much more efficient than the present ones.

V. Conclusion

I have tried to weave together the different but overlapping issues of the state of U.S. alliances, the INF Treaty, the future conventional military balance and arms reductions, and the changing world political, military, economic and social context in which these issues must all be seen. The U.S. and its allies have some severe deficiencies, and some considerable advantages, in the military competition. Our own nation finds itself in the new position of competing economically, and not always successfully, with our allies, and negotiating with a new, articulate, innovative, but by no means assuredly benign, Soviet leadership. I think we can manage a transition to a stabler world situation. But it will take skill, nerve, experience, and innovation.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. ALFRED M. GRAY

I am privileged to appear before you today to offer my views on the implications of the INF Treaty signed by the President on December 8th, 1987. The Constitution gives the Senate an extremely important role in the ratification of treaties. Given the unique nature of this treaty, a treaty which eliminates an entire category of weapons, your task is all that more important. Before consenting in this important matter, you are entitled to the most candid and insightful counsel you can obtain. I hope to so assist the Senate as it carries out its constitutional role regarding the INF Treaty.

I speak to you, of course, in two capacities. First, I wear the hat of a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the body responsible for providing military advice to the President of the United States. In my second role, I appear before you as the Commandant of the Marine Corps -- Chief of my Service -- responsible for training, equipping, and providing Marines to the Unified Commanders, who in turn are tasked to fight should our Nation's deterrent fail. While both these roles are important, it is the second one in particular that should assure you that I do not take lightly my duty to provide to you my best possible counsel. For should deterrence fail, there is no doubt that the young Marines entrusted to my care will be called upon to be the "First To Fight."

These thoughts considered, I say to you that an arms control agreement which does not meet at least two measures of merit is not in the interest of our Nation and may well serve to undermine our strategy of deterrence. In my mind, we must ensure that any arms control agreement meets the following two criteria: First, an arms control agreement must not result in a shift of the military balance against the United States. More specifically, this means that a viable U.S. capability to deter hostilities across the spectrum of conflict from terrorism to high intensity conflict must be maintained. This is especially true in the light of the Soviet Union's considerable conventional capabilities. The lowering of tensions in Europe through arms control must not be allowed to encourage Soviet, or Soviet sponsored, adventurism and coercion elsewhere.

Secondly, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. This requirement ensures that our partner in such an agreement cannot surreptitiously undermine my first criterion. However, I offer a note of caution concerning verification. It is not a cure-all for ensuring that a stable military balance is maintained. More pointedly, we should not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security by overly optimistic hopes concerning verification. True military balance will ultimately rest on the readiness and warfighting capability of our country's armed forces -- not on our monitoring capability.

As the members of this committee well know, the INF Treaty is said by some to violate one or both of the conditions I have framed.

Nevertheless, it is my professional military judgment that we, as a nation, can preserve the global power balance, maintain deterrence and make verification work -- but certain force modernization programs continue to be necessary, whether there is an INF Treaty or not. The force modernization programs are aimed at ensuring deterrence by maintaining the credibility of US military power in the eyes of the world; a credibility rooted in this Nation's ability to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict, when and where required.

Unfortunately, this need for modernization comes at a time when all Services face substantial budget reductions. Yet if budgetary considerations prevail over military requirements, the results, without continuing the modernization process, could well be to increase global instability and the risks to U.S. interests. Allow me to briefly outline how I arrive at this conclusion and suggest a solution to the dilemma.

It is widely perceived that nuclear weapons have deterred war, particularly in Europe, by altering the correlation of forces in such a manner that the risks of aggression outweighed any possible gain. NATO's strategy of flexible response -- the ability to selectively respond with conventional forces and tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces -- has provided a credible deterrent at all levels of conflict for nearly 20 years. Throughout these years, as circumstances changed, theater nuclear weapons have played a pivotal role in maintaining our strategy of flexible response. Indeed, it is the flexibility of strong, modernized INF weapons -- Pershing IIs and GLCMs -- that is so intolerable to the Soviets that they are now willing to forego forces capable of delivering four times as many warheads to rid themselves of this facet of NATO's deterrent.

However, if flexible response is to continue to be a viable strategy in the absence of INF weapons, the forces remaining must be seen as a credible deterrent in their own right. For as we know, the Soviet Union's conventional might, and its proximity to Western Europe, is not altered by this treaty. Thus, measures must be taken to sustain deterrence following the removal of INF.

Consequently, the JCS, in endorsing the INF Treaty, have endorsed a number of measures which minimize the risks associated with the removal of INF missiles. These measures, in the main, consist of previously identified modernization programs and force adjustments that provide a mix of both short- and long-range weapons systems, capable of selective employment against the full spectrum of the potential enemy's capabilities. In short, for deterrence to work in the absence of INF, the remaining conventional and theater nuclear forces must be capable of holding at risk massed troops on the battlefield and be able to strike militarily significant targets throughout the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union.

However, it must be recognized that any measures we take to maintain our deterrence will be neither free nor cheap. In a fiscally constrained environment, it is likely that the Services may be called upon to make force adjustments. Those Services affected by these force adjustments may be required to restructure internally -- absorbing associated costs. Such restructuring will have a rippling effect on the overall defense establishment -- exerting a considerable impact on our ability to meet global responsibilities across the spectrum of conflict from counter-terrorism to high intensity conflict.

I raise this latter point to emphasize again that the impact of the proposed INF Treaty extends well beyond the issues of arms control and force structure in Europe. The INF Treaty cannot be examined in isolation. If history tells us one thing, it is that the enemies of peace and freedom take many forms -- the turmoil in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Philippines are only the most recent examples. As the leader of the free world, the United States must be ever vigilant and always capable of defending its interests when threatened. Global security must not be sacrificed in the process of adjusting to the post-INF environment in Europe.

Given our traditional NATO focus, the United States must continue to deter high intensity conflict in Europe -- and failing this, conclude any conflict there on terms favorable to the alliance. However, we must also maintain our ability to deter conflict on a global basis and prevail. If the Services -- forced to divert assets to deter a massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe in order to adjust for the removal of INF in Europe -- are degraded in their ability to provide, train, and adequately equip the forces necessary to fight elsewhere in the world; then the result of the INF agreement will be to increase the risks to United States global interests. Should this occur, the military balance of power will shift to the disadvantage of our nation and global security will decline. Such a climate may well embolden those nations inclined toward adventurism and the promotion of instability in the world. This advice considered, I believe that it is essential, in a post-INF environment, to maintain a proper balance within our national force structure between forces focused on high intensity conflict and those oriented towards the mid to low level of the spectrum of conflict.

We should not forget that the INF agreement in question was made possible by the determination of the United States and its NATO Allies. This determination was evidenced by the decision to develop and deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs. These INF weapons were perceived by the Soviets not only as a credible military capability, but as a statement of will. As such they were an effective deterrent and ultimately motivated Soviet concessions. The lesson for us is that national determination and credible military capability are the keys to maintaining deterrence, protecting our national interests, and, ultimately, making peace. Many predict that this INF agreement is a precursor of a new era of superpower relations and global stability -- a situation we would all applaud. However, until that day comes the United

States must remain strong and steadfast in its role as leader of the free world.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I offer the following:

First, in the larger scheme of things, certain upgrades to our defensive posture in Europe, identified by the JCS, should be accomplished in order to forestall any shifting in the balance of military power in a post-INF NATO/WTO relationship. The period of INF withdrawal from Europe, and the years immediately following, will be critical. At no time during this period should the NATO alliance project an image of lessening its military capability or wavering in its resolve. Thus, the recommended force adjustments will be a must. Secondly, these force adjustments -- if accomplished without proper funding and only through internal Service restructuring -- will most certainly have an adverse impact on the capability of the United States Armed Forces to respond to crises outside of NATO. This treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot ensure worldwide security throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Thus, the INF Treaty must necessarily be accompanied by our pledge to ourselves to maintain our global military capabilities.

Finally, I say that as an initiative to reduce the level of tension between the superpowers and the alliances of which they are a part, the INF Treaty is a sound first step. It is in this context that I recommend that the Senate give its consent to the INF agreement achieved by our President.

**SS-20 Disguised as SS-25,
by Placing SS-20 Inside SS-25 Canister**



[The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1987]

EUROPE'S INF MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Mr. President:

As longstanding admirers of your great personal contribution to the cause of freedom we wish to draw your attention, and that of the Senate, to the risks inherent in the agreement now signed to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe. **Although we would like to convince ourselves otherwise, we believe that the accord will seriously and adversely change the balance of military and political forces within Europe in favor of the Soviet Union.**

We are also fearful that unless NATO defenses are buttressed by a range of compensatory measures the agreement may set in train a course of events that will progressively undermine the fragile cohesion of the Western Alliance.

Ours is not, we think, a Euro-centric view. We fear that the accord will damage the influence and reputation of the United States, upon which all free, democratic societies remain dependent. It also will damage the vital interests of the U.S. itself. We must therefore decline to join in the summit euphoria that has gripped so many and that brings to mind unfortunate historical precedents. Rather, we would respectfully ask you—and by means of this open letter, members of the Senate who will soon be asked to ratify the accord—to consider the following:

The zero zero option will remove a vital part of the architecture of deterrence that cannot be replaced soon. The cruise and Pershing II missiles serve a combination of functions that are essential to NATO strategy in an age of [illegible] Soviet military superiority. The [illegible] make a general contribution to deterrence through their ability to reach targets deep within the Soviet Union—a capability not matched by any other U.S. land-based missile in Europe. The missiles link the European pillar of the alliance to the American pillar. They provide a crucial element between the level of tactical missiles and the strategic level. Take away that vital rung in the escalatory ladder and you immediately throw into question the mutual transatlantic involvement and solidarity that have preserved the peace in Europe for 40 years.

It is also important to bear in mind that **the Soviet SS-20s no longer present the same threat to Western Europe they once did: the strategic and political value of their removal may therefore be exaggerated. This is partly because,** by the latest standards, the SS-20 lacks accuracy and sophistication. Indeed, it will soon be obsolete.

Meanwhile, **the Soviets are modernizing their nuclear arsenals by the inclusion of such weapons as the SS-24 that are outside the scope of the agreement. Thus,** although the Soviets will give up many more warheads than the U.S., there is no balance or symmetry in this exchange. **Even in the short term the accord will not exclude the possibility of an intermediate-range nuclear strike against Europe. The Warsaw Pact may simply re-target a proportion of its Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles against Europe.**

It should also be remembered that if the Soviets break the agreement—as they have violated earlier deals—or find ways of avoiding its provision, it is unlikely that any American president will be able to put the missiles back. It is doubtful, too, whether it would be possible to create a European consensus in favor of the missiles' re-deployment. At a later date some European nations may have been effectively neutralized.

We regret that you have not followed the advice of European political leaders who urged that what was needed to preserve deterrence in Europe was not the zero-zero option but a balanced *reduction* of INF forces. Perhaps the Europeans did not speak sufficiently clearly and consistently. We fully understand that Americans must be irritated by Europeans who appear ambivalent or hostile to the U.S. position when so many of their fellow Europeans have pushed you relentlessly in the direction of the negotiating table.

These comments, however, come from those who have publicly supported both the case for INF deployment throughout and the case for SDI program. We are not partisans of the arms race for its own sake and we emphatically are not opposed to arms reduction in principle. Indeed, we are saddened to read that you recently dismissed informed criticism of the INF deal as coming from those who believed nuclear conflict was in any case inevitable.

SDI, the British and French strategic nuclear deterrents, Pershing II, cruise missiles, shorter-range intermediate nuclear weapons, the N-bomb and conventional weaponry—all these [illegible] dependent assets complicate the calculations of the Soviet military planner and so deter attack. **This may not be the case if the Soviet Union comes to believe that a conventional land battle waged in Europe can be successfully fought without risk of a nuclear response.** Clearly, the Soviet political leadership already believes the new agreement brings it closer to securing its related objectives of achieving a nuclear-free Europe and of dividing that continent from its Atlantic partner.

All this we have explained at length to our countrymen. Our friends will be baffled and our adversaries delighted if the great political and strategic victory represented by the INF deployment is now to be [illegible]. Such an eventuality would provide the most unexpected and welcome encouragement to neutralists and unilateralists who in Holland, Belgium, West Germany and Britain lost the game and were proved wrong.

Americanism scarcely provides evidence of brilliant statecraft. Whatever show of unity Western politicians may now feel obliged to provide, the inescapable truth is that the West has been comprehensively outplayed. We run the risk of a denuclearized, neutralist West Germany, which in our view would be fatal to the alliance. Europe generally may be plunged into a worse state of doubt than that which existed prior to INF deployment. All this because in our haste for an agreement the arms-control process became an end in itself.

As Frank Barnett has written: "We have played at the arms-limitation table now for more than 60 years, first against Nazi Germany and Japan, then against the Soviet Empire. For the most part we gained little more than the euphoria of being seen at the Peace Casino while our adversaries went home to convert 'lawful' winnings into larger stockpiles of more advanced weapons."

It is one thing to strike a spectacular arms deal with one's adversary. It is another to preserve the conditions of peace and freedom. We remember the president who once denounced the "empire of evil" and who courageously scorned fashionable opinion in order to build up Western defenses. To that president we wish renewed courage, resolve and good fortune. We extend no less to the members of the United States Senate to whom the burden of a historic responsibility now passes.

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION ARMS CONTROL HANDBOOK

Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Force (LRINF) Missile Trends/Relationship

Supplemental Information

- Since some INF systems carry more than one warhead, launchers and warheads totals are different (see following graph). Because of geographical or numerical limitations, LRINFs could not be a component of a U.S. or Soviet first strike against each other. However, Soviet INF forces, for example, could be used in a first strike against NATO military sites, many of which are essentially unprotected. The graph indicates the USSR has a strong lead in numbers of LRINF launchers. Soviet LRINF launchers are reloadable. In addition, Moscow has a substantial lead in shorter-range INF missiles: it has around 370 such systems while the U.S. has none.

- LRINF missiles are considered to be those with ranges between 1,800 and 5,500 kilometers.

- Totals include all individual LRINF missiles; i.e., SS-4s, SS-20s, Pershing IIs, and individual ground-launched cruise missiles (four per launcher).

- The USSR also stockpiles SS-20s and estimates suggest there are anywhere from two to five spare SS-20s (with 3 warheads each) for each launcher.

- Latest public information is that around 171 SS-20 launchers are deployed in Asia; however, the SS-20 is mobile and could be redeployed from Europe to Asia or vice versa.

- Some current and future Soviet defensive systems may be able to intercept U.S. LRINF systems; NATO has no similar capabilities.

- The location of targets may have an impact upon the INF balance; many important NATO targets, for example, are within 500 miles of the intra-German border and therefore in close range of Soviet LRINFs (and shorter-range INFs also).

- The USSR is developing a GLCM which could be deployed to target U.S. allies (the SS-CX-4).

IN-PLACE AND RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES

A comparison of forces must always include reference to specific geographical areas, definitions of readiness, etc. A fine unclassified source for making such comparisons is the FY 1988 United States Military Posture. I have attached a chart from the Military Posture (page 20) which best addresses your question. For your interest, pages 17 through 18 provide a good unclassified overview of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

In–Place and Rapidly Deployable NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces*


Iceland
North:
18 Brigade Groups
(Approx 6.0 Div equiv.)
Finland
12 Soviet Divisions
Sweden
Norway
USSR
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
The US Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union
TOTAL SOVIET & NSWP
77
Ireland
Denmark
UK
Neth
E. Ger
Center:
39 Divisions
Bel
W. Ger
Lux
France**
Liech.
Aust
Swit
Hun
Romania
Caspian Sea
Italy
Black Sea
Portugal
Spain**
Yugo
Bulgaria
Alb
Turkey
TOTAL SOVIET & NSWP
43
Greece
South:
49.6 Divisions
NATO
Warsaw Pact

* Includes rapidly deployable and POMCUS forces. Includes those US Forces whose equipment is stored in Europe and high-readiness Soviet Forces located in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, Odessa, Kiev, and North Caucasus Military Districts. Also includes separate Soviet airborne divisions. All Soviet forces in the Leningrad and Transcaucasus Military Districts and NSWP mobilization bases are considered in place. Excludes artillery division.

** France and Spain are not part of the NATO integrated military command structure and are not included.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

FIGURE III-3

As of 30 September 1987

[The New York Post, June 9, 1983]

"LOST" RED MISSILES

U.S. FAILURE to discover the location of three "regiments" of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles known or strongly suspected to be somewhere on Soviet soil has strengthened agreement within the Reagan Administration that early compromise with Moscow over the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe is impossible.

The three regiments, each with ten launchers for the three-warhead missile, are believed to be somewhere in Central Russia. The U.S. intelligence community is understood to be certain that the 30 missing launchers in three regiments are deployed in the field.

"It is believed that they have been positioned for potential use against either European or Asian targets — which includes the mainland of Communist China and the Japanese islands.

The still-rising numbers of SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe are clearly identifiable in their shelters from spy satellite pictures that regularly photograph them.

The missing regiments, however, have not been spotted, raising questions as to whether the Soviets have arranged new and unknown camouflage protection for them.

Indeed, the unexpected discovery in April of one additional regiment of SS-20s under camouflage signalled a warning to the U.S. that the presumed total number of SS-20s, around 360, may be far less than the actual number.

That was before the existence of the three phantom regiments was even suspected.

The impact of these phantom regiments on U.S. policy could be considerable.

With talks now resuming in Geneva on the NATO plan to start deploying the Pershing 2 missile as a counter to the SS-20s, precise knowledge of the number of SS-20s is obviously essential to the U.S. negotiators, headed by veteran diplomat Paul Nitze.

A just-published appraisal of these negotiations by the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee virtually rules out agreement with the Soviets this year "unless one or both governments propose meaningful shifts in their current ... positions."

Soviet refusal to identify the precise location of the missing regiments is likely to harden the U.S. position.

Equally disconcerting to U.S. policymakers is the strong indication that for each SS-20 launcher, the Russians are now believed to have up to five missiles, not the previously estimated two missiles.

If American specialists are correct on this point, it means that the Soviets now have more than 8000 SS-20 warheads available for use against Western European and Oriental targets: the initial missile plus four backups for each launcher.

SS-20 PRODUCTION



Source: INF Treaty MOU

Source: DIA SMP '81-'87

Source: William Beecher "Soviet Mobile Missile Worries US," Boston Globe, Sept. 5, 1976, various press

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[The Boston Globe, Sept. 5, 1976]

SOVIET MOBILE MISSILE WORRIES U.S.

WASHINGTON--A new Soviet medium-range missile, preparations for deployment of which are just beginning in commands aimed at Western Europe and China, is causing deep concern with the administration.

The missile, called by Western intelligence the SS-20, is a solid-fuel, mobile weapon carrying three separately guided warheads.

The concern, a bit of which crept into public discourse last week, is based on the following information which has not been made public.

—About twice as many SS-20s are being manufactured by the Soviet Union as the number of the missiles they are to replace.

—The missile is estimated to be 10 times more accurate than deployed models.

—Comprising the first two stages of the three-stage SS-16 intercontinental ballistic missile, the SS-20 is believed subject to quick transformation into an ICBM, giving the Russians the potential of having more than 1000 weapons that could cover targets throughout much of the United States but totally outside any SALT limitations.

Dr. Fred Ikle, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, without addressing any of these specifics, made a speech in Los Angeles a few days ago asking why the Soviets deem it necessary to add the SS-20 when they already possess regional nuclear superiority. The specter of such weapons, he declared, "grows like a towering, dark cloud over Europe and Asia."

"Why are they adding to this arsenal?" Ikle asked. "What — we must ask with deep concern — is the possible political purpose?"

Some government analysts are apprehensive that the Russians are determined to field a force perceived as so preponderant — in Europe principally, but also in Asia — that they can expect to realize commensurately greater political leverage.

Especially if the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks result in a parallel scale-down of forces deployed on the central front in Europe, the appearance of twice as many Soviet nuclear missiles, each one carrying three times as many more accurate warheads, should not be lost on political leaders in Western Europe.

Work is under way at some of the SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missile complexes in Southwestern Russia to construct new storage facilities, housing and command bunkers for the SS-20s, well-placed sources report. There are now about 540 of the older missiles in such sites. Some dismantling has begun. But with about 1200 SS-20s now being produced in Soviet factories, a question arises over how many of these are destined for the European front.

Sources report that a goodly number appear also headed for the Sino-Soviet front. The Russians are constructing facilities at an SS-7 ICBM site in Soviet Asia identical to those associated with the SS-20 in southwestern Russia. This suggests to some analysts that Russia intends to place additional numbers of medium-range missiles in its Far East deployment to increase coverage of targets in China.

Under the SALT-1 agreement, the Soviets are allowed to deploy more missile submarines if they dismantle their vintage SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs. It thus appears that the SS-20 will be deployed as a replacement, unconstrained by SALT, in at least some of these sites.

The SS-20 is carried on the same transporter-launcher as the SS-16 ICBM. The only difference discernible from space satellites is that the firing cannister in which the missile is housed is about five feet shorter in the case of the SS-20.

But the SS-20, which has been tested at ranges of about 200 miles, could speedily be given a third stage and a larger cannister and thus become an ICBM.

In that the missiles are mobile, they would be hard to keep track of, compared with missiles in silos. It is anticipated that the SS-20s will normally be kept in a fixed site, with associated spare-parts warehouses, repair shops and troop barracks. But in time of crisis they could easily be moved to alternate sites, thus increasing their chances of surviving any missiles or bombers aimed at the fixed sites.

And even without being fitted with the SS-16's third stage, analysts say, by putting on a lighter single warhead and making certain other difficult-to-detect changes, the SS-20 could probably be given a 4000-mile range, sufficient to reach many targets in the United States.

The SS-20 has not been discussed either in the SALT or Mutual Balance Reduction talks, since the first negotiation deals only with long-range strategic weapons and the other deals only with troops and weapons stationed in the central NATO front and Warsaw pact territory. It this represents a gray-area weapon unconstrained by limits of any kind.

And yet it has clearcut potential of great significance in both areas. It is this failure of coming to grips with a new capability, and the implications of large-scale deployment in suggesting Soviet intentions, that is raising such great concerns within the upper echelons of the military, and arms-control communities.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY CARLUCCI TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL

Use of Pershing II

Senator Pell: Some have argued that this agreement will have the effect of removing a critical rung in the ladder of escalation because the President would be more likely to authorize the use of Pershing II missiles than authorize a limited use of strategic arms in the event of an attack on NATO. Do you agree with this view? Please elaborate.

Secretary Carlucci: No. NATO will retain a broad spectrum of theater and strategic nuclear capabilities, able to hold at risk targets throughout the Warsaw Pact. In fact, although NATO is giving up a significant military capability, the Soviets are giving up a greater capability involving deployed missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times more warheads than NATO. With the elimination of the SS-20 and SS-4 systems, the Soviet's ability to strike deep, time-urgent targets in NATO will be reduced. This, coupled with the reduced threat against NATO seaports, airfields and U.S. POMCUS sites from triple-capable Soviet SRM systems, will increase the sustainability and survivability of our forces.

Role of SACEUR

Senator Pell: Is there a difference between the calculation that the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO must make regarding the ability of NATO to deter a Soviet attack and the calculation the Secretary of Defense can make given that the Secretary of Defense can include all U.S. strategic forces in his decision-making?

Secretary Carlucci: No. Both the Secretary of Defense and SACEUR recognize that NATO must possess a credible capability for effective response across the full spectrum of conflict. Both see the balanced triad of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces as providing an interlocking system of deterrence and defense. Within this framework, both the Secretary of Defense and SACEUR see the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. as providing the backbone of deterrence and the Alliance's ultimate guarantee of security.

START and Conventional Force Balances

Senator Pell: Should there be a formal linkage between completing a START Treaty and improving the conventional balance? Should progress in one area be contingent on progress in the other?

Secretary Carlucci: No. We and our Allies have consistently resisted Soviet efforts to link various arms control issues. If we reach agreement with the Soviets on an effectively verifiable START Treaty, it will be a Treaty which, on its own merits, enhances U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, we should not hold that Treaty and its benefits hostage while we try to redress the conventional imbalance.

START and NATO Strategy

Senator Pell: Would a reduction in strategic arms of approximately 50 percent as envisioned in the START Treaty in any way undermine NATO's strategy of flexible response?

Secretary Carlucci: No. Deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms are seen by NATO Allies as the next priority in achieving the Alliance's goal of stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons. NATO's foreign ministers have repeatedly stated that 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are the next step in the process. Achievement of the U.S. objective of reductions in the most destabilizing strategic nuclear arms -- ballistic missiles, especially heavy, intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads -- would further buttress the Alliance's ultimate deterrent.

How serious are the prospects for agreement in conventional forces?

Senator Pell: How serious are the prospects for agreement in conventional forces?

Secretary Carlucci: The major threat to security and stability in Europe is the Warsaw Pact's substantial conventional superiority together with a war-fighting doctrine that emphasizes rapid offensive operations with massed armor forces. Fourteen years of negotiations for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction agreement indicates that the Soviets have not been seriously interested in reducing their military advantages and building a stable military balance in Europe. Their recent proposals for new negotiations in conventional forces have emphasized nuclear/conventional tradeoffs and have been one-sided given existing disparities (i.e., equal reductions rather than reductions to equal levels).

Increased stability and security are the West's primary objectives. Force reductions through negotiated agreement can help achieve those objectives, but are not sufficient of themselves. Given overall Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, even modest reductions in Western forces would reduce Western security and would not promote stability without larger steps from the East. For negotiations to succeed, they will need to focus on conventional ground forces, and particularly combat-decisive forces like tanks and artillery. Negotiating a stable balance in conventional forces will be complicated enough without mixing nuclear weapons into these negotiations.

As the INF negotiations have shown, the Soviet Union is unlikely to negotiate seriously to redress actual disparities if NATO fails to pursue conventional force improvements. NATO must pursue such improvements vigorously whether or not we achieve arms reductions.

Senator Pell: What formulas are most likely to succeed in this area?

Secretary Carlucci: A major threat to security and stability in Europe is the Warsaw Pact's substantial conventional superiority together with a war-fighting doctrine that emphasizes rapid offensive operations with massed armor forces. Fourteen years of negotiations for a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction indicates that the Soviets have not been seriously interested in reducing their military advantages and building a stable military balance in Europe. Their recent proposals for new negotiations in conventional forces have emphasized nuclear/conventional tradeoffs and have been one-sided given existing disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (i.e., equal reductions rather than reductions to equal levels).

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Given overall Warsaw Pact conventional superiority, even modest reductions in Western forces would reduce Western security and would not promote stability, absent larger steps from the East. For negotiations to succeed, they will need to focus on conventional ground forces, and particularly combat decisive forces like tanks and artillery. Negotiating a stable balance in conventional forces will be complicated enough without mixing nuclear weapons into these negotiations.

The Soviet Union is unlikely to negotiate seriously to redress actual disparities if NATO is unwilling to pursue conventional force improvements. NATO must pursue such improvements vigorously whether or not we achieve arms reductions.

Senator Pell: Please discuss the timeframe within which NATO can reasonably be expected to agree on a mandate for the new negotiations and develop a formal proposal.

Secretary Carlucci: We have yet to receive a constructive Warsaw Pact response to our compromise proposal on conventional forces put forward in MBFR in December of 1985. In June of 1986, the Halifax NAC issued a statement calling for new negotiations on conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a result of this NATO initiative, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact states are now meeting in Vienna to negotiate a mandate for new conventional stability talks covering the whole of Europe. We hope to reach agreement on a mandate and begin actual negotiations this year, if a balanced outcome to the Vienna meeting can be achieved. NATO's objectives are to concentrate on increasing stability in Europe by removing the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

Although there have been several Soviet references to "eliminating disparities", it seems clear that the Soviets have their own definition of disparities which are biased by qualitative offsets (of unknown dimensions) and false or misleading bases for comparison.

The US is now consulting with NATO about the specific elements of proposals for these new conventional stability talks. There is already consensus on the major elements of an approach and NATO is developing a sound proposal supporting our goals for the start of talks.

Conventional and Nuclear Modernization

Senator Pell: Given the current plans to modernize NATO's nuclear and conventional forces, are there additional unilateral U.S. or Alliance programs being considered in the area of conventional force modernization? In nuclear modernization plans?

-- Is there consideration being given to developing new air-launched cruise missiles to be assigned to NATO in light of the INF Treaty?

-- Please describe the importance of assigning sea-launched cruise missiles to the NATO commander in light of the INF Treaty? Would this require an increase over the 758 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles currently programmed?

-- Do you expect to seek funds to deploy modernized longer-range Lance missiles in light of the INF Treaty?

-- In which countries would such missiles be deployed?

-- Will such countries accept deployment of these missiles?

Secretary Carlucci: (U) NATO is not considering additional programs to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces because of the INF Treaty. Rather, it is pursuing pre-existing requirements stemming from the 1985 Conventional Defense Improvements program and the 1983 Montebello Decision.

NATO is not considering development of a new air-launched cruise missile to be assigned to NATO in light of the INF Treaty. However, the US and UK are pursuing the requirement, stemming from the Montebello Decision, for a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) to replace a portion of the air-delivered bombs currently assigned to NATO aircraft.

The DoD budget request for FY89 includes $15 million to study a follow-on to LANCE (FOTL). Deployment possibilities would be a matter for discussion, both within NATO and bilaterally. Our objective would be to maintain and enhance the contribution to deterrence provided by current LANCE deployments.

Q: What is the difference between "effective" and "adequate" verification?

A: During the course of its arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has stressed that any new agreement would have to be effectively verifiable. What we mean by effective verification is if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty, we would be able to detect a militarily significant violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation. Our ability to detect and respond to violations helps to deter the other side from committing them in the first place.

At the same time, our approach called for verification measures well beyond those found in previous arms control efforts. The INF Treaty goes beyond simple reliance on NTM. The specific INF requirements for cooperative efforts, such as extensive data exchanges, various types of on-site inspections, and enhanced NTM, will make it more difficult for the Soviets to engage in illegal activities and elude detection. The INF verification regime thus goes beyond the measures employed in previous arms control treaties and meets our standards for effective verification.

✓ Q: Are on-site inspections central to the verification regime?

A: The verification measures in the INF Treaty are designed to operate together so that the sum of the measures results in the overall effectiveness of verification in the INF Treaty. This clearly includes the various on-site inspection measures, different types of which provide different contributions to the overall verfication regime. On-site inspection measures, in particular, create an element of uncertainty in the Soviet mind regarding the risk of detection and thus help to deter cheating.

Q: Are we basically relying on our intelligence capabilities, rather than on-site inspections, to detect any Soviet effort to covertly produce and deploy SS-20s or shorter-range missiles?

A: While NTM will play the major role in detecting any covert force of systems limited by the INF Treaty, other verification measures including on-site inspections will supplement and enhance our NTM capabilities. This combination of NTM, on-site inspections and other measures, particularly the ban on flight testing, adds to the complications and costs that the Soviets would have to incur in order to produce, deploy, and maintain a covert force. The combination of verification measures thus will have a significant deterrent effect on possible Soviet violations.

Q: What aspects of the INF inspection regime do you think would be particularly applicable to a strategic arms control agreement?

A: In the Joint Statement issued after their December 1987 summit, the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev stated that START verification would "build upon the provisions" of the INF Treaty. Their statement recognizes that, while the INF negotiations have provided a solid foundation for drafting START verification procedures, including an inspection regime, START and INF represent fundamentally different verification challenges. First, START involves a greater diversity of systems. More importantly, unlike INF systems, START systems will continue to exist indefinitely. In START, therefore, we must verify continuing compliance with numerical limits on systems, rather than simply confirming their elimination. Because of the greater challenge this presents, START verification provisions are likely to be different and more complicated than INF provisions.

The INF Treaty has established verification precedents upon which START negotiators will build. For instance, START Treaty provisions probably would include baseline, short-notice, on-site, and elimination inspections. An effective START inspection regime probably would include an expansion of the portal monitoring provisions in the INF Treaty. In START, however, since both sides will retain a large number of missile systems and their infrastructure, the verification regime will have to be considerably more extensive than the one crafted for INF's double global zero outcome.

Q: Do you think the type of production controls established in the INF Treaty would be a useful means of limiting mobile missiles or cruise missiles?

A: The INF Treaty has provisions for a ban on the production of INF missile systems; it does not contain provisions for production controls.

Q: Do you think the Senate should condition its approval of the Treaty on some kind of guaranteed response? What would be the risks of such conditions?

A: We do not believe that such a condition is necessary or useful. We would hope that Congress would express its willingness during the INF Treaty debate to work closely with this and future administrations in reaching agreement on responses which would be appropriate should Soviet violations of the INF Treaty occur.

We would wish to determine our response on a case-by-case basis as actual problems are unlikely to fit hypothetical scenarios determined in advance. Consequently, we require the flexibility to deal with compliance issues as they might arise, and need the cooperation of Congress in implementing the appropriate response.

Q: To what extent is it advisable, or possible to formulate an appropriate response to a treaty violation before we know what sort of violation has occured?

A: We would wish to determine our response on a case-by-case basis as actual problems are unlikely to fit hypothetical scenarios determined in advance. Consequently, we require the flexibility to deal with compliance issues as they might arise, and need the cooperation of Congress in implementing the appropriate response.

Q: Which entity in the U.S. Government will have the responsibility for determining whether the Soviet Union has violated the INF Treaty?

A: Judgements of Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty will be made by the Administration in the same manner that such judgements are currently made for other arms control agreements. Ultimately, these determinations will be made by the President. The main mechanism created to aid the President in these decisions is the Arms Control Verification Committee (ACVC), which is responsible for reviewing monitoring information and verification analyses and drafting judgements regarding Soviet compliance with arms control agreements.

Q: Have we made the necessary arrangements yet to implement this Treaty? Is the OSIA organized and staffed? Has the necessary equipment been purchased? Please give us your assessment of where we stand today.

A: Work is progressing on preparations to implement the inspection provisions of the INF Treaty with a target date geared to the earliest anticipated completion of the ratification process. The On-Site Inspection Agency Headquarters is now staffed and inspectors are undergoing extensive training. While the U.S. has developed a tentative inventory of required equipment, a final list is contingent on agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be worked out in technical discussions. We feel confident that the U.S. will be ready to implement the inspection requirements under the terms of the Treaty when the ratification process is complete.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY CARLUCCI TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Purpose of Reducing SS-20s

Senator Biden: To what extent will the required eliminations reduce our coverage of Warsaw Pact targets and Soviet coverage of NATO targets?

-- After the INF Treaty is implemented, will the Soviet Union still maintain thousands of strategic systems which can serve the same military function as the SS-20? Can it be said that we are eliminating a significant part of U.S. or Soviet military capcapability?

Secretary Carlucci: Naturally, the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons brings with it, for both sides, a diminution of military capability. For the US, SACEUR loses the ability to use ground-launched missiles based in Europe to hit some important targets, in particular aim points deep inside the Warsaw Pact and in the Soviet Union itself. However, the West retains the ability to reallocate nuclear systems, including strategic weapons assigned to SACEUR, to cover such targets. There is little doubt that the Soviets felt strongly about capturing the Pershings because of their rapid deep-strike capability and that was an influential element in moving them toward the double-zero approach.

In turn, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters to strike many potential NATO targets. In addition, in Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites and debarkation sea and airports.

Additionally, we have long been worried about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter-range delivery systems for chemical weapons (SS-12s and SS-23s) will be removed from the Soviet order of battle as a result of this Treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-12 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and airfields. In essence, the Treaty will assist in facilitating our reinforcement of Europe.

In East Asia, elimination of the SS-20 prevents the Soviets from using these systems to hold at risk nearly 500 targets in that region -- in addition to the elimination of 300 shorter-range missiles in the Asian-Pacific theater.

For example, the Soviet Union will have to use its dual-capable aircraft or its strategic weapons to threaten targets now covered by INF ballistic missiles. Today, most of those aircraft are concentrated on a few main operating bases and are not dispersed over the countryside like land-mobile missiles.

The objective NATO established in the 1979 dual-track decision was to redress the growing disparity between U.S. and Soviet INF missiles. The agreement does more than redress that disparity -- it eliminates Soviet INF missile capacity.

Strategic Arms

Senator Biden: In May 1986, President Reagan announced that the United States would abandon its policy of informal adherence to the limits of SALT II. If the Soviet Union so chose, it could now add new strategic forces to compensate for reducing its SS-20s. Those new strategic forces could be programmed to cover the same targets as the SS-20.

-- In the absence of a new agreement covering strategic arms, should some informal arrangement be negotiated to prevent the Soviet Union from taking such actions which would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the INF Treaty?

Secretary Carlucci: Limiting strategic nuclear weapons was never the intent of the INF Treaty. That Treaty stands firmly on its own merits. Along with eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles and establishing stability at a lower level of nuclear arms, it achieves all of the INF negotiating objectives set forth by the U.S. and its NATO allies.

Although the INF Treaty will cause the Soviets to give up roughly 4 times as much INF warhead-delivery potential as the U.S., both sides will retain the ability to reallocate strategic weapons to cover targets previously assigned to INF weapons. Of course, this is not without some additional strain on such strategic assets. More importantly, however, we cannot lose sight of the political achievements of the INF Treaty. This Treaty will eradicate the missiles the Soviets attempted to use to drive wedges in the NATO Alliance and to heighten fears about the possibility that the US could be decoupled from the defense of Europe. These Soviet attempts were based on the perception that Soviet INF missiles could reach our Europen Allies but could not threaten US territory directly. The INF Treaty will eliminate these missile systems and Soviet attempts to use them to disrupt the Alliance. The Treaty leaves intact, however, our long-standing strategy of flexible response and the conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic assets to implement it.

Conditioning Senate approval of the INF Treaty on an unverifiable informal arrangement by both parties would jeopardize a Treaty that stands on its own merits and is clearly in our national security interest, while risking an outcome that is not in that interest. Moreover, the time and effort needed to reach such an agreement and effective verification for it would be better spent pursuing deep, equitable reductions in START. Among other things, jeopardizing prompt ratification places at risk the strength and cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance and the future of all arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

Regarding limits on strategic arms, the President's approach to interim restraint has not impeded progress in arms control. In fact, the Soviets have made their most constructive START proposals subsequent to the President's decision.

No regime of interim restraint can substitute for the significant reductions in strategic offensive arms that we are seeking and are closer than ever to achieving in START.

Re-establishing informal adherence to the unequal SALT II sublimits would require the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent force on the basis of standards in that outdated, unratified and Soviet-violated Treaty, rather than looking toward our current and anticipated security requirements under an INF Treaty and a prospective START treaty.

Senator Biden: Could you please provide the Committee with an assessment of the Soviet capability and incentives to compensate for the INF Treaty by re-targeting or expanding their strategic forces?

Secretary Carlucci: The Soviets would be able to compensate for the short-range INF (SRINF) systems, the SS-23 and SS-12, banned by the Treaty. Currently, Soviet tactical aviation assets can cover many of the targets previously assigned to the SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. In the future, the Soviets may deploy follow-on surface-to-surface missile systems with ranges less than 500 kilometers to execute SRINF missions.

The replacement of the 470 deployed SS-20 and SS-4 missiles declared by the Soviets poses a more significant problem for the Soviets. It is believed that the Soviets will retarget ICBMs and SLBMs to fill critical gaps left by the elimination of the SS-20s and SS-4s. In addition, they may deploy sea-launched cruise missiles, augmented by air-delivered weapons, against theater targets.

The Soviets will likely continue to cover those targets that required nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons. The Soviets have probably assessed that such targets required nuclear weapons with their inherent high damage expectancies. The Soviets would probably not depend on conventional weapon systems to meet their goals. Therefore, it is likely that the Soviets will allocate other nuclear weapons to compensate for the vacuum left by the elimination of the SS-20 and SS-4.

Senator Biden: Could you please explain how the reduction of Soviet SS-20s and shorter-range missiles fits into our overall goals and objectives for strategic arms control?

Secretary Carlucci: The President's long-standing goal, and that of the Alliance, has been to achieve stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty clearly contributes significantly to that goal by completely eliminating a class of such weapons. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev, as well as NATO's Foreign Ministers, have repeatedly stated that the next step in this process should be 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and Soviet Union. US and Soviet negotiators are at the table in Geneva working toward that end.

Senator Biden: How important is achieving a START agreement to making the INF Treaty strategically significant?

Secretary Carlucci: The INF Treaty stands firmly on its own merits. One of its most significant contributions, moreover, is the impetus it provides for further steps in the area of strategic nuclear reductions, as well as in the conventional and chemical arenas.

The INF Treaty, standing alone, will have a considerable beneficial effect. It will strengthen our national security and that of Western Europe. Its contribution will be further enhanced, morever, if it is complemented by progress in the other arms control deliberations as well as in the other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Further Nuclear Reductions in Europe

Senator Biden: The question of whether NATO should proceed with further reductions in its nuclear forces has caused some controversy within the Alliance.

— In the absence of agreement on conventional forces, should we proceed with further reductions in nuclear forces, particularly short-range nuclear weapons? How should NATO respond to a Soviet "triple-zero" proposal?

Secretary Carlucci: The zero outcome in INF is not necessarily the most desirable outcome for other arms control agreements. In the face of pressures for further negotiated reductions, we must continue to have the political conviction and courage to pursue a responsible approach to arms control.

The United States strongly supports the position that was adopted by the NATO ministers at Reykjavik to pursue:

- a 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

NATO nations are also in agreement that the Alliance should reject any proposal for a third zero. On his recent visit to Washington, Chancellor Kohl made clear the FRG's strong opposition to what he called the "zero resolution" of the SNF issue.

Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control

Senator Biden: Can you describe the progress being made in NATO towards the development of a "comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" as prescribed by paragraph 8 of the June, 1987 NATO Defense Ministers' communique released at Reykjavik?

Secretary Carlucci: We and our Allies have been examining our approach to arms control in light of our fundamental principles and security objectives. In examining our concept of arms control, we took as a starting point the need to reaffirm the validity of the basic principles of our political and military strategy. That has been done. We have set the stage for an arms control approach that builds on the political strategy of deterring conflict and engaging in a dialogue with the East, as set out in the Harmel report, with a clear vision of our security interests. We have, accordingly, agreed that:

- — our strategy is based on shared burdens and risks;
- -- deterrence is indivisible;

-- flexible response requires both U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe;

-- nuclear weapons are essential to deterrence; and

-- a third zero is not acceptable.

In addition, the Alliance is developing its approach for resuming negotiations on confidence building measures under the Conference of Disarmament in Europe (CDE). NATO is working now to build upon the success of the Stackholm CDE meeting of late 1986 and increase the transparency of the East's military establishment. In the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), NATO nations are also addressing the fundamental issues dividing East and West.

As part of NATO's comprehensive arms control framework, in the ongoing CSCE Review Meeting in Vienna and in the prospective Conventional Stability Talks (CST), NATO will test the Soviet approach to Europe. While negotiations on a mandate for CST continue in Vienna, NATO is continuing to work on developing the substance of a Western proposal. While disagreements remain, a consensus is emerging on the broad outlines of that proposal:

-- large and asymmetrical Warsaw Pact force reductions to achieve a more stable equilibrium in Europe;

-- concentration on the essential elements of offensive, ground-combat power, particularly tanks and artillery and perhaps armored infantry fighting vehicles;

-- application of the measures involved to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, with particular attention to the large concentration of forces in the central region and the unique security problems on the flanks;

-- an intrusive verification regime to increase the transparency of Warsaw Pact military activities;

-- exclusion of aircraft, at least in the first phase, and

-- the firm exclusion of nuclear weapons.

NATO certainly faces challenges in developing a substantive proposal for CST and in refining a coherent arms control framework that can take advantage of opportunities without succumbing to the lure of false security. NATO is hard at work but has already reaffirmed its existing strategy as the instrument that shapes its comprehensive framework. The success of the INF Treaty is seen by NATO nations as proof that they can enjoy positive results in arms control negotiations when NATO participates with political solidarity and confidence in its military strength.

Battlefield Nuclear Weapons in Germany

Senator Biden: There is strong public sentiment in West Germany in favor of eliminating the short-range nuclear weapons -- such as nuclear artillery and the LANCE missile -- stationed on German soil. West Germany's deputy parliament leader, Volker Ruhe, has remarked, "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." Many NATO leaders, however, have stressed the need to modernize these weapons. How should the Alliance approach this sensitive issue?

Secretary Carlucci: NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Reykjavik last June determined that the Alliance's arms control priorities are to pursue:

-- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

-- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Before we agreed on an INF Treaty, NATO decisions were made to strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrent capabilities, including existing short-range systems and dual-capable aircraft. The Montebello Decision of 1983 mandated substantial reductions in the size of NATO's nuclear stockpile, while calling for necessary modernization measures for remaining systems in order to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of the nuclear component of NATO's strategy of flexible response. Those reductions have already been made. NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to continue to move forward with these necessary modernization meassures as the INF Treaty enters into force.

Similarly, NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to press ahead with conventional defense improvements (CDI) in accordance with the CDI action plan formulated in 1985.

Q: Can you please discuss with us the distinction between militarily significant violations and detecting violations of lesser importance?

A: Judgements about the military significance of Soviet cheating must be made on a case-by-case basis. We do not want to be explicit in defining in advance what we would consider to be, in the abstract, militarily significant. To do so would be ill-advised and misleading vis-a-vis the Soviets. We would regard any cheating with the greatest concern. In determining the military significance of any given case of cheating, we would take into account the following kinds of factors:

The quantitative level of cheating and the overall threat it posed to U.S. and NATO defenses.

Qualitative factors, including the kind or kinds of weapons involved inn any cheating and their specific capabilities for target coverage, survivability, etc.

Our assessment of the state of readiness and training of a cheating force.

The extent to which other forces available to the Soviets render a cheating force largely redundant or, conversely, comprised a significant addtional military capability.

The extent to which the U.S. and its allies possessed existing military forces or surge capabilities which could permit an effective counter to a Soviet cheating force.

The overall political and military situation surrounding the discovery of Soviet cheating, e.g., whether that situation was one of relative stability, one of tension, etc. The assessment of military significance of any Soviet cheating would be a fundemental part of our response to Soviet noncompliance. We would govern our actions by insuring an appropriate response directed toward meeting our military requirements. We would retain the right to cease to observe selected provisions of the Treaty we judge appropriate or to withdraw from the Treaty altogether.

Q: How confident can we be that, with our national technical means and the cooperative measures provided for in this Treaty, we will be able to detect any and all militarily significant violations? Please describe our confidence level with National Technical Means alone.

A: No agreement is ever 100% verifiable and there is no way to ensure that the Soviets cannot cheat. However, we feel that the measures in this Treaty taken together create major disincentives to Soviet cheating by raising significantly the cost that the Soviet Union would have to incur in order to covertly deploy a significant force of banned missiles and by raising the probability of getting caught if they do cheat. This is particularly true because of the flight testing, production and training bans which, over time, would impair the military utility and viability of any covert force. In addition, the total elimination of systems covered by this Treaty and the on-site inspection regime will enhance U.S. capabilities to detect cheating that is extensive enough to pose a threat to U.S. or Allied security.

Taken together, U.S. National Technical Means and the verification measures provided for in the INF Treaty, including extensive data exchanges and on-site inspections, will facilitate the detection of significant Soviet violations in a timely fashion so as to protect U.S. and allied security. At the same time, NTM and the Treaty's verification measures will also serve as a deterrent to Soviet cheating.

(Information regarding the confidence level for NTM is classified and should be requested directly from the intelligence community.)

Q: Was there significant opposition from various government agencies to an "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspection regime? Were certain agencies opposed to such inspections on the grounds that sensitive U.S. facilities might be compromised?

A: We do not comment on internal executive branch deliberations. For the reasons cited earlier, we are convinced that the right balance between our verification needs and security concerns was achieved and that the INF Treaty is effectively verifiable without "anytime, anywhere" inspections.

Q: What are the verification benefits of access to all "suspect sites" in the Soviet Union?

A: The benefits to be derived from such access would, of course, be contingent on the specific agreement and the procedural provisions that would govern such an inspection regime. For an arms control agreement that establishes numerical limits on missile systems -- especially if a significant force structure is to remain intact after a period of reduction has passed -- general access to suspect sites would make an important contribution to verifying Soviet compliance. The exact nature of suspect site provisions must be developed in the context of other on-site verification techniques and cooperative measures. However, because any verification regime requires reciprocity, careful consideration must be afforded to the security problems that would be associated with reciprocal access to sensitive U.S. facilities.

Q: Under an "anytime, anywhere" inspection regime, to what extent would we ultimately rely on NTM to determine which sites we wish to inspect?

A: The specific capabilities of U.S. National Technical Means are classified and could be provided, if required, in a classified answer. However, even under such an inspection regime, NTM would ultimately be one of the primary means of identifying sites where suspected Soviet activities would indicate noncompliance.

Q: What are the risks associated with allowing Soviet inspectors access to U.S. "suspect sites."

A: There are always potential risks associated with Soviet inspections in the U.S. In each case we need to assess the risks in terms of the benefits derived from reciprocal inspections in the U.S. There are both political and practical problems associated with "anytime, anywhere" inspections. The political problems associated with the INF Treaty, for instance, included the fact that the U.S. operated sites in Allied Basing Countries which would have been subject to inspection. Practically, in our own county, we faced the problems of permitting unlimited Soviet inspections of sensitive U.S. facilities. Of course, associated risks are variables that must be examined in light of procedures to mitigate such risks and to enhance verification benefits.

Q: Do you believe the risks of allowing Soviet inspectors access to "suspect" sites in the U.S. outweigh the verification benefits of U.S. access to "suspect" Soviet sites?

A: It was the conclusion of the Administration that, in the context of the INF Treaty, "anytime, anywhere" inspections added little to the already extensive and unprecedented INF verification regime when balanced against the possible risks which they raised to other U.S. and Allied security interests.

Q: Could you please explain why broad challenge inspections of any suspect sites should be included in a START agreement, but not the INF agreement? How would a right of refusal work under such a regime?

A: The INF Treaty does include provisions for short-notice, on-site inspection and other cooperative measures at specified locations. For example, we will be able to inspect on short-notice all active INF missile operating bases as well as those at which INF missile activity ceases. We will also have the right to demand, on short notice, open displays of road-mobile strategic missiles on launchers and their launch garages.

The U.S. initially proposed an even more intrusive inspection regime for INF which included challenge inspections at any location at which a violation was suspected. However, following Soviet acceptance of double global zero, we were able to simplify the verification regime required. We are convinced that the right balance between our verification needs and security concerns was achieved in the Treaty.

In START, however, both sides will retain a large number of missile systems and their infrastructure; the verification regime required in such an environment will have to be considerably more extensive than the one crafted for INF's double global zero outcome. We are, therefore, working to develop procedures that strike the appropriate balance between our concerns regarding sensitive U.S. facilities and the need to verify Soviet compliance with a START agreement. That work is proceeding and will be reflected in the START Treaty.

RESPONSES OF ADMIRAL CROWE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL

Senator Pell: In the FY 1987 Posture Statement, the Joint Chiefs pointed out the importance of Pershing II and GLCMs stating that they provide "a major deterrent to conventional, theater nuclear, and chemical attack, and are essential to a strategy of flexible response." Does the elimination of INF undermine flexible response?
Admiral Crowe: Flexible response will remain fully valid. It does not depend on any specific weapons system; what is needed depends in part on the nature of the threat.
NATO will retain sufficiently robust and credible forces to confront a potential aggressor with major uncertainties about the consequences of using or threatening to use nuclear or conventional forces in an attack against NATO. These systems will, of course, have to be maintained and modernized to ensure our ability to execute a strategy of "flexible response."

Senator Pell: Some have argued that because the President would be more likely to authorize the use of PERSHING II missiles than a limited use of strategic arms, the removal of PERSHING II missiles will undermine deterrence. How would you respond to this concern? Would the President be more likely to authorize the use of PERSHING II missiles than a limited use of strategic arms in the event of an attack on NATO?

Admiral Crowe: The question implies that the President has been/would be limited in options between the use of PERSHING II missiles or a limited use of strategic arms. In fact, the NATO Triad is composed of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. The elimination of PERSHING II does not leave the President without sufficient military options. Other theater nuclear forces will remain as alternatives to authorization of one system over another and the decision made would depend on the prevailing situation, the types of targets to be attacked, enemy defenses, assets available to perform the assigned mission, and many other variables.

Flexible response will remain fully valid following the INF Treaty. Deterrence through flexible response does not depend on any specific weapons system; what is needed depends in part on the nature of the threat.

NATO will retain sufficiently robust and credible forces to confront a potential aggressor with major uncertainties about the consequences of using or threatening to use nuclear or conventional forces in an attack against NATO.

Senator Pell: Is there a difference between the calculation that the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO must make regarding the ability of NATO to deter a Soviet attack and the calculation you can make given that you can include all U.S. strategic forces?

Admiral Crowe: No. Both the JCS and SACEUR recognize that NATO must possess a credible capability for effective response across the full spectrum of conflict. Both see the balanced triad of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces as providing in combination an interlocking system of deterrence and defense. Within this framework both the JCS and SACEUR see the central strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. as providing the backbone of deterrence and the Alliance's ultimate guarantee of security.

Senator Pell: Could you assess the relative risk of conventional and nuclear war now as compared to the late 1970s? Has the risk of war increased or decreased? Has the character of the Soviet threat changed in any significant ways?

Admiral Crowe: The risk of war, either nuclear or conventional, has changed little since the late 1970s. The risk of war with the Soviet Union was low then and it remains low. If there has been any change, the risk is probably somewhat lower now because of the improvements in the strategic balance made over the past several years which strengthen deterrence.

During the 1970s real defense spending declined by over 20 percent. The result was a force structure insufficient to meet the requirements of our military strategy. While America was cutting back on the resources it devoted to defense, the Soviet Union was engaged in an ambitious and sustained program to expand and modernize its military forces. The United States exited the 1970s with significant military weaknesses, both actual and perceived, relative to the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s, the American people and the Congress recognized the dangers inherent in our weakened defense posture, and strongly supported rebuilding U.S. defense capabilities. After seven years and nearly $2 trillion, the defense capability necessary to implement our security requirements has been improved. We now have a well-manned, well-equipped, balanced structure of strategic, general purpose, and special purpose forces capable of deterring aggression across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is not to say that we have eliminated risk. Should deterrence fail, the risk to the United States and its allies is high. The investments made in the last few years have improved our position, but we have a long way to go. The picture is a dynamic one and the Soviets are working diligently to improve their position across the spectrum of conflict.

The Soviet threat has not changed in its basic character. The Soviet Union's overall peacetime goal is to expand its influence throughout the world and establish itself as the dominant world power. The Soviet leadership prefers to achieve its goals without resorting to military force but must understand that, because of its persistent and unyielding efforts to make progress toward its goals, a military conflict with the West is possible. Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has built the world's largest military force, both nuclear and conventional, supported by a huge arms production base and a steady and consistent research and development program. It may be possible to develop a more stable and sustainable relationship with the Soviet Union. Much depends, however, upon U.S. and Allied resolve to render Soviet military power less coercive and dangerous.

Senator Pell: To what extent do Soviet forces stationed in Eastern European countries serve an internal security function as well as a military capability?

-- To what extent does this factor play a role in our assessment of the Warsaw Pact's ability to engage NATO forces in combat?

Admiral Crowe: This factor does not diminish our assessment of Soviet or Warsaw Pact combat ability. The only known internal security function performed by Soviet forces in Eastern Europe is the assurance of cooperation with the established political structure that is achieved by the presence of non-indigenous forces. Soviet forces serve as a constant reminder and have been used on occasion to aid in the suppression of local populations.

Senator Pell: We have been deluged with a variety of numerical comparisons assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance. Can you discuss these numerical comparisons and their significance?

-- What do numerical comparisons tell us about the relative capabilities of the two sides in actually prosecuting a conventional war?

-- What other factors should be taken into account?

Admiral Crowe: By themselves, numerical comparisons can not tell you the capabilities of forces to prosecute a war. They tell you the size of the forces, but to judge capability many more factors must be taken into account.

Without trying to provide a definitive list, the following are among the factors that could be taken into account when assessing capability to prosecute a war:

1. The synergy of the spectrum of forces -- strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, chemical, and conventional forces
2. Strategy, doctrine, and tactics
3. Disposition and organization of forces
4. Sustainability
5. Mobility
6. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
7. Leadership, Morale, and Training
8. Space systems
9. Reserve forces
10. Alliances
11. Quantity and quality of weapons systems
12. Readiness
13. Geography
14. Mobilization.

However, this said, it is true that the Warsaw Pact has the edge in several key quantitative measures of combat capability.

Senator Pell: How would you compare the reliability of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies during a conventional war versus the reliability of our allies in NATO?

Admiral Crowe: In terms of reliability, there is no comparison between the USSR and the Warsaw Pact (WP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Confronted by an unambiguous Soviet threat in any of the regions of NATO, there is no doubt that NATO member nations will coalesce and fight. There may be lengthy negotiations/ consultations prior to the outset of hostilities (as there should be) but in the final analysis NATO will fight to defend Western Europe.

Numerous studies have been completed regarding the reliability of the Soviet Union's WP satellites. Pact reliability will depend upon the face painted on the threat from the West (e.g., a Neo Nazi Germany) and the duration of the conflict. In the short term, the Soviet Union can probably depend on her WP partners because of Eastern Europe's unique ability to control and shape the information provided its population. They have the ability to paint whatever face they want on the threat in the short term. During a longer duration conflict, when Soviet/WP forces might be severely attrited or halted, it is likely that the Soviet command apparatus would have a difficult time in retaining large scale WP support. Further, a longer duration conflict could present opportunities to the West to communicate the correct picture to the East and thus present solidarity problems for the Soviets.

The Soviets are well aware of the potential reliability problem with the WP. Their forces structure, (large-offensive) particularly in the central region, would suggest they are prepared/equipped to go it alone. In most scenarios, their plans appear to call for Soviet troops to conduct offensive cross border operations in two major echelons, with WP armies being sandwiched in between or on the shoulders of a Soviet led penetration. Such a deployment helps force a commitment of WP units, thus, allowing much less flexibility on the part of the WP leadership.

Senator Pell: Do you believe there has been a change in Soviet military doctrine over the past several years?

-- What is your view about the significance of the Soviet use of the term "reasonable sufficiency"?

-- If so, have you detected any changes in force posture as a result of changes in doctrine?

Admiral Crowe: [Deleted.]

Senator Pell: Could you discuss the military significance of recent statements by French political leaders that their security zone begins at the inter-German border?

-- What effect does including French forces have on a status comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces?

-- What effect does including French forces have on a comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces?

Admiral Crowe: The statement that the French Security Zone begins at the Inner-German boarder (IGB) derives from a common platform agreed to and signed by the member nations of the Western European Union (WEU) -- UK, FR, IT, FRG, BE, NL, LU -- in 1987. The common platform is that all attacks on one member nation will automatically be considered as an attack on all. For the French, therefore, the entire area east of the IGB to the Oder-Neisse line is considered to be strategic space. According to this rationale, hostile Warsaw Pact activity within this area would evoke an almost automatic military reaction. Prime Minister Chirac is one of the main proponents of this statement.

In the nuclear arena, France considers her capabilities to be modest. In the context of the common platform, France intends to maintain its peacetime PLUTON (short-range) nuclear system within national territory. In 1992 the PLUTON will be replaced by the longer-range HADES. With an attack on the IGB, there is nothing to prevent France from deploying these missiles into the FRG in order to effect a strike on the Warsaw Pact nations or the USSR itself. This, of course, is within the NATO context. From the French perspective, it reinforces the European pillar.

Militarily, it must be recalled that France and also Spain are not integrated into NATO's force structure and that their forces have no commitments to the planned defense of NATO.

The inclusion of French equipment in overall NATO figures increases Western totals in some categories by less than 10% (tanks) to more than 40% in others (attack helicopters). Although their presence does not substantially lessen the Warsaw Pact's numerical advantage in critical combat systems, French forces comprise a significant portion of the existing forces of Alliance members.

Any dynamic comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces must include France. Although not integrated into NATO's military command, French forces figure prominently in the defense of Western Europe, at least in the Central Region. France considers its security zone to begin in the Inner-German border, and maintains a significant military presence in the southwestern region of the FRG. French forces and territory represent important factors in NATO's wartime potential for reinforcement and resupply. Consequently, potential conventional arms control agreements must be assessed in light of their effect on France's national assets.

Senator Pell: The question of whether NATO should proceed with further reductions in its nuclear forces has caused some controversy within the Alliance. Would the Chiefs favor further reductions or elimination of ground-based nuclear weapons in Europe?

-- What about an agreement reducing dual-capable aircraft?

Admiral Crowe: Negotiated SNF reductions, to equal ceilings should be considered only in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance in Europe and the global elimination of chemical weapons. NATO has already reduced its stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe to the lowest level in twenty years. Dual-capable aircraft play a major role in NATO's theater nuclear deterrent, as well as providing major contributions to NATO's conventional war fighting capability, and should not be addressed in isolation. The NATO Foreign Ministers, at Reykjavik, established that the Alliance's arms control priorities are to pursue:

-- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

--the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter-range, leading to equal ceilings.

Senator Pell: Should there be a formal linkage between completing a START Treaty and improving the conventional balance? Should progress in one area be contingent on progress in the other?

Admiral Crowe: No. We and our Allies have consistently resisted Soviet efforts to link various arms control issues. If we reach agreement with the Soviets on an effectively verifiable START treaty, we should not hold that treaty and its benefits hostage while we try to redress the conventional imbalance.

Senator Pell: Would a reduction in strategic arms of approximately 50 percent as envisioned in the START Treaty in any way undermine NATO's strategy of flexible response?

Admiral Crowe: No. The President's long-standing goal, and that of the Alliance, has been to achieve stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty contributes significantly to that goal by completely eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev, as well as NATO's Foreign Ministers, have repeatedly stated that the next step in that process should be 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

As was the case with the INF Treaty, we will not pursue an agreement for its own sake or if it undermines in any way the agreed NATO strategy of flexible response. We will enter into an agreement only if it is sound, verifiable and clearly in our national interest.

Senator Pell: Some Western defense experts have suggested that stability in Central Europe would be enhanced if NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed to pull back major ammunition, tank and attack helicopter units, and fuel storage depots from within 100 kilometers of the inner German border.

-- Would such measures reduce the Warsaw Pact's ability to conduct a surprise standing-start attack? Do you think NATO should propose such measures? Could we rely on the Warsaw pact's commitment?

Admiral Crowe: Given existing force and geographical asymmetries between the East and West, constraints on military activity would be harmful to the ability of NATO to conduct an effective defense.

Constraints such as those proposed would hurt NATO more than the WP because NATO is already at a military disadvantage. Since NATO lacks the necessary geographic depth to absorb an attack and then organize an effective defense which would lead to pushing out the attacking force, it must have forward deployed, highly mobile forces supplied with adequate ammunition stocks in order to meet a WP surprise attack as close as possible to the border. NATO simply does not have the terrain on which to fight effectively if it can not defend forward.

NATO should not propose measures which are not in its interests.

We can rely on WP commitment to the extent that we can verify compliance. We must remain vigilant against the Warsaw Pact using a constraint as a cover for launching a surprise attack.

Senator Pell: Increasing attention has been focused on the conventional force balance in Europe and prospects for agreed reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. How serious are the prospects for agreement in conventional forces?

-- Please discuss the time frame within which NATO can reasonably be expected to agree on a mandate for the new negotiations and develop a formal proposal?

-- What should be NATO's primary objective in the conventional arms talks?

-- Do you think reductions in tactical nuclear weapons should be discussed in the context of conventional arms reductions?

Admiral Crowe: The U.S. Government, as well as NATO, remains committed to achieving a negotiated solution to the conventional force imbalance in Europe which preponderantly favors the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. NATO continues to seek agreement to its tabled initiative in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has demeaned NATO's concessions made in an effort to reach a time-limited, first-phase agreement and now refuses to exchange disaggregated information or accept verification measures necessary to monitor an agreement.

The East appears to be focusing its attention towards bypassing the ongoing Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations in favor of a broader forum which includes the entire Atlantic-to-the-Urals area. Discussions on a mandate for these negotiations are being conducted among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Vienna.

However, until a mandate is fully agreed and Conventional Stability Talks are a reality, NATO will remain committed to the MBFR process as it is the only extant conventional arms control forum in between East and West.

Progress towards reaching a mandate for Conventional Stability Talks has been made. If equal efforts are made to resolve remaining areas of disagreement in the context of an acceptable, balanced outcome to the CSCE Review Conference, an agreed mandate could be reached as early as summer of this year, with negotiations commencing in the fall.

The U.S. Government's and NATO's primary objective will be to strengthen stability and security in Europe. Pursuit of this objective will be through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

Tactical nuclear weapons are clearly beyond the scope of conventional negotiations. Discussion of Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) should not be held until the conventional force imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are brought into balance.

Senator Pell: NATO modernization plans existed before this agreement. Now that you have the agreement, what effect does it have on our modernization plans? Has this treaty created new requirements?

-- Please describe the importance of assigning sea-launched cruise missiles to the NATO commander in light of the INF Treaty? Would this require an increase over the 758 nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles currently programmed?

-- Do you expect to seek funds to deploy modernized longer-range LANCE missiles in light of the INF Treaty?

Admiral Crowe: [Deleted.]

Senator Pell: Over the last several years, the defense budget has been under increasing pressure, and budgets may be further constrained. We have now achieved this agreement, what are the priorities we should keep in mind, given the existing budgetary pressures?

Admiral Crowe: In real terms after inflation, Congressional appropriations peaked at $286 billion in FY 1985 and then declined by 10% through FY 1988. In keeping with the Budget Summit Agreement of last November, the President is requesting $299.5 billion in FY 1989. The Chiefs and, to an unprecedented degree, the CINCs participated in the formulation of the budget. Its main priorities, as set forth by the SECDEF, are people, readiness, and efficient acquisition. In continued support of our national strategy of deterrence, we should keep in mind these same priorities for future budgets as well.

-- The most precious assets we have are our trained and skilled people. In times of constrained resources they become even more important because we depend on them to compensate for force adjustments. If necessary, we can draw down force structure, but the Chiefs are determined not to let the strength of the remaining units deteriorate. Never again do we want to return to the hollow forces of the 1970s.

-- We must ensure this and future budgets protect military capabilities and readiness levels for those military responsibilities unique to the United States. Priorities in these areas are: a secure nuclear deterrent; maritime superiority (especially in the area of ASW); strategic mobility (for rapid movement of forces); special operations forces; and associated command, control, and communications capabilities. Continued modernization of these capabilities is essential to effective deterrence.

Senator Pell: The verification of arms control arrangements has been a very controversial issue. Some believe that the Soviet Union is always going to cheat on arms control agreements, therefore we should not enter into agreements that go to the heart of our national security interests. Past Administrations have sought arms control agreements because they believed we could verify them adequately to protect our security.

-- Could you please explain why you think the verification provisions in this agreement are adequate to protect our security.

-- Put yourself in Soviet shoes for a moment. What would you see as the benefits of cheating and the risks of cheating? Would you conclude that the risks outweigh the benefits?

Admiral Crowe: We feel that the measures in this Treaty taken together create major disincentives to Soviet cheating by raising significantly the cost that the Soviet Union would have to incur in order to covertly deploy a significant force of banned missiles, while raising the probability of getting caught if they do cheat. This is particularly true because of the flight testing and production bans which, over time, would impair the military utility and viability of any covert force. In addition, the total ban on systems covered by this Treaty and the on-site inspection regime will enhance U.S. capabilities to detect cheating that is extensive enough to pose a threat to U.S. or Allied security.

Taken together, U.S. National Technical Means and the verification measures provided for in the INF Treaty, including extensive data exchanges and on-site inspections, will facilitate the detection of significant Soviet violations in a timely fashion so as to protect U.S. and Allied security. At the same time, NTM and the Treaty's verification measures will also serve as a deterrent to Soviet cheating. It is clear that the high verification standards embodied in the INF Treaty will help insure that a possible Soviet violation does not pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. and Allied security.

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Senator Pell: In his testimony, Ambassador Nitze defined effective verification as follows: "...we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation...." Do you believe the standard articulated by Ambassador Nitze is an acceptable one?

-- Do the verification provisions in this treaty meet that standard?

Admiral Crowe: Yes. During the course of this arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has stressed that any new agreement would have to be "effectively verifiable." Effective verification includes, among other elements, the ability to detect potentially militarily significant violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation. Our ability to detect and respond to violations helps to deter the other side from committing them in the first place. Since we are concerned with substance rather than semantics, our approach called for verification measures well beyond those found in previous arms control efforts.

The INF Treaty goes beyond simple reliance on NTM. The specific INF requirements for cooperative efforts, such as extensive data exchanges, various types of on-site inspections, and measures to enhance verification by NTM, will make it more difficult for the Soviets to engage in illegal activities and elude detection. The INF verification regime thus goes beyond the measures employed in previous arms control treaties and meets our standards for effective verification.

Senator Pell: Can you please discuss with us the distinction between detecting militarily significant violations of the INF Treaty and the emerging START Treaty?

-- How confident can we be that, with our national technical means and the cooperative measures provided for in this treaty, we will be able to detect any and all militarily significant violations? Please describe our confidence level with national technical means alone.

Admiral Crowe: Soviet INF systems, both intermediate range (IRM) (SS-20; SS-4; SS-5) and shorter range (SRM) (SS-12; SS-23) are designed to attack targets to various depths in the Eurasian theater. Long-range strategic systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, etc.) are primarily deployed against CONUS and global targets. The Soviets view these systems as complementing each other in attaining their worldwide targeting objectives. Determining the overall military significance of a particular violation of either treaty requires an evaluation of the nature of the violation, its magnitude, and its impact on U.S. and NATO forces. As such, assessing the military significance of treaty violations goes well beyond Intelligence Community monitoring of a treaty.

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Senator Pell: According to a number of accounts, a vigorous debate took place within our government regarding the desirability of an "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspection regime.

-- What are the verification benefits of access to all "suspect sites" in the Soviet Union as part of an INF Treaty? As part of the START Treaty?

-- Under an "anytime, anywhere" inspection regime, to what extent would we ultimately rely on NTM to determine which sites we would inspect?

-- What are the risks associated with allowing Soviet inspectors access to U.S. "suspect sites" as part of an INF Treaty? As part of a START Treaty?

-- Do you believe the risks of allowing Soviet inspectors access to "suspect" sites in the U.S. outweigh the verification benefits of U.S. access to "suspect" Soviet sites as part of an INF Treaty? As part of a START Treaty?

Admiral Crowe: Prior to Soviet acceptance of a zero-zero outcome in INF, the U.S. had articulated a broad suspect site provision to enhance verification of the remaining INF systems. It is true that there was a rigorous debate within the government on the extent of a suspect site provision, and such a debate continues today for inspections under a START treaty. When a zero-zero outcome was achieved in INF, the determination was made that, for INF, a broad right of inspection at undeclared facilities was not a necessary element of the INF Treaty since U.S. ability to monitor Soviet compliance in an environment where no production or flight-testing of INF systems is allowed was considered sufficient to constitute effective verification.

In START, the U.S. desires a strong suspect site provision to help deter Soviet cheating and encourage an accurate data exchange. At the same time, the U.S. must balance the risks of disclosure of U.S. classified or sensitive data against the level of deterrence against Soviet noncompliance such inspections might provide. The JCS are continuing their study of this balance and will be full participants in the development of a suspect site provision under START.

Naturally, NTM will play a major role in verification of any arms control treaty and data collected by NTM would be one factor used to select a site at which to conduct a "suspect site" inspection.

Senator Pell: What aspects of the INF inspection regime do you think would be particularly applicable to a strategic arms control agreement?

-- Do you think the type of production controls established in the INF Treaty would be a useful means of verifying limitations on mobile missiles and cruise missiles in a future START Treaty?

-- With respect to on-site inspection, is there a difference between allowing the adversary access to facilities which will be eliminated as compared to allowing access to missiles and facilities which remain deployed and which are considered vital to security? What particular problems do you foresee in this regard?

Admiral Crowe: While the INF agreement established a number of important precedents for intrusive verification, especially the unprecedented access by U.S. inspectors to Soviet facilities, the INF provisions specifically relate to systems which will all be destroyed in three years after the Treaty enters into force. As you correctly noted, the verification provisions for a START agreement must deal with a broader range of weapons systems which will continue to exist for the foreseeable future.

Control procedures for critical ballistic missile production facilities are currently a part of U.S. proposed START verification regime and we believe such measures are an important element in a START agreement. Production control for cruise missiles is a much more difficult task for which the U.S. currently has no requirement.

Concerning the inspection of facilities under the two agreements, there are both similarities and critical differences in the procedures which are now being developed. I would note however that, in INF, many inspections will take place at U.S. facilities where INF systems are no longer present, but at which commercial or military activities unconnected with INF systems will continue. The General Dynamics plant in San Diego where the GLCM launchers were produced is an example of such a facility. Thus, our net assessment of the risks associated with Soviet inspections at both INF and START facilities must proceed along much the same lines.

Senator Pell: The question of how the United States should respond to Soviet violations has been controversial. Some have suggested that the Senate should condition its consent to the INF Treaty on a guaranteed response to Soviet violations under a "positive compliance" regime. Should the Senate condition its approval of the INF Treaty on such a policy of guaranteed responses?

-- Can we formulate responses to potential treaty violations in advance?

-- Ambassador Kampelman stressed in his testimony the need for flexibility in responding to Soviet violations, suggesting that pre-determined responses would be unwise. Do you agree?

Admiral Crowe: We do not believe that such a condition is necessary or useful. We would hope that Congress would express its willingness to work closely with this or future administrations in reaching agreement on responses which would be appropriate should Soviet violations of the INF Treaty occur.

We would wish to determine our response on a case-by-case basis as "real world" problems are unlikely to fit hypothetical scenarios. Consequently, we require the flexibility to deal with compliance issues as they might arise.

Should a Soviet violation be detected, the appropriate response would depend on a timely assessment of the effect the specific violation would have on the military balance. Predetermined response criteria would narrow the assessment and limit both its value and impact. An appropriate response to Treaty violations should be determined on a case-by-case basis and predicated on a comprehensive assessment of a host of complex security considerations.

RESPONSES OF ADMIRAL CROWE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Senator Biden: Should NATO move unilaterally to configure its nuclear forces so as to retain their deterrent effect with the minimum number of nuclear weapons?

Admiral Crowe: NATO's adherence to sound security principles is based on the premise that arms control should not be an end in itself but rather only one of several means for NATO to enhance its security. Although the INF Treaty enhances NATO's security in many ways, the U.S. does have to destroy forces capable of delivering about 400 nuclear warheads. This will remove a part of our ability to hold at risk targets in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR with European-based systems.

On the other hand, the Soviets will have to destroy forces capable of delivering nearly 1700 nuclear warheads. As a result of the Treaty, the Soviets will lose capability in both the European and Asian theaters to strike many of our Allies. In addition, in Europe, they no longer will have the capacity to strike with these weapons many of our pre-positioned major equipment (POMCUS) sites, and debarkation points, both ports and airfields.

Additionally, we have long been concerned about Soviet capabilities to attack NATO Europe with chemical weapons. We still are, but at least two of the significant shorter-range delivery systems for chemical and conventional weapons (SS-12s and SS-23s) will be removed from the Soviet order of battle as a result of this Treaty. Our field commanders have always considered the SS-12 a particularly worrisome threat to ports of entry and airfields. In essence, the Treaty will assist in facilitating our reinforcement of Europe.

Moreover, after implementation of the Treaty, NATO will still retain robust nuclear and conventional forces. These forces will be capable of holding at risk the full spectrum of Warsaw Pact targets, although to do so over the long term, they will have to be modernized when necessary, as has always been the case.

To maintain deterrence, NATO must continue to fulfill existing requirements to modernize and increase the survivability of its nuclear forces. These requirements stem from NATO's 1983 Montebello Decision to reduce the European nuclear stockpile by 1400 warheads, while taking the steps necessary to ensure the remaining stockpile is responsive, survivable and effective. NATO continues to set a high priority on a follow-on to the

LANCE surface-to-surface missile; development of a tactical air-to-surface missile; modernization of NATO's nuclear artillery, dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs; and improved nuclear security and survivability. These were priorities before the INF Treaty was signed and must be pursued independent of the Treaty. NATO will continue to seek modernized weapons to maintain a robust deterrence with the minimum number of weapons.

Senator Biden: How should NATO approach the issue of negotiations on short-range nuclear forces?

-- Should full agreement on negotiated limitations on such forces occur only in the context of significant progress in improving the conventional balance?

Admiral Crowe: NATO Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Reykjavik last June determined that the Alliance's arms control priorities are to pursue:

-- a 50% reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

-- the global elimination of chemical weapons;

-- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;

-- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings.

Thus, negotiated SNF reductions, to equal ceilings, should be considered only in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance in Europe and the global elimination of chemical weapons.

Senator Biden: What should the U.S. objectives for the upcoming Conventional Stability Talks be?

-- Should the primary objective be to diminish the Warsaw Pact's short-warning attack capability through asymmetrical reductions in specific categories of military equipment, such as tanks, artillery, as well as personnel?

Admiral Crowe: The diminishment of the Warsaw Pact's short-warning attack capability is a primary objective for the upcoming Conventional Stability Talks, but equally as important is the objective of diminishing its capability for initiating, as well as sustaining, large-scale offensive operations against all Western European nations. The combination of these capabilities, which is primarily due to the presence of large amounts of Soviet forces on its own territory as well as in the countries of Eastern Europe, presents the most significant threat to stability and security in Europe today.

-- Asymmetrical reductions of Warsaw Pact forces, which include, at least, tanks and artillery, are required in the course of accomplishing these objectives. Other weapon systems that enhance the Warsaw Pact's threat to NATO's security or that could be used to circumvent reductions, such as armored fighting vehicles, must also be considered. Manpower is the most difficult force component to verify; therefore, it is less likely to be the central focus of any future agreement. Additionally, limitations on manpower have the potential to negatively impact on NATO's mobilization capability.

Senator Biden: Would it be in the military interest of the United States to exercise a policy of restraint by not exceeding the number of Soviet launchers for MIRVed ICBMs, launchers for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, and launchers for MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, and heavy bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles if that restraint were to cause the Soviet Union not to exceed existing number of launchers in those three categories?

Admiral Crowe: On 27 May 1986 President Reagan decided that in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which, as he then said, "has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance." The President also stated that the United States would seek to meet its strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. The President did not at that time anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Finally, the President stated that, assuming no significant change in the threat we face, the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. The President's decision, which embodies a policy of restraint as long as the nature of the threat permits such restraint, is in the U.S. interest while we continue to seek agreement on deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable reductions and limits in offensive nuclear arms codified in a START treaty between the U.S. and the USSR.

Senator Biden: In order to improve deterrence by ensuring the survivability of U.S. forces, should the United States seek to disperse rather than concentrate its strategic nuclear forces?

-- Should the United States emphasize mobile ICBMs in order to maximize ICBM survivability?

-- Should the United States test its new strategic weapons systems with a view to maximizing the number of delivery vehicles the U.S. would be permitted under counting rules established by a potential START Treaty?

Admiral Crowe: Developing and fielding survivable strategic forces is one of our highest priorities in the strategic modernization program. Deterrence in a future, START-constrained environment, however, entails dealing with a wide range of issues. Present asymmetries in our strategic offensive and defensive force structures as well as our target bases; increasing Soviet trends in hardening and mobilizing their weapons, command centers and communications facilities; and the exploitation of areas where the U.S. and its allies hold important technological advantages are but a short list of other issues which must be considered in future force structure planning. Mobility, dispersal and reduced MIRVing of delivery vehicles may have significant advantages in a START environment but must be weighed against the current constraints of the U.S. defense budget. Survivability, readiness, flexibility, controllability, sustainability, cost effectiveness and the ability to inflict unacceptable damage against the assets and institutions that the Soviets hold most dear are all ingredients of the same deterrent equation. Continued strategic modernization under the severe constraints of a reduced defense budget is complex, but essential, and will require carefully thinking through the implications of START as well as the promise held by future strategic offensive and defensive weapons programs. The Joint Staff is presently analyzing these factors and providing their assessments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they can provide appropriate military advice during the treaty negotiation process.

Senator Biden: Should the overall objective of a potential START treaty be to reduce the risk of nuclear war by eliminating incentives to strike first in a crisis?

-- Should the provisions of a START Treaty be designed to create an incentive for both sides to reduce the number of nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs?

-- Should the United States maintain the right to deploy mobile ICBMs?

-- Should a START agreement include limitations on nuclear systems, such as sea-launched cruise missiles, which if unconstrained could undercut the significance of the reductions in other strategic arms?

Admiral Crowe: The overall U.S. objective in the START negotiations is to enhance strategic stability by achieving verifiable agreements on broad, deep, and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Within this framework, the U.S. gives priority to reducing the most destabilizing weapons: fast-flying, non-recallable ballistic missiles. Since no appropriate verification regime for mobile ICBMs has been devised, the U.S. maintains that such ICBMs be banned under a potential START treaty. In the event that an acceptable mobile ICBM verification regime is created, the U.S. must reserve the right to deploy these systems. The U.S. is also prepared to consider limits on the deployment of nuclear-armed SLCMs, if an acceptable and effective method of verification can be devised. The U.S. believes that a potential START treaty should create incentives for the signatories to move away from destabilizing strategic systems to systems that enhance strategic stability.

Senator Biden: What standard of verification should be applied to a START Treaty?

-- Should the verification standard provide that, through a combination of national technical means, cooperative measures, and on-site inspections, the United States will be able to detect militarily significant violations by the Soviet Union in time to allow for an effective response?

-- Should the verification procedures provide adequate means of determining the armament of any dual-capable weapon systems covered by the agreement, if only the nuclear-armed versions are to be limited?

-- How intrusive should challenge inspections rights be?

-- Should short-notice inspections of suspect sites be included with a right of refusal or without a right of refusal?

-- What are the risks associated with giving the Soviet Union access to sensitive U.S. facilities under a regime which includes short-notice inspections of "suspect sites?"

Admiral Crowe: Because the question of what capabilities and systems are to be constrained by the START treaty is still under negotiation, it would be impossible to say with certainty what verification regime will ultimately be agreed upon as acceptable. The variables of inspection rights and degree of intrusiveness are inseparable elements of any verification regime and will require extensive study and negotiation before final agreement.

The objective of any U.S. START verification regime must be first to deter any potential Soviet violation. The regime must also maximize our ability to detect a violation before it poses a significant risk to national security. Once a violation has been detected, the form a response takes would depend on decisions made at that time after considering a number of factors, including the nature of the violation. Other factors would include the willingness or unwillingness of the Soviet Union to resolve and reverse the violation and, perhaps most importantly, the level of U.S. and Allied security threatened at the time the violation is detected.

Soviet access to U.S. facilities would involve a risk of compromise to some degree of sensitive information. Continuing study is being conducted at all levels to determine the means best suited to minimize the degree of compromise and detailed procedures will be worked out to insure this. In many ways, the best preventive measure is the early identification of sensitive projects and facilities such that provisions can be included in the Treaty and/or other steps be taken that will preclude or minimize their susceptibility to any form of "suspect site" inspection. This process of early identification is already underway.

Senator Biden: The Joint Chiefs are charged with ensuring that our nuclear and conventional forces are sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from threatening our vital interests. That deterrent rests in large measure on the ability of our strategic forces to carry out their operational plans. Could the United States carry out its operational plans if the Soviet Union were to construct a defense of its national territory?

-- Could the United States carry out its operational plans under the emerging START Treaty, assuming it were negotiated along the lines of the current U.S. proposal, if the Soviet Union were to construct a defense of its national territory?

Admiral Crowe: [Deleted.]

Senator Biden: Should the United States retain the right to withdraw from a potential START treaty if the Soviet Union deploys a defense of its national territory or provides a base for such a defense?

Admiral Crowe: A START treaty will grant each party the right to withdraw if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty occur and jeopardize a party's supreme national interest.

The U.S. has expressed willingness, in connection with the achievement of a START treaty, to sign a new agreement with the Soviet Union committing to a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying defenses not permitted by the ABM Treaty. Soviet unilateral deployment of a nationwide defense during such a period would be a serious matter requiring an appropriate U.S. response. It serves no purpose, however, to speculate now on what such a U.S. response might be.

The U.S. and USSR have already agreed, on the other hand, that -- unless otherwise agreed -- either side would be free to deploy defenses after such a period of non-withdrawal. We would, in fact, welcome at that time a cooperative transition by both sides to increasing reliance on defensive deterrence.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY CARLUCCI TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR KERRY

Senator Kerry: It has been charged by some that with the elimination of the INF Weapons NATO will be left with fewer bases where nuclear weapons are located and that NATO will therefore present the Warsaw Pact an attractively small number of targets, making pre-emption by the Soviets of NATO forces in a crisis more likely. Do you agree with this evaluation? If not, why not?

Secretary Carlucci: The elimination of Soviet INF missiles will reduce the number of Soviet missiles capable of threatening NATO's remaining systems with nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Moreover, the variety of NATO nuclear systems remaining in Europe, backed by NATO's strategic nuclear forces, would leave the Soviet Union with little confidence in its ability to pre-empt successfully NATO's European-based forces and predict NATO's response.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal of NATO's INF missiles will leave the Alliance with a smaller number of theater nuclear systems based in a smaller number of locations. NATO has recognized that efforts to improve the survivability of these systems -- already being undertaken in accordance with NATO's 1983 Montebello Decision -- will therefore assume increased importance.

Senator Kerry: What actions should the U.S. take, if any, to compensate for the removal of the Pershing II's and cruise missiles?

Secretary Carlucci: "Compensatory measures" is a misleading term, since the Treaty enhances NATO's security.

With or without an INF Treaty, NATO decisions have been made to strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrent capabilities, including existing short-range systems and dual-capable aircraft. The Montebello Decision of 1983 mandated substantial reductions in the size of NATO's nuclear stockpile, while calling for necessary modernization measures for remaining systems, in order to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of the nuclear component of NATO's strategy of flexible response. Those reductions have already been made. NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to continue to move forward with these necessary modernization measures as the INF Treaty enters into force.

Similarly, NATO Defense Ministers have reaffirmed the need to press ahead with conventional defense improvements (CDI) in accordance with the CDI action plan formulated in 1985.

Senator Kerry: You among others have cited the Montebello accords of 1983 as evidence of NATO having agreed to nuclear force modernizations in Europe.

a. What language in the Montebello agreement or the appendices sets forth an agreement by our allies on further nuclear deployments?

b. What kinds of further nuclear deployments are under consideration?

c. Have we an explicit agreement from the allies on the deployment of LANCE 2 or other new nuclear systems

d. Is deployment of an enhanced Lance or other new nuclear systems in Europe a "safeguard" necessary for the Treaty to be in U.S. interests?

Secretary Carlucci: a. In the Press Statement on the Montebello Decision, issued at the conclusion of the October 1983 Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting in Montebello, Canada, NATO Defense Ministers recognized that "for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective." The Press Statement further noted that "Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements."

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In the Communique from last November's NPG meeting in Monterey, Defense Ministers stated that they are "determined, consistent with the framework of the Montebello Decision and with our arms control obligations, to continue to implement those measures require to maintain the effectiveness, responsiveness, and survivability of our nuclear forces."

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b. Major modernization programs stemming from the Montebello Decision are:

- modernization of NATO's dual-capable aircraft and their nuclear bombs;
- development of a tactical air-to-surface missile to replace a portion of the nuclear bombs delivered by US and Allied aircraft;
- development of a follow-on system to replace the aging LANCE short-range missiles deployed with US and Allied forces; and

- production of sufficient modern nuclear artillery rounds to replace older rounds.

All of these programs involve replacement of existing systems, and none are precluded by the INF Treaty.

Programs to modernize NATO's air-delivered bombs and artillery rounds are well under way, whereas programs for a tactical air-to-surface missile and follow-on to LANCE are at much earlier stages.

c. Deployment possibilities would be a matter for discussion both within NATO and bilaterally. National commitments to deploy a follow-on to LANCE are not necessary at this time because the system is not envisioned to be available until the mid 1990s.

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d. The INF Treaty is in US and NATO interests based on its own merits. Similarly, the follow-on to LANCE and the other modernization programs stemming from the Montebello Decision are necessary on their own merits, in order for NATO to retain a credible deterrent with the minimum level of forces over the long term.

Q: Inspections of Suspect Sites: The Treaty contains no provision permitting the U.S. to inspect sites which we might suspect are being used for Soviet cheating. We've had testimony that this is a consequence of the U.S. military changing its position on this issue towards the conclusion of the negotiations, because we do not want Soviet inspectors up close to so many American installations. (a) Can you please provide an account of when and how the U.S. changed its position on on-site inspection of suspect sites, and who was involved in the decision-making process. (b) What are the implications of the unwillingness of the U.S. to have on-site inspection of suspect sites in INF for START negotiations regarding verification of strategic systems, launchers, or warheads?

A: We do not believe it is appropriate to comment on internal executive branch deliberations. Clearly, any potential verification measure must be considered in terms of its associated risks as well as its anticipated benefits. When the Soviets accepted the proposed U.S. double-zero option, the U.S. was able to drop its earlier proposal for "anytime, anywhere" inspections while still retaining an effective verification regime. This change recognized the fact that it is easier to verify a Treaty that bans entire classes of weapons than one which sets numerical limits.

The decision not to require "anytime, anywhere" inspections in the provisions of the INF Treaty cannot accurately be construed as an "unwillingness" on the part of the U.S. to allow such inspections. Rather, it was plainly a reassessment of the means to effectively achieve a redefined objective -- verification of the total elimination of an entire class of missiles instead of verification of established numerical limits. Because a verification regime is reciprocal, we had to weigh verification benefits against U.S. and Allied security concerns. In the context of the Soviet acceptance of our "double zero" proposal, we concluded that "anytime, anywhere" inspections were not essential given the extensive and unprecedented nature of our verification procedures as a whole.

There are essential differences in the provisions of the INF and START Treaties. In the Joint Statement issued after their December 1987 Summit, the President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev stated that START verification would "build upon the provisions" of the INF Treaty. Their statement recognized that, while INF negotiations have provided a solid foundation for drafting START verification procedures, START and INF represent fundamentally different verification challenges. The INF negotiations introduced the concept of suspect-site inspections as a verification technique. The START negotiations will consider suspect-site inspections in light of very different verification requirements.

Senator Kerry: It has been reported that at the summit, the two sides agreed to counting rules that change the procedure adopted in SALT II of attributing to each missile the greatest number of warheads it has been tested with. How would the U.S. verify a rule that would count fewer than the maximum possible number of warheads tested on any given delivery vehicle?

Secretary Carlucci: [Deleted.]

Senator Kerry: According to current public accounts of our START negotiating position, post-START the U.S. and Soviets would be permitted 4900 ICBM and SLBM warheads in all, down from 8900 today. The Joint Chiefs have suggested a post-START submarine force of 16 Tridents, carrying a total of about 3200 warheads. That would leave 1700 warheads available from land based ICBMs. We now have 50 MX missiles. The Air Force wants to deploy 100 and you have supported that position. But after START, if we deployed 100 MX missiles, they would constitute 1000 of our 1700 total land based missiles. If the remainder are deployed on triple-headed minuteman, we're talking about a little over 330 targets, with the Soviets having about 3300 warheads aimed at them.

(a) If the U.S. has 330 targets in its land-based missile force and the Soviets can target them at 10-1, is there a "window of vulnerability" for U.S. land-based forces? If not, why not?

(b) If the proposed START structure is negotiated according to current guidelines, what would be the advantages and disadvantages of deploying the 50 additional MX missiles (even in a rail-garrison mode) instead of moving to a single headed weapon like the Midgetman? Would there be advantages to maintaining less concentrated land based nuclear forces?

Secretary Carlucci: Your first two questions are based on a post-START force structure which has yet to be decided.

As you are aware, we are engaged in very delicate negotiations that are not yet completed and may not be for some time to come. Many of the issues that are involved in these negotiations will ultimately affect the nature of our future strategic force structure. However, until the negotiations have been completed, I believe it would be premature and, indeed, unwise to speculate on what the make-up of these forces might look like. As such, commenting on the scenario you have presented would be of little value or meaning.

With respect to your last two questions, I can only surmise that you are asking for my rationale regarding my recent decision on the SICBM program:

- After careful consideration, I do not believe that the Department of Defense can afford to develop and acquire the SICBM within the funding levels that will be available to us in the near term;
- I also have serious doubts that it is cost effective at budget levels higher than those projected for the DoD;
- At the same time, I understand the Congress's desire to allow

the next administration an opportunity to review the program and to make a decision on its potential for deployment;

- To that end, I have included funds in the FY89 budget request to preserve that decision for the next administration.
- With regard to the MX program, the Congressional mandate of 50 missiles deployed in silos is clear and the Department has no plans to deploy additional missiles in this basing mode;
- However, the MX missiles based in garrisons at existing Air Force bases shows great promise in terms of achieving a highly survivable ICBM--approaching that of the SICBM--at an affordable cost;
- With Congressional approval, we plan to deploy up to 100 Peacekeeper missiles in the rail garrison basing mode--50 new missiles and 50 redeployed missiles taken from silos.

Q: Verifying R&D Boosters: Article VII (12) provides an exception to the ban on possessing INF launcher components by giving each Party the right to produce and use for booster systems of existing types of booster stages. (a) What is the purpose of this exception? Was it put in at the Soviets request or at ours? (b) Among the limits to this exception is the requirement that "booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves." How can we verify this provision?

A: In the interest of clarity, let me first explain that Paragraph 12 of Article VII deals with booster systems other than those to be eliminated under the terms of the INF Treaty. Thus, it is not an "exception". Under the Treaty, a ballistic missile is defined as an INF missile (and has to be eliminated) if it is a groundlaunched weapon delivery vehicle with a a maximum tested range between 500 to 5500 kilometers. However, paragraph 12 of Article VII gives each Party the right, for research and development purposes, to produce and use existing types of booster stages that are different from stages used in those missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty to create booster systems with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. This provision is essential to permit the United States to continue on-going research on programs such as advanced concepts for strategic reentry vehicles and defensive systems.

Other provisions of the paragraph further restrict the launch of these systems to enhance our ability to confirm that INF systems are not being developed under the guise of permissible R&D programs. These provisions, such as those limiting the launches to research and development purposes for testing objects other than the booster systems themselves and for limiting the number of launches to no more than 35, will be monitored by National Technical Means (NTM). Furthermore, Paragraph 6 of Article IX provides that each Party must notify the other Party, at least ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system. The purpose of such a notification is to enhance the verification by NTM.

Question 9: It has been suggested that NATO should deploy non-nuclear cruise missiles based on air, sea, and land capable of deep strikes against Warsaw Pact airfields, air defense units, command and control bunkers and military chokepoints. What would be the advantages and the disadvantages of developing and deploying such non-nuclear systems?

Answer: One of NATO's persistent deficiencies remains an insufficient effective means by which NATO can delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy's follow-on forces and their resources. Therefore, programs such as conventionally-armed cruise missiles of less than INF range which could be deployed to perform FOFA (Follow-on Forces Attack) could be beneficial by enhancing NATO's capability to hold at risk those Warsaw Pact forces which lie deep beyond the immediate close battle area and thereby, at the same time, enhancing NATO's deterrent posture. FOFA should be viewed as a conventional targeting strategy that supports an overall requirement to interdict an enemy's capacity to launch and sustain an attack. It is one means by which NATO forces can counter numerically superior opponents. While the INF Treaty, once it enters into force, would preclude the deployment of land-based cruise missiles in NATO (in the ranges proscribed by the Treaty 500-5500km), no such restriction applies to sea and air-launched cruise missiles; nor does the treaty prohibit Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) with ranges below 500km. Employment of Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and other concepts will be thoroughly explored as part of our Competitive Strategies approach.

Question 10: (a) Are there implications for crisis stability if the U.S. develops conventional weapons which cannot readily be distinguished from nuclear weapons? (b) Can we be certain that the Soviets would not interpret the launch of a cruise missile as nuclear, regardless of whether or not it was, and react accordingly?

Response: (a) This is a problem that will exist so long as dual-capable systems are deployed whether they are aircraft, missiles, or artillery shells. One can never be certain with such systems until impact and detonation whether they were armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. Like deterrence, however, crisis stability is in the eye of the beholder and will be, to a large extent, a function of demonstrated capability, established doctrine, and wed to an espoused willingness to establish certain levels of risk. The Warsaw Pact maintains a sizeable force of tactical ballistic missiles which are capable of delivering conventional, chemical/biological, and nuclear munitions; many of these missiles are not affected by the INF Treaty. Morover, concern over the relationship between crisis stability and the potential use of these systems does not appear to have affected the Pact's decision to deploy such systems.

(b) Obviously it is very difficult to ascertain how the employment of dual-capable systems would be perceived by the Warsaw Pact. However, the Pact has been faced by NATO's dual-capable aircraft for years. It is unclear how a dual-capable cruise missile capability would significantly differ from a comparable dual-capable aircraft capability. In fact, it could be argued that a cruise missile is little different from a manned aircraft except that the cruise missile is unmanned and carries a smaller payload.

Senator Kerry: On July 15, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a military net assessment of US and Soviet conventional strength. This report remains classified. But an account of the Report published in the New York Times November 30, quotes military officials as acknowledging that NATO has sufficient conventional strength to make a Soviet attack highly unlikely.

Do you agree that after implementation of INF, NATO is strong enough to deter a Soviet attack in Europe and is likely to remain so in the future?

Secretary Carlucci: NATO will retain an interlocking "triad" of strategic nuclear, European-based nuclear, and conventional forces that provide for deterrence of war in Europe. Nevertheless, we remain concerned with the advantages the Warsaw Pact holds over NATO in most remaining categories of forces. Each leg of the NATO triad therefore must be maintained and modernized to ensure our ability to execute NATO's strategy of Flexible Response.

Senator Kerry: Some who've studied the European military balance have concluded that there is no way to predict the outcome of a war between the two sides. For example, in 1985, the International Institute of Strategic Studies concluded that "the conventional overall balance is still such as to make general military aggression a highly risky undertaking for either side." Do you agree that the uncertainties are so significant that it would highly risky for the Soviets to attack the West?

Secretary Carlucci: Yes. NATO will retain sufficiently robust and credible forces to confront the Soviet Union with major uncertainties about the consequences of attacking NATO. At the conventional level, the Soviets may not be confident that their forces are sufficient to guarantee them a high probability of success. Moreover, the Soviets must remain concerned with the risks of escalation. This favorable judgment depends crucially on NATO's ability to sustain improvements, both nuclear and conventional, if we are to maintain deterrence.

Question 13: One emerging approach for NATO is to use emerging high technology weapons ("ET" for emerging technology), to allow conventional strikes deep into Warsaw Pact territory, with the goal of interdicting second and third echelon Soviet reinforcements, as part of a strategy of follow-on-forces attack or FOFA. (a) If both sides adopt ET could such systems be used by either side for deep-strikes in an invasion strategy? (b) What is the likely Soviet response to NATO adoption of ET and FOFA?

Response: NATO and the West generally have been committed to the exploitation of superior technology to help offset numerically superior forces for years. Therefore, the use of ET initiatives should not be viewed as something new or different in our approach to a lingering problem. Rather, ET provides a renewed commitment to the way we address this matter. FOFA (Follow-on Forces Attack), a concept developed by SACEUR, is likewise not a new concept but a different way of thinking about the long-standing mission of interdiction of enemy forces. It provides a concept for planning and programming forces in packages of systems (a system of systems approach) to better enable numerically inferior NATO forces to offset the numerically superior forces of the Warsaw Pact. FOFA as a concept is designed to attack -- interdict -- the enemy's follow-on forces generally, not necessarily only second and third echelon forces.

(a) Both the Pact and NATO exploit "ET" to maximize their military position. Neither side has a monopoly on new technologies or the exploitation of those technologies for their own advantage. However, while the technology gap has been seen to be narrowing, the West generally enjoys a technology advantage and has sought to exploit it to maintain an effective, efficient military capability and deterrent posture. NATO must be prepared to rebuff a potential invasion by the Pact; NATO is a defensive alliance and seeks to develop ET systems for, among other things, conducting FOFA (interdiction missions) to support its defensive strategy -- a strategy of flexible response geared toward deterring war and being able to defend effectively should deterrence fail. ET systems and FOFA are intended to make defense effective, credible, and manageable.

(b) The Soviets already believe that NATO has adopted FOFA and is fielding the ET weapons needed to implement it. Their response to ET has been to continue to exploit new technologies for its own military forces just as the West has and will continue to do. Regarding FOFA, we have already seen evidence of changing Soviet/Pact warfighting doctrine which is intended to render their military forces less vulnerable to FOFA operations. In addition, we would expect the Soviets/Pact to engage in propaganda efforts aimed at attempting to put a more offensive face on NATO strategy and thus endeavoring to create dissent and division within the Alliance. The Soviets may engage in arms control initiatives aimed at limiting those technology areas where they perceive NATO to have an advantage.

Question 14: Some critics have argued that FOFA emerging technologies "are not robust enough for the battlefield, where smoke, dust and bad weather would severely degrade the performance of the sensors used for precision guidance, and also that the weapons may be rendered ineffective through cheap defensive measures like decoys and roof-mounted umbrella-like shields." Do you agree or disagree with this assessment?

Response: We and our allies have engaged in extensive R&D programs to reduce this limitation as much as possible given the state of current technology. Programs such as JSTARS, LANTIRN, stand-off weapons, smart munitions, sensors, communications, and fusion are intended to help overcome this problem. Obviously, countermeasures can be undertaken in an attempt to thwart our best efforts; however, this condition exists as an age-old problem and we should not, indeed cannot, give up because of the risk that the potential enemy might be able to counter our efforts. If the enemy is forced to devote resources and scarce spares in the battle zone to confuse and counter our FOFA systems, those same resources are not available for attack and exploitation. Deterrence and our ability to engage the enemy in the event deterrence should fail requires that we take all reasonable approaches aimed at maintaining a capability to defeat the potential aggressor.

Question 15: What will the implications be for NATO if the Soviet Union develops technologies similar to ET and a deep-strike strategy using dual-capable drones?

Response: As I stated previously, NATO is committed to the exploitation of ET and to a Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) program aimed at modernizing and improving NATO's military posture to enhance deterrence and NATO's flexible response capabilities. These efforts are undertaken with the full awareness that the Soviet Union is not standing still in its efforts to develop similar capabilities intended to reduce the effectiveness of NATO's overall military capabilities. Furthermore, our Competitive Strategies approach is intended to address, in part, this very issue.

Question 16: If both sides adopt conventional deep interdiction weapons aimed at the adversary's transportation choke points, C-3 facilities, airfields and nuclear weapons sites, would there be a military advantage in using such weapons pre-emptively at the outset of a conflict?

Response: The Warsaw Pact is assessed to have such weapon systems in the form of manned aircraft and tactical missiles. Further, we believe the Soviets can be expected to develop and deploy additional INF Treaty-compliant deep-strike tactical missiles which would be intended for pre-emptive use at the outbreak of hostilities. NATO is limited at the present time to manned aircraft for such deep strike interdiction missions. And, since NATO is a defensive alliance, we conduct no planning for preemptive attack. NATO would be forced to react to Pact initiated hostilities -- hostilities which would occur at the time and place of the Pact's choosing. Any such weapons that we or our Allies might develop, such as conventionally-armed sea and air-launched cruise missiles, would be deployed as a deterrent force and used to defend ourselves should deterrence fail -- not to launch a preemptive strike . These considerations underscore the need for NATO to develop and deploy an effective anti-tactical missile (ATM) system.

Senator Kerry: What would we want the Soviets to do to improve the stability of the Central Region military balance if we could get them to do it?

Secretary Carlucci: Eliminate the zone-wide (Atlantic to the Urals) disparity in critical areas of Warsaw Pact conventional force superiority, e.g., tank and artillery forces. These are the forces that give the East its offensive breakthrough capability in Central Europe and capability to operate on NATO's flanks. Although NATO enjoys the inherent advantages of the defender and can offset some Soviet disparities, both the quantity and rate of modernization of Soviet/Pact conventional forces is daunting. Eliminating disparities critical to generating superior forces across a broad front would greatly improve stability in Central Europe.

Senator Kerry: Is the Central Region the most important measure of military stability, or is the overall balance from the Atlantic to the Urals?

Secretary Carlucci: The answer is that both are important. One of the advantages of the new Conventional Stability Talks (CST) over MBFR is that CST deals with Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, rather than focusing solely on the Central Region as MBFR does. However, it is true that the Pact's highly ready forces in Central Europe pose a short warning/surprise attack threat to the Alliance. But it is the ability to move massive reserve forces in the Western Soviet Union forward on the heels of an initial attack that gives those forward based forces the prospect of ultimate success.

Senator Kerry: (a) What are the most important areas for reduction to parity besides tanks and artillery? (b) Is it appropriate for negotiations to take place which include discussions on limiting fighter-bombers, tactical missiles, or attack helicopters?

Secretary Carlucci: Armored fighting vehicles, attack helicopters, engineering (e.g., bridging) equipment, air defense systems, and unit manpower are all possible candidates for reductions to parity, along with tanks and artillery. Fixed-wing aircraft, because of their great mobility and the fact they tend to favor the defense in combined arms engagements emphasizing maneuver and concentrated firepower, are less appropriate in negotiations aimed at achieving stability in a particular geographic region. An approach within the Alliance thus far has been to concentrate first on equalizing/neutralizing those weapons systems that are decisive in seizing territory and destroying the opposing forces -- that is tanks and artillery. The Soviets want to involve both aircraft and shorter range surface-to-surface missiles primarily because of their actual and potential nuclear contribution to NATO's defenses.

Senator Kerry: In December, it was reported that Britain and France are moving toward a new level of defense cooperation that could include joint develoment of an air-launched nuclear cruise missile, with a range of about 300 miles. The French and British have also been discussing coordinated nuclear submarine patrols, possible with joint targeting.

(a) Do these developments suggest that France and Britain may be moving towards mutual security measures outside the parameters of NATO? (b) What are the implications for NATO of separate agreements by the French and British? (c) What efforts, if any, is the U.S. making to increase French cooperation with other NATO projects?

Secretary Carlucci: a. Bilateral defense relations of the nature described would be outside the defense parameters of NATO, but would not necessarily by incompatible with it, since, while the French are not part of the integrated NATO defense structure, they are in the North Atlantic Alliance.

b. Expanded defense cooperation with and by the French will, in our view, be welcomed by NATO as it provides a new dimension to the Alliance. Given the appropriate coordination within the Alliance, such expansion can prove most useful.

c. The French are members of the North Atlantic Council and participate in projects under the aegis of that Council. Those include important armament cooperation issues such as "Nunn Amendment" programs.

Senator Kerry: Will the implementation of INF reduce any requirement by NATO for the introduction of an extensive network of ATBM (anti-tactical ballistic missiles) for Europe? Can ATBM protect Europe's key military targets from conventional or nuclear warheads?

Secretary Carlucci: In my view, NATO will continue to require an effective defense against tactical missiles, including an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability, after implementation of the INF Treaty. Such a capability would be a logical and necessary extension of existing air defenses. The INF Treaty will eliminate from the Soviet inventory intermediate-

and shorter range missiles with ranges in excess of 500 km and less than 5500 km. However, short-range systems, which are currently available to the Warsaw Pact in large numbers, will remain and will continue to pose a significant threat.

The ultimate goal of an ATBM system would be to protect key European targets from conventional or nuclear warheads. However, due to the complexity of the warheads, an initial ATBM capability would be designed to defend against the conventional threat and, to the extent possible, against the nuclear and chemical threat as well.

Senator Kerry: Is it in NATO's interest to negotiate a "tank free" zone in Central Europe, as has been discussed by former National Security Advisor Brzezinski, among others?

Secretary Carlucci: It would be much more stabilizing to reduce to parity at lower levels in several categories of offensive equipment than to eliminate a single category. And if such a zone meant, de facto, that US tanks would have to be withdrawn from Europe, our reinforcement problems would be worsened. Furthermore, many of our Allies see many problems with zones within Europe that would separate one ally (or ally's forces) from another. NATO remains committed to a forward defense of the entire territory of the Atlantic alliance, and a "tank free" zone would call that commitment into question.